Across the Middle East, Britain’s role in conflict has often been indirect yet consequential. From the late imperial period to contemporary defence partnerships, the United Kingdom has supplied weapons, technology, finance and military personnel to regional allies engaged in wars and security operations. These relationships, justified in terms of strategic stability and alliance commitments, have at times intersected with credible allegations of human-rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law. This series examines Britain’s involvement country by country, tracing military deployments, arms transfers, technical support and financial ties to assess where and how British policy has shaped conflicts across the region, and what responsibilities may follow.

The United Kingdom has long maintained a close defence and security relationship with Israel, rooted in intelligence cooperation, defence engagement and shared strategic interests in the Middle East. This relationship was visibly reinforced in October 2023, when then Prime Minister Rishi Sunak authorised the deployment of UK military assets to the Eastern Mediterranean following the Hamas-led attacks of 7 October. Those attacks killed around 1,200 people in Israel, the majority civilians, and involved the taking of more than 200 hostages.

The UK deployment included Royal Navy vessels, RAF surveillance aircraft and supporting personnel. British officials stated that these assets were intended to support regional stability, enhance situational awareness and deter wider escalation, rather than to take part directly in combat operations in Gaza. The move nonetheless made it clear: Israel can rely on the UK as a security partner at a moment of acute crisis.

Israel’s subsequent military campaign in Gaza has been extensive and sustained, involving coordinated air, land and maritime operations. Israeli authorities maintain that these operations are directed against Hamas and other armed groups, which they say operate within civilian areas and infrastructure. At the same time, the scale of destruction and civilian harm has been widely documented by UN agencies, humanitarian organisations and journalists. Civilian infrastructure, including residential buildings, hospitals, schools and shelters, has been repeatedly damaged or destroyed, with Israel arguing in many cases that such sites were being used for military purposes.

Casualty figures remain contested but broadly indicate a very high civilian toll. Data from Gaza’s health authorities, which are widely cited by international organisations, suggest that over 60,000 Palestinians have been killed since October 2023, with a substantial proportion identified as women and children. Independent verification is inherently difficult in an active conflict, but the overall scale of casualties is not in serious dispute, even if precise breakdowns are.

Claims about the proportion of civilians among those killed vary and are politically sensitive. Some reporting, including investigations cited by The Guardian, has pointed to high civilian casualty ratios in particular datasets or incidents. However, there is no single agreed figure across the conflict, and different methodologies produce different results. Comparisons with historical atrocities such as Rwanda or Srebrenica, and the use of the term genocide, remain matters of legal and political contention. South Africa, has brought a case before the International Court of Justice alleging violations of the Genocide Convention, bit despite mounting accusations, other governments have not adopted that characterisation. Proceedings at the ICJ are ongoing.

Within this context, attention has turned to the role of partner countries, including the United Kingdom, in supplying military equipment or components. The UK is not a leading supplier of arms to Israel, having issued export licences worth around £17 million in 2023. However, in 2024, the value of licences approved rose drastically to £142 million. The available data indicate that the exported parts have included items such as components for military aircraft, small arms ammunition, naval systems and body armour. These are generally supplied under a tightly controlled licensing regime, with the UK government required to assess the risk that such items could be used in violations of international humanitarian law.

A more significant and structurally complex area of UK involvement lies in multinational defence programmes, particularly the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The UK is a principal partner in the F-35 programme and contributes an estimated 10–15% of each aircraft by value. Israel has operated F-35 aircraft since 2016 and has used them operationally in multiple theatres, including Gaza.

These exported components are built in the UK, with BAE Systems making the rear fuselage of every F-35 fighter at Samlesbury Aerodrome, Lancashire. The “active inceptor system,” which might be the most strategic contribution of the UK to the F-35, is crucial because the F-35 is inherently unstable by design and requires this advanced digital control system to automatically stabilise the aircraft, making thousands of micro-adjustments per second to keep the aircraft stable and operational. BAE Systems also develops it from its location in Rochester, Kent. The durability testing is undertaken at the BAE structural testing facility in East Yorkshire.

Other UK-based firms contribute key subsystems. L3Harris, previously known as EDO MBM, the company that manufactures the “Hornet System” for the Turkish TB2 drones, also produces weapons release cables for the F-35 in Brighton Leonardo produces targeting and sensor components, including elements of laser designation systems, at its Edinburgh site. Martin-Baker supplies ejection seats used across multiple fast-jet platforms, including variants of the F-35 programme. Dunlop Aircraft Tyres manufactures tyres for military aircraft in Birmingham. These contributions are integrated into a global production system managed primarily through the United States, rather than exported directly to Israel under bilateral UK licences.

There is also UK-linked industrial involvement in legacy aircraft platforms used by Israel, particularly the F-16. British companies have historically supplied components such as avionics elements, display systems and ejection seats through international supply chains. As with the F-35, these are typically incorporated via US-led production and sustainment arrangements.

The operational importance of these aircraft is clear. The F-15, F-16 and F-35 form the backbone of the Israeli Air Force’s strike capability and have been widely reported as being used in air operations over Gaza. However, attributing specific airstrikes to particular aircraft types is often difficult without access to classified or highly detailed forensic data.

Numerous airstrikes have been documented in which large numbers of civilians were reportedly killed. Human rights organisations, including Amnesty International, have investigated incidents in locations such as Rafah and al-Maghazi in 2024, where dozens of civilians, including children, were killed in individual strikes.

