Today, many in Lebanon remain afraid of a third round after the September 2024 and March 2026 Israeli offensives. [Getty]
The third anniversary of Hezbollah launching what it describes as “the support front for Gaza” falls on 8 October 2023. Its repercussions continue for Lebanon, amid ongoing Israeli attacks and an expanded occupation over more than 60 villages and towns.
Today, many in Lebanon remain afraid of a third round after the September 2024 and March 2026 Israeli offensives.
On the third anniversary, Hezbollah issued a statement, saying: “The enemy has failed to eliminate Hamas, the resistance factions or the people of Gaza, and has failed to achieve peace, or even a temporary truce and stability. The situation remains open to developments whose repercussions will extend beyond the Gaza Strip to the future of the entire region, the Palestinian cause, and international security and peace.”
“Hezbollah in Lebanon, which believes in the justness of the Palestinian cause and does not hesitate to support its resisting and oppressed people, renews its strong condemnation of the blatant Zionist genocide that exposes the false values of the international community and holds the US administration and Western countries that remain silent about condemning Zionist crimes responsible, whether those involving genocide or crimes against humanity,” it further said.
“We stand firmly with all these resistance factions so that they remain steadfast and united around their vision and position against the enemy’s project, its supporters and those complicit with it. We also warn the region’s rulers that remaining silent, accommodating and flattering the enemy and its allies will only lead to the undermining of their authority, weakening them and enabling the enemy to determine the future of their countries and peoples,” it added.
Victims of the two support wars
Hezbollah’s ‘Gaza support front’ began on 8 October 2023 and was initially confined to south Lebanon. But the geographical scope, consequences, human losses, and economic cost gradually expanded, particularly after September 2024.
More than 8,900 people have been killed and more than 30,000 injured by Israel since 8 October 2023, while the forced displacement of thousands of families continues, whether because their homes were damaged, their villages were occupied or destroyed, or some were destroyed by more than 90%.
Additionally, financial losses are estimated at more than $27 billion, mostly in the south, as well as damage in the Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel in eastern Lebanon, Beirut, the southern suburbs of Beirut, and other areas to varying degrees.
The war also brought radical changes.
First for Hezbollah, with the loss of its first- and second-tier leaders, most notably its Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah on 27 September 2024 and his successor Hashem Safieddine on 3 October 2024.
It was also subjected to one of the largest cybersecurity operations, with the explosions of “pagers” and “walkie-talkies” on 17 and 18 September 2024.
The Islamic group found its military capabilities significant declined, while it also lost key supply lines, most notably the Syrian route, after the fall of the Assad regime on 8 December 2024, and its external support, particularly Iranian support, decreased.
Moreover, Israel is targeting Hezbollah’s financing networks, foremost among them the Al-Qard Al-Hassan Association.
Hezbollah’s political position was also impacted with a decline in its influence in state centres and institutions with the beginning of the new era under President Joseph Aoun on 9 January 2025, which came with broad US support, sovereignty-focused slogans and historic decisions.
The most important of these decisions was the cabinet’s approval of a measure to restrict weapons in Lebanon and its tasking of the Lebanese army with drawing up a plan to implement this, in August 2025, with progress recorded in implementation south of the Litani River.
This came before Hezbollah’s security and military activities were banned on 2 March, after it supported Iran by launching six missiles from Lebanon at Israel, following the start of the US-Israeli war on Iran on 28 February, along with other decisions that also affected the Iranian side.
The choice of launching “support fronts”, for Gaza and Iran, also affected Hezbollah’s alliances, particularly through the “disengagement” between it and the Free Patriotic Movement headed by MP Gebran Bassil, as well as its relationship with the Amal Movement headed by Nabih Berri, amid differences and varying views that emerged in approaching the issue.
Hezbollah and Amal have continued to seek through ongoing meetings to maintain coordination and cooperation, amid some tensions in southern areas associated with both sides.
This followed media reports about attempts by Hezbollah to establish positions and launch platforms in some towns politically associated with the Amal Movement.
Another major shift is that Lebanon and Israel began direct negotiations for the first time on 14 April 2026, resulting in the signing of a framework agreement in Washington on 26 June, and subsequently encouraged political and media discourse calling for normalisation and peace with Israel, marking a major breaking of taboos.
This was particularly evident with Lebanese channels conducting interviews with Israelis and showing blatant bias towards Israeli narratives, eventually leading to direct cooperation between a Lebanese platform and an Israeli one.
Addressing the cost of the ongoing war for Lebanon, Nasser Yassin, director of the Beirut branch of the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies, told The New Arab that estimates indicate that the cost since 8 October until today has exceeded $27 billion.
These losses are divided between direct losses related to the destruction and damage to homes, residences, buildings and infrastructure, as well as losses related to the agricultural, commercial and economic sectors, among others.
Yassin noted that most losses are concentrated in the south, alongside damage also recorded in the southern suburbs of Beirut and the Bekaa in eastern Lebanon.
He pointed out that the number of homes destroyed or requiring complete demolition in this war had reached about 132,000, more than those recorded during the July and August 2006 war, when the number of destroyed homes reached around 12,000.
