Shafaq News

Syria entered a
new political era following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government in
2024; few communities faced a more consequential moment than the country’s
Kurds. Concentrated largely in the north and northeast, Syrian Kurds spent
decades seeking citizenship, cultural recognition and political representation.
The 2011 civil war transformed them into one of Syria’s most influential
military and political actors. Today, Kurdish leaders are working to preserve
gains achieved during long-time conflict while defining their place in Syria’s
future.

Most estimates
place Syria’s Kurdish population at between two and three million people before
the civil war, representing roughly 10 to 15% of the country’s population. The
largest Kurdish communities are concentrated in three historically important
regions: al-Jazira in the northeast, Kobani (also known as Ain al-Arab) along
the Turkish border and Afrin in the northwest. Significant Kurdish populations
have also long lived in Aleppo and Damascus.

Unlike the
Kurds of Iraq, who have enjoyed varying degrees of autonomy for decades, Syrian
Kurds spent much of the modern era on the margins of political life. While
Kurdish identity remained strong through language, tribal networks and cultural
traditions, successive governments viewed expressions of Kurdish nationalism
with suspicion.

Syrian Kurdish
politics has long been shaped by tribal, ideological and regional divisions.
Some movements developed close ties with Iraqi Kurdish parties, particularly
the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by the Barzani family. Others were
influenced by the ideas of Abdullah Öcalan, founder of the Kurdistan Workers’
Party (PKK), whose writings on decentralization and local governance later
shaped institutions in northeastern Syria.

These
influences became increasingly important after 2011, when the collapse of state
authority across large parts of Syria created opportunities few Syrian Kurds
had previously imagined. Within a few years, Kurdish-led forces controlled vast
territories, administered millions of residents and became key partners in the
international campaign against ISIS.

Decades of
Marginalization

The modern
Kurdish political experience in Syria was defined by exclusion, cultural
restrictions, and unresolved questions of citizenship.

The most
consequential episode occurred in 1962, when Damascus conducted a special
census in al-Hasakah province. Approximately 120,000 Kurds were stripped of
Syrian citizenship after being classified as foreigners. Because citizenship status
was inherited, the number of stateless Kurds and their descendants grew
steadily over the following decades, reaching roughly 300,000 by the eve of the
2011 uprising.

Stateless Kurds
faced restrictions on employment, education, property ownership, marriage
registration and freedom of movement. For generations of Kurdish families,
citizenship became one of the defining political issues in their relationship
with the Syrian state.

Historian Jordi
Tejel, author of Syria’s Kurds: “History, Politics and Society,”
described statelessness as “one of the most powerful symbols of Kurdish
exclusion in Syria.” The issue became a central rallying point for Kurdish
political movements and remained unresolved for nearly half a century.

Citizenship was
only one aspect of a broader framework that many Kurds viewed as an effort to
weaken their identity. Kurdish-language education was largely absent from
public schools, political activism was closely monitored, and Arabization
policies in parts of the northeast deepened tensions between Kurdish
communities and the state.

Despite these
pressures, Kurdish political movements remained active. Several parties emerged
during the second half of the twentieth century, though many operated under
significant constraints. Their demands generally focused on cultural rights,
citizenship, and political recognition rather than outright independence.

The most
significant pre-war challenge to state authority came in March 2004. What began
as clashes during a football match in Qamishli escalated into widespread unrest
across Kurdish areas. Security forces responded forcefully, resulting in,
according to Human Rights Watch, at least 30 to 40 deaths, dozens of arrests,
and thousands of demonstrations that spread beyond the city.

The Qamishli
unrest is widely regarded as the most significant Kurdish protest movement in
Syria before the civil war. For many, it demonstrated both the depth of Kurdish
grievances and the limits of reform under the existing system. Researcher
Harriet Allsopp has argued that the unrest exposed frustrations that had
accumulated over decades and foreshadowed many of the demands that later
emerged during the Syrian uprising.

