Lebanese President Aoun meets with Italian Prime Minister Meloni in Rome (Lebanese presidency X account, August 21, 2026)
Lebanese concerns over the continued stalemate and the collapse of the framework agreement: a play on the Arabic word itar, which means both framework and tire. The agreement is a winged tire flying away from Lebanon’s hands (al-Joumhouria, August 18, 2026)
Prime Minister Nawaf Salam (front row fourth from the left) and National Defense Minister Michel Menassa visit a Lebanese army base in Tyre (Lebanese prime minister’s office X account, August 21, 2026)
Concern over a security and international vacuum in the south after the end of UNIFIL’s mission, while calls increase in Lebanon for the continued presence of an international body to monitor developments and assist the Lebanese army (al-Liwaa, August 21, 2026)Trending
The United States is expected to increase its direct involvement in the next phase of the negotiations between Israel and Lebanon.
Hezbollah firmly opposes the diplomatic track between Israel and Lebanon but has not ended contacts.
The struggle over the Ali al-Taher Ridge is a test of Hezbollah’s updated operational concept.
The Lebanese army is prepared to assume control of the Ali al-Taher Ridge but demands guarantees from the United States.
Preparations for ending UNIFIL’s mandate continue while alternatives are being examined.
Overview[1]
Contacts to expand the pilot zones continue, but the dispute over the verification mechanism, the lack of progress in the Israeli withdrawal and the demand for measures against Hezbollah infrastructure prevent transitioning to the next phase.
Hezbollah opposes the transfer of control of the Ali al-Taher Ridge[2] to the Lebanese army and claims it will take action against an Israeli attempt to expand its control in the area. The United States is looking for a diplomatic way to end the dispute over the Ridge, with control of the area transferred to the Lebanese army and guarantees that Israel would not demand control of the area again.
Transfer of Amal’s weapons to the Lebanese army from south of the Litani was reported.
The United States is increasing diplomatic, security and financial pressure on Hezbollah while linking support for Lebanon and its army to concrete measures against Hezbollah’s military-terrorist and financial infrastructures.
Lebanon tightened supervision at the border crossings due to concerns about the entry of Iranians and reported that the visa of the Iranian chargé d’affaires would not be renewed.
Preparations for the end of UNIFIL’s mandate in Lebanon continue, along with a search for an alternative mechanism.
The civilian situation in south Lebanon prevents a return to normal routine, and approximately 268,000 people still displaced.
Direct Negotiations and the Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun used his visit to Italy and the Vatican (August 20–21, 2026) to mobilize support for the framework agreement, the cessation of Israeli activity and withdrawal from the territories under Israeli control, steps presented by Aoun as conditions for the reconstruction of south Lebanon and the return of the displaced. Meeting with senior Vatican officials and with Italian President Sergio Mattarella and Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, he sought to expand international involvement for the agreement and to strengthen the Lebanese army, while reiterating his commitment to extending state authority over all Lebanese territory and over declarations of war and peace (Lebanese presidency X account, al-Diyar, August 20; Lebanese presidency X account, August 21; al-Nashra, August 22, 2026).
Lebanese President Aoun meets with Italian Prime Minister Meloni in Rome (Lebanese presidency X account, August 21, 2026)
The eighth round of talks may not be held, although early September has been offered as a possible date and the United States is pushing for their resumption. Beirut adheres to the diplomatic track, but Lebanese sources were pessimist of possible progress in view of Israel’s positions and its October elections (al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 19; al-Joumhouria, August 20, 2026).
Lebanese Parliament speaker and Amal leader Nabih Berri reiterated that before progress in the framework agreement could be made, a ceasefire and an Israeli withdrawal to the international border were required. He said that after the withdrawal he would work for the immediate deployment of the Lebanese army south of the Litani River and its establishment as the only armed force in the area. He called on the United States to exert pressure on Israel, adding that he wanted the pilot zones to be successful and to resolve the issue of Ali al-Taher by transferring it to the responsibility of the Lebanese army (Lebanese News Agency, August 19, 2026).
