On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched a coordinated military operation against Iran, resulting in the decapitation of much of Iran’s political and military leadership including the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Iran’s retaliatory operation has struck US military installations, critical infrastructure, and civilian targets across 11 countries in the region. Syria has so far avoided direct involvement in the conflict, but its geographic position offers little insulation. The country shares borders with Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Israel, all of which are active theaters of war.

Despite some progress made by the transitional authorities led by President Ahmad al-Sharaa since the fall of the Assad regime, Syria’s situation remains inherently fragile. With the regional escalation expanding in size and scope, the spillover risks for the country are significant: Refugee flows, economic shocks, and renewed pressure on its borders all threaten to compound an already fragile political transition, with a government already facing a formidable set of structural, economic, and political challenges.

Security implications

Beyond debris falls, airspace violations, and temporary airport closures, Syria has largely remained on the periphery of the regional conflict. Dozens of Iranian missiles and military drones intercepted over Syrian airspace have left a trail of debris across at least 18 locations in the south, resulting in several civilian casualties, while schools in Quneitra, Daraa, and Suwayda were temporarily suspended. Damascus International Airport remains closed, though the partial reopening of a northern corridor through Aleppo Airport signals an attempt to position Syria as a limited transit alternative amid widespread regional airspace disruptions.

Nonetheless, the deterioration of the regional security environment is already shaping to have a direct impact on Syria. Israel’s renewed escalation of violence in Lebanon constitutes the most direct spillover risk. Syria has deployed military forces along its border with Lebanon, officially to prevent Hezbollah and IRGC elements from entering Syrian territory and staging attacks on Israel. Units consisting of Uzbek and Uyghur fighters have reportedly been deployed around Qusair, directly opposite of Hermel in the Lebanese Beqaa Valley which is known to have a significant presence of Hezbollah fighters. 

Following President al-Sharaa’s public expression of support for Hezbollah’s disarmament, artillery shells fired from Lebanon landed in the Syrian border town of Serghaya. The Syrian Army confirmed the shelling and stated it had detected Hezbollah reinforcements moving toward the Syrian-Lebanese border, warning it would coordinate any response with the Lebanese government. Moreover, since the resumption of Israeli military operations in Lebanon, at least 119,000 Syrians have crossed back into Syria, adding further strain on Damascus’s already limited institutional capacity.

The renewed tensions along the Lebanese-Syrian border have raised concerns that Damascus may be contemplating direct military intervention in Lebanon against Hezbollah

The renewed tensions along the Lebanese-Syrian border have raised concerns that Damascus may be contemplating direct military intervention in Lebanon against Hezbollah. While a ground incursion remains unlikely at the current stage, the tensions have already drawn in European mediation efforts. On March 12, French President Emmanuel Macron convened a tripartite call with his Syrian and Lebanese counterparts to discuss the ongoing security situation that reportedly includes direct negotiations with Israel. Should Lebanon’s efforts to disarm Hezbollah lead into open confrontation, Beirut may turn to Damascus to support its efforts, though a direct military intervention remains unlikely at the current stage. Washington has reportedly encouraged Syria to deploy forces into eastern Lebanon to assist in disarming Hezbollah, something which Damascus has so far shown little appetite for. While the US Special Envoy for Syria denied these claims, the calculus may shift in the future. The expansion of Israel’s ground offensive into southern Lebanon, sustained American pressure on both Damascus and Beirut, and continued Hezbollah cross-border violations could all compel Syrian authorities to reassess their position—leaving al-Sharaa to tread carefully in a climate where direct involvement carries risks Syria may not be in a position to absorb. 

Similarly, Damascus confirmed it had reinforced its deployment along the Iraqi border with units described as border guard forces and reconnaissance battalions tasked with monitoring cross-border activity and combating smuggling. Syria’s eastern frontier has long served as a corridor for Iran-aligned militias, and the collapse of Iranian strategic infrastructure elsewhere in the region has heightened concerns that armed groups may attempt to exploit the border to reposition or resupply.

Moreover, the recent US military withdrawal from northeastern Syria has deepened an already fragile security environment. Limited government presence in the region, combined with only a partially implemented integration agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), has left a lingering security vacuum that hostile actors may attempt to exploit. Additionally, several ISIS-related incidents have been recorded in Syria since the start of the regional conflict, including a failed car bomb attack in Damascus. This comes after ISIS recently announced a “new phase of operations,” carrying out at least six attacks across Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor that killed at least eight Syrian security personnel. 

The threat extends to Syria’s leadership directly. Reports suggest Türkiye’s intelligence agency MIT formally requested MI6 take a larger role in protecting President al-Sharaa following a “high-risk assassination plot.” While Ankara has denied the claim, it comes after a recent report by the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism, which confirmed that al-Sharaa and two senior cabinet ministers were targeted in five foiled ISIS assassination attempts in 2025 alone. A sustained ISIS resurgence, enabled by the diversion of United States Central Command resources, risks confronting the transitional government with a security crisis it cannot manage alone—directly impacting the prospects of the political transition.