When protests
erupted across Syria in 2011, Kurdish communities entered the crisis with a
distinct historical experience. Their concerns overlapped with those of other
Syrians seeking political change, while also reflecting long-standing,
unresolved grievances that had accumulated over decades.

Chaos Breeds
Power

The collapse of
state authority across large parts of northern and northeastern Syria created
opportunities that previous generations of Syrian Kurds had rarely imagined.

In 2012,
government troops withdrew from many Kurdish-majority towns and cities, including
Kobani, Amuda, Derik and large parts of al-Hasakah province. The main
beneficiary was the Democratic Union Party (PYD), founded in 2003, which
rapidly expanded its influence through local councils, civil institutions, and
security structures.

The rise of
ISIS accelerated this transformation. Beginning in 2013, the group seized vast
territory across Syria and Iraq, placing Kurdish-controlled areas on the front
lines of one of the region’s most consequential conflicts.

No battle
proved more significant than Kobani. In September 2014, ISIS launched a major
offensive against the city, and many expected it to fall. Kurdish fighters,
backed by US-led Coalition airstrikes, mounted a determined defense that
ultimately forced ISIS to retreat.

Beyond its
military importance, Kobani transformed the international profile of Syrian
Kurdish forces. Images of Kurdish fighters resisting ISIS spread worldwide,
turning the city into a symbol of resistance against extremism and elevating
Kurdish forces into key partners in the campaign against ISIS.

As cooperation
with Washington expanded, Kurdish-led forces helped establish the Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF) in October 2015. The Kurdish-majority coalition brought
together Arab, Syriac-Assyrian and other local forces, enabling operations
across a broader area while reducing perceptions that the fight against ISIS
was exclusively Kurdish.

Backed by the
US, the SDF spearheaded major offensives against ISIS strongholds, including
Manbij in 2016 and Raqqa in 2017, the group’s de facto capital in Syria. Former
US Special Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS Brett McGurk described
the SDF as an “indispensable partner” in the campaign, which
culminated in March 2019 with the fall of Baghouz, ISIS’s last territorial
enclave in Syria.

The victory
came at a high cost. More than 11,000 SDF fighters were killed and
approximately 24,000 wounded during the campaign. According to the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), more than 190,000 people were displaced in
and around Raqqa between April and July 2017, while large sections of Kobani
and other frontline communities were left heavily damaged.

Building the
Autonomous Administration

Military
victories against ISIS transformed the balance of power in northeastern Syria, but
the more enduring development was political. As Kurdish-led forces expanded
their control, they faced a challenge few Kurdish movements in the Middle East
had previously encountered: governing a territory inhabited by millions of
people from diverse ethnic, religious and tribal backgrounds.

The result was
the gradual emergence of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria
(AANES). Known to many supporters as Rojava, it evolved from local councils
focused on public services, aid distribution and security into a broader
administrative framework responsible for education, municipal affairs, economic
management, and internal security.

At its greatest
territorial extent, the Administration governed roughly one-third of Syria, an
estimated four to five million residents. The territory also included many of
the country’s most important agricultural regions and oil-producing areas.
Arabs, Syriac-Assyrians, Armenians, Turkmens, and other communities lived
alongside Kurds, making diversity a defining feature of governance.

The
Administration’s political philosophy drew heavily on the ideas of Abdullah
Öcalan, founder of the PKK. His concept of democratic confederalism emphasized
decentralization, local participation, and community-based governance rather than
a traditional nation-state.

Supporters
viewed the model as an alternative to the highly centralized structures that
had long dominated Syria. Critics, however, argued that power remained
concentrated within a single political movement. Former Syrian Foreign Minister
Faisal Mekdad, for example, dismissed the Kurdish-led project as “a
separatist project that has no future,” questioning whether it truly
reflected the region’s political diversity.

One of the
Administration’s most distinctive features has been its emphasis on women’s
participation. Leadership positions generally operate through a co-chair system
in which a man and a woman jointly hold authority, a model replicated across
councils, political institutions and civil organizations. Among the Administration’s
most prominent female figures was Ilham Ahmed, who emerged as a leading
diplomatic representative and became one of the best-known Kurdish political
figures on the international stage.