The Pilot Zones and the Verification Mechanism
No breakthrough has been made in advancing the second phase of the pilot zones. The head of the American military coordination group, General Joseph Clearfield, visited Beirut to advance the expansion of the plan and the verification mechanism. Establishing the mechanism is delayed by disagreements over its authorities, areas of operation and method of operation, including the Israeli demand to permit inspections of private homes, a demand the Lebanese army will not accept without legal authority. Meanwhile, according to the army, continued Israeli activity and the lack of progress in the withdrawal make the transition to the next phase difficult (al-Joumhouria, al-Akhbar, August 18; Lebanon 24, August 19; Nidaa al-Watan, August 20, 2026).
Because of the stalemate, more direct American involvement in the next phase is being considered. The United States is reportedly looking for a diplomatic solution to the dispute over the Ali al-Taher Ridge, under which control of the area would be transferred to the Lebanese army and guarantees would be provided that Israel would not again demand control of the area. Such a plan could assuage Lebanese concerns that transferring control of the area to the Lebanese army would subsequently allow Israel to return to it. According to sources, if Lebanon and Israel do not reach an agreement, the United States may determine which communities will be included in the second pilot zone. The pilot zones are expected to be a focus of the activity of the American general, Joseph Clearfield, and the Lebanese establishment is preparing for contacts concerning the mechanism. The Lebanese newspaper al-Nahar called the Ali al-Taher situation “a countdown to a confrontation” which could have broad political and military implications. American Ambassador Michel Issa said if Hezbollah disarmed the war would end (al-Sharq al-Awsat, al-Joumhouria, August 20; al-Liwaa, August 21, 2026; al-Nahar, al-Liwaa, August 24, 2026).
In the field, expansion of the plan remained gradual. Only a few families returned to Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh because of the destruction, unexploded ordnance and damage to infrastructure, while the Lebanese army expanded its presence in Froun and al-Ghandouriyeh with patrols, checkpoints and observation posts (Lebanon 24, August 19, 2026).
Lebanese concerns over the continued stalemate and the collapse of the framework agreement: a play on the Arabic word itar, which means both framework and tire. The agreement is a winged tire flying away from Lebanon’s hands (al-Joumhouria, August 18, 2026)
Hezbollah
Hezbollah refuses to transfer control of the Ali al-Taher Ridge to the Lebanese army, and it seems difficult to find a mechanism which would enable the army to assume responsibility without exposing the area to further Israeli activity (al-Joumhouria, August 18–19; Lebanon Debate, August 20, 2026).
Hezbollah strongly opposes the framework agreement, representing continued Israeli activity and the absence of its withdrawal as evidence that diplomacy failed. Future monitoring mechanisms are another point of contention because Hezbollah opposes an external mechanism with power over its weapons. Senior Hezbollah figures called for abandoning the agreement but left the door open to the diplomatic track as long as it did not deny Hezbollah’s right to “respond to Israeli advances in the area.” Meanwhile, the organization worked to broaden political and public opposition to the agreement and to enlist political allies, including Christians. A report claimed Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri’s opposition to taking the protest to the streets contributed to shifting the confrontation to state institutions, while Gebran Bassil might also raise the agreement and the government’s policy in parliament (MTV, August 21, 2026).
The dispute between Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and the Hezbollah leadership because of the framework agreement has not changed. Mediation attempts made during the week to renew dialogue between the sides failed because of Aoun’s insistence on the agreement and Hezbollah’s opposition to it. As a result, mediation efforts were suspended for the time being. Reportedly, contact between Hezbollah and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam is limited to government matters and does not extend to political issues (al-Diyar, August 22, 2026).
Senior figures in the Shi’ite religious establishment criticized the diplomatic track. Sheikh Ali al-Khatib and Mufti Ahmed Qabalan criticized the framework agreement and the conduct of the government, while Ali Fadlallah called for an agreed national formula. All three also warned not to allow the dispute over weapons and relations with Hezbollah to turn into an internal or sectarian rift (al-Diyar, al-Joumhouria, August 21, 2026).