Economic implications

Regional escalation has already impacted global energy markets and resulted in supply chain disruptions, with Syria being no exception. Syria’s Ministry of Energy acknowledged on March 2 that the reduction in electricity supply hours was a direct result of the suspension of natural gas flows arriving via Jordan. Egypt simultaneously halted the pumping of approximately 100 million cubic feet of natural gas per day that had been destined for Syria and Lebanon through the Arab Gas Pipeline. Panic buying and queues at fuel stations resulted in a demand spike of over 300 percent above the daily average, forcing the ministry to state that there is no immediate fuel crisis. Both the Jordanian and Egyptian supply channels that Damascus had negotiated in early 2026 as part of its Arab reconnection strategy are now suspended or disrupted. 

In recent weeks, Syria has experienced a gradual increase in the cost of living

In recent weeks, Syria has experienced a gradual increase in the cost of living. Disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz have impacted global supply chains resulting in rising import costs for food, medicine, and industrial goods, and will likely present a further stress test for the Syrian economy. Meanwhile, the suspension of Gulf air routes and the rerouting of regional maritime traffic have severed the commercial corridors through which Damascus had been receiving early reconstruction investment and humanitarian aid. At a time where Syria has been seeking to diversify its regional ties, the ensuing crisis may force the Syrian administration to increase its economic dependency on Türkiye. Moreover, Ankara is currently the only partner with functioning pipeline infrastructure already connected to the Syrian grid. With Gulf donor states absorbing direct and sustained Iranian attacks, the financial and reconstruction pledges essential to Syria’s economic revival are also at risk of being put on hold.

Political implications

Syria has publicly positioned itself alongside the Gulf Arab states targeted by Iranian retaliation, while refraining from commenting on US and Israeli operations in the region. Syria’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement condemning Tehran’s aggression on Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Jordan, describing it as a blatant attack on the sovereignty and security of those states. It has also condemned ballistic missile and drone attacks on Türkiye and Azerbaijan. President al-Sharaa conducted a series of phone calls with regional heads of state, while Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani engaged counterparts across the Gulf and the Levant. On March 9, al-Sharaa participated in a video conference convened by European Council President António Costa and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, bringing together Middle Eastern leaders to discuss deescalation and ways to prevent the conflict from widening. 

Syria’s position appears less a choice than a necessity, as Damascus closely monitors a deteriorating security environment on both its eastern and western flanks

Unlike Iraq, which lodged a formal complaint with the UN Security Council, Syria has made no public statement on the use of its airspace by US and Israeli forces, which may be interpreted as a tacit approval. Syria’s position appears less a choice than a necessity, as Damascus closely monitors a deteriorating security environment on both its eastern and western flanks, with Lebanon and Iraq increasingly drawn into the conflict. Its international reintegration, sanctions relief, and reconstruction financing all depend on maintaining credibility with Washington and the Gulf states. 

Domestically, the conflict risks straining a still-fragile political transition: rising energy costs, refugee inflows from Lebanon, and the assertiveness of border actors like Hezbollah could embolden spoilers and complicate state-building efforts. Damascus’s delicate diplomatic balancing act rests on one assumption: that direct involvement would almost certainly undermine the progress of the post-Assad political transition.

Outlook 

The risk of a protracted, ever-expanding regional conflict may have long-lasting implications for the country’s internal security, economic recovery, and political transition. The transitional government’s ability to project competence and stability, already constrained by limited resources and incomplete state consolidation, influx of Syrian returnees, and economic disruptions attributable to the wider conflict, may further erode its domestic legitimacy.

At the same time, the conflict may also create openings for Damascus. A weakened Iran and Hezbollah would diminish their residual influence inside Syria and reduce their ability to destabilize the transitional government. Moreover, the broader shift in regional attention may afford the government greater room to maneuver on unresolved internal fronts. With Israeli attention divided across multiple theaters, Damascus may perceive a window to accelerate its push to restore central authority over the Suwayda province. Yet any such move carries serious risks, given Israel’s purported commitment to Druze security in Syria. It has warned Damascus against exploiting the current situation and has shown its intent to follow up with actions as exemplified by its strikes against Syrian Army positions on March 20, which came one day after clashes between the army and the Druze National Guard militia in Suwayda.

How Damascus manages to balance between consolidating state authority, avoiding direct entanglement in the wider conflict, and capitalizing on the weakening of its historical adversaries, will be a defining test of the transitional government’s strategic judgment in the months ahead.

Samy Akil is a Nonresident Fellow at TIMEP focusing on politics and security in Syria and a Senior Program Advisor for The Syria Report.