The Historical Legacy of Syrian Women
Women’s Political Leadership During the Assad Regime
The Role of Women in the New Regime
Refugee and Displaced Women: Beyond Lebanon
Women, Peace, and Security: Resolution 1325 and the Security Council
The recent inaugural session of the new People’s Assembly in Damascus, the legislative body of the transitional period, presented a political picture marked by stark contrasts. Of the 210 seats, only 22 are held by women (10.4%), fifteen of whom were directly appointed by interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, with the aim of correcting the low female representation resulting from the selection process carried out by local electoral committees. The session also reflected the country’s social and religious diversity, with the election of Christian Madonna Beshara as second vice president of the chamber and the presence of female representatives from different communities, such as the Kurdish Fasla Yusuf and Mirvet Sobhi Toto, who attended wearing a niqab.
At the same time, the new government has sought to project an image of commitment to women’s empowerment on the international stage. During the Ninth Ministerial Conference of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation on Women, held in Islamabad, Minister of Social Affairs and Labor Hind Kabawat highlighted the role played by Syrian women during the fourteen years of conflict. She stated that it was women who supported their families, ensured the continuity of education, organized community support networks, and helped preserve social cohesion when state institutions were unable to meet the population’s needs.
At the same forum, Kabawat presented some of the government’s priorities regarding equality and institutional reconstruction, including the creation of women’s protection units, specialized training for police forces, a review of legislation regarding Syrian mothers’ right to pass on their nationality to their children, the promotion of vocational training programs, and greater female participation in peacebuilding and transitional justice processes. She also highlighted the appointment of women to positions of responsibility, such as two female judges on the Supreme Constitutional Court, though she acknowledged that the presence of only 22 women in the new People’s Assembly remains insufficient.
The contradiction between an official narrative that positions women as key players in national reconstruction and institutional representation that remains limited raises a central question for the new Syria: To what extent is the political transition truly incorporating women as full-fledged actors? To address this question, this article analyzes the historical evolution of women’s participation in Syria, the legacy of the Assad regime, and the alternative initiatives developed during the conflict, before examining the role of women in the new regime (including the constitutional debate, civil activism, and the specific case of the YPJ), the situation of refugee and displaced women inside and outside Syria, and their contribution to peace processes and the international Women, Peace, and Security agenda.
A woman reacts as people celebrate after Syrian rebels announced they had overthrown President Bashar al-Assad, in Majdal Shams, a Druze village in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights – REUTERS/STOYAN NENOV
The Historical Legacy of Syrian Women
Women’s participation in Syrian public life has deep historical roots that predate contemporary debates on gender equality and political representation by a wide margin. Archaeological and historical studies show that women from the ancient civilizations that inhabited Syrian territory actively participated in economic, religious, and administrative life. In cities such as Ugarit and Mari, preserved records attest to their involvement in the management of property, temples, and commercial activities.
During the Roman, Byzantine, Islamic, and Ottoman periods, women continued to play significant roles in religious education, charitable endowments (waqf), social welfare, and community development, particularly in cities such as Damascus and Aleppo. Although their participation was constrained by prevailing patriarchal structures, women maintained a constant presence in social and economic spheres.
Beginning in the second half of the 19th century, coinciding with the Ottoman Tanzimat reforms, an early feminist consciousness began to develop in Syria’s major urban centers. Literary salons led by women emerged, and spaces for debate on education, modernization, and women’s participation in public life expanded.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the first publications aimed at women appeared, including the magazine *Al-Arous* (1910–1925), which helped spread reformist ideas related to women’s education, equal opportunities, and the improvement of women’s social status. At the same time, women’s associations began to be established, dedicated to literacy, social welfare, girls’ education, and support for orphans and vulnerable people. During the 1920s and 1930s, these organizations evolved from charitable work toward political advocacy, pushing for reforms to personal status laws, access to education, and the expansion of women’s civil rights.