Political council member Mahmoud Qamati said Hezbollah chose the appropriate style and degree of response and its current restraint was not the result of weakness. He claimed Hezbollah was giving the diplomatic track an opportunity, but an Israeli attempt to advance on the ground or expand the territory under its control would be considered a violation of the ceasefire and would be “responded to” accordingly. Although criticized by Hezbollah supporters who opposed the diplomatic track, Qamati did not dismiss the possibility of direct contacts with the United States and said the decision would be made according to the organization’s interests and the circumstances. His remarks may indicate Hezbollah’s desire to preserve a channel for dialogue with Washington and not leave the management of contacts regarding the organization’s future solely in the hands of Lebanese state institutions. Regarding Ali al-Taher, Qamati called the policy “steadfastness and resistance”[3] (al-Manar, al-Nashra, al-Araby al-Jadeed, August 22–24, 2026).
Support for the Agreement
Those who support the framework agreement demanded the decision for the state monopoly on weapons to be translated into practical measures. Kataeb Party chairman Sami Gemayel said he supported the track led by President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and called the government’s decision regarding a state monopoly on weapons “a historic step” which should be implemented. He said dealing with Hezbollah’s weapons should not be conditioned on an American-Iranian agreement or a full Israeli withdrawal, rather the state and the army had to exercise their authority alongside continued negotiations and international support (Kataeb website, August 20, 2026).
The Military Situation in Lebanon
The IDF
This past week IDF forces operated in the security zone in south Lebanon, maintaining their hold on the territory and attacking Hezbollah infrastructure and operatives. The focus remained the Ali al-Taher Ridge, and in response to Hezbollah activity the IDF expanded its strikes to other areas in south Lebanon. Later in the week, operations to eliminate threats in the area continued, including a strike on a building in Baraachit where there were suspects who had crossed the security line (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 15–23, 2026).
According to Lebanese reports, Israel is isolating the Ali al-Taher Ridge area, disrupting supply routes and destroying Hezbollah infrastructure and forces with strikes, surveillance and limited ground activity, while the organization has reportedly retained some access to the area. According to Lebanese sources, Israel does not currently have an American green light for a large-scale operation to take control of the ridge (al-Akhbar, August 18; al-Arabiya, al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 19; Lebanon Debate, August 20; Nidaa al-Watan, August 21; al-Nahar and al-Liwaa, August 22, 2026).
Hezbollah
This past week Hezbollah did not issue claims of responsibility for the actions attributed to it or expand the confrontation to include attacks on the Israeli home front.
The Hezbollah-affiliated newspaper al-Akhbar claimed that Israeli activity in the Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh–Ali al-Taher area led to a direct confrontation with Hezbollah’s Badr Unit, which is responsible for the area north of the Litani River. According to the report, Israel views the unit as key to Hezbollah’s control in the south, and therefore damaging its infrastructure in the area is an Israeli objective (al-Akhbar, August 19, 2026).
Hezbollah’s information department denied reports by al-Arabiya and al-Hadath according to which more than 100 Hezbollah and Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps operatives were present in the Ali al-Taher compound and supplies continued to be transferred to it (Lebanon Debate, August 20; al-Araby al-Jadeed, August 22, 2026).
Several op-ed pieces in the Lebanese press claimed that the struggle over Ali al-Taher could test Hezbollah’s post-war operational concept. The organization wants to avoid a broad campaign at a time determined by Israel, but also wants to prevent a situation in which not responding would allow Israel to gradually erode its assets and expand the area under its control. Therefore, from Hezbollah’s perspective, apparently the issue is not only control of the ridge itself, but the ability to limit further Israeli advances and preserve freedom of action north of the Litani River, even at the cost of limited operational friction (al-Joumhouria, August 19; al-Nashra, al-Araby al-Jadeed, August 22, 2026).
Journalist Imad Marmal reported that Hezbollah had decided not to return to its “strategic patience” after the ceasefire in November 2024 and the question now was not whether to respond, but when and under what circumstances. He wrote that the organization’s leadership did not want a response which would lead to escalation at a time convenient for Israel, while taking into account the price paid by its Shi’ite support base and the impact of developments in the Iranian-American war on the Lebanese arena (al-Joumhouria, August 19, 2026).
According to Lebanese security sources, Hezbollah has an underground complex in the al-Hermel area in the northern Beqa’a Valley, near the Syrian border, which it uses to store weapons and for logistics, command and preserving its ability to rebuild. The importance of the area reportedly increased following the damage to Hezbollah’s systems in the south and the Beqa’a Valley and the narrowing of the supply route through Syria. The complex is presented as part of a dispersed strategic-depth system intended to enable the organization to preserve reserves and recovery capabilities even after its forward systems have been damaged, with Unit 4400[4] continuing to play a role in the supply network in the Syrian border area (Erem News, August 20, 2026).
