Iran Update Special Report, March 18, 2026

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period. 

NOTE: ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.

Key Takeaways

The IDF struck critical Iranian energy infrastructure on March 18, including facilities linked to the South Pars natural gas field and the Asaluyeh processing hub in Bushehr Province. These facilities are central to Iran’s domestic natural gas supply and broader energy system, which supports a significant portion of Iran’s economic activity and regime revenue. Iran exports a small share of its natural gas, primarily to Iraq and Turkey, meaning disruptions will also affect regional energy consumption.

The IDF killed Iranian Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib in an airstrike on March 18. Khatib was responsible for coordinating the regime’s repression of the Iranian population in his role within the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, including overseeing the regime‘s crackdowns on the Winter 2025-2026 protests and the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests.

The combined force’s decapitation campaign and targeting of security services is reportedly causing paranoia among Iranian regime officials and members of Iranian security services. Israeli strikes targeting internal security services are reportedly hurting “rank-and-file morale” and are driving security forces to sleep in vehicles, mosques, or sports facilities in order to avoid targeting.

Hezbollah claimed 57 attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon since CTP-ISW’s last data cut off. The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, including strikes targeting Hezbollah’s social and financial service network in Lebanon.

Toplines

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck Iran’s most important energy infrastructure, including facilities linked to the South Pars natural gas field and the Asaluyeh processing hub in Bushehr Province on March 18.[1] These facilities are central to Iran’s domestic natural gas supply and broader energy system, which supports a significant portion of Iran’s economic activity and regime revenue.[2] Iran consumes roughly 94 percent of its natural gas production internally, according to data by the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, meaning disruptions will primarily strain domestic supply.[3] Damage to these facilities will likely disrupt Iran’s electricity generation capacity, given their role in supplying fuel to the power sector. Over 90 percent of Iran’s electricity is generated by gas-powered thermal plants.[4] Israeli media reported on March 18 that the strikes reportedly damaged up to one-fifth of Iran’s gas processing capacity.[5] Israel previously struck Iranian energy infrastructure, including gas processing facilities linked to the South Pars field and the Fajr-e Jam Gas Refinery in Bushehr Province, during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.[6]

Iran exports a small share of its natural gas, primarily to Iraq and Turkey, meaning disruptions will also affect regional energy consumption.[7] An Iraqi official reported that Iranian gas flows to Iraq stopped completely following the strikes.[8] Disrupting natural gas supplies accounts for more than one-third of Iraq’s gas and electricity needs, according to Iraq’s electricity ministry.[9] Iran has repeatedly reduced gas exports to Iraq due to domestic shortages, which have previously caused electricity crises that contributed to unrest and protests in Iraq.[10] The United States has issued sanctions waivers since 2018 to allow Iraq to continue importing Iranian gas and electricity to mitigate such instability.[11] An unspecified Israeli official told Axios on March 18 that the strike was meant to signal that Israel could expand attacks on Iran’s energy sector if Iran continues disrupting maritime trade and energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz.[12]

The IDF killed Iranian Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib in an airstrike on March 18.[13] Both Iranian officials and the IDF confirmed his death on March 18.[14] Khatib was responsible for coordinating the regime’s repression of the Iranian population in his role within the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, including overseeing the regime‘s crackdowns on the Winter 2025-2026 protests and the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests.[15] The United States sanctioned both Khatib and the ministry in 2022 for engaging in cyber attacks against the United States and allies.[16] Khatib’s killing follows Israel’s March 17 assassinations of prominent regime officials, Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Ali Larijani and Basij Commander Gholamreza Soleimani.[17] It is unclear how or where the IDF targeted Khatib, but the Wall Street Journal reported on March 18 that tips from Iranian civilians led to the strikes that killed Soleimani.[18]

The combined force’s decapitation campaign and targeting of security services is reportedly causing paranoia among Iranian regime officials and members of Iranian security services. Israeli strikes targeting internal security services are reportedly hurting “rank-and-file morale” and are driving security forces to sleep in vehicles, mosques, or sports facilities in order to avoid targeting.[19] Israel reportedly learned of an Iranian effort to shield security forces in local sports complexes in the event of targeting, according to the Wall Street Journal.[20] Israeli strikes on sports complexes hosting security forces have reportedly been among the “deadliest” of the war and killed hundreds of security services and military personnel.[21] Some residents also reported that some Tehran police stations have been abandoned.[22] Tips from Iranian civilians have contributed to Israeli targeting of locally positioned security personnel as the war has continued.[23] Unspecified sources told the Wall Street Journal on March 18 that Israeli intelligence officers have been placing individual calls to Iranian commanders to threaten them to stand aside during civil uprisings.[24] Israel employed a similar tactic during the June 2025 12-Day War.[25]