Israel has been attacking south Lebanon daily, despite an alleged ceasefire. [Getty]
He also said there are currently about 65 occupied villages and towns in the south where destruction and land levelling are taking place continuously.
Yassin was environment minister in the government of former Prime Minister Najib Mikati, during which indirect negotiations with Israel led to a ceasefire agreement on 27 November 2024.
However, Israel violated it thousands of times while insisting on remaining at five southern positions.
The expanded offensive then resumed on 2 March, increasing Israeli control over southern villages and sites.
Yassin noted the 27 November 2024 agreement was based on Resolution 1701, which brought an end to the Israeli offensive against Lebanon in summer 2006.
Under the agreement, Lebanon affirmed its commitment to the deployment of the Lebanese army and the state’s exercise of sovereignty through its own forces in the south, particularly south of the Litani River, while Israel was to withdraw from positions it occupied at the time.
“Today, the situation is different. There is a security zone, Israeli occupation and control over about 65 villages, and an area that Israel has completely eradicated and destroyed. Therefore, the discussion is now taking place in a different context,” he said.
As for whether the negotiations could produce the anticipated solution, Yassin acknowledged it is unclear whether the negotiations currently underway will lead to an outcome.
However, Lebanon has no option other than negotiations to achieve a withdrawal, whether directly, indirectly or through Arab or international mediators.
Yassin said the negotiating performance should be better and should primarily place Israel’s withdrawal at the top of any framework, since Israel is occupying another country’s land, namely Lebanon, thereby violating international law.
Therefore, he added, the withdrawal should not be linked to measures and issues as happened in the framework agreement, even though these are important.
Domestic repercussions
Regarding the domestic repercussions, particularly for Hezbollah, political writer Khaldoun Al Sharif told The New Arab that “[the support front] led to major Israeli breaches that affected Hezbollah, beginning with the pager and walkie-talkie operations and the assassination of Nasrallah and ending with the occupation of a large area of the south.”
Al Sharif noted that “the assassination of Nasrallah, the symbolic leader of Hezbollah, along with the assassination of leaders in the Radwan Force, the party’s elite force, and military officials, fundamentally changed the equation. This included the leadership, capabilities, military capacity and material resources.”
At the popular level, Al Sharif does not believe the support for the war changed much.
There had been no national, international or governmental support for the party’s constituency, which led to its continued attachment to the party.
He also noted that it is impossible to assess changes at this level or among the opposing Shia constituency because the usual measure is parliamentary elections, which were postponed because of the war.
According to Al Sharif, the war inevitably affected domestic alliances because political forces in Lebanon only agree on specific interests, rather than principles or values.
“The Amal Movement remains committed to its alliance with the party because the fall of the duo, in one way or another, would lead to the Shiite community being left alone. Therefore, the issue of Shiite unity remains fundamental for both of them regardless of the repercussions,” he said.
Al Sharif also said the decisions taken by the government in August 2025 and March 2026 have not been implemented to date, adding that what matters is implementation.
However, he noted there is no doubt that these decisions were taken after the balance of power changed, particularly following the assassination of Nasrallah.
Al Sharif argued that there is a division between two camps in Lebanon, with only a small percentage of people in the middle: “the Iranian camp,” which has been left alone, and the US camp and its allies.
He said that before the situation in the Gulf and Iran becomes clear, it is difficult to determine where Lebanon will go.
“If Iran is crushed, we will face a new equation. If it is not crushed, the equation will be different. Therefore, today we are in a state of ‘status quo’, particularly since the latest round of negotiations held in Rome last August. Whether we like it or not, Lebanon has become tied to the existing regional equations and the international equations that will impose new balances of power in this region,” he remarked.
Hezbollah alliances in decline
Mahend Al Hajj Ali, a researcher at the Malcolm Kerr-Carnegie Middle East Centre, told The New Arab that the war weakened and destabilised the political alliances Hezbollah had built since 2005.
Presently, there is a threat emerging against the alliance it also established with the Amal Movement.
This is one of the repercussions at the political level, in addition to its relationship with Christian, Sunni and Druze forces that had been allied with it but are no longer as they were and have become distributed among a group of regional powers that are not allied with the party.
Al Hajj Ali said that at the social and demographic level, the repercussions have been enormous for the community that supports Hezbollah, namely Lebanese Shias, who, as a result of the war, have been subjected to ethnic cleansing that displaced them from their homeland across a large part of Jabal Amel in southern Lebanon.
Currently, the other part north of the Litani River is also exposed to ethnic cleansing, and in his view it has begun and could continue if a third war breaks out, which is very possible.
Al Hajj Ali also highlighted the changes that have taken place at the regional level, including the change in the situation in Syria and the collapse of the Syrian regime, which had repercussions for Lebanon and Hezbollah.
He also pointed to the establishment of a new era and a new government in Lebanon, following a line opposed to that of Hezbollah and based on the principle that weapons come first.
Article translated from Arabic by Afrah Almatwari. To read the original, click here.