According to a report in Nidaa al-Watan, Hezbollah expanded its deployment in the Dahiyat Kafr Rumman area, which overlooks the Ali al-Taher Ridge, and took control of houses in the area. So far, the report has not been verified by other sources, but if verified could indicate that Hezbollah wanted an alternative operational depth around the ridge, even if it were forced to relinquish part of it (Nidaa al-Watan, August 24, 2026).
Hezbollah’s internal and External Arenas
The Shi’ites in Lebanon
Among some south Lebanese, the traditional victory narrative is less prevalent and there is more frequent use of ” steadfastness” in the wake of the heavy costs of the war and the continued confrontation with Israel, which is perceived as necessary, alongside blaming the state for abandoning the south. Responsible for the shift are the scale of the casualties and destruction, the continuing displacement and the damage to homes, agriculture, infrastructure and the education system, along with growing doubts regarding compensation and reconstruction. However, the increasing criticism of Hezbollah and how it conducted the war does not necessarily translate into a desire to weaken it. Parts of the Shi’ite community are concerned that a decline in Hezbollah’s status and strength would be perceived as a defeat for the entire Shi’ite community and a loss of its status in the Lebanese system. The report also points to increased discourse among residents of the south that the current war may be the last against Israel, possibly indicating the depth of the criticism and a reluctance to return to another cycle of fighting (al-Araby al-Jadeed, August 19, 2026).
Senior figures and representatives of Hezbollah and Amal, the Islamic Shi’ite council and prominent clerics, and Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad representatives participated in a rally held at the Iranian Embassy in Beirut to mark 40 days since the burial of Ali Khamenei. The event noted Khamenei’s “jihadist legacy” and the continuation of his ideology (al-Diyar, August 20, 2026).
Given the American sanctions on Hezbollah, the organization relies on Iranian financial and ideological support and serves as a tool for Iran to project its influence beyond Iran’s borders (Sa’ersabil X account, August 19, 2026)
American Pressure on Hezbollah
The United States increased pressure on Hezbollah by directly linking it to the Qods Force and widening the legal basis for imposing sanctions. Sanctions were imposed on ten individuals accused of operating a network which transferred hundreds of millions of dollars to Hezbollah through Iran, the UAE, Turkey and Lebanon. According to American sources, the objective was not only to disrupt the organization’s sources of funding and damage its ability to rebuild, but also to impose sanctions on Hezbollah-affiliated banks, currency-exchange companies and logistics entities. At the same time, Washington linked the financial pressure to the framework agreement and signaled that continued support for Lebanon and its army would increasingly depend on their demonstrating concrete measures against Hezbollah’s military and financial infrastructure (al-Arabiya, al-Joumhouria, August 20; Nidaa al-Watan, August 22, 2026). Hezbollah rejected the American measure and called it “exerting pressure on the organization and its environment to shift the focus of the confrontation with Israel to Lebanon’s internal arena.” Hezbollah said it was proud of its relations with Iran but rejected its portrayal as subordinate to Tehran, adding that sanctions would not make it disarm or abandon the concept of “resistance” (al-’Ahed, August 21, 2026).
The Lebanese Army and Government
The Army
Visiting the headquarters of the South Litani Sector in Tyre, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said the expansion of the Lebanese army’s deployment was key to restoring state authority, adding that the objective was to extend its authority over the entire territory and restore declaring war and peace to constitutional institutions. Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri said the government would not retreat from its objective, but did not seek to impose it by force in a way which would endanger national unity. He said the army was prepared to assume responsibility for the Ali al-Taher Ridge as well, and the government was mobilizing international support to strengthen its capabilities and expand its presence in the south (Lebanese prime minister’s office X account, al-Markazia, August 21, 2026).