US and Israeli Air Campaign

The combined force struck multiple Iranian internal security targets on March 18, including Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Basij, and Law Enforcement Command (LEC) facilities in Tehran, Alborz, and Lorestan Provinces.[26] The LEC is Iran’s primary uniformed police force responsible for law enforcement and crowd control.[27] The Basij is a paramilitary organization subordinate to the IRGC that the regime uses extensively to suppress protests and enforce internal security. The IDF stated on March 18 that Israeli aircraft struck the LEC logistics and support division and an IRGC security unit headquarters responsible for suppressing protests in western Tehran Province.[28] The LEC logistics and support division is responsible for sustaining police operations, including equipment supply, vehicle maintenance, storage, distribution of riot-control gear, and general logistical support to internal security forces. The combined force previously struck the main building on March 3.[29] These strikes will likely degrade the regime’s internal security capabilities by disrupting the sustainment, mobility, and operational readiness of forces responsible for protest suppression. An unspecified Israeli official told anti-regime media on March 18 that Israeli drones targeted Basij and LEC patrols attempting to approach locations where Chaharshanbe Suri celebrations were taking place.[30] The official added that the attacks disrupted Iran’s repression apparatus and effectively created “an air umbrella” for civilians during the celebrations.[31] Footage circulating on social media shows LEC and Basij personnel taking cover under bridges or establishing checkpoints in tunnels in order to avoid aerial surveillance and drone strikes.[32]

The combined force has widely targeted elements of Iran’s internal security apparatus that contribute to the repression of the Iranian population, as CTP-ISW has extensively documented. The IDF has reportedly dropped at least 2,200 munitions on targets affiliated with the IRGC, Basij, and other internal security forces.[33] The combined force has targeted internal security institutions at the highest level – such as the Basij Organization Headquarters – down to Basij street checkpoints and local police stations, particularly in Tehran, since the war began. An Israeli targeting list seen by the Wall Street Journal included LEC computer equipment, vehicles, and police gear, for example.[34] The IDF reportedly targeted motorcycle units involved in protest suppression on an unspecified date, likely referring to the Imam Ali Battalions.[35] The Imam Ali Battalions are Basij security units trained and equipped to suppress urban protests and conduct anti-riot operations and intimidate and arrest protesters under IRGC direction.[36]

Israeli strikes on Iran’s internal security apparatus have not only been concentrated in Tehran, however. The combined force has targeted numerous internal security installations throughout Iran’s northwestern provinces, which are home to Kurdish-populated areas and are also hotspots for protests and civil unrest. Documents reviewed by the Wall Street Journal confirmed that the IDF has recently struck around 34 distinct internal security targets in Ilam Province.[37] CTP-ISW has observed at least 14 strikes on internal security sites in Ilam Province in northwestern Iran since the beginning of the war (see below).[38]

The Iranian regime is continuing mass arrests and information control measures as part of its securitization efforts. Iranian authorities arrested dozens of individuals across multiple provinces between March 17 and 18 for alleged espionage and anti-regime activities.[39] The regime also continues to disrupt internet connectivity.[40] Iranian media reported the seizure of 350 Starlink satellite internet devices to restrict access to independent communications, while nationwide internet disruptions have persisted.[41]

The combined force continued to target Iranian naval capabilities on March 17 and 18. US forces targeted an anti-ship cruise missile site along the Iranian coastline on the Strait of Hormuz with multiple 5,000-pound bunker-buster munitions.[42] US Central Command (CENTCOM) commander Admiral Brad Cooper said on March 11 that the United States aims to “end their ability to project power and harass shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.”[43]

Israeli officials confirmed that Israel conducted strikes targeting at least five Iranian Navy missile boats in the Caspian Sea on March 18.[44] This is the first time that the combined force has conducted airstrikes in the Capsian Sea since the conflict began on February 28. The Artesh Navy 4th Naval District is headquartered in Bandar Anzali, Gilan Province, which is on the Caspian Sea.[45]

