Shafaq News
On Sept. 30, the US-led Global Coalition’s military mission
in Iraq is scheduled to end, marking a transition toward a bilateral security
relationship between Baghdad and Washington. Six analysts interviewed by Shafaq
News say the country it leaves behind is the most exposed battleground in a
regional war that no longer runs along a single front.
The experts broadly agree that the Middle East has entered a
phase of multi-front escalation. They see the main danger not in one decisive
confrontation but in the way violence now moves between Iraq, Syria, Lebanon,
Yemen, the Gulf and the Red Sea. A strike in one place can trigger a response
in another, often through armed groups that no government fully controls.
Since war broke out between the United States and Iran on
February 28, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has fallen sharply. Traffic
through Bab el-Mandeb, the narrow passage between Yemen and the Horn of Africa,
has also suffered under attacks by Yemen’s Houthi movement.
Read more: Houthi advance raises stakes from Bab al-Mandeb to Iraq
In Iraq, many of the factions operate through formations
within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a state-funded security
institution established during the 2014 fight against ISIS and dominated by
Shiite formations. Several of those factions keep close ties to Tehran. Their
political wings sit inside the Coordination Framework, the principal Shiite
political alliance and a central force in government formation. Prime Minister
Ali Falih al-Zaidi took office after the November 2025 elections. He is now
trying to keep Iraq out of the war while negotiating the disarmament of groups
that answer only partly to his government.
Read more:Iran war spreads to Iraq and Red Sea as regional risks mount
No Longer One Bloc
Firas Elias, a professor of international relations at the
University of Mosul, argues that treating the region’s armed groups as a
unified front is now analytically wrong. Their goals, capabilities and
dependence on state sponsors differ too widely.
Elias describes three overlapping circles. The first is Iran
and the groups aligned with it in Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen. The second is
Israel, which relies increasingly on direct military force. The third is the
United States, still the most influential outside military power in the region.
Turkiye, the Gulf states and Syria each play their own, uneven roles alongside
them. These circles now link the Gulf and Hormuz to Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and
the Red Sea. With so many militias, regular armies, foreign bases, oil
installations and shipping lanes packed into one theater, he warns that a
single “miscalculation” could push the conflict onto a different
level. A strike on a strategic facility or one that causes mass casualties
would be enough.
He places Iraq at the top of the risk list. The country sits
between the warring parties, and some of its factions hold missiles and drones.
“Any attack launched from Iraqi territory therefore reaches directly into
Baghdad’s relations with Washington, Tehran and the Gulf.”
Read more:Saudi pipeline attack deepens pressure on Al-Zaidi over armed factions
For Elias, the real challenge is not only keeping Iraqi soil
out of the war. It is whether the Iraqi state can hold a monopoly over the
decision to use force and stop the country from becoming a military extension
of wider regional conflicts. He adds that if the fighting reaches energy
infrastructure or shipping routes, the security crisis would become an economic
one. Freight and insurance costs would rise, oil exports would be disrupted,
and supply chains would break.
Adnan al-Kinani, an Iraqi security expert, argues that the
war has outgrown its three main protagonists: the United States, Israel and
Iran. It has spread to fronts where their allies and partners operate. He names
the Houthis, Iraq’s factions and Lebanon’s Hezbollah as potential backup fronts
if the war with Iran widens. In his reading, fighting in Syria and Lebanon has
eased compared with elsewhere. Yemen, by contrast, has become more closely tied
to the regional confrontation, particularly as Saudi Arabia takes a more active
role against the Houthis. He also places the conflict within a wider climate of
global tension, noting that the war in Ukraine carries its own risks for energy
markets and the world economy.
Iran’s relationships with the groups are not identical.
Hezbollah has maintained a particularly close ideological, financial, and
military relationship with Tehran for decades, while the Houthis retain a more
distinct political and religious identity despite extensive cooperation with
Iran. In both cases, Iranian support has extended their reach well beyond
national borders.
Players Outside The Axis
Sami Salam, a political researcher, argues that Turkiye,
Saudi Arabia and a transformed Syria make any two-camp reading of the region
misleading. He points to the agreement between al-Zaidi and Turkish President
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, reached on Sept. 23 on the sidelines of the UN General
Assembly in New York. Under the deal, control of the Bashiqa/Zilkan base, a
Turkish military installation northeast of Mosul, will pass gradually to the
Iraqi government. The two leaders also agreed on steps to restore state
authority in Sinjar, the Yazidi-majority district where Ankara has long
demanded the removal of armed groups it regards as foreign and banned.