Prime Minister Nawaf Salam (front row fourth from the left) and National Defense Minister Michel Menassa visit a Lebanese army base in Tyre (Lebanese prime minister’s office X account, August 21, 2026)
The Lebanese army is reportedly prepared to assume control of the Ali al-Taher Ridge, but requires American guarantees that the IDF will cease its activity and withdraw its forces before Lebanese army forces deploy in the area. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun held contacts with American officials to find a solution to the Ali al-Taher issue to keep it from spinning out of control and proposed that the Lebanese army enter the ridge area after Hezbollah forces withdrew. Hezbollah rejected the proposal because it did not trust American or Israeli guarantees and because Israeli forces entered and took control of positions they had not held before the ceasefire and the signing of the framework agreement. Hezbollah also believes the pilot zone experiment has not yet been successfully concluded. A source said there were Hezbollah operatives on the Ali al-Taher Ridge but did not report on order of combat or the situation on the ground. The source added that the implications of control of the ridge were not limited to Hezbollah alone but affected Lebanon as a whole, adding that the “enemy” would continue to demand control of other areas beyond its Yellow Line and beyond the area south of the Litani River, “proving” it had no intention of complying with the agreement. The source said Hezbollah had transferred several areas of responsibility to the Lebanese army south of the Litani River as part of implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (al-Araby al-Jadeed, August 24, 2026).
In recent months the Amal movement transferred weapons in its possession south of the Litani River to the Lebanese army, including medium weapons, vehicles equipped with 106mm guns and anti-aircraft machine guns. The transfer was done quietly and with limited coordination as part of the expansion of the army’s control in the area. Amal denied that military posts had been handed over and claimed the movement had only offices and civilian centers. The report, if accurate, would indicate Amal’s willingness to adapt to the move to expand state authority south of the Litani and shows it differs from Hezbollah on the issue of weapons (al-Madan, August 22, 2026).
Beirut remains a significant challenge to the state’s ability to enforce the principle of a state monopoly on weapons. More than three months after the government launched the “weapons-free Beirut campaign,” its success has been only partial. Shooting incidents and clashes continued in the capital and weapons were also found, including a weapons depot in Ras al-Nabaa. Lebanese Parliament members Nadim Gemayel and Waddah Sadek criticized the lack of an organized security plan, while a source said the increase in checkpoints and the nighttime deployment of security forces were part of enforcing the decision (al-Nahar, August 22, 2026).
Measures against Iranian Interference
The ministry of the interior ordered an increase in inspections at border crossings and the airport following information regarding the possibility that Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps operatives might attempt to enter Lebanon using forged documents. The foreign ministry said the residence visa of the designated Iranian ambassador, Mohammad Reza Sheibani, who was declared persona non grata in March, would not be renewed and an extension of the visa of the chargé d’affaires at the embassy was also not under consideration. Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji said the measures were a sovereign decision and called on Tehran to stop interfering in Lebanon’s internal affairs (al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 20; Youssef Rajji’s X account, August 20; al-Arabiya, August 21, 2026).
The Lebanese government continued to advance practical measures to enable residents to return to their homes and strengthen their ability to remain in the communities of the south. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam instructed the purchase and placement of temporary housing units to be accelerated, repairs begun on homes which had been damaged but remained suitable for reconstruction and rental assistance to be considered. Following his meeting with the heads of the local authorities in Rmeish and Debel, he noted the need for uninterrupted transportation routes to the border communities, fuel supplies, the operation of schools and basic services and to strengthen the local authorities, and said the continued presence of border residents on their land was a national priority (Lebanese prime minister’s Office X account, August 20, 2026).
UNIFIL and Its Future
Activity continued regarding UNIFIL’s future and the formulation of the security arrangement to replace it in south Lebanon. While Lebanon wants an international presence in the south, the United States opposes extending the mandate in its current form and is promoting an alternative within the framework agreement. The contacts currently focus on transferring responsibility to the Lebanese army, the composition and powers of the verification mechanism and the possibility of including European and Arab countries in it (Nidaa al-Watan, August 18; al-Nahar, August 22, 2026). UNIFIL has already begun preparations for the end of its mission and handed over the al-Khardali post to the Lebanese army, alongside changes in deployment and logistical preparations for the withdrawal of approximately 7,500 troops during 2027. In accordance with Resolution 2790, the force is supposed to continue its missions until December 31, 2026, after which it will cease its monitoring activities, joint patrols and humanitarian assistance (al-Nahar, August 22, 2026).
