The Strait of Hormuz was meant to be Iran’s leverage. It has instead begun to work against Iran. What started as a pressure tactic to raise the costs of U.S. action and unsettle global energy markets has produced the opposite effect. The U.S. naval blockade has remained in place, Iran has linked its return to the second Islamabad round to lifting that blockade, and diplomacy has stalled. In effect, Tehran has tied a political process to a military lever it does not fully control. That is a risky position.

This is where Pakistan’s mediation has become important. Field Marshal Asim Munir carried broad U.S. proposals to Tehran and sought a clear response. That response has still not come. Yet President Trump agreed, at Pakistan’s request, to extend the ceasefire, even while keeping the blockade in place. The meaning is straightforward: Washington has left the door open for talks, but not indefinitely. Time has been created for Iran to decide.

The immediate problem is not that talks have collapsed. It is that talks are delayed because Iran has not produced a unified answer. The U.S. side, led again by Vice President J.D. Vance, was reportedly prepared for a second round in Islamabad. Tehran did not come, insisting first on movement over the blockade. That hesitation reflects a deeper problem in Tehran’s decision-making.

There appear to be two broad tendencies at work. On one side are President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, representing a political-diplomatic camp inclined to keep negotiations alive. On the other hand are harder security figures, including IRGC Commander Ahmad Vahidi, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, and elements linked to the Guards’ wider security network, who have stressed resistance and pushed back against compromise. In between sits Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a former Revolutionary Guard commander and also a negotiator, trying to bridge both worlds while under pressure from both. This is why the question of a “unified Iranian response” is political.

Contrary to what Iran experts like Vali Nasr led many to believe—that Iran’s behaviour reflects a coherent grand strategy—recent events suggest something far less orderly. There is also a pattern in Iranian conduct—part ideological rigidity, part tactical mischief—where public defiance is mixed with private accommodation. That may serve as bargaining at times. But when it produces mixed signals, frustrates mediators, or mistakes bravado for strategy, it becomes self-defeating.

There is a lesson here I have seen before. In my first article, ‘Saddam’s Fatal Miscalculation,’ published during the 1991 Gulf War, I argued Iraq was no match for the U.S.-led coalition despite claims that the Republican Guards or even sandstorms would halt the war. They did not. Operation Desert Storm ended quickly. Yet many believed rhetoric over military reality. Some of the same exaggerated confidence can be heard today from hardline circles in Tehran and among their sympathisers outside. It does not alter the facts of war. The risk is that parts of Tehran’s hardline establishment may be repeating a similar misreading of power, leverage and timing.

Pakistan is not pressing Iran to accept U.S. demands. It is urging Iran to respond to the broad points already on the table so talks can resume. That is very different

During the first phase of this conflict, Iran’s strike capability was significantly curtailed, and it suffered tangible military losses. Just as important, the Gulf states showed enormous restraint despite direct risks to their security. That restraint should not be assumed indefinitely. If diplomacy fails, and renewed U.S.-Israeli attacks are followed by Iranian retaliation against energy infrastructure, power grids or maritime traffic, one should not expect the Gulf states to remain silent. Their substantial defence capabilities could come into play, with wider implications, including for Pakistan under its security commitments with Saudi Arabia.

There was also reported progress in the first Islamabad round that should not be overlooked. Much of the broader framework reportedly moved forward, including sanctions relief, maritime security and the structure of a possible agreement. Even on the nuclear file, differences narrowed to defined issues rather than open-ended disagreement. The question of the highly enriched uranium stockpile raised legitimate concern, but that is precisely why it belongs at the negotiating table. The same applies to Iran’s future permissible enrichment. Tehran reportedly came with a 10-point approach, Washington with 15 conditions. That suggests not a closed door, but a basis for bargaining.

That is why refusing to return to Islamabad makes little strategic sense. If Iran disagrees on enriched uranium, on enrichment limits, on sanctions sequencing, on frozen assets, on Hormuz-related guarantees or wider security assurances, these are matters to sort out in talks, not by delay.

