Five weeks into the conflict, the maritime system is no longer defined by simple restriction—it is being actively managed, Windward analysis highlights.
Transit through the Strait of Hormuz increased over the past week, continuing under a permission-based model. This system now incorporates both the IRGC-controlled northern corridor and an emerging southern route along the Omani coastline.
At the same time, new visibility into Bandar Abbas offers a clearer picture of how this framework operates in practice. Energy exports have continued, food imports are being prioritized and China-linked container trade remains active.
Much of this activity is conducted under AIS-dark conditions, closely tied to controlled access through Hormuz.
Other key developments
Iranian crude and refined product exports remained active, supported by dark loading activity at Kharg Island, Bandar Abbas, and sanctioned tanker movements.
Iranian cargo on water rose from roughly 174.2 million barrels to approximately 184 million barrels within the week’s reporting.
Russian exports remained active, but Ust-Luga’s disruption deepened, with only one shipment recorded in seven days after repeated UAV attacks.
Russian flows continued adapting through sanctioned and dark fleet routes, including resumed crude deliveries to Cuba and legal ambiguity around other shipments.
Jet fuel supply tightened sharply following refinery strikes, with tanker availability dropping significantly and exposing aviation markets to supply risk.
Gulf security risk escalated beyond chokepoints, with consecutive attacks on laden tankers near Dubai and off Ras Laffan.
Port disruption remained elevated across Gulf and external hubs, reinforcing continued rerouting pressure and scheduling instability.
The maritime system is still functioning, but through controlled access, dark operations, infrastructure disruption, and growing exposure across multiple critical nodes.
Hormuz throughput rises under control
As explained by Windward, the clearest shift this week was the increase in confirmed crossings through the Strait of Hormuz.
On March 29, only two AIS-transmitting vessels exited the Gulf and one entered. By March 30, confirmed crossings rose to six. By March 31, they reached 11. On April 1, transits climbed again to 16, marking a third consecutive daily increase.
This is not a return to open transit. Throughout the week, the dominant model remained the same. Vessels primarily moved through the Iranian-controlled corridor north of Larak Island, hugging Iranian territorial waters rather than using the standard commercial lanes. SAR imagery repeatedly showed vessels staged north of Larak, likely awaiting or preparing for controlled transit.
SAR imagery of the Strait of Hormuz, March 28, 2026. Source: Windward Remote Sensing Intelligence.
At the same time, a second transit corridor emerged along the southern side of the Strait, with vessels moving along the Omani coastline. Between April 2 and April 5, multiple vessels transited this route, beginning with three Omani-operated vessels — two VLCCs and one LNG carrier — marking the first confirmed use of the southern pathway and the first LNG transit since the war began.
Subsequent movements included additional eastbound crossings and a coordinated cluster of transits on April 4, indicating structured scheduling rather than isolated passage. Iran and Oman have also initiated discussions to formalize navigation rules, suggesting that this southern route is being integrated into a broader, permission-based transit framework rather than operating independently.
A significant share of transits through Hormuz involved sanctioned vessels, falsely flagged tankers, or operators tied directly or indirectly to Iranian trade.
Outbound movements were concentrated in cargoes that benefited Iran directly or operationally. Bulk carriers carrying agricultural commodities, containerized goods, and dry bulk dominated the exits. Inbound movements were led by sanctioned, Iran-linked tankers and other cargoes aligned with the controlled system.
This confirms that throughput is rising, but access remains filtered. Hormuz is operating as a permission-based corridor that benefits approved cargoes, aligned operators, and sanctioned networks already adapted to reduced-visibility movement.
Port friction remains elevated
Port activity this week reflected continued operational strain rather than recovery.
Inside the Gulf, disruption indicators remained elevated at Jebel Ali, Port Khalid, Shuwaikh, and Khalifa Bin Salman. These included transshipment rollovers, delay cases, and port-of-destination changes, often far above seven-day averages.
Outside the Gulf, Karachi, Khor Fakkan, and Salalah also showed ongoing friction. Karachi recorded both rollovers and destination changes above recent averages. Khor Fakkan saw a sharp jump in destination changes. Salalah’s delay and rollover counts remained significant even where they were below recent seven-day averages, indicating that external hubs continue to absorb rerouting pressure.
These patterns point to a wider operating environment in which routing decisions remain fluid, schedules are unstable, and secondary hubs are carrying more of the system’s adjustment burden. Even where ports remain active, the network around them is becoming less predictable.
Outlook
Week five marked a clear shift from constrained closure to managed throughput.
The emergence of a second, Oman-linked transit corridor suggests that access is no longer confined to a single route, but is instead evolving into a multi-lane system managed through a combination of control, coordination, and bilateral negotiation.
At the same time, Bandar Abbas showed that Iran has built a functioning maritime model under conflict conditions. Energy exports continue, food imports are prioritized, and China-linked trade remains active. Much of it operates under dark or partial-visibility conditions.
Iranian exports remain resilient, and Russian exports remain active, but Ust-Luga’s disruption now appears material rather than temporary. Alternative routes such as Yanbu are carrying more of the system’s weight, which makes them more strategically important and more exposed. Jet fuel markets are already showing the effects of this disruption, with tightening supply translating into availability risk rather than price pressure alone.
The week also expanded the threat picture. Consecutive tanker attacks near Dubai and Ras Laffan showed that maritime risk is spreading beyond chokepoints and into the wider Gulf operating environment. The system is still moving. But it is moving through a narrower set of routes, darker logistics patterns, and more exposed infrastructure.
…Windward highlights.