The Lebanese leadership wants and international umbrella in south Lebanon, even if UNIFIL does not continue in its current form. A petition signed by 86 members of Lebanese Parliament called for the continued presence of a UN force, and President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam said that if the mandate could not be extended, monitoring, reporting, coordination and liaison capabilities alongside the Lebanese army should be preserved within an alternative framework. Washington continues to oppose extending the mandate and is promoting an alternative mechanism within the framework agreement, while Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri called the termination of UNIFIL’s mission a “sin” and claimed its presence was necessary to complete the army’s deployment and implement Resolution 1701 (Lebanese presidency and prime minister’s office X accounts, August 17; Nidaa al-Watan, August 18; al-Joumhouria, August 20, 2026).
Meanwhile, several alternatives are under consideration for the composition of the future international framework to be deployed in south Lebanon. Italy has emerged as a candidate to play a central role in a possible European framework, alongside Germany and other countries, while France is working to strengthen the Lebanese army and will host a preparatory meeting in September for an international conference to support it and the internal security forces. According to reports, in Jordan, American General Joseph Clearfield examined the possibility of including an Arab component in the verification mechanism, in part to provide the framework with broader political backing (al-Diyar, August 19; Lebanese presidency X account, August 19; al-Akhbar, August 21, 2026).
Concern over a security and international vacuum in the south after the end of UNIFIL’s mission, while calls increase in Lebanon for the continued presence of an international body to monitor developments and assist the Lebanese army (al-Liwaa, August 21, 2026)
The Situation in South Lebanon
The situation in south Lebanon remains complex and uneven. While significant recovery can be seen in Tyre, tens of thousands of families are still displaced and the return to affected communities is limited by destruction, unexploded ordnance and damage to sources of livelihood. The government promotes housing solutions and basic services, but the gap between the scale of the damage and reconstruction capabilities remains enormous. The displaced persons crisis continues as a central obstacle to the south’s return to normal daily life. According to data from the national relief authority (Samidoun), approximately 268,000 people from approximately 75,000 families are still registered as displaced. Most live in private apartments and houses, and the housing shortage has led to an increase in rent, including in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia, where an increase of approximately 30% or more was reported in certain areas. The approaching new school year increases pressure to evacuate schools used as reception centers, while a comprehensive solution for alternative housing has yet to be found. Even in areas where residents have been able to return, including Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh, the return is gradual and dependent on the reconstruction of buildings and infrastructure and the continued provision of basic services (al-Akhbar, August 22; Lebanon Debate, August 20, 2026).
However, there are more significant signs of recovery in Tyre. More than 90% of the city’s approximately 60,000 permanent residents have returned, institutions and businesses have resumed operations, new restaurants and cafés have opened and a recovery in tourism was recorded in August. Nevertheless, the city continues to serve as a rear area for a population unable to return to its communities. Approximately 2,700 displaced persons still live in ten reception centers in the city and its surroundings, and the municipality is preparing to evacuate them from the schools ahead of the beginning of the school year (al-Akhbar, August 22, 2026).
The Lebanese government is taking practical measures to enable residents to return and strengthen their ability to remain in the communities of the south. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam instructed that the purchase and placement of temporary housing units be accelerated, repairs begun on homes which were damaged but remained suitable for rehabilitation and rental assistance be considered. Following his meeting with the heads of the local authorities in Rmeish and Debel, Salam noted the need for uninterrupted transportation routes to the border communities, fuel supplies, the operation of schools and basic services and to strengthen the local authorities, and called the continued presence of border residents on their land a “national priority” (Lebanese prime minister’s office X account, August 20, 2026).
To complement the limited government response, remittances from the Lebanese diaspora provide a safety net for households, particularly for families affected by the war and displaced from their homes. During the war, there was a decline in remittances from the Gulf States, but there was an increase in remittances from West Africa, in part to support families in the south and in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia. The funds are used primarily to cover basic expenses, including housing, food, electricity, medications and education (Lebanon 24, August 17, 2026).
[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the Amit Institute’s daily updates as well as its other publications.
[2] East of Nabatiyeh and north of the Litani River.
[3] Violence and terrorism against the State of Israel.
[4] The primary logistical and reinforcement branch which deals with smuggling and transferring Iranian weapons, military equipment, and funds into Lebanon.
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