The development of the women’s movement was closely linked to the Syrian national movement against the French Mandate. During the Battle of Maysalun (1920) and later during the Great Syrian Revolt (1925–1927) , women participated in logistical support, healthcare, information dissemination, and the organization of solidarity campaigns. Among the most prominent figures of this period was Nazik al-Abid, considered one of the pioneers of Syrian feminism, who actively participated in the national resistance, supported women’s education, and founded the Nur al-Fayhaa association to promote women’s education and empowerment. Another notable figure was Roshen Bedir Khan, who contributed to women’s cultural and educational development, participated in women’s organizations, and was one of the first Kurdish women to use the Latin alphabet in her publications.
Following Syria’s independence in 1946, demands for women’s political participation took on a new dimension: in 1949, women obtained the right to vote, and in 1953, the right to run as candidates in parliamentary elections, placing Syria among the most advanced countries in the region in terms of women’s political participation. During this period, figures such as Thuraya Al-Hafez emerged; she was one of the first women to publicly advocate for women’s political participation and the expansion of women’s rights within state institutions.
With the Ba’ath Party’s rise to power in 1963, the women’s movement was gradually integrated into official, state-controlled structures. The creation of the General Women’s Union in 1967 helped expand women’s participation in certain educational and occupational fields, but it limited the autonomy of independent organizations. Despite advances in education and employment, fundamental issues such as the reform of family laws, legal equality, and citizenship rights remained subjects of debate without any substantial changes taking place. Najah Al-Attar also stood out during this period; she is considered one of the women with the greatest institutional presence in the country’s contemporary history.
With the start of the 2011 protests, women actively participated in demonstrations, in the media, in documenting human rights violations, and in humanitarian work. Many activists were detained, persecuted, or subjected to enforced disappearance. One of the most iconic figures of this period was Fadwa Suleiman, whose participation in the early protests made her a symbol of the connection between the struggle for political freedom and the defense of women’s rights.
As the conflict dragged on, dozens of women’s organizations emerged both within Syria and in the diaspora. These organizations worked to document human rights violations, defend detainees , transitional justice, economic empowerment, and the fight against gender-based violence, while also incorporating the demands of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda into the debate on the country’s future.
Among the most prominent activists is Elizabeth Kuria, co-founder of the Syriac Union Party and one of the driving forces behind the Assyrian community’s political participation within the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. Alongside her, Nazira Kuria promoted the creation of the Assyrian Women’s Union and held institutional responsibilities in the Jazira region, while other leaders, such as Hannan Hussein, advocated for joint co-presidency as a mechanism to ensure women’s equal participation in decision-making. Similarly, activists such as Ahlam al-Rasheed, Sabah Shabo, Jiyan Hassan, and the legal scholar Rojin Abdulbaqi Khasho have helped strengthen women’s participation in public life and place gender equality and the constitutional protection of women’s rights at the center of the political debate.
In parallel with the Syrian state model, a particularly significant development took place in the north and east of the country, where the women’s movement developed one of the most unique examples of women’s political participation in the Middle East. Linked to the political project of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), women’s organizations trace their origins to Abdullah Öcalan’s arrival in Syria in 1979 and to the spread of the idea that women’s liberation is an indispensable prerequisite for the democratic transformation of society. Under slogans such as “there is no life without women” or “a free woman means a free society,” the movement gradually built its own organizational structures, which took on an institutional dimension following the 2012 Rojava Revolution.
From that point on, a system of equal co-presidency was implemented in political institutions, autonomous women’s organizations were consolidated, jineology academies—conceived as a theoretical framework for rethinking knowledge from the perspective of women’s experience—were promoted, and, in 2013, the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) were created, gaining international prominence during the fight against the Islamic State. Women’s participation also extended to the political, judicial, educational, diplomatic, and military spheres, to the point that numerous analysts defined the Rojava experience as a true “women’s revolution.”
