There are two rounds of voting in Iraq’s democracy, one official and the other seldom spoken about openly. In the first, Iraqis vote for candidates in single constituencies, though most candidates affiliate with party lists. Because Iraq is such a diverse country and so many parties compete, no candidate or party ever gets a majority. What comes next is a lot of backroom deal-making as Iraqi power brokers like Nouri al-Maliki, Hadi al-Ameri, or Masoud Barzani maneuver pawns into various offices.
Within the Iraqi system, the prime minister is the most powerful position, followed by the parliamentary speaker, and then the president, whose job is largely ceremonial. The current president, Abdul Latif Rashid, is dementia-addled, does little, and mostly exists to channel the presidency’s budget to the Patriot Union of Kurdistan, the political party and family enterprise his late brother-in-law, Jalal Talabani, founded in 1975.
Candidates for the premiership must meet with influential figures in the offices of the various ayatollahs and win their non-objection.
The second round of voting revolves around winning the support of major stakeholders and influence-brokers. After each election, the aspirants for prime minister seek to gain the approval not only of rival party bosses, but also the leading figures of Najaf and Iraq’s chief international stakeholders. Shi’ism’s most respected ayatollahs pride themselves on standing aloof from politics. In practice, they will never endorse a candidate, though they will object to those whose corruption and incompetence risk hurting the broader Shi’i community. One reason why so few incumbents win a second premiership is that the ayatollahs assess with objectivity and do not allow empty promises or financial incentives to sway them on principles. This means that candidates for the premiership must meet with influential figures in the offices of the various ayatollahs and win their non-objection. Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki failed in this regard. So, too, has the ambitious current intelligence chief, Hamid Rashid Faleh Al-Shatri.
Candidates also seek the buy-in of the United States and Iran. In practice, this means U.S. envoys, ambassadors, and chiefs-of-station have series of meetings in which aspirants promise them all sorts of deliverables in exchange for support. The same candidates often make opposite commitments to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Some aspirants—Badr Corps chief Hadi Al-Ameri, for example—will never win U.S. support due to their fealty to Iran. Others, like former Prime Minister and intelligence chief Mustafa al-Kadhimi, appear to have made conflicting promises. While he regaled American patrons with promises and tales of rounding up assets, he appears to have diverted more weaponry and resources to Iranian-backed groups than any predecessor.
Incumbent Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani desperately wants a second term. He has much about which he can brag: Iraqi infrastructure has developed incredibly since he took office. Iraq has been relatively peaceful under his tenure, although his critics would allege this is due to his appeasement of Iranian interests. Still, there are dark clouds over his tenure. A phone-tapping scandal nearly cost him his position, though in the end, many other interests—including Iran—appear to have concluded it was better to have a weak prime minister than a new one. Allegations of corruption swirl, with many critics fingering his brother Abbas, who reputedly acts as his unofficial agent.
Sudani also appears desperate to cement himself as a major and permanent power broker, much the way Maliki and Ameri have. His picture appears far more in public than Maliki’s ever did. Iraqis fear that a second term could whitewash the faults of the first and allow Sudani to entrench himself to the detriment of democracy.
On November 11, 2025, Iraqis went to the polls. Sudani won forty-six seats outright to Maliki’s twenty-nine, though adding Maliki’s coalition partners put him neck-in-neck with Sudani. Maliki’s pro-Iran antics led President Donald Trump to reject publicly Maliki’s candidacy. While this was an affront to Iraqi sovereignty, Sudani did not mind. He stood aside while Trump kneecapped Sudani’s chief rival.
With the military balance tilting America’s way, the deference Iraqi politicians must show Iran is dwindling.
With war raging between the United States and Iran, it is not an easy time to be Iraq’s prime minister. Still, with the military balance tilting America’s way, the deference Iraqi politicians must show Iran is dwindling. Sudani, however, has not gotten the message. While any Iraqi leader who puts his own country first should scramble to stay aloof of the conflict, Sudani now doubles down on Iran. On March 24, 2026, he declared that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias should respond to any attacks on their headquarters. These attacks, however, come as Kata’ib Hezbollah launches drones and the Badr Corps launches ballistic missiles at U.S. targets inside Iraq.
Perhaps Sudani is fearful of Iran, but so overtly showing cowardice will only encourage more Iranian infringements of Iraqi sovereignty and put American personnel at risk. Accordingly, Sudani’s backroom pleading with U.S. officials notwithstanding, Trump, Envoy Steve Witkoff, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio should make clear that Sudani will have no U.S. support for a second term and, indeed, Washington will consider him an adversary if he does not step aside gracefully.
With Sudani likely on his way out and the crisis in the Middle East escalating, Iraq needs a prime minister to guide the country through the turbulence without Iraq being dragged into conflict. Sudani can no longer do that; Maliki certainly cannot. Other Iraqi technocrats wait in the wings, senior aides and veterans of previous Iraqi administrations whose credentials rest not on empty promises but on action—successfully managing the high-profile trial of Saddam Hussein, for example, or cracking down on Green Zone squatting by officials unwilling to vacate property that was not theirs. There are candidates who reportedly have the “no objection” of both Sistani’s office and that of Kadhimiya-based Grand Ayatollah Hussein al-Sadr whose clear-eyed criticism of Iranian abuses of Iraqi sovereignty carry weight.
Washington now realizes Sudani is not essential and it has its favorite to succeed him.