The military intervention was precipitated by evidence that Tehran was accelerating its uranium enrichment program, against a backdrop of internal instability marked by massive popular protests that rocked Iran in late 2025 and early 2026, resulting in a violent state crackdown that claimed the lives of thousands of protesters. Washington and Tel Aviv assessed that the Iranian regime’s internal weakness opened a window of opportunity to neutralize its nuclear capabilities and force political change.
However, the joint air campaign—which within its first twelve hours claimed the lives of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and dozens of senior religious, political, and military leaders—triggered a massive asymmetric response by Iran. The coordinated launch of ballistic missiles and drones against U.S. facilities and bases in the Gulf, coupled with the effective blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, resulted in loss of life, the saturation of the region’s air defense systems, and global economic losses stemming from the rerouting of commercial shipping lanes and rising fuel prices.
The new leadership that emerged following the death of the Supreme Leader—embodied by his son Mojtaba Khamenei as the country’s third Supreme Leader—found itself politically weakened and facing a national economy on the brink of collapse. It was forced to balance confrontational rhetoric with the regime’s need for survival, prioritizing the latter, as was inevitable. The U.S. administration, under pressure in turn from both domestic discontent and that of its traditional allies—amid rising gasoline prices and the cost of the military campaign—agreed to pursue a diplomatic solution facilitated by neutral regional powers.
Last May, the United States set forth five non-negotiable preconditions for resuming formal dialogue that would pave the way for a return to normalcy and the opening of the Strait of Hormuz, the epicenter of the negotiations:
1. The immediate delivery of 400 kilograms of enriched uranium to U.S. territory.
2. The limitation of Iran’s nuclear program to a single authorized operational facility.
3. The direct linking of any talks to a complete cessation of hostilities on all regional fronts.
4. The permanent retention of at least 25% of Iranian financial assets frozen abroad.
5. The absolute rejection of any claim for war reparations made by Tehran
These demands stood in stark contrast to Iran’s agenda, which made the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz contingent on the complete lifting of economic sanctions and the payment of compensation for damages caused by the airstrike campaign.
The gulf between the two positions forced the mediating countries to devise a provisional compromise that would scale back demands for immediate security in exchange for immediate economic relief for the Islamic Republic—a matter of vital importance given the risk of collapse facing Iran.
The so-called Islamabad Memorandum was not the result of direct bilateral negotiations, but rather the outcome of a complex multilateral mediation framework in which various states served as facilitators, guarantors, and operational hosts for the talks. Among these are Qatar, Oman, Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt…
The outcome of this complex mediation process took the form of a one-and-a-half-page framework document, structured into fourteen paragraphs, outlining what we might call “conditional compliance”. The agreement does not constitute a permanent peace treaty, but rather a temporary 60-day framework designed to stabilize the region, reopen shipping lanes, and allow for the technical negotiation of a final agreement under UN supervision. As we see here—and as we witnessed just one day ago—the fragility of the agreement was, and remains, extreme.
Assuming that the Islamabad memorandum were to be successfully consolidated and the provisional technical commitments were to result in a permanent peace treaty endorsed by the UN Security Council, the geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East would undergo a profound structural transformation with repercussions across multiple global dimensions; however, this still seems a distant prospect, as demonstrated by the events of the weekend.
If the memorandum were to become an effective peace agreement, the first consequence would be the consolidation of the position of the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, legitimizing the dynastic transfer of power within the Islamic regime under the guise of far-reaching economic stabilization. By bringing military actions to a definitive halt and preserving Iran’s territorial integrity, the regime’s pragmatic political wing could justify the pact with Washington as a strategic triumph of its resilience. However, this institutional strengthening of the regime would irreversibly weaken the aspirations for change held by Iranian opposition factions in exile—represented by figures aligned with the former Pahlavi dynasty—who would see Western powers’ support for a government transition wane; given the current situation, this outcome can already be considered a foregone conclusion.