A maritime intelligence organization, TankerTrackers, reported on March 18 that the combined forces’ strikes targeting Bandar Abbas Port damaged an additional three Iranian vessels.[46] The combined force has struck Bandar Abbas Port several times since the conflict began on February 28.[47] Bandar Abbas Port is home to the IRGC Navy Headquarters, the IRGC Navy 1st Naval District, and the Artesh Navy Southern Forward Naval Headquarters.[48] TankerTrackers reported that combined forces’ strikes damaged the Artesh Navy IRIS Kurdistan, which Iran unveiled and inaugurated in November 2025.[49] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on March 2 shows that the combined force also struck the Artesh Navy IRIS Kurdistan.[50] TankerTrackers reported that the combined forces’ strikes damaged the IRIS Shahid Mahdavi, which is a retrofitted cargo ship that has two helicopter landing pads and anti-ship missiles.[51] TankerTrackers reported that the combined forces’ strikes damaged the IRIS Makran, which was a former oil tanker that Iran converted into a floating base in 2020.[52] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on March 2 showed the vessel on fire at the Bandar Abbas Port.[53] TankerTrackers also reported that the combined forces’ strikes damaged the IRGC Navy IRIS Shahid Bagheri, which CTP-ISW reported on March 6.[54]

The combined force continued targeting air defense systems across Iran. Geolocated satellite imagery shows several destroyed buildings at Fath Air Base, a military base operated by the IRGC Aerospace Force, in Tehran.[55] Some open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysts assessed that these damaged structures served as hangars. Fath Air Base hosts an attack helicopter squadron.[56] The IRGC Aviation School is also located near Fath Air Base.

The combined force continued to target Iran’s defense industrial base to degrade its ability to rebuild its missile, drone, and air defense programs. Geolocated satellite imagery confirms damage to several unidentified buildings in Pasargad Industrial Town in Tehran.[57] The Saba Battery Factory, a subsidiary of the Defense Industries Organization, is located within this complex.[58] Several countries have sanctioned the factory for producing power units for the Iranian Armed Forces, including missile systems.[59] The combined force also reportedly struck facilities at the Shahid Qadiri Factory in Tehran, which produces air defense systems.[60] The factory is located at the IRGC Aerospace Force Shahid Qadiri base. Iran reportedly expanded the base in May 2025 and added new hangars and other structures.[61]

Iranian Retaliation

A maritime intelligence organization, TankerTrackers, reported on March 18 that the Egyptian-owned, Maltese-flagged container ship, Safeen Prestige, is on fire.[62] It is unclear if Iran targeted the Safeen Prestige again. A likely Iranian unmanned surface vessel (USV) struck the Safeen Prestige on March 4, which caused a fire in the engine room and forced the crew to abandon ship.[63] Iran may be attempting to demonstrate its ability to target vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, assuming it targeted the Safeen Prestige a second time, as part of the ongoing effort to threaten merchant shipping.

United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on March 18 that there have been no confirmed attacks on vessels since March 12.[64] UKMTO has reported more than 20 maritime incidents in and around the strait since March 1.[65]

PBS reported on March 18 that at least 89 vessels, including 16 oil tankers, have transited the Strait of Hormuz between March 1 and 15.[66] PBS, citing a maritime data firm, reported that many of these vessels were ”dark” transits attempting to evade Western government sanctions and oversight and may have had links to Iran.[67] The Iranian regime has appeared to be offering safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz to certain oil-carrying vessels. Iran has allowed some tankers transporting oil to China and India to transit the Strait, for example, according to unspecified US officials speaking to the New York Times on March 15.[68] Iran also allowed Pakistani oil tankers and two Indian-flagged liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) carriers to cross the strait.[69]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on March 18 that countries bordering the Persian Gulf should draft a new Strait of Hormuz protocol once the conflict concludes.[70] Araghchi said this new protocol should align with regional and Iranian interests to ensure safe passage through the strait.[71]

Iran launched ten missile barrages at Israel between 3:00 PM ET on March 17 and 3:00 pm ET on March 18.[72] IDF Home Front Command Commander Major General Shai Klepper reported that an Iranian missile strike killed two civilians in Ramat Gan, Central Israel, on March 18.[73] Israel’s national emergency service, Magen David Adom, reported that Iranian projectile shrapnel injured one person in Bnei Brak, Central Israel, on March 18.[74] Magen David Adom also reported damage to Tel Aviv’s Savidor Central railway station in Tel Aviv, Central Israel.[75] IRGC’s Public Relations Office claimed that Iran used Khorramshahr-4, Ghadr, Emad, and Kheibar Shekan ballistic missiles, some of which were armed with cluster munitions, in its strikes on Israel.[76] A cluster munition warhead contains submunitions that disperse over a wide area and are intended to maximize damage.[77]

