Shafaq News
In the southern
Iraqi city of Najaf, the modest houses and narrow streets of the old quarter
conceal one of the country’s most influential religious and political centers.
The city hosts the leading figures of Iraq’s Shiite religious establishment,
foremost among them Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Despite their simple
lifestyle and reputation for asceticism, the decisions and guidance issued from
Najaf have repeatedly shaped major developments in Iraq and beyond.
For nearly a
thousand years, the Najaf seminary has maintained a moderate approach to political
and social affairs. Throughout Iraq’s various historical periods, the religious
authority has consistently emphasized national interests and social stability,
advocating dialogue, political solutions, and diplomacy over violence and
internal conflict.
While urging
calm and peaceful coexistence, the religious authority has also demonstrated a
willingness to take decisive action when Iraq faced existential threats. The
most prominent example came after the rapid expansion of ISIS across several
Iraqi cities. At a time when both the state and society faced grave danger, the
religious authority issued the historic “sufficient jihad” fatwa* in June 2014,
calling on Iraqis to defend their country.
Read more: Ayatollah Al-Sistani’s authority rejects role in Iraq PM selection
The broad
public response to that decree underscored the religious authority’s ability to
mobilize society during critical moments. The fatwa became a turning point in
Iraq’s campaign against terrorism and contributed to restoring security and
stability not only within Iraq but across the wider region during that period.
Also, on very
specific occasions, the religious authority outlines its vision for Iraq’s
public policies through brief and clearly defined points. On November 4, 2024,
after a meeting with the UN Envoy, Mohammed Al-Hassan, Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani
outlined seven factors necessary for the “stability of the country,”
emphasizing that Iraqis have a “long path” ahead to achieve this
goal. One of these factors is extremely related to the key issues in Iraq
today. The restraint of weapons on the state. In his seven factors, Ayatollah
al-Sistani talked clearly about “confining arms to the authority of the state,”
with the other six points focused mainly on preventing foreign interference and
enforcing the rule of law.
Historical
precedents also highlight the institution’s long-standing opposition to
internal conflict. During the 1960s, the late religious authority Mohsen
al-Hakim issued positions and rulings urging Iraqis to avoid fighting between
Arabs and Kurds amid the conflict between the Iraqi government and the Kurdish
movement. He called for dialogue and peaceful solutions, describing internal
bloodshed as harmful to national unity and social cohesion.
The religious
authority occupies the highest religious status among Twelver Shia Muslims
during the period known as the Major Occultation of the Twelfth Imam. As a
result, followers are expected to adhere to its religious guidance, reflecting
the significant influence it exercises over its constituency.
The fall of the
regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003 further expanded the authority’s role in Iraqi
public life. The political environment that emerged afterward ended decades of
restrictions, persecution, house arrests, and assassinations that had targeted
senior clerics under previous governments, allowing the institution to operate
more openly and exert greater influence.
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Speaking to
Shafaq News, Iraqi researcher Raji Nasser argued that the Najaf religious
authority played a “central role” in preserving Iraq’s unity and preventing the
country from sliding into civil war after 2003.
According to
Nasser, the institution consistently promoted de-escalation, dialogue, and the
rejection of sectarianism despite waves of violence and bombings that targeted
civilians and religious shrines. He recalled several major crises that were met
with restraint by Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, including the assassination of
Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim in 2003 and bombings in Karbala, Baghdad’s al-Kadhimiya
and Buratha Mosque, Babil’s Hilla, and other cities.
“The religious
authority stressed in its statements the need for awareness and caution
regarding parties seeking to tear apart Iraq’s social fabric,” Nasser said,
adding that it consistently called for resolving crises “through wisdom,
self-restraint, and avoiding sectarian reactions.”
He also pointed
to the 2006 bombing of the al-Askari Shrine, one of the most sacred Twelver
Shia Muslim holy sites, in Samarra of Saladin Province, describing it as “the
most dangerous test of Iraqi unity.” Nasser noted that the religious authority
helped contain public anger by encouraging peaceful demonstrations and
prohibiting attacks on mosques and shrines belonging to all sects, while
emphasizing that internal conflict would only benefit terrorist groups.
“The positions
of the religious authority, particularly the statements of Grand Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani, played a major role in calming the Iraqi street and preventing its
descent into a comprehensive civil war despite the severe sectarian tensions at
the time,” Nasser stressed, describing the institution’s discourse as a
moderate national approach based on dialogue, coexistence, and respect for all
components of Iraqi society.
The researcher
further argued that, in the years following the fall of the former regime, the
religious authority helped shape public opinion toward political participation
and the building of a constitutional civil state, while also undermining
efforts to fuel sectarian division and preserving Iraq’s unity and stability.
A source close
to the religious authority in Najaf told Shafaq News that “after this scale of
corruption and theft, it has become difficult to find a trusted representative
of the people capable of negotiating politically or diplomatically on behalf of
Iraqis.”
That distance
has been made explicit across successive electoral cycles. In 2018, speaking on
al-Sistani’s behalf, Deputy Ahmad al-Safi stated that the religious authority
was “maintaining a distance from all candidates and electoral lists”
and would not back any individual or political grouping. In the elections of
2021 and 2025, al-Sistani reiterated that position while urging voters to treat
each cycle as an opportunity for genuine change —to remove corrupt and
incompetent figures from power and to participate consciously rather than
repeat the failures of previous parliaments and governments. The most recent
signal came in 2026, when Mohammed Reza al-Sistani, the cleric’s eldest son,
delivered a response to the Coordination Framework, the Shiite alliance that
emerged as the largest parliamentary bloc, voicing the authority’s discomfort
over repeated attempts to draw it into the selection of a prime minister
candidate, a source told Shafaq News.
Beyond
electoral politics, the authority draws an equally firm line on armed conflict.
Read more: Report: Who will succeed Ayatollah al-Sistani, and what will become of hismethodology?
Ali Baqir, a
professor at the Najaf seminary, told Shafaq News that “the religious authority
does not believe in fighting and bloodshed unless it sees an external threat to
the state and its sovereignty.”
According to
Baqir, the institution has issued calls for jihad only when the state faced
dangers threatening its existence and sovereignty, or when citizens were
subjected to killing, displacement, and other violations. He added that the
Najaf authority consistently urges respect for state laws when they serve the
public interest.
Baqir also
highlighted differences between the Najaf school and the religious authority in
Qom, Iran, particularly regarding the concept of Wilayat al-Faqih (The
Guardianship of the Jurist), explaining that the current Najaf authority under
al-Sistani intervenes in political affairs only when public and religious
interests require it under the principle of limited guardianship, rather than
adopting a doctrine of direct political rule by religious authorities.
The experience
of Iraq’s religious authority suggests a model centered on mediation,
restraint, and the prioritization of national stability over political
competition. Throughout periods of terrorism, sectarian violence, and political
turmoil, the institution has sought to promote dialogue while reserving
exceptional intervention for moments when the state itself faced serious
threats.
Baqir concluded
by urging Iraq’s political blocs to follow the guidance of the Najaf religious
authority and “work toward an Iraq free from conflict” while avoiding
entanglement in the disputes and confrontations of regional powers.
*Fatwa is a
formal religious ruling or legal opinion issued by a qualified Islamic scholar
or religious authority on matters of Islamic law and practice.
Read more: Al-Sistani reiterates non-intervention in Iraq’s prime minister choice
Written and
Edited by Shafaq News Staff.