A building is seen damaged after Israeli attacks, amid escalating hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, as the US-Israeli conflict with Iran continues, in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, on April 6, 2026 – Photo taken with a mobile phone/ via REUTERS
The explicit inclusion of a cessation of hostilities on the southern front in Lebanon and Iraq would redefine the scope of the “Axis of Resistance” promoted by Tehran. While the agreement stipulates a halt to direct support for the armed actions of proxy militias, a definitive cessation of military operations by Israel would prevent the operational dismantling of Hezbollah’s military structure. The Lebanese Shiite militia would manage to preserve its capacity for internal political and military control in Lebanon, albeit subject to a framework of permanent military containment that would freeze the cross-border balance of power with Israel.
In the Persian Gulf, the success of the de-escalation plan would facilitate the full restoration of diplomatic and commercial relations between Iran and its neighbors on the Arabian Peninsula, enabling a model of détente that would gradually reduce the direct military deployment of the United States in the coastal waters near Iran. Notwithstanding the above, and as has become clear, this issue—along with the nuclear problem in the medium term—is the main stumbling block to progress in the negotiations.
Israel has made it clear that it has no intention of withdrawing from southern Lebanon, and its operations against Hezbollah leaders and infrastructure do not appear to be slowing down either. Moreover, we can be certain that Israel will not give up on establishing a buffer zone within Lebanese territory that ensures the northern part of its territory remains out of range of rockets and missiles.
The definitive normalization of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and the systematic lifting of the blockade on Iranian ports and hydrocarbon terminals would immediately ease tensions in the global crude oil and liquefied natural gas markets—which, let’s not kid ourselves, is the primary international concern. The influx of Iranian oil into international supply chains—free from the customs restrictions imposed by previous U.S. administrations—would trigger a sustained and lasting decline in the price per barrel of Brent crude, reducing global inflationary pressures and stimulating macroeconomic growth in Asia’s major importing powers. For economies such as India’s, the agreement’s implementation would guarantee not only the security of its national energy bill but also the priority revival of transnational logistics connectivity projects of great strategic value, such as the development of the port of Chabahar in Iran and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) leading to Central Asian markets.
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At this point, two scenarios are possible:
Consolidation of the Agreements
In this scenario, the bilateral technical delegations, meeting under the mediation of Pakistan and Qatar in Switzerland, manage to resolve the complex technical details of the nuclear program and the sanctions timeline within the stipulated sixty-day period, drafting a definitive peace agreement that is solemnly ratified by the UN Security Council.
On the nuclear front, the Islamic Republic of Iran would strictly comply (something it has never done under previous agreements) with the plan to reduce its remaining stockpile of enriched uranium, converting the 440 kilograms of nuclear fuel to the civilian purity level of 3.67% directly on its territory, under the technical supervision of the IAEA. In return, the European Union, the U.S. Congress, and the United Nations would begin the orderly dismantling of the network of primary and secondary sanctions. The revival of Iran’s economy could attract the interest of European and Asian multinational infrastructure companies, which, backed by authorizations from the U.S. Treasury, would begin bidding on projects under the international economic reconstruction plan valued at 300,000 million dollars.
On the political front, Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei would consolidate a pragmatic yet authoritarian model of governance, prioritizing industrial and commercial cooperation with China and promoting domestic development to quell popular discontent, while the country regains its role as an active trading partner in the region. Crude oil trade flows would return to pre-war levels, ensuring a period of stability and sustained energy growth in the international economy. However, despite the optimism of this scenario, the question of the new Supreme Leader’s true hold on power would remain unresolved, as the reluctance within the Revolutionary Guard’s hardline faction to reach any kind of agreement is well known. It cannot be ruled out that these elements would wait for any sign of internal weakness to seize power, which would mean the collapse of all agreements.
Breakdown, Collapse, and New Confrontation
The collapse of the provisional memorandum would immediately give way to a resurgence of hostilities and new military operations on Iranian territory.