A protest against the killing of civilians and security forces linked to Syria’s new rulers follows clashes between forces loyal to the new administration and fighters from Bashar al-Assad’s Alawite sect, in Marjeh Square, Damascus, Syria, on March 9, 2025 – REUTERS/KHALIL ASHAWI
This philosophy found one of its most symbolic expressions in Jinwar, a village inaugurated in 2018 near Qamishli whose name combines the Kurdish words jin (“woman”) and war (“home” or “place”). Conceived as a space managed exclusively by women, Jinwar is home to war widows, survivors of gender-based violence, and women seeking to rebuild their lives in a community setting. Its residents autonomously manage the school, agricultural production, and much of the settlement’s day-to-day organization, making it a practical example of the principles of self-sufficiency, solidarity, and autonomy championed by the Rojava women’s movement.
Women’s Political Leadership During the Assad Regime
Although the Syrian Constitution—including the one adopted in 2012 following the 2011 protests—formally established equality between men and women, the political and legal reality under Bashar al-Assad’s regime was marked by significant limitations on women’s participation. Laws governing personal status, nationality, inheritance, and social security continued to include discriminatory provisions, while the authoritarian political system restricted the fundamental freedoms of both men and women alike.
The Syrian constitutions of 1973 and 2012 shared the same Islamic-inspired framework without going so far as to establish Islam as the official state religion. Both required the President of the Republic to profess the Muslim faith and established Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) as a primary—though not the sole—source of legislation. However, neither text incorporated a distinct gender perspective: they contained no specific provisions on women’s rights or concrete mechanisms to protect against discrimination based on sex, beyond a generic declaration of equality before the law.
This lack of a gender perspective was compounded, furthermore, with the lack of a common civil law governing personal status matters (marriage, divorce, child custody, inheritance) applicable equally to all citizens regardless of their religious denomination. Inheriting the Ottoman tradition of the millet system and the country’s own multiconfessional composition—as the historical cradle of Christianity in the Middle East and home to Sunni and Shia Muslim communities, Alawites, Druze, Christians of various rites, and Jews, the Syrian legal system maintained a dual judicial system: alongside the ordinary civil and criminal courts, each religious community had its own personal status courts, composed not of civil judges but of clergy or religious dignitaries of the respective faith. Sharia courts resolved matters concerning the Muslim population; doctrinal (Madhhabi) courts served the Druze community; and spiritual (Ruhi or Mahiakim al-Ruhiya) dealt with matrimonial and family matters for Christians and Jews, applying in each case the canonical or religious law specific to each community; there were also mixed courts for individuals of different religions who wished to marry or resolve disputes, and although civil rules existed to mediate, priority was often given to the husband’s religion in Muslim marriages.
This jurisdictional fragmentation had direct consequences for Syrian women, regardless of their religious affiliation: their rights regarding marriage, divorce, custody, and inheritance depended, ultimately, on the religious interpretation applied by the relevant religious court, rather than on a uniform and egalitarian civil framework guaranteed by the state. In practice, this meant that the formal equality proclaimed by the 1973 and 2012 constitutions clashed—in one of the most critical areas of women’s daily lives—with a pluralistic legal system that reproduced the gender asymmetries inherent in each religious tradition, without the State offering a common civil alternative to those who wished to opt out of them.
Despite the presence of some women in visible positions within state institutions, according to the Women’s Power Index, in 2024 women represented only 12% of the government and 10% of the Syrian legislature. Among the regime’s most visible female figures was Najah al-Attar, who was appointed vice president for cultural affairs in 2006; although her tenure in the position until the regime’s fall in 2024 was presented as a sign of political inclusion, numerous analysts consider that her role was primarily symbolic within a male-dominated power structure. Another milestone was the appointment of Hadia Khalaf Abbas as president of the People’s Assembly in 2016; however, her dismissal less than a year later highlighted the fragility of progress in terms of women’s political representation.
Bouthaina Shaaban and Luna al-Shibl, both linked to Bashar al-Assad’s inner circle, also held prominent positions. However, their influence was primarily tied to the regime’s power structures and did not translate into a substantial expansion of Syrian women’s political participation. The most powerful and influential woman within the system was likely First Lady Asma al -Assad, whose position allowed her to exert considerable political and economic influence.
