According to the report, the route is about 1,600 feet wide and has a natural depth of roughly 93 feet, potentially allowing Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) to navigate it after limited dredging.
The claim has not been independently verified. There has been no official announcement from the White House, the US military or Omani authorities confirming that such an operation took place.
Morse Report further claims that the route would allow ships to remain shielded from direct Iranian observation by the geography of Jazirat Musandam and the curvature of the Earth.
Why the Strait of Hormuz matters
The Strait of Hormuz is only about 29 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point, with designated shipping channels for vessels entering and leaving the Persian Gulf.
Its importance is enormous. The International Energy Agency estimates that about 20 million barrels of oil and petroleum products moved through the strait each day in 2025 — roughly a quarter of global seaborne oil trade. Nearly 15 million barrels per day of crude alone passed through the waterway.
The vulnerability extends beyond crude. Almost all LNG exports from Qatar and the UAE also rely on Hormuz, accounting for nearly 20% of global LNG trade.
Hormuz closure has already forced a rethink
The current crisis has demonstrated how quickly shipping patterns can change when Hormuz becomes unreliable. Iran has maintained that it has control over the waterway, while the US has said the strait remains open.
In practice, however, vessel traffic has fallen sharply and shipping companies have been forced to assess whether sailing through the waterway is worth the military and insurance risks.The disruption has accelerated the use of alternative infrastructure.
Saudi Arabia has increased exports through its East-West pipeline to Yanbu on the Red Sea, while the UAE is relying on its pipeline from Habshan to Fujairah, which bypasses Hormuz. The IEA estimates that around 3.5 million to 5.5 million barrels per day of crude could potentially be redirected through existing bypass infrastructure — far below the volumes normally moving through Hormuz.
What would an Oman-side corridor actually change?
If the Morse Report claim were eventually verified, an Omani corridor could provide another navigational option at a time when every additional route matters. But it would not amount to a complete bypass of the Strait of Hormuz.
A 1,600-foot-wide passage would still be geographically within the Hormuz region. Its usefulness would depend on factors including its exact location, depth, navigational restrictions, proximity to Iranian military assets, mine risks, insurance requirements and whether commercial shipping companies were willing to use it.
The claim that the geography would make vessels completely invisible to Iran should also be treated cautiously. Being outside a particular line of sight does not make a vessel immune from detection by radar, aircraft, drones, satellites, electronic surveillance or other military assets.
The second problem: the Red Sea
The Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb corridor connect the Indian Ocean with the Suez Canal and provide the shortest maritime route between Asia and Europe. Around 12% of global trade has traditionally passed through the Suez Canal, while the Red Sea corridor accounts for a much larger share of container traffic.
The Iran conflict has added another layer of risk. Yemen’s Houthi movement has threatened shipping linked to Saudi Arabia and has targeted tankers, raising concerns that Bab el-Mandeb could become another major chokepoint.
That matters because Saudi Arabia is increasingly using Yanbu and its Red Sea infrastructure as an alternative outlet for crude that cannot move normally through Hormuz. If the Red Sea route becomes unsafe at the same time, the effectiveness of that workaround would be severely reduced.
S&P Global has warned that the Houthi threat has already tightened tanker availability and pushed up freight rates, while Saudi crude flows through Yanbu have risen sharply.
What happens if both chokepoints are disrupted?
Hormuz controls the Gulf’s energy exit. Bab el-Mandeb controls the southern gateway to the Red Sea and Suez. If both become effectively unusable, ships carrying Gulf crude to Asia could face major disruption, while vessels travelling between Asia and Europe would have to take the much longer route around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope.
That means more fuel, longer voyages, greater demand for vessels and higher insurance premiums. The impact is not limited to shipping companies. Higher freight costs can eventually feed into the prices of manufactured goods, electronics, machinery, food and other commodities.
Asia is at the centre of the risk because the bulk of the oil travelling through Hormuz is destined for Asian economies. China and India together accounted for 44% of crude exports passing through Hormuz in 2025, according to the IEA. Japan and South Korea are also heavily dependent on Gulf energy flows.
For India, a prolonged disruption could therefore affect crude import costs, freight rates, refinery economics and ultimately fuel prices. The country is also exposed to the Red Sea problem because the Suez route is important for India’s trade with Europe and parts of the Atlantic market.