On July 13th, 2025, Israeli F-35s dropped several multi-ton bombs (likely GBU-31) in the Al-Mawasi humanitarian zone in southern Gaza, where Palestinians thought they would be safe from such atrocities. Estimates are that as many as 150 people were likely killed in this attack. It is not the first case of Israeli fighters flying with these 2,000 lb GBU-31 JDAM bombs, which are being used to provide Close Air Support (CAS) to troops in Gaza, confirms the IDF Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi.

In some cases, analysts have identified munition fragments consistent with Israeli weapons systems, including bombs designed for use on F-15 and F-16 aircraft, such as the MPR 500. Attribution to specific aircraft or supply chains, however, remains complex and often inconclusive.

Other investigations have focused on precision-guided munitions. Reporting by The Guardian and others has highlighted that MBDA, through its US subsidiary MBDA Incorporated, manufactures components for the GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb, specifically the wing kits that enable guided flight. These components are produced under US export controls, even though MBDA has a significant UK presence and British industrial participation. Financial flows within multinational defence firms mean that profits can be distributed across corporate structures that include UK-based entities, including BAE Systems as a shareholder in MBDA.

Individual incidents involving such munitions have been widely reported. For example, strikes on displaced persons’ camps and schools in Gaza in 2024 and 2025 have been linked by investigators to precision-guided bombs, including GBU-39 variants, with significant civilian casualties reported. As with other aspects of the conflict, details of weapon type, delivery platform and targeting decisions are often disputed and not always independently verifiable in full.

Despite the heavy presence of these fighter jets, it is often highly complicated to confirm that an F-35, an F-16, or an F-15 was the aircraft conducting the strike. Still, it is something that cannot be discarded. As such, other cruel examples of airstrikes must be considered, such as in October 2023, the Israeli Air Force struck a residential building known as the Engineer’s building in the Gaza Strip with four separate strikes, killing 106 civilians, including 54 children. In August 2025, another airstrike struck one of the leading hospitals in Gaza, killing at least 20 people and wounding many more. Five journalists and an unknown number of rescue workers were also killed in this pitiful attack.

Three airstrikes, one on al-Maghazi on the 16th of April, and two on Rafah on the 19th and the 20th of April 2024, killed 44 Palestinian civilians, including 32 children. Children as young as 2 years old were killed in the airstrike or in the following days, succumbing to the fatal injuries, as reported by Amnesty International: “I found my sister’s son, Mohammed (age 12). He was badly injured and died two days later. Then I found my daughter Mila (four). She was badly injured and was taken to the hospital, but when I went to the hospital about an hour later, I found that she had died shortly after… Then I saw my daughter Lujan (nine), she was dead.” His son Ahmed (seven) was badly injured but survived.”

Fragments recovered from a four-storey home of a family in West Rafah – killing nine members of the family – six children, two women and one man – belonged to an Israeli-produced 500lb bomb named MPR 500, which was designed for integration into the F-15I and F-16s. There is no clear evidence that the MPR 500 are compatible with F-35s of the IAF; however, F-35s have participated in operations where these bombs were used, such as Israel’s Operation Rising Lion against Iranian military targets.

Sometimes, the involvement is self-explanatory: An aircraft like the F-35 cannot operate without key components which are manufactured in the UK. On other occasions, the involvement is murkier and, in some cases, it’s not the components that need to be traced and analysed, but rather the money:

An investigation by The Guardian revealed that MBDA, through its US subsidiary MBDA Incorporated, produces the Diamond Back wing system, also known as “folding aerodynamic surfaces,” for the GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb (SDB). These “wings” are designed to stabilise the bomb in flight, unfolding after launch, allowing the bomb to be guided to its target. Financial flows from the US company go through MBDA UK, based in Hertfordshire, England, and then move to the other headquarters in France. MBDA’s dividends, which reached nearly £350m in 2024, are then distributed to its shareholders, which include the UK’s biggest defence contractor, BAE Systems.

This investigation showed 24 distinct occurrences where Israeli airstrikes used GBU-39 bombs, and over 100 children were killed as a result. On the 26th of May 2025, a bomb struck the roof of Fahmi al-Jarjawi school while dozens of families that had been displaced were resting there. 36 people, half of them children, were killed that night as the building was engulfed in flames. One year before, on the 26th of May 2024, another strike with GBU-39s had hit the Kuwaiti Peace Camp 1 in Rafah, killing 45 and injuring 249, with a toddler and a young woman being decapitated by the fragments of the bomb.

In September 2024, UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy announced the suspension of a number of export licences to Israel, citing a “clear risk” that certain items might be used in serious violations of international humanitarian law. These suspensions apply to direct UK export licences but do not automatically cover overseas subsidiaries of UK-linked firms operating under other jurisdictions, such as the United States.

The result is a layered picture of UK involvement. Direct arms exports are relatively limited and subject to formal controls. Indirect participation through multinational programmes and supply chains is more substantial but also more diffuse, making it harder to regulate through national export policy alone.

The broader conduct of the war in Gaza continues to generate intense international scrutiny. The high number of reported civilian casualties, including large numbers of children, has led to repeated warnings from humanitarian organisations about proportionality and civilian protection. Allegations of war crimes have been made by various actors, though legal determinations depend on ongoing investigations and judicial processes.

Within this context, the UK’s role remains the subject of political and legal debate. The central tension is between its position as a strategic partner to Israel and its obligations under international law, particularly with regard to arms exports and the risk of facilitating violations.