After six weeks of tit-for-tat strikes by Iran on the one side, and the United States, Israel and Arab sheikhdoms on the other, the primary warring parties, Washington and Tehran, engaged in 21 hours of negotiations in Islamabad, Pakistan, on April 10-11, but without arriving at a conclusive agreement. The talks were historic, although devoid of breakthroughs, as it marked the first high-level political rendezvous between the two sides since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The U.S. side was led by Vice President JD Vance and the Iranian side by the Speaker of the Majlis – Iranian Parliament – Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, among others.
Interestingly, Washington was negotiating with the same regime in Tehran that it sought to topple earlier, first by unleashing an information warfare campaign in January and later through a decapitation strike in late February, and both failing to meet ends. In an apparent “carrot and stick” approach, when U.S.-Iran negotiations were progressing positively under Omani mediation in Geneva last time, the U.S. military built up in the Persian Gulf took a drastic turn after the February 28 opening salvo, leading to a region-wide escalation.
As expected, Iran leveraged its most potent geostrategic weapon – rendering the strategic Strait of Hormuz, through which one-fifth of the global oil trade transits, unnavigable and holding it hostage. The price of oil crossed $100 per barrel by the second week of the conflict and continued to rise, from $60–$70 before the conflict broke out. The choked Strait in Iran’s backyard and its global economic fallout have clearly been the most immediate trigger for talks in Islamabad.
Previous negotiations under the Obama presidency aimed primarily at limiting Iran’s nuclear ambitions in exchange for sanctions relief and it took two years to materialise into the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, which President Trump walked away from three years later. Even as the Iranian side agreed to a ceasefire, President Masoud Pezeshkian made it clear that “our hands remain on the trigger”, while Speaker Ghalibaf opined that Washington “failed to gain” the trust of the Iranian delegation.
Proposals by both sides
The Islamabad Talks were facilitated by a fragile two-week ceasefire, announced on April 7-8, following six weeks of fighting. Both the U.S. and Iranian sides projected it as a victory for their respective sides. This indicated a convergence of constraints, rather than a convergence of positions. Iran demonstrated its ability to impose economic costs on the world without conceding its core demands and to sustain pressure under continued attacks. The U.S. may have the military edge, but it is constrained by Washington’s inclination to avoid deeper entanglement. Leverage now lies more in the ability to raise costs for the adversary than the use of force.
The U.S. delivered a 15-point plan via Pakistan’s army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir, who emerged as the key interlocutor between Washington and Tehran, according to The New York Times. While initially rejecting the U.S. proposal as “largely excessive, unrealistic and unreasonable”, Iran’s Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, later clarified that Tehran was willing to consider it as Washington accepted the “general framework” of Iran’s alternative 10-point proposal as “a workable basis” to move ahead. Both plans were interpreted as opening negotiating positions rather than final demands.
After the negotiations concluded in Islamabad, Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei said, “We reached an understanding on a number of issues, but on 2-3 important issues, views were far apart, and ultimately, the talks did not lead to an agreement …”, while U.S. Vice President Vance stated that “We just could not get to a situation where the Iranians were willing to accept our terms … we leave here with a very simple proposal, a method of understanding that is our final and best offer…”
Sticking points
According to media reports, the major bones of contention, inter alia, include: (a) the control and safe transit of ships through the Strait of Hormuz; (b) the curtailment of Iran’s nuclear programme; and (c) the release of frozen Iranian assets abroad. Even from pre-war days, Tehran has been demanding its release, more so now to rebuild the country from all the devastation it incurred, along with relief on sanctions and demand for reparations, which Washington has reportedly refused to yield.
Likewise, the U.S. side has demanded to reopen the Strait of Hormuz to all international maritime traffic, which Tehran is not willing to let go of. Coming to the nuclear programme, the question of the Iran’s right to enrich uranium and maintain the current stockpile is now hyphenated with the idea of Iranian sovereignty itself. The U.S. wants Iran to abandon its nuclear programme altogether, which is unacceptable for Tehran.
Another issue is Iran’s support for proxy groups, the so-called ‘Axis of Resistance’, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon, which has been subjected to heavy Israeli bombing even after the announcement of a ceasefire, with significant civilian casualties. Iran-supported Houthis in Yemen have also opened a new front along the Gulf of Aden. The fate of Iran’s support to these non-state actors also remains undecided.
Iran’s unexpected resilience against sustained U.S.-Israeli military assaults has made President Trump impatient. Contrary to his initial expectations, the Iranian regime not only survived but also continued its stranglehold on the Strait of Hormuz. Hours before the ceasefire, President Trump’s typical profanity-filled social media posts touched a new low with brazenly threatening statements such as, “a whole civilization will die tonight”. Washington badly needed a way out of this mess of its own making, and continuing negotiations through mediation emerged as a reasonable proposition.