Iran has continued to conduct drone and missile attacks against the Gulf states on March 17 and 18, including targeting Gulf energy facilities. IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri stated on March 18 that Iran will begin targeting oil facilities linked to the United States and warned civilians and workers to stay away from these sites.[78] Iranian regime media said on March 18 that Iran would target five Gulf energy facilities, including the Samerf Refinery and al Jubail Petrochemical Complex in Saudi Arabia, the Mesaiyd Petrochemical Complex and Ras Laffan Refinery in Qatar, and the al Hosn Gas Field in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), ”in the coming hours.”[79] Qatar reported that one ballistic missile hit the Ras Laffan Industrial City on March 18.[80] Qatar’s state-owned oil company QatarEnergy reported that the Iranian strike caused ”extensive damage” at the industrial site.[81]

The Bahrain Defense Force reported that it intercepted one Iranian ballistic missile and one drone on March 18.[82]

The Saudi Defense Ministry reported Saudi air defenses intercepted seven Iranian ballistic missiles and 19 drones between 3:00 PM ET on March 17 and 3:00 pm ET on March 18.[83] The Saudi Defense Ministry reported that Iranian ballistic missile debris fell near the Prince Sultan Air Base on March 17.[84] The Saudi Defense Ministry also reported that Saudi air defenses intercepted an Iranian drone that attempted to approach an unspecified Saudi natural gas facility in eastern Saudi Arabia.[85] Saudi air defenses reportedly intercepted four ballistic missiles over Riyadh on March 18.[86] Saudi Arabia was planned to host a meeting on March 18 with foreign ministers from Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Pakistan, Qatar, Syria, Turkey, and the UAE to discuss regional stability and security, according to a Turkish diplomatic source speaking to Reuters.[87]

The Emirati Defense Ministry reported that it intercepted 13 ballistic missiles and 27 drones from Iran on March 18.[88] Emirati air defenses have intercepted 327 ballistic missiles, 15 cruise missiles, and 1,699 drones since the conflict started.[89] The Emirati Defense Ministry also reported that Iranian attacks killed two Emirati soldiers and 6 civilians of Pakistani, Nepalese, Bangladeshi, and Palestinian nationalities, and injured 158 individuals since the start of the conflict.[90] The Emirati soldiers are the first recorded Emirati military deaths during the conflict. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese reported that an unspecified projectile hit a road leading up to the Al Minhad Air Base in the UAE, which is the headquarters for Australia’s Middle East Area of Operations command.[91] Albanese stated that the strike started a fire that caused no casualties and minor damage to an accommodation block and medical facility.[92]

The Kuwaiti Army reported that it detected and intercepted four Iranian ballistic missiles within the past 24 hours.[93] The army reported it detected 23 drones, 20 of which were intercepted, and 3 fell outside the threat area.[94]

Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah claimed 57 attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon between 3:00 PM ET on March 17 and 3:00 PM ET on March 18.[95] Hezbollah claimed several drone, mortar, rocket, and missile attacks targeting IDF positions and forces along both sides of the Israel-Lebanon border. Hezbollah claimed it separately launched “high-quality missiles” targeting the “Shayetet 13” headquarters and Haifa Naval Base, both in northern Israel, on March 17.[96] The ”Shayetet 13” is an IDF Navy special operations unit.[97] Hezbollah launched the start of “Operation Khyber 1” on March 17. Hezbollah claimed it fired rockets targeting [98] towns in northern Israel on March 17.[99] The IDF said it intercepted ”more than half” of the rockets, according to an Israeli journalist on March 18.[100] Hezbollah previously increased attacks after launching a new operation.[101]

The rate of Hezbollah attacks targeting Israel has varied since the group joined the war on March 1, as illustrated below.  

Hezbollah has also employed a variety of weapons in its attacks against Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon (see below).  

The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes and ground operations targeting Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. The IDF said it struck Hezbollah infrastructure, including weapons depots, operational headquarters, and rocket launchers, in Beirut and southern Lebanon on March 17 and 18.[102] The IDF also struck and destroyed two bridges over the Litani River on March 17.[103] The IDF stated that Hezbollah used the bridges to move its fighters from northern to southern Lebanon to fight against Israeli forces.[104] Israeli strikes reportedly killed three Amal Movement-affiliated individuals and Hezbollah-controlled al Manar TV Political Programming Department Director Mohammad Sherri on March 17.[105] The IDF also confirmed it killed newly appointed Imam Hussein Division Commander Hassan Ali Marwan in an airstrike on Beirut on March 17.[106] The IRGC Quds Force uses the Imam Hussein Division to carry out attacks against the IDF and Israel.[107] The IDF stated that Marwan was responsible for coordinating between the Imam Hussein Division, the IRGC Quds Force, and Hezbollah.[108] The IDF 36th Division ”deepened” its ”focused ground activity” in southern Lebanon on March 18.[109] The IDF 869th Combat Intelligence Collection Unit (91st Division) and 410th Armored Brigade (91st Division) are also operating in southern Lebanon on March 18.[110] The IDF 300th Regional Brigade (146th Division) carried out several raids to destroy Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon over the past week.[111]