During the 2011 popular uprising, women played a key role in organizing marches, developing slogans and protest materials, coordinating community actions, and disseminating information internationally about the situation in Syria. On numerous occasions, they acted as mediators between protesters and security forces, even physically positioning themselves between the two groups to try to prevent outbreaks of violence. They also participated in the Local Coordination Committees, one of the opposition’s main organizational structures during the early stages of the revolution, and their work proved essential in documenting human rights violations and communicating with international media. Among the most prominent activists of this period were Ghalia Rahhal, founder of the Mazaya organization in Idlib, and Muna al-Farij; both were later persecuted by the Assad regime and by extremist groups such as the self-proclaimed Islamic State, forcing them into exile.
The progressive militarization of the conflict profoundly altered the role of women within the opposition. As armed groups took center stage, leadership positions became dominated by men, and many women were displaced from decision-making spheres. Various researchers have described this process as the creation of “male-dominated spaces,” in which women were relegated to secondary roles related to humanitarian aid, care for displaced persons, informal education, fundraising, and awareness campaigns.
However, far from disappearing from the public sphere, numerous women began to play essential roles in mediation and peacebuilding processes at the local level. One of the most notable examples was the organization Damma, founded by activists who had experienced systematic exclusion from leadership roles within other civil society organizations, with the aim of increasing women’s visibility and promoting their participation in peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and humanitarian aid. In the city of Zabadani, particularly between 2012 and 2014, its members led campaigns to demand a ceasefire, organized mobilizations of displaced women, and established contacts with civilian mediators, businesspeople, and representatives of the security forces to advance local negotiations regarding detainees, missing persons, and the reduction of violence, although they frequently faced mistrust from male-dominated political leaders and local councils.
The experience gained during the revolution and the war spurred the creation of numerous women-led organizations both within Syria and in exile, focused on defending human rights, documenting violations, transitional justice, economic empowerment, and promoting women’s political participation. Among these, the Syrian Women’s Political Movement (SWPM), officially established in 2017 though emerging from activist networks formed during the early years of the revolution. The SWPM has advocated for the establishment of a democratic, pluralistic, and inclusive state and has promoted political education programs aimed at both women and men, with the goal of incorporating feminist perspectives into future legislation and state institutions.
The track record of these organizations demonstrates that, despite the regime’s repression, the violence of the conflict, and the restrictions imposed by various armed groups, Syrian women not only participated in the revolution but also developed their own forms of political leadership, mediation, and peacebuilding that continue to influence the debate on Syria’s future.
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa attends the signing ceremony of a memorandum of understanding for investment in Syria, in Damascus, Syria, on August 6, 2025 – REUTERS/KHALIL ASHAWI
The Role of Women in the New Regime
The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the start of the political transition raised expectations for greater women’s participation in the country’s institutional reconstruction. The new authorities have appointed some women to visible positions and involved them in certain political processes, but women’s representation remains limited and continues to be a subject of debate among women’s organizations, civil society actors, and international organizations.
Among the most notable appointments made by the transitional government are those of Maysa Sabreen, appointed governor of the Central Bank of Syria and considered the first woman to head a central bank in the Arab world, and Mohsena al-Maithawi, appointed governor of Suwayda province. Likewise, women such as Hind Kabawat and Houda Atassi participated in the preparations for the National Dialogue Conference held in February 2025, while legal experts Raya’an Kahilan and Bahia Mardini were involved in drafting the transitional constitutional declaration. Kabawat, Minister of Social Affairs and Labor since March 2025 and the only woman in al-Sharaa’s cabinet for much of the transition, has insisted that her position should not be viewed as merely a token gesture.