Even the first Islamabad round illustrated that Iran needed a diplomatic exit, not indefinite confrontation. Reportedly, its own delegation arrived and departed under Pakistani air cover. That was a reality check in itself.

There is also a more serious risk. If the Revolutionary Guards continue to dominate decision-making while the political leadership remains constrained, the problem is no longer simply hard bargaining. It becomes an inability to make and implement a compromise. That would be dangerous for Iran itself.

There is a misconception in Tehran that time works against Washington more than against Iran. The opposite may be true. Trump can walk away from talks more easily than Iran can walk away from the economic costs of prolonged confrontation. Iran still needs sanctions relief, access to frozen assets and a path to economic recovery.

The Hormuz issue makes this clearer. The longer this continues, the more Iran’s own position weakens. Gulf states are adjusting. China wants stability, not disruption of a key energy route. Even Russia has shown unease at some of the IRGC’s high-handedness. Major energy consumers do not support prolonged coercion through maritime choke points.

There is also a regional political cost. Pressure on shipping or signalling in Iraq and Lebanon may strengthen hardline narratives in Tehran, but it also raises fears in the Gulf and pushes regional states closer to Washington’s security logic.

Recent signals illustrate the point. The visit of Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani to Baghdad suggests Tehran is keen to show pressure has not diminished its regional influence. But such signalling may reassure hardliners more than it improves Iran’s negotiating position. The same applies to linking Lebanon, Hormuz and the nuclear file into a single bargaining package. It increases complexity without necessarily increasing leverage.

This is where Pakistan’s role deserves attention. It did not begin mediating after the first round stalled. It worked before the ceasefire, during the first round, and afterwards. It carried messages when direct channels faltered and persuaded Washington to extend the truce when the process was at risk.

The United States has publicly underlined this. The White House has made the point that many countries offered mediation, but Pakistan is the channel in use. The UN Secretary-General has supported the ceasefire extension and Pakistan’s mediation. These are not minor signals. They indicate the diplomatic route still exists.

Pakistan is not pressing Iran to accept U.S. demands. It is urging Iran to respond to the broad points already on the table so talks can resume. That is very different.

If Tehran continues to delay, believing that more pressure will improve its hand, it may be misreading both power and timing

Some in Tehran appear to treat movement as a loss of face. That is a mistake. Serious states negotiate from difficulty all the time. The unresolved issues were never meant to be settled all at once. The purpose of the next Islamabad round was to move from framework to sequencing.

Trump also has constraints. His political base wants the war to end. Midterm calculations matter. Israel prefers continued pressure and opposes large sanctions relief. Trump is balancing these pressures. Tehran is not the only side under constraints.

The assumption in some hardline Iranian circles that Washington is bluffing may be dangerous. The blockade is not a bluff. Nor is there the risk of resumed strikes if the ceasefire expires without movement. Pakistan’s effort to secure an extension may have created the last practical opening before a harsher phase.

Even within Iran, there are signs that not everyone supports continued obstinacy. Araghchi’s earlier statement on Hormuz, Iran’s ambassador’s public messaging, and continuing indirect contacts suggest a peace constituency exists, even if under pressure. Nor should Ghalibaf’s role be dismissed. Precisely because he has roots in the security establishment, he may be among the few able to help turn internal resistance into compromise.

There is also a broader question: what has Iran gained from the war that could not be secured better through negotiation? Resistance without sanctions relief, without reconstruction, and without a more stable regional position is not much of a gain.

Iran has not strengthened its leverage by delaying a response. It has raised doubts among friends, frustrated mediators, and given opponents arguments that diplomacy cannot work. Iran has dealt pragmatically with adversaries before. There is no reason pragmatism cannot prevail again. The second Islamabad round should not be treated as a favour to Washington or Pakistan. It serves Iran’s own interests.

If Tehran continues to delay, believing that more pressure will improve its hand, it may be misreading both power and timing. That would be the fatal miscalculation. Return to Islamabad, answer the proposals, and negotiate. The alternatives are not likely to improve Iran’s position. They may worsen it.