The IDF has also continued to target Hezbollah organizations that provide financial and social services.  The IDF reportedly struck a NewPharm Company drug store in Aaqbiyeh, Sidon District, on March 17 following an evacuation order.[112]  The NewPharm Company has been linked to Hezbollah since at least 2021.[113] The IDF also said it struck unspecified al Qard al Hassan branches, Hezbollah’s main financial arm, in Beirut on March 18.[114] Hezbollah uses funds via al Qard al Hassan to finance its military operations, pay its fighters, and purchase weapons.[115] The IDF has destroyed at least 30 al Qard al Hassan sites since the start of the conflict.[116] The IDF reported on March 13 that al Qard al Hassan has completely stopped its activities due to the IDF’s recent strikes.[117] The IDF also said it struck several Amana Fuel Company-owned gas stations in southern Lebanon on March 18.[118] The Amana Fuel Company is owned by Hezbollah, operates a network of gas stations in Lebanon, and also manages Hezbollah’s fuel supplies.[119] The United States sanctioned the Amana Fuel Company in February 2020 for its role in Hezbollah’s support network.[120] The United States stated in 2020 that Hezbollah profits from the sale of essential goods, such as pharmaceuticals and gasoline.[121] NewPharm Company, al Qard al Hassan, and Amana Fuel Company are all part of Hezbollah’s social and financial service network in Lebanon that is essential to the group’s efforts to maintain the support of its Shia base.

The IDF reiterated evacuation orders for southern Lebanese residents to move north of the Zahrani River on March 17 and 18.[122] The Zahrani River is further north than the Litani River and is located approximately 56 kilometers north of the Israel-Lebanon border.[123]

The IDF said on March 17 that Israeli tank fire hit a United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) position in southern Lebanon on March 6, injuring three UNIFIL peacekeepers.[124] UNIFIL forces are stationed across southern Lebanon to monitor hostilities along the Blue Line, which stretches approximately 120 kilometers along the Israel-Lebanon border.[125] The IDF told Reuters on March 17 that it had responded to Hezbollah anti-tank guided missile fire and had misidentified UNIFIL troops as the source of the anti-tank fire.[126] An unspecified Western military source told Reuters that an initial internal UN investigation suggested that Israel carried out the attack.[127] UNIFIL Spokesperson Kandic Ardiel said that UNIFIL‘s investigation is not yet complete.[128]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continued to launch drone attacks targeting US forces and interests in Iraq. The combined force conducted several airstrikes targeting the Badr Organization, Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al Haq, and several Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) positions across Iraq since 3:00 PM ET on March 17.[129] The PMF told Iraqi media that a combined force airstrike targeted the PMF Anbar Operations Command headquarters in al Qaim, Anbar Province, on March 18, and killed at least three fighters and wounded several others.[130] PMF Anbar Operations Command Commander Qasim Muslih al Khafaji ordered the headquarters evacuated on March 13 to avoid combined force strikes, but the March 18 strikes that killed three fighters and wounded others [131] that the PMF did not fully evacuate the facility.[132] Muslih leads Liwa al Tafuf, a PMF group that is closely tied to Kataib Hezbollah.[133]The combined force has consistently struck PMF positions in al Qaim since March 1.[134] The combined force likely struck several Iranian-backed militia positions in Kirkuk on March 18, including an Asaib Ahl al Haq headquarters, according to Iraqi media.[135] Asaib Ahl al Haq said a combined force drone strike at the headquarters injured four fighters.[136] The combined force also struck the headquarters of the Badr-affiliated 16th PMF Brigade and the Badr Organization in Kirkuk on March 18.[137] Kataib Hezbollah announced the deaths of three fighters on March 18 who were likely killed in combined force strikes.[138]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continued to launch drone attacks targeting US forces and interests in Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are almost certainly responsible for another reported drone attack on the US Embassy compound in Baghdad on March 17.[139] Iraqi media reported that air defenses at the US embassy intercepted one drone targeting the embassy, but a second drone struck in the vicinity of the embassy compound.[140] An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia previously struck the US embassy compound on March 17.[141] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias separately targeted US forces at the Erbil International Airport with two drones, but air defenses at the airport intercepted the drones.[142] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) claimed that it conducted 47 operations using dozens of missiles and drones targeting occupation bases in Iraq and the region in the past 24 hours on March 17, but provided no evidence for the number of claimed operations.[143] A senior diplomatic official told Iraqi media on March 18 that the Saudi Arabian and Qatari diplomatic missions are leaving Iraq, citing security concerns.[144]