However, numerous organizations consider these advances to be primarily symbolic and do not reflect a structural inclusion of women in positions of power. Women’s representation remains low in executive, legislative, and security institutions, and no binding quota mechanisms have been established to ensure balanced participation in decision-making. Furthermore, the concerns of women’s organizations are not limited to the issue of numbers: various statements by officials in the new government have fueled fears about the model of citizenship and gender roles that could take root during the transition.
One of the most controversial cases involved Aisha al-Dibs, head of the Office of Women’s Affairs, who publicly advocated for the creation of a model of womanhood based on an Islamic interpretation of Syrian society and stated that she would not make room for those who did not share her ideological vision. Her statements were widely criticized by feminist activists and organizations, who interpreted them as a rejection of the political and social pluralism existing among Syrian women. Concerns were also raised by the statements of Obaida Arnaout, spokesperson for the Political Administration of the Department of Military Operations, who argued that certain roles—particularly in defense and security— were incompatible with women’s biological and psychological nature—statements perceived by numerous organizations as a justification for excluding women from strategic state positions.
Doubts about the new government’s commitment to women’s rights have also been reinforced by some controversial appointments, such as that of Shadi al-Waisi, who has been singled out by various groups due to the existence of recordings linking him to overseeing the execution of a woman accused of adultery while he was serving in a judicial capacity in Idlib. Although the authorities argued that those actions were carried out under the legislation in force at the time, feminist organizations have questioned whether this track record is compatible with an agenda of equality and the protection of human rights.
The low level of women’s political representation is another major cause for concern. During the Al-Assad regime, women never held more than approximately 12% of parliamentary seats. Following the transition, expectations for improvement also failed to fully materialize: although the initial goal was for women to hold 20% of the seats, this proposal was never implemented as a mandatory quota. In the first parliamentary elections following the fall of the regime, women accounted for only 14% of the candidates, and the final results further reduced that presence: only about 4% of the seats were won by women, and some provinces, such as Idlib, did not elect any female representatives. These figures contrast with the demands of the SWPM, which calls for the minimum international standard of 30% female representation in all political, constitutional, transitional justice, administrative, and national reconstruction institutions.
Although the presence of 22 women in the new People’s Assembly represents progress compared to the expectations raised during the transition, the percentage remains low compared to some neighboring countries. Iraq constitutionally guarantees that women hold at least 25% of parliamentary seats through a quota system, while Jordan has progressively expanded its representation mechanisms, bringing female representation to about one-fifth of the House of Representatives. In contrast, Lebanon, which lacks parliamentary quotas, maintains representation of less than 10%, placing Syria at similar levels despite the profound differences between the two political contexts.
These political tensions are compounded by significant socioeconomic obstacles. More than 90% of the Syrian population continues to live in poverty, and millions of women have become the primary breadwinners for their households due to the war, displacement, or the loss of family members. Despite this, women’s participation in the labor market remains very low, which limits their economic autonomy and hinders their involvement in public life. A report by the Syrian Feminist Lobby also documented 82 verified cases of the abduction of women and girls during 2025 along the Syrian coast, in western Hama, and in Homs; 90% of the victims were women between the ages of 15 and 40, and approximately 60% remained missing at the time of the report’s publication.
The 2025 Constitutional Declaration and the Dispute Over the New Constitution
The 2025 Syrian Constitutional Declaration includes, for the first time, a specific provision on the status of women. Article 21 stipulates that the State must preserve women’s social standing, protect their dignity and their role within the family and society, and guarantee their right to education and work; it further provides that the State shall guarantee their social, economic, and political rights and protect them against all forms of oppression, injustice, and violence.
These guarantees, however, must be analyzed within the broader context of Syria’s new political and legal framework. The Declaration itself states that Islam is the religion of the president and that Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) constitutes the primary source of legislation—a strengthening of the religious reference compared to the previous Constitution, in which Sharia was merely one of the sources of law. This orientation is particularly relevant with regard to women’s rights, given that Syria maintains reservations to several articles of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) because it considers them incompatible with Islamic law. Various international sources also indicate that no substantial reforms have been identified in ordinary legislation to eliminate existing inequalities regarding nationality, personal status, guardianship, and child custody—including the general inability of Syrian women to pass on their nationality to their children on an equal footing with men.
