Iraq’s Shiite coalition puts weapons transfer at heart of new government-factions pact

 

BAGHDAD, Iraq – Iraq’s ruling Shiite Coordination Framework is finalizing a written agreement setting out weapons transfer arrangements and rules governing the military activities of Iranian-backed Shiite armed factions after the final US troop withdrawal scheduled for September 30, Iraqi politicians, faction commanders, and security officials told The New Region.

 

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi pledged in May to disarm Shiite armed factions and bring their weapons under state control in conjunction with the completion of the US troop withdrawal from Iraq.

 

Three of the seven key Iran-affiliated Shiite armed factions, however, rejected the plan.

 

Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, which have recently been operating under the banner of the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq,” accused Zaidi of implementing a US agenda targeting Iraq’s armed resistance groups.

 

The dispute escalated sharply last month after six factions’ commanders were separately arrested over their alleged involvement with a drone-manufacturing cell uncovered in Baghdad in late July, bringing tensions between Zaidi and the three factions close to an armed confrontation.

 

To avoid Shiite infighting, the Coordination Framework, the largest parliamentary bloc backing the government, intervened as a mediator and guarantor between the two sides.

 

A committee was formed to handle the negotiations. It is led by Hadi al-Amiri, leader of the Badr Organization, the oldest and largest Iranian-backed Shiite armed faction, Nouri al-Maliki, former prime minister and leader of the State of Law bloc, Sheikh Humam Hamoudi, leader of the Iraqi Islamic Supreme Council and the Absher Ya Iraq bloc, and Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani, former prime minister and leader of the Reconstruction and Development Alliance.

 

The committee was tasked with negotiating an agreement governing relations between the government and the three factions and finding mutually acceptable solutions for the future of the factions and their weapons, Coordination Framework leaders familiar with the ongoing negotiations told The New Region.

 

The resulting document would mark the latest effort by Iraq’s Shiite political leadership to reach an understanding with the factions of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq as a temporary truce between the two sides approaches the end of its first stage on September 30.

 

The agreement would require the factions to halt military operations and refrain from launching armed attacks against neighboring countries for any reason.

 

“We decided to proceed step by step with the government. There is a truce until September 30th as a first phase, followed by an extension of the truce until December 1st to monitor the seriousness of the American withdrawal,” a commander of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq told The New Region.

 

“The agreement mandates that resistance factions carry out no military operations, whether domestic or external.”

 

“Naturally, this applies to the Kurdistan Region and foreign companies operating in Iraq,” the commander said.

 

From disarmament to weapons transfer

 

The term “disarmament”, promoted by Zaidi during the early weeks of his government, quickly provoked the ire of commanders of Iran-affiliated armed factions. The term in Arabic (nazae al-silah) could also be translated to “stripping” someone of their arms.

 

The term became even more infuriating for the factions after anti-Iran groups and activists launched social media campaigns mocking the term by using “stripping” in sexually suggestive ways.

 

The government sought to defuse the sensitivity by replacing “disarmament” with “confining weapons” (hasr al-silah).

 

Although the word “hasr” on its own is not a homonym for any action that is sexual in nature, the new terminology was similarly exploited, with those behind the campaigns using the term as a sexual innuendo for forcibly restricting one’s movement.

 

Seeking to deprive the campaigns of their inflammatory content and ease pressure on factions’ fighters and commanders, the process was subsequently rebranded as “weapons regulation,” but to no avail.

 

Agreeing on how to define the process is at the top of the agenda in the document being finalized by the four leaders, who have held intense negotiations with Zaidi and his security and military teams on one side and the commanders of the three factions on the other.

 

The document proposes adopting the term “transfer of weapons” to describe the process.

 

“Disarmament, confinement, or regulation, these are all terms that lead to the same outcome: the state regaining control over uncontrolled weapons, regardless of their affiliation,” a Coordination Framework leader told The New Region.

 

“We are trying to defuse the sensitivity stoked by the widespread campaigns launched from all quarters on social media, which aim to humiliate these factions.”

 

“The problem is that the issue extends beyond the factions themselves. The Americans reject the term ‘weapon regulation’ while the Iranians reject the term ‘disarmament’.”

 

“We are currently seeking to convince all the concerned parties on a term acceptable to all, and the proposal on the table is to designate the process as the transfer of weapons.”

 

The document does not specify how the proposed “transfer of weapons” would be carried out, with negotiators still working to agree on a mechanism to transfer the factions’ weapons to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).

 

One initial proposal builds on the fact that the three factions already have brigades operating within the PMF, a PMF official involved in the process told The New Region.

 

Under the proposal, the factions would hand their weapons to their respective brigades, placing the weapons under the authority of PMF command.

 

The discussions extend beyond weapons to the fate of factions’ fighters who are not currently registered on the PMF payroll, with their integration potentially requiring amendments to the existing 2016 PMF law and approval of the PMF retirement law.

 

“The proposal is to include a clause in the PMF Law designed to absorb fighters following the dissolution of their groups and integrate them into the existing forces,” the PMF official said.

 

“As for the factions’ senior commanders, it was proposed that they be incorporated into an advisory council devoid of executive powers to allow them to save face and keep them away from the fighters.”

 

No guarantee of US restraint

 

The United States has periodically targeted the commanders and facilities of Iran-affiliated armed factions, as well as positions where their fighters are deployed under the umbrella of the PMF.

 

On July 29, Saudi aircraft, in coordination with US air jets, launched strikes against PMF positions and weapons depots across seven Iraqi provinces, killing 20 fighters and wounding a further 32.

 

The Saudi Ministry of Defense said the operation came in response to successive drone attacks launched from Iraqi territory against its oil facilities on July 27 and 28, describing the strikes as an act of self-defense.

 

The operation nevertheless triggered a fierce backlash, with Islamic Resistance factions threatening to attack Saudi Arabia unless the Iraqi government retaliated in kind.

 

Zaidi cancelled a diplomatic visit to Riyadh scheduled for the following day and demanded that Saudi authorities provide evidence justifying the attack.

 

Intelligence subsequently provided by Saudi services to Iraqi authorities indicated that the two waves of drone attacks targeting Saudi oil facilities had originated from a site north of Basra, security officials told The New Region.

 

The Saudi side also revealed that its F-15 and F-16 jets, which took off from Saudi territory, did not enter Iraqi airspace. Instead, they fired missiles from outside Iraqi airspace at a single location in the al-Dayr town, north of Basra, identified as the launch point for the drone attacks, Iraqi security officials including PMF commanders told The New Region.

 

The target was an arms depot inside the PMF’s Basra operations headquarters. PMF officials said only two fighters were injured.

 

The investigation conducted by Saudi and Iraqi authorities confirmed that it was US jets that carried out the July 29 assault, Iraqi officials said.

 

Against that backdrop, one of the major challenges facing Coordination Framework negotiators was how to secure guarantees that the United States would not again target faction commanders, weapons depots, or brigade positions, Coordination Framework leaders familiar with the ongoing negotiations told The New Region.

 

The document, expected to be finalized before September 30, addresses that concern by stipulating that any US violation of the undeclared truce with the factions, during either its first or second phase, would be subject to a collective decision by the so-called “Quartet”, leaders said.

 

The Quartet is a four-party body comprising the government, the PMF, the Coordination Framework, and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.

 

“It was agreed among all parties that these factions would not respond unilaterally if subjected to a US attack,” a Coordination Framework leader familiar with the latest developments of the negotiations told The New Region.

 

“No response will be made until the Quartet convenes, reaches an agreement, and makes a unanimous decision.”