American intelligence agencies assess that between 15,000-20,000 former prisoners affiliated with the Islamic State are now at large in Syria. This comes after President Ahmed al-Sharaa launched an offensive against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces — a key partner of the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS for over a decade.

Under Al-Sharaa, a former al Qaeda leader, the Syrian military has carried out sectarian violence against minorities in Syria in a chilling pattern: first against Alawites, then Druze, and now Kurds, committing numerous potential war crimes, including executions of civilians.

On Jan. 9, President Trump called for an end to the conflict between the Syrian military and the Syrian Democratic Forces after al-Sharaa had launched an offensive against Kurds in Aleppo. On Jan. 17, U.S. Central Command’s Admiral Brad Cooper called upon al-Sharaa to stop the violence and cease offensive actions, but he ignored the warnings.

For his part, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey and special envoy to Syria, Tom Barrack, tweeted on Jan. 20 that the role of the Syrian Democratic Forces as the primary U.S. coalition partner had “largely expired,” and that the Syrian interim government in Damascus would take over the mission, including “control of ISIS detention facilities.”

As al-Sharaa’s army continued their assault, ISIS militants were sprung from multiple detention camps. Al-Sharaa tried to blame the Syrian Defense Forces, which had maintained the camps securely for years after militarily defeating the territorial Islamic State caliphate in 2019. U.S. intelligence pins the blame squarely on Al-Sharaa’s government.

Al-Sharaa seems to think he can simply ignore the U.S. Congress must therefore investigate the unfolding disaster over which he presides. If actual pressure had been applied to al-Sharaa, could the mass ISIS jailbreak have been prevented? What has happened to the tens of thousands of ISIS fighters on the loose? Why did al-Sharaa ignore U.S. warnings?

Most importantly, Congress should make clear that U.S. support for al-Sharaa is not unconditional.

A Jan. 30 agreement between al-Sharaa and Syrian Defense Forces chief Mazloum Abdi has halted the fighting, but there is no mechanism to monitor it. Time is of the essence to impose a ceasefire monitoring mechanism and ensure that any American pivot toward Damascus does not enable the establishment of a violent extremist state. A proactive Congress can play a key role in working with Secretary of State Marco Rubio and shaping key U.S. decisions in the coming months.

Congress should also ensure that any assistance to Syria is contingent upon the monitoring of the implementation of the Jan. 30 agreement and non-aggression from Damascus against minorities across Syria. Congress could request a report every three months.

The U.S. military appears to disagree with Barrack’s claim that Damascus can handle the ISIS detainees. Instead, the U.S. undertook the transfer of thousands of ISIS militants from Syria to Iraq. In December, a member of the Syrian military killed three Americans. What more evidence do we need that al-Sharaa’s military cannot be our security partner in Syria?

If the U.S. does choose to pursue a security partnership with the Syrian interim government, it must overcome at least the following hurdles.

First, U.S. partnership with foreign security personnel requires vetting through the Leahy Law, which will be an arduous, if not impossible task, given the number of former al Qaeda and ISIS terrorists now serving in the Syrian military.

Additionally, security partnership requires some degree of information and intelligence sharing, which will pose challenges due to the makeup of Syria’s current military personnel. Finally, al-Sharaa has appointed senior Syrian military officials who are currently under U.S. Treasury sanctions for a variety of violations, including trafficking of enslaved Yazidi women and other human rights violations.

However, the primary obstacle is a more fundamental dilemma: Why would the U.S. pursue an alliance to defeat ISIS with a military that is itself composed of former ISIS and al Qaeda members and Islamic extremists?

It appears that Barrack, for reasons not yet clear, is advancing Turkey’s long-standing goal of degrading U.S.-Kurdish strategic cooperation, at great cost to American interest and the prospect of peace and security in a volatile region. These concerns were elucidated last month during a House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on Syria, which revealed widespread bipartisan dissatisfaction with Damascus.

The pervasive sense of betrayal felt by Kurds regarding recent events in Syria may also inform the decisions and next steps of Kurds in Iran, who oppose the current Iranian regime but remain wary of potential attacks on Kurdish fighters and civilians and the possibility of being abandoned by the West once again. The bipartisan Save the Kurds Act, while focused on Syria, would also send a signal to Iranian Kurds that Congress is watching.

Amy Austin Holmes is the author of three books, including “Statelet of Survivors: The Making of a Semi-Autonomous Region of Northeast Syria.” She is also a professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service in Washington and a research professor at George Washington University. David Sklar advises the Free Yezidi Foundation.

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