Human rights organizations have also raised concerns about the practical implementation of formally recognized rights: debates over bringing the justice system more into line with Sharia law, uncertainty regarding the role of women in the judiciary, gender-based segregation measures in certain public spaces, and the persistence of forced and early marriages, gender-based violence, and honor killings. There is, furthermore, a marked difference between the model promoted by Damascus and the one developed in the areas under the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES or Rojava), whose regulations expressly prohibit polygamy, forced and child marriages, and honor killings, and promotes equal co-presidency.
Precisely because of this divergence, a large part of the Syrian women’s rights movement has thrown its weight behind the process of drafting the final constitution that is to succeed the 2025 Declaration. Since early 2026, dozens of organizations have launched campaigns demanding that the new text enshrine co-presidency, a minimum quota of 50% in representative bodies, accountability for conflict-related sexual violence, and guarantees for the YPJ. In July 2026, activists from al-Darbasiyah, such as Zubaida Hussein, Zaini Ali, and Fatima Kalash, similarly demanded that any future constitution guarantee women’s effective participation, while leaders like Leila Qaraman and Ilham Ahmed insisted that women’s rights are non-negotiable and that the integration process with Damascus cannot treat women as mere tools. Journalist Farah Al-Aqil, for her part, has called for representation of between 40% and 50% on the body tasked with drafting the final constitution, while activists such as Ster Qasim warn that the current Declaration offers no explicit guarantees for women in any of its articles.
Consequently, although the 2025 Syrian Constitution contains formal provisions for the protection and recognition of women’s rights, available information indicates that significant contradictions persist between these constitutional guarantees and the current legislative framework, as well as significant challenges in their practical implementation. The situation of women in Syria continues to be characterized by the coexistence of declarative normative advances with persistent forms of legal, social, and structural discrimination.
Under the scars of war in Syria, by Sameer Al-Doumy (France)
The Issue of the YPJ: Women, Defense, and Security
This same struggle is being waged, in an even more acute form, over the future of the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ)—the all-female Kurdish armed force founded in Afrin in 2013, with its own command structure and approximately 2,000 fighters, which fought in all the major battles against the Islamic State. The integration agreement signed on January 29, 2026, between SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi and the interim president provides for the incorporation of forces from northern and eastern Syria into four brigades of the new army, but months later, the issue of women’s participation in those brigades remained unresolved.
According to YPJ Commander-in-Chief Rojhilat Afrin, Damascus is willing to integrate women into internal security roles under the Ministry of the Interior but is reluctant to admit them into the Ministry of Defense—a stance that Afrin attributes to the belief that women have no place in the Syrian army. International partners, including the team led by U.S. envoy Tom Barrack, have proposed a compromise solution: integrating the YPJ as a separate unit within the internal security forces. For the YPJ leadership, however, this solution does not address the fundamental exclusion of women from the regular armed forces—a situation they consider incompatible with the stability the country needs, especially in light of the recent violence against Yazidi, Druze, and Alawites.
Article 10 of the Constitutional Declaration, which establishes equality before the law without distinction of sex, could in theory serve as the basis for women’s participation in all state institutions; however, analysts agree that the new army is being built primarily from Islamist factions with no tradition of incorporating women, which explains much of the resistance. Organizations such as Kongra Star and the Syrian Women’s Council argue that excluding the YPJ would amount to erasing the contribution of thousands of women to the fight against armed extremism, and in April 2026 they launched the campaign “We Are All YPJ: Self-Defense Is Our Natural Right,” which calls for their recognition within the Ministry of Defense and sparked acts of solidarity in more than thirty regions around the world. For commanders like Ruksen Mohamed, women’s participation in defense has been as crucial to transforming gender relations in civilian life as their presence in politics; therefore, their exclusion from security institutions could lead to broader marginalization in the rest of public life.
