Following the first round of direct U.S.-Iran talks held in Islamabad in April this year, the standoff between Tehran and Washington continues. However, recently, because of renewed mediatory efforts by Pakistan to sustain the U.S.-Iran ceasefire, followed by a comprehensive agreement covering contentious issues, one can observe some momentum for peace in the Persian Gulf and West Asia.
The U.S. President, Donald Trump, the other day hoped that a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) could be reached with Tehran, leading to a final agreement (deal) in the coming four to six weeks. Does it mean that gaps in U.S.-Iran positions have been narrowed, if not bridged, and how can the two adversaries, locked in a perpetual state of conflict since 1979, move ahead towards full normalisation in their relations? How can the minimum bridging of gaps in U.S.-Iranian conflicts at least set the ball rolling and create a conducive environment for better diplomatic engagement?
One can identify eight gaps in U.S.-Iran conflicts. These gaps are the result of deep-rooted mistrust and suspicions. First, the nuclear issue, which the U.S. and Israel focus on as a fundamental requirement for ending hostilities with Tehran. Second, the unfreezing of Iranian assets by the United States. Third, ending sanctions on Iran by the U.S. Fourth, a commitment by the U.S. not to attack Iran again. Fifth, reopening the Strait of Hormuz for all users. Sixth, payment of compensation by the U.S. and Israel for the destruction caused in Iran. Seventh, Iran is stopping its support for proxies like Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. Eighth, ending American-Israeli attempts at regime change in Iran. These gaps are regarded as critical and fundamental for preventing another round of hostilities in the Persian Gulf.
The foremost gap in the U.S.-Iranian position is the nuclear issue. For Iran, it is out of the question to hand over its enriched uranium to some other body or to forgo its nuclear ambitions. After the June 2025 and February 2026 U.S.-Israeli attacks, the Iranian nuclear control and command structure was targeted but not fully destroyed. It is argued that Iran has offered to freeze its uranium enrichment for five years, whereas the United States wants Tehran to follow a timeline of 20 years.
Israel and some American circles fear that, as time passes, Iran’s nuclear capability for reaching 90 per cent enrichment, essential for carrying out a nuclear test, is almost accomplished. Iranian leaders are warning the U.S. of serious consequences if it attempts to launch a second round of attacks because, in the last two months of the ceasefire, their country has managed to compensate for military losses.
Along with the nuclear issue is Iran’s missile capability, which is perceived as a major security threat to pro-American Gulf countries and Israel. The Iranian regime has ruled out any possibility of dismantling its missile programme which, along with its nuclear ambitions, tends to formulate some sort of deterrence against the U.S.-Israel axis. Therefore, the foremost gap in the U.S.-Iranian position is the nuclear-missile issue. Both the U.S. and Israel argue that, through the ceasefire, Iran is buying time to augment its nuclear weapons programme because that is perhaps the only trump card it can use against its adversaries.
In a new security architecture in the Persian Gulf, one can see the marginalisation of American military power and the pursuit of a regional approach composed of Iran and other regional countries adopting military and non-military confidence-building measures for dealing with security threats
Ironically, regime change, which was a fundamental objective for the U.S. and Israel in attacking Iran, has almost disappeared from the scene. President Donald Trump, following his contradictory statements, is now arguing that regime change has already taken place in Iran following the decapitation of the Iranian leadership, including Ayatollah Khamenei and other senior civilian and military officials.
However, he has forgotten the fact that the current Iranian regime, led by the son of Ali Khamenei, is a continuation of the policies of the leaders who were killed as a result of the U.S.-Israeli attack on 28 February and afterwards. Strangely, the U.S. is now projecting former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as a suitable contender in the new Iranian regime. Such an approach will not work in Iran because even Ahmadinejad would not want to return to the corridors of power with American support.
The Strait of Hormuz, which was not an issue when the U.S. and Israel attacked Iran, is now a fundamental gap in the U.S.-Iran conflict. Iran has made it clear that it will, along with Oman, control Hormuz and that the U.S. must lift the blockade it has imposed on ships navigating Iranian ports. The United States and its Gulf allies reject the Iranian position on the Strait of Hormuz, arguing that it should remain open for navigation for all users.
It seems that some sort of understanding on the Strait of Hormuz will be reflected in the proposed MoU between Iran and the United States. However, restoring the status quo over the Strait of Hormuz that existed on 28 February is perhaps the only way to deal with that issue. Accepting the Iranian position that Hormuz be managed by Tehran and Oman will be acceptable neither to the U.S. nor its Gulf allies. The implications of the near closure of the Strait of Hormuz are severe: escalating oil, gas, and food prices, and an intensifying global economic crisis.
Bridging gaps in the U.S.-Iranian position, which may lead to a breakthrough and the signing of a final agreement (deal), needs to be examined from two angles. First, after facing the destruction of 45 warplanes and helicopters in its recent war with Iran and losing 30 billion dollars, the U.S. has no option other than to find a suitable exit strategy. Perhaps, if Iran agrees to freeze its uranium enrichment for 25 years and agrees to keep the Strait of Hormuz open for navigation, it may provide the U.S. with some sort of face-saving measure.
Despite facing unprecedented destruction of its infrastructure and physical losses, Iran is still determined and resilient in facing another round of American-Israeli attacks. It is Iranian strength and moral courage that have compelled the U.S. to refrain from resuming its attacks on Tehran. The U.S. President may issue all sorts of threats against Iran, but the world has now refused to take his words seriously.
Second, a new security architecture in the Persian Gulf is in the offing, with Iran holding a commanding position. Except for the UAE, which has strong collaboration with Israel, neither Saudi Arabia, nor Qatar, nor Oman are interested in pursuing an aggressive stance against Iran. For these Gulf states, the failure of the U.S. to protect their security when they faced Iranian drone and missile attacks has forced them to pursue a pragmatic and realistic approach based on mending fences with Iran.
Iran’s approach of not surrendering or relinquishing its position, and of facing American-Israeli attacks with resilience, sends a message that a country facing sanctions for almost five decades can effectively deal with a superior enemy. Trump’s failure to gain the support of NATO, Australia, Japan, and South Korea on reopening the Strait of Hormuz tends to demoralise Washington further. Therefore, in a new security architecture in the Persian Gulf, one can see the marginalisation of American military power and the pursuit of a regional approach, with Iran and other regional countries adopting military and non-military confidence-building measures to address security threats.
Iranian success in combating joint U.S.-Israeli aggression will go a long way in mitigating American pressure on Tehran. However, it also depends on the Iranian leadership adopting a prudent approach regarding the Strait of Hormuz and ending support for its proxies in Lebanon and Yemen. The Iranian regime must follow a democratic approach with non-conformist groups instead of using force against them, as it did in the recent past.