Salam says Saudi Arabia has become a more direct security
actor. Syria now weighs heavily in Iraq’s calculations, he adds, especially as
regional trade and energy routes shift. Since Bashar al-Assad fell in December
2024, the transitional leadership under Ahmed al-Sharaa has widened Damascus’s
Arab and Western ties. On Aug. 24, Washington formally removed Syria from its
list of state sponsors of terrorism, building on broader sanctions relief
introduced earlier. The experts argue that Syria no longer serves as the land
bridge in Iran’s regional network that it did under al-Assad. That change
reshapes the calculations of factions operating across the Iraqi-Syrian border.
Asef Melhem, director of the JSM Center for Research and
Studies in Moscow, expects Washington to scale back its Middle East presence
after years of direct involvement. The mounting cost of unresolved conflicts,
from Gaza and Lebanon to Yemen, Iran, and Iraq’s factions, is blurring US
strategy for the region’s future, he argues. Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan,
Egypt, Iran and Israel would each try to fill the resulting vacuum.
Melhem does not expect any regional alliance to replace the
US role. Instead, he warns that the competition could turn into indirect
rivalry fought through local allies. Without a regional settlement, that
rivalry would keep the region unstable and carry it onto new fronts.
The Weapons Question
Salam says not all factions share al-Zaidi’s goal of
neutrality. Some have already handed over their weapons or begun integrating
into state institutions. Others keep their arms, remain tied to Iran
politically and ideologically, and argue that continuing regional threats
justify what they call “resistance weapons.”
The holdouts include Kataib Hezbollah, whose political wing,
the Hoqooq Movement, holds six seats in parliament. They also include Kataib
Sayyid al-Shuhada, whose Muntasiroun bloc won about five seats within the State
of Law coalition led by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Harakat
al-Nujaba, which has no parliamentary wing, completes the group. On Sept. 4,
al-Nujaba reaffirmed that it would not give up its arms. The holdouts tie any
handover to a full withdrawal of foreign forces, and some also demand defense
guarantees, including stronger Iraqi air defenses.
Other factions have shown more willingness to work with the
state. They include Asaib Ahl al-Haq, whose Sadiqoon bloc won 27 seats in the
2025 vote. Another is Saraya al-Salam, the armed wing of cleric Muqtada
al-Sadr’s movement, which boycotted the elections. The third is Kataib al-Imam
Ali, which leads the five-seat Khadamat Alliance.
The timetable has evolved. Sept. 30 was initially treated by
Iraqi political forces as a key deadline for bringing factional weapons under
state control, but al-Zaidi has since outlined a phased process extending to
June 30, 2027. Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein said on Sept. 25 that the
government is drafting a new plan to bring unlicensed weapons under state
control while talks with the factions continue.
Even within the Coordination Framework, the approach has
critics. A source in the alliance told Shafaq News on Sept. 23 that fixing a
hard deadline could complicate negotiations with faction leaders.
Read more: Iraq’s disarmament deadline pits Baghdad against Iran-aligned factions
The US-led Coalition’s forces have been withdrawing from
their remaining mission sites as Baghdad and Washington transition toward a
bilateral security relationship. Iraq says its forces can manage internal
security and the remaining ISIS threat, while intelligence sharing, training
and arms cooperation are expected to continue.
Beyond Security
Ahmed Fouad Anwar, a professor of Israeli studies at Egypt’s
Alexandria University, sees risks on two levels. At home, any security
breakdown or delay in payments owed to some armed groups could spill into
Iraq’s internal security. Abroad, the factions’ behavior will track the
pressure on Iran. He argues that ordinary Iraqis would be the first to feel any
wider shock through fuel prices, flight disruptions and insurance costs.
“Because so many outside powers are involved, disarming the factions will also
require broader regional arrangements. It may even require a review of Iraq’s
political and constitutional framework.”
From Beirut, political analyst Hussein Chaito argues that
Iraq’s geography and the overlapping presence of regional powers on its soil
make it impossible to separate from events around it. He considers Iraq a key
front for Iran’s allies and sees the dispute over weapons as inseparable from
the US presence and the regional balance of power. He describes the standoff
between the government and the factions as a fire smoldering beneath the
surface, though he believes dialogue can still prevent armed confrontation. He
stresses the role of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq’s senior Shiite
cleric in Najaf, in calming public anger and preventing a slide into internal
conflict. Iraq’s stability, he concludes, is essential to the stability of the
region as a whole.
Al-Zaidi’s 90-day phase runs until late December. That
period covers the first weeks after the Coalition mission ends and a US-Iran
war that shows no sign of ending. The plan is built around factions refraining
from attacks. Whether that restraint survives a sharper escalation against Iran
could shape not only Iraq’s internal stability, but the wider regional
conflict.
Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.