Why Pakistan?
Oman and Qatar traditionally acted as go-betweens among the warring sides of preceding conflicts in the region. But this time, by enduring Iranian attacks, they became parties to the conflict themselves, which deprived them of their capacity to act as neutral third-party mediators. Other GCC states also overlook the same scenario. It was in this void Pakistan stepped in, being a country with fairly good historical ties with both Washington and Tehran.
During the Cold War, in 1971, Islamabad played an instrumental role in the normalisation of ties between Washington and Beijing, by facilitating Secretary Kissinger’s secret visit to China in a historic first since the founding of the People’s Republic, which paved the way for President Nixon’s visit in the following year. Pakistan also played a crucial role in aiding American operations in support of the mujahideen rebels in Soviet-controlled Afghanistan, which eventually backfired with the rise of militant Islamist groups in the region.
Unlike his predecessors, President Trump’s Oval Office currently prioritises his personal rapport with individual leaders over formal institutional channels. Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, who President Trump described as his “favourite field marshal,” met the latter more than once in 2025, giving Islamabad a rare personal access to the White House.
Meanwhile, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sherif nominated President Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize twice, crediting him for mediating a ceasefire between India and Pakistan following a four-day aerial conflict in May 2025, something which New Delhi categorically denies. Both the civilian and military leadership of Pakistan worked hand-in-hand to bring about mediation talks in Islamabad.
Coming to Pakistan’s ties with Iran, despite occasional skirmishes along the border, such as the one that occurred two years ago, ties remain fairly good. The latest incident happened in January 2024, when the two neighbouring Islamic Republics, sharing a 900-km-long border, engaged in a confrontation targeting militant groups in the porous borders of the Baluchistan region, which is spread over the two countries.
Pakistan is also home to the world’s second-largest Shia population, and the largest outside of Iran, numbering around 40 million, although Pakistani Shias continue to face attacks from fringe elements among the country’s majority Sunnis. Earlier in February 2026, a suicide bombing at a Shiite mosque in Islamabad killed at least 31 people and wounded more than 130 during Friday prayers.
Geographically, Pakistan was in a convenient position for the talks. It lies next door to Iran, and both sides preferred Islamabad for security considerations. But Islamabad-Washington ties were not as warm as it is today a few years ago. During his first term, President Trump accused Pakistan of giving the U.S. “nothing but lies and deceit”, despite handing over more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, while President Joe Biden referred to Pakistan as “one of the most dangerous nations”, which even prompted Islamabad to summon the U.S. envoy.
Even as Pakistan was designated a ‘Major Non-NATO Ally’ by the Bush Administration in 2004, Islamabad’s continued use and abetment of terrorism as a state policy led to a downturn in ties, particularly during the Obama administration, when the world came to witness Pakistan’s complicity and ‘double game’ in harbouring the wanted Al-Qaeda mastermind Osama bin Laden close to an elite military cantonment in Abbottabad.
Both the Trump and Biden administrations took measures to reduce aid for Pakistan, while U.S. policy pivoted sharply towards India, a fellow Quad partner and potential counterweight to China in the Indo-Pacific.But if President Trump rewards Pakistan with increased arms and financial aid, that will be a cause of concern for neighbouring India, which continues to face the brunt of cross-border terrorism emanating from Pakistani soil.
What lies ahead?
As the Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson was quoted in the Iranian media, “naturally, from the beginning, we should not have expected to reach an agreement in a single session. No one had such an expectation”. This may indicate that both sides appear to move towards a long game.
The fact that both sides backpedaled on their maximalist points and have agreed to talk shows the willingness to negotiate further. Until now, asymmetry in military power has not earned the desired results for the initiators of the conflict – the U.S. and Israel – and the geostrategic advantages of Iran are holding ground, more than its cheaply-produced missiles and drones. The U.S. must reassure its Gulf allies in any agreement that it reaches with Iran to keep the petrodollar relevant amid rising challenges from powerful economic players like China.
And the nuclear question will remain the biggest bone of contention, which needs negotiations at both political and technical levels, and there should be more confidence-building measures to be taken by both sides to reduce the trust deficit and threat perception against each other. And how long the global economy can afford to remain stuck in limbo will be decisive. This war has now evolved into something very different from what it was originally planned and strategised at the onset. Mediation or otherwise, leave no stone unturned to restore status quo ante bellum, even if it appears far-fetched.
Fortunately, the tone of open hostility has now been superseded by an accusatory one, which is still manageable. All channels, formal and indirect, must remain open. Returning to normalcy in transiting the Strait of Hormuz calls for joint mine-sweeping efforts by all regional actors involved. In the upcoming rounds of negotiations, which Pakistan has expressed intent to host again, the two sides must try to arrive at a modus vivendi for coexistence, at least, if not an agreement, by reining in the rhetoric of hatred toward each other.