The outcome of these negotiations, like that of the constitutional process, has become an early indicator of the extent to which the new Syria is willing to incorporate women as full—and not merely symbolic—participants in security, politics, and citizenship.
Refugee and Displaced Women: Beyond Lebanon
The war and the subsequent transition have not only reshaped Syria’s institutional landscape; they have also created—and to a large extent perpetuated—one of the world’s largest displacement crises, in which women face specific protection risks in each of the host countries, as well as within Syrian territory itself.
In Lebanon, a 2026 study conducted among Syrian refugee women and Lebanese women in the Baalbek-Hermel governorate found that those who had recently arrived from Syria after December 2024 constituted the group at greatest risk in terms of protection: 47.5% reported having suffered psychological violence, 32.5% domestic violence, and 30% restrictions on their freedom of movement, while 62.5% stated they were unaware of formal reporting mechanisms and 72.5% lacked complete documentation. The escalation of violence in March 2026 exacerbated these difficulties, as collective shelters prioritized Lebanese displaced persons and increased the exposure of women and girls to exploitation and forced marriage, amid growing pressure for refugee families to return to Syria under conditions that were not always voluntary.
In Jordan, which hosts nearly 700,000 registered Syrian refugees, between 67% and 86% of the refugee population lives below the poverty line, and nine out of ten resort to borrowing to cover basic needs such as rent, food, or medication. UN Women studies on the situation of refugee women in the country have found that gender-based discrimination combines with poverty and instability to increase their exposure to violence and physical isolation, while barriers related to documentation, mobility, and access to reproductive health services—similar to those described in Lebanon—persist.
In Turkey, which continues to host more than 3.2 million registered Syrians, available studies indicate high rates of child marriage among young Syrian women under temporary protection: approximately 45% of women aged 20 to 24 had been married before turning 18, and 9% before the age of 15. Academic research on Syrian communities in cities such as Ankara and Izmir also describes significant rates of sexual and gender-based violence, low use of modern contraceptive methods, and limited access to prenatal care—factors exacerbated by language barriers and family strategies such as restricting young women’s mobility or marrying them off early, which ultimately reinforce unequal gender norms.
Within Syria itself, persistent widespread poverty, the destruction of infrastructure, and insecurity in numerous areas of return—from Aleppo to Deir ez-Zor and the coast—continue to trigger new internal displacements and hinder the safe and dignified return of those who fled during the conflict. Internally displaced women, as well as those returning from abroad, repeatedly face a lack of civil documentation, limited access to housing and basic services, and greater exposure to gender-based violence in contexts of overcrowding and the absence of gender-specific protection mechanisms.
Thus, the available information on Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, and within Syria itself reveals a shared pattern: the vulnerability of refugee and displaced women does not depend solely on the host country, but on a recurring combination of legal insecurity, economic dependence, normalized gender-based violence, and the absence of protection mechanisms tailored to their specific needs—a pattern that directly connects to the pillars of protection, relief, and recovery within the international Women, Peace, and Security agenda, which is examined below.
US President Donald Trump meets with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia – Saudi Press Agency via REUTERS
Women, Peace, and Security: Resolution 1325 and the Security Council
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, adopted in 2000, constitutes the primary international framework for addressing the differential impact of armed conflict on women and promoting their participation in peacebuilding. The resolution is structured around four fundamental pillars: protection, participation, prevention, and relief and recovery.
While attention in the early years focused primarily on protecting women and girls from violence in conflict contexts, the need to ensure women’s effective participation in peace processes, negotiations, and political decision-making was subsequently emphasized. Thus, subsequent resolutions—particularly Resolutions 1889 (2009) and 2122 (2013), emphasized that women continued to be underrepresented in conflict prevention and resolution, protection, and peacebuilding. They also urged Member States to adopt measures to strengthen women’s leadership and participation in peacebuilding processes.