Endnotes

[1] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202509190909?source=share-link ;
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/irans-main-oil-gas-production-infrastructure-2026-03-18/
[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/an-overview-irans-energy-industry-infrastructure-2026-02-28/
[3] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202509190909
[4] https://www.israelhayom dot com/2026/03/18/idf-strikes-iran-assaluyeh-gas-facility-trump/

[6] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-06-14/israel-strikes-refinery-at-iran-s-giant-south-pars-gas-field
[7] https://www.meforum.org/mef-observer/iran-watches-qatars-soaring-gas-exports-from-shared-field
[8] https://www.bbc.com/news/live/c24d410m3g4t?post=asset%3A2755d091-48b5-432a-a864-44297fd2c7c4#post
[9] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iraq-says-no-sign-gas-supplies-iran-resume-soon-2026-01-10/
[10] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iraq-says-gas-supplies-iran-have-been-halted-2025-12-23 ;
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iraq-says-no-sign-gas-supplies-iran-resume-soon-2026-01-10/ ; https://www.axios.com/2018/08/02/electricity-cuts-in-iraq-cause-protests-baghdad
[11] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-sanctions-iraq/us-grants-iraq-45-day-waiver-over-iran-sanctions-to-import-gas-electricity-us-embassy-idUSKCN1NF09Z/
[12] https://www.axios.com/2026/03/18/israel-strikes-iran-natural-gas-infrastructure
[13] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-iran-leadership-528c6114?st=hG5e2U; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034219767561679086?s=20
[14] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-iran-leadership-528c6114?st=hG5e2U ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034219767561679086?s=20 ; https://x.com/drpezeshkian/status/2034271068488130787
[15] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/18/world/middleeast/iran-intelligence-minister-khatib-israel.html
[16] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0941
[17] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-iran-leadership-528c6114?st=hG5e2U
[18] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-iran-leadership-528c6114?st=hG5e2U
[19]
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-iran-leadership-528c6114?st=hG5e2U
[20] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-iran-leadership-528c6114?st=hG5e2U
[21] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-iran-leadership-528c6114?st=hG5e2U
[22] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-iran-leadership-528c6114?st=hG5e2U
[23] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-iran-leadership-528c6114?st=hG5e2U
[24] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-iran-leadership-528c6114?st=hG5e2U
[25] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/in-leaked-call-israeli-operative-tells-iranian-general-you-have-12-hours-to-escape/
[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/explainer-the-iranian-armed-forces/
[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/explainer-the-iranian-armed-forces/
[28] https://x.com/mamlekate/status/2028835685210234927 ;
https://x.com/etelaf10/status/2028843167106150851
[29] https://www.iranintl.com/202603181466?source=share-link
[30] https://www.iranintl.com/202603181466?source=share-link

[32] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2034264707087958105 ;
https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2034319181848469766 ;
https://x.com/FattahiFarzad/status/2032561415488184712

[33] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-iran-leadership-528c6114?st=hG5e2U
[34] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-iran-leadership-528c6114?st=hG5e2U
[35] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-iran-leadership-528c6114?st=hG5e2U
[36] https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/files/FINAL%20-%20The%20Tharallah%20Headquarters%20Unveiled%20JAN%2026.pdf (pp. 15)
[37] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-iran-leadership-528c6114?st=hG5e2U
[38] Data upon request.
[39] https://x.com/hra_news/status/2033990311886618873 ;
https://t.me/Tasnimnews/398105 ;
https://t.me/Tasnimnews/398032 ;
https://t.me/Tasnimnews/398006 ;
https://t.me/Tasnimnews/397973 ;
https://t.me/Tasnimnews/398235

[40] https://x.com/netblocks/status/2034364834607693873?s=20
[41] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/398006
[42] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2034040698954031326
[43] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/us-israel-iran-war-2026/card/u-s-commander-highlights-destruction-of-iranian-ships-JWyzdIHOW7h0dhTVuj7u

[44] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/2034351013340106945?s=20
[45] https://mei.edu/publication/artesh-navy-irans-strategic-force/
[46] https://x.com/TankerTrackers/status/2034279303899177442
[47] https://x.com/TheIranWatcher/status/2027667405904752782 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2028204572078907429 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2028431046727918000?s=20 ; https://x.com/TheWarMonitor/status/2029472493723861240
[48] https://www.dia.mil/portals/110/images/news/military_powers_publications/iran_military_power_lr.pdf
[49] https://wanaen dot com/kurdistan-floating-base-and-sahand-destroyer-added-to-irans-naval-forces/ ; https://x.com/TankerTrackers/status/2034279303899177442