The dynamics of this collapse would be accelerated by the convergence of several critical vulnerabilities that directly undermine the viability of the provisional agreement:
● The sovereignty dispute over toll collection in the Strait of Hormuz: This represents the immediate breaking point of the memorandum. The leadership of the Revolutionary Guard and spokespeople for the radical wing in the Iranian parliament, led by Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref, maintain that the strait will under no circumstances return to its pre-war status quo. Under Iranian legal doctrine, Tehran insists that it retains sovereign rights over the waterway and will impose fees for navigation and security services on all international commercial vessels once the 60-day exemption period set forth in the agreement expires. Donald Trump has labeled the attempt to charge transit fees as an unacceptable hostile act, and the unilateral imposition of fees by the authorities in Tehran would immediately trigger the reinstatement of the U.S. naval blockade.
● Military instability on the Lebanon-Israel front: Israel is not a party to the bilateral framework agreement reached between the United States and Iran, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly stated that the Israeli armed forces do not consider themselves bound by the terms of the Islamabad memorandum. The hardline faction within the Israeli cabinet views the Washington pact as a mistake that allows Iran to evade military disarmament and financially resupply its proxy militias. The resumption of Israeli airstrikes on Hezbollah positions in Lebanon and the militia’s retaliation against Israeli territory have already forced the suspension of the preliminary technical delegations in Geneva, demonstrating that the instability of the militias on the external front, coupled with Israel’s position, represents a factor capable of suddenly derailing any bilateral diplomatic effort.
● The Financial Dilemma and Skepticism Regarding Reconstruction: Although the memorandum promises the establishment of a postwar reconstruction fund valued at $300,000 million for Iran, the actual source of this capital remains a constant source of disagreement. The White House has sent mixed signals: Vice President Vance—and initially President Trump himself—publicly clarified that the United States will not contribute “even ten cents” from its budgets to this fund, delegating the investment entirely to the sovereign wealth funds and corporations of allied Arab monarchies in the Persian Gulf. However, the Arab states of the peninsula are reluctant to commit multibillion-dollar sums to the industrial reconstruction of a power that, during the escalation of 2026, launched missiles and drones against their own airports, refineries, and hotel complexes. The lack of concrete financial support will weaken the pragmatic factions within President Pezeshkian’s cabinet, leading to the agreement’s failure due to a lack of real economic incentives for Tehran.
● The institutional weakness of Mojtaba Khamenei’s new leadership: The appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei as the new Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic has exacerbated internal instability within the national clergy and security factions. With limited theological credentials and no public record of government service, his legitimacy rests almost exclusively on the support of the Revolutionary Guard and his direct dynastic ties. His prolonged absence from the public eye following injuries sustained during the war campaign and the publication of written messages containing stark warnings against the pact reflect pressure from ultra-conservative hardline factions. To counter accusations of weakness toward the West leveled by fundamentalist factions, Mojtaba Khamenei could be compelled to order a unilateral withdrawal from the IAEA’s uranium enrichment commitments or to reignite the asymmetric military actions of the “Axis of Resistance,” forcing a return to the battlefield.
● Internal legislative opposition in Washington: The preliminary agreement faces stiff resistance from the hardline wing of the Republican Party and from Democratic opposition representatives in the U.S. Congress. Members of both chambers of Congress have described the automatic granting of exemptions for Iranian oil exports and the unfreezing of the Islamic Republic’s financial assets as the greatest “foreign policy blunder of the past decades.” They argue that the U.S. administration has prematurely surrendered most of its capacity to exert economic pressure on Tehran without securing verifiable restrictions on its ballistic missile arsenals or solid commitments to regional disarmament. This pressure from the legislature could block the conversion of provisional licenses into a permanent lifting of sanctions in Congress, leading to the definitive collapse of the truce due to the political unfeasibility of fulfilling the economic concessions promised to Iran.
In light of these two possible scenarios, the fragility of the agreements and the multitude of factors that seem to be driving them toward failure are evident.
Questions remain unanswered, such as what was the point of this war? It is obvious that the Iranian regime has emerged weakened, but not defeated. It is also clear that it has lost its main foreign policy tools: the proxy militias. However, the true consequences may lie much further east. It will be necessary to analyze how the lack of access to Iranian oil has affected China and to assess whether, in the end, it was worth it.