Numerous studies have shown that the meaningful inclusion of women contributes to the sustainability of peace agreements. Research indicates that agreements negotiated with women’s participation are more likely to endure over time and that a greater presence of women in political and social life reduces the risk of a relapse into violence following armed conflicts. Furthermore, women often bring perspectives related to human security, the basic needs of the population, and social reconstruction, thereby enriching the negotiation processes.
However, it is important to avoid views that portray women as a homogeneous or inherently peaceful group. Women participate in conflict contexts from very diverse positions and have distinct experiences, interests, and perspectives. It is precisely this diversity that constitutes one of the main values of their inclusion in peace processes, as it allows for the incorporation of broader approaches to the social, economic, political, and human consequences of conflicts.
Within the framework of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015) and the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda promoted by Resolution 1325 (2000), UN Women has supported women’s leadership in the Syrian political process since 2013. This support has taken the form of strengthening civil society organizations, supporting the Women’s Advisory Board (WAB), and cooperating with the Office of the United Nations Special Envoy for Syria.
The 10,151st meeting of the Security Council (May 15, 2026)
During this meeting, held on May 15, 2026, the representative of the United Kingdom, James Kariuki, emphasized that women continue to be underrepresented in Syrian political and security institutions—an observation consistent with the figures on parliamentary representation and the key point regarding the YPJ outlined above—and urged the Syrian authorities to strengthen women’s inclusion in decision-making.
During the same session, the United Nations Deputy Special Envoy for Syria, Claudio Cordone, emphasized that the political transition requires representative institutions that meaningfully incorporate women and the country’s diverse communities, and noted that the Supreme Electoral Commission had announced the creation of electoral subcommittees in Hasakah and Kobane to complete the indirect election of representatives to the People’s Assembly. Cordone also reported on a meeting with Syrian women from Idlib involved in community development initiatives , who reiterated that women’s participation in public life is essential for social cohesion and expressed their support for specific representation measures and a future national framework for women’s empowerment.
The issue also took center stage at the meeting of the Informal Group of Experts on Women, Peace and Security of the Security Council, held on April 30, 2026, where the political and economic participation of women, transitional justice, and accountability for sexual violence committed during the Assad regime were addressed, as well as new forms of violence recorded following the political transition (kidnappings, disappearances, and attacks against Alawite, Druze, and Bedouin women)—which have already been mentioned in previous sections of this article.
Overall, statements by the United Nations and various member states reflect a broad international consensus on the need for meaningful women’s participation in all phases of the Syrian transition. However, as demonstrated by both the low level of parliamentary representation and the impasse surrounding the integration of the YPJ, as well as the conditions faced by refugee and displaced women, this rhetorical consensus continues to clash with structural obstacles that are far from being resolved.
French President Emmanuel Macron and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa shake hands on the day they meet in Damascus, Syria, on July 7, 2026 – REUTERS/MAHMOUD HASSANO
Conclusion
The Syrian transition has allowed some women to be appointed to key institutional positions and has opened up certain spaces for political participation, ranging from the Central Bank to the Suwayda governorate and the constitutional drafting process. However, significant structural limitations persist regarding political representation, access to decision-making positions (particularly in defense and security, as evidenced by the standoff over the YPJ), economic equality, the protection of refugee and displaced women both inside and outside the country, and the effective guarantee of their rights. The debate over the role of women has thus become one of the central pillars of the reconstruction of the Syrian state, pitting visions that advocate for more inclusive and pluralistic models against those that defend more conservative conceptions of gender and citizenship.
From the perspective of the international agenda on Women, Peace, and Security, the main challenge for the new Syria lies not only in increasing women’s representation in institutions but also in ensuring women’s effective and substantive participation in all processes related to political transition, justice, security, reconciliation, and the country’s reconstruction. The outcome of the ongoing constitutional process—and, in particular, the role ultimately reserved for the YPJ and the principle of co-presidency—will most likely be the clearest indicator of whether post-Assad Syria succeeds in translating its rhetoric of women’s empowerment into full citizenship for women, or whether it repeats, in new forms, the limitations that already characterized the previous regime.
Sources of Information
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