[50] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-2-2026/
[51] https://www.hisutton.com/Iran-Navy-IRGC-Forward-Base-Ships.html ; https://x.com/TankerTrackers/status/2034279303899177442
[52] https://x.com/TankerTrackers/status/2034279303899177442 ; https://www.businessinsider.com/satellite-image-show-iran-warship-smoking-airstrikes-2026-3
[53] https://www.businessinsider.com/satellite-image-show-iran-warship-smoking-airstrikes-2026-3
[54] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-6-2026/ ; https://x.com/TankerTrackers/status/2034279303899177442
[55] https://x.com/SoarAtlas/status/2034114251791720535 ; https://x.com/geo27752/status/2033933752007598313
[56] https://www.xairforces.net/ppolice.asp?id=50
[57] https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2033999504832135526
[58] https://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=35.547137&lon=51.107326&z=15&m=w&search=35.55081%2C%2051.11313
[59] https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/NK-nNiyvbbL2UDAKSUEX3mfR3/
[60] https://t.me/BenTzionM/7141
[61] https://x.com/Gomnam_User/status/1923128688800825480?s=20
[62] https://x.com/TankerTrackers/status/2034264379655356816
[63] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-4-2026/ ; https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2029240527879655542/photo/1
[64] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2034320846584430960?s=20
[65] https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/update-014—jmic-advisory-note-14_mar_2026_final.pdf?rev=85c7878cf35a44739b699a38a537dad2
[66] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/iran-continues-exporting-millions-of-barrels-of-oil-as-around-90-ships-cross-the-strait-of-hormuz-despite-the-war
[67] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/iran-continues-exporting-millions-of-barrels-of-oil-as-around-90-ships-cross-the-strait-of-hormuz-despite-the-war
[68] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/15/us/politics/energy-secretary-iran-oil-prices.html
[69] https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/iran-war-us-israel-trump-03-16-26?post -id=cmmt6xka2000h3b6v05525eag ; https://x.com/MarineTraffic/status/2033490585298915497 ; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iran-allows-two-gas-tankers-sail-india-through-hormuz-sources-say-2026-03-13/
[70] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-nuclear-doctrine-not-likely-change-foreign-minister-says-2026-03-18/
[71] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-nuclear-doctrine-not-likely-change-foreign-minister-says-2026-03-18/
[72] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2033991816450871699?s=20 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034030169661575199?s=20 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034085320824643883?s=20 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034096154065920079?s=20 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034146172810526737?s=20 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034194349085376649?s=20 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034227408170004794?s=20 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034262403337134573 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034276344440193302 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034296507713687905
[73] https://t.me/moriahdoron/29122 ; https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/2034206963760873598 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034118153773408578?s=20
[74] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/03/17/world/iran-war-trump-oil-lebanon/68e1cbca-1390-5241-baec-eb4e679ad63b?smid=url-share
[75] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/03/17/world/iran-war-trump-oil-lebanon/68e1cbca-1390-5241-baec-eb4e679ad63b?smid=url-share ; https://t.me/inews18i/6839?single ; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2034039978372612180?s=20
[76] https://t.me/mehrnews/361512
[77] https://www.clusterconvention.org/files/publications/A-Guide-to-Cluster-Munitions.pdf
[78] https://x.com/alirezatangsiri/status/2034272394274132266?s=20
[79] https://t.me/mehrnews/361622
[80] https://x.com/MOD_Qatar/status/2034344764594672041
[81] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trump-criticises-allies-over-rejection-hormuz-request-iran-israel-trade-2026-03-17/
[82] https://x.com/BDF_Bahrain/status/2034009509807431946; https://x.com/BDF_Bahrain/status/2034190124871823581
[83] https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2033994000596635728 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034007764591075696 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034039842900775355 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034051961037770851 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034065780422365268 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034094878011826466 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034118547492819180 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034148650067087841 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034167396554973514 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034179337151197550 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034189141328474172 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034286661652435336 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034322419956035680 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034328899023245722
[84] https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034065780422365268
[85] https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034328899023245722
[86] https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034322419956035680
[87] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/riyadh-residents-receive-phone-alerts-first-time-warning-hostile-threat-2026-03-18/
[88] https://x.com/modgovae/status/2034224417996476422
[89] https://x.com/modgovae/status/2034224417996476422
[90] https://x.com/modgovae/status/2034224417996476422
[91] https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-03-18/al-minhad-air-base-attacked-by-iran-no-australians-hurt/106468378 ; https://nautilus.org/publications/books/australian-forces-abroad/afghanistan/hq-jtf633/
[92] https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-03-18/al-minhad-air-base-attacked-by-iran-no-australians-hurt/106468378
[93] https://x.com/KuwaitArmyGHQ/status/2034293773161639966
[94] https://x.com/KuwaitArmyGHQ/status/2034293773161639966
[95] Data available upon request
[96] https://t.me/mmirleb/11424 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/11430
[97] https://t.me/mmirleb/11384
[98] https://t.me/mmirleb/11388
[99] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2034170294185738406

[101] https://t.me/mmirleb/10772 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-12-2026/
[102] https://x.com/IDF/status/2034218585933947084?s=20 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034003306008228342?s=20 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034186140358455618?s=20

[103] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034311197634289924
[104] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034311197634289924
[105] https://x.com/no_itsmyturn/status/2034291544941805899 ; https://x.com/no_itsmyturn/status/2034274057953136997 ; https://x.com/no_itsmyturn/status/2034272603242709455
[106] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034325393214144715
[107] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034325393214144715
[108] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034325393214144715
[109] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034330494851060014
[110] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034295250110366073 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2034205605099896840
[111] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2034201035523178696
[112] https://x.com/Zeldamices/status/2034143776046756292 ; https://x.com/Zeldamices/status/2034143776046756292
[113] https://www.arabnews.com/node/1917251/middle-east ; https://blogbaladi.com/raids-on-fuel-depots-medicine-warehouses-are-useless/
[114] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034186140358455618?s=20
[115] https://www.idf dot il/332370
[116] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031251052729712988
[117] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032370825303589100
[118] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034269123509617047
[119] https://x.com/israel_alma_org/status/2034213973902414156?s=46
[120] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm917
[121] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm917
[122] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2034063793630716219 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2034059407768568294 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2034130860539052394 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2034215553200423193
[123] https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-war-us-israel-gulf-allies-strait-of-hormuz-attacks-oil-prices-stocks/#post-update-c220177e
[124] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/early-indications-show-israel-tank-fire-hit-un-lebanon-base-source-says-2026-03-17/ ; https://www.facebook.com/newswireLK/posts/israels-army-has-admitted-one-of-its-tanks-fired-on-a-un-position-in-southern-le/1521187693350949/
[125] https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/02/1166875 ; https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/early-indications-show-israel-tank-fire-hit-un-lebanon-base-source-says-2026-03-17/
[126] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/early-indications-show-israel-tank-fire-hit-un-lebanon-base-source-says-2026-03-17/
[127] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/early-indications-show-israel-tank-fire-hit-un-lebanon-base-source-says-2026-03-17/
[128] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/early-indications-show-israel-tank-fire-hit-un-lebanon-base-source-says-2026-03-17/
[129] https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2034257904920854698 https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2034270682909999547 https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/مقتل-و-صابة-5-منتسبين-بقصف-مقر-قا-د-عمليات-ال-نبار-للحشد-الشعبي ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/ال-نبار-قصف-جوي-يستهدف-نقطة-تفتيش-ومقرا-للحشد-الشعبي ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/كركوك-انفجاران-قرب-مقر-العصا-ب-ولوا-63-بالحشد-الشعبي-فيديو ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/قصف-جديد-يستهدف-مقرا-للحشد-الشعبي-في-كركوك
[130] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-%D9%88-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A9-5-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7-%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A
[131] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-13-2026/ ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-liwa-al-tafuf-13th-pmf-brigade;

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/2/iraq-qasim-muslih ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84-%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%8A%D9%87-%D8%A8-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AD%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D9%83-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%8A ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/the-leadership-and-purpose-of-iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces/
[132] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-liwa-al-tafuf-13th-pmf-brigade
[133] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-10-2026/
[134] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%87%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%82-%D8%AA-%D9%83%D8%AF-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A9-4-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%88%D9%83-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9

[135] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%87%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%82-%D8%AA-%D9%83%D8%AF-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A9-4-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%88%D9%83-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9

[136] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%87%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%82-%D8%AA-%D9%83%D8%AF-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A9-4-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%88%D9%83-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9 ;

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[138] https://t.me/centerkaf/5597 ; https://t.me/centerkaf/5598 ; https://t.me/centerkaf/5599
[139] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF
[140] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%B3%D9%82%D9%88%D8%B7-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF
[141] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%B3%D9%82%D9%88%D8%B7-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF
[142] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/كوردســتانيات/حباط-هجوم-جديد-بمسيرتين-قرب-مطار-ربيل
[143] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1591
[144] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A8-%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84