Women also
assumed prominent military roles through the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ),
which gained international attention during the fight against ISIS and became
one of the most recognizable symbols of Kurdish resistance.

Education,
meanwhile, became another major area of change. For decades, Kurdish-language
instruction had been largely absent from Syria’s public schools. Under AANES,
Kurdish-language curricula were introduced in many schools alongside efforts to
expand teaching of Kurdish history, literature, and culture.

Maintaining
security across a vast and conflict-affected territory became another central
responsibility of the Administration. To that end, it established the Asayish,
an internal security force responsible for policing, public order, and
counterterrorism operations. Together with the SDF, it became a central pillar
of governance.

The
Administration also faced persistent political disputes from within the Kurdish
political arena. Although the PYD emerged as the dominant force, it never
enjoyed unanimous support among Syria’s Kurds. The Kurdish National Council
(ENKS) repeatedly accused it of monopolizing political life and restricting
opposition activity.

These disputes
reflected a broader reality often overlooked by outside observers: Syrian Kurds
are not politically unified. Differences over ideology, relations with regional
powers and the future of self-government continue to shape politics across
northeastern Syria.

Four-Way
Crossfire

The future of
Syria’s Kurds cannot be understood through domestic politics alone. Geography
has placed them within one of the Middle East’s most complex geopolitical
environments, where decisions made in Damascus, Ankara, Erbil, and Washington
often carry as much weight as those made in Qamishli or Raqqa.

Since the
emergence of AANES, Syrian Kurds have balanced relationships with regional and
international actors whose interests frequently overlap, compete or directly
conflict. Among these relationships, none has been more important than that
with Damascus.

Despite years
of conflict, Kurdish authorities and the Syrian state never existed in complete
separation. Government institutions continued operating in parts of Qamishli
and Hasakah, while state employees continued receiving salaries from Damascus,
maintaining a limited presence in Rojava.

Late PYD
co-chair Salih Muslim, whose party remains the dominant force within AANES,
consistently maintained that the Kurds were not seeking independence. Instead,
they advocated a decentralized political system that would preserve Syria’s
territorial integrity while granting substantial authority to local
administrations.

Damascus,
meanwhile, has traditionally taken a different view. Successive governments
favored centralized authority, arguing that military and administrative
institutions should ultimately operate under state control.

If relations
with Damascus are defined by constitutional and political questions, relations
with Turkiye are shaped primarily by security concerns. Ankara maintains that
the PYD and YPG have close ties to the PKK, an organization designated as a
terrorist group by Turkiye, US and the European Union, and therefore represent
a ‘’national security threat.’’ This perception has guided Ankara’s policy
throughout the conflict.

Beginning in
2016, Turkiye launched a series of military operations aimed at preventing
Kurdish-controlled territories from forming a continuous zone along its
southern border. Operation Euphrates Shield disrupted Kurdish territorial
continuity west of the Euphrates River. Operation Olive Branch in 2018 resulted
in the capture of Afrin, while Operation Peace Spring in 2019 led to further
territorial changes around Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ayn.

Turkish
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan described these operations as “necessary
border security measures,” while Syrian Kurds viewed them as efforts to
prevent the consolidation of Kurdish self-rule and weaken institutions that
emerged during the war.

The
relationship between Syrian Kurds and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq has also
shaped political dynamics. The strongest ties have historically existed between
the Kurdish National Council (ENKS) and the KDP, one of the dominant political
forces in the Region.

KDP President
Masoud Barzani repeatedly encouraged dialogue among Syrian Kurdish factions,
with Erbil serving as a venue for repeated reconciliation efforts between the
PYD and ENKS. That role has continued under current President Nechirvan
Barzani, who has consistently advocated dialogue and political compromise.

This
relationship extends beyond politics. Thousands of Syrian Kurds maintain
family, educational and commercial ties with the Kurdistan Region, which has
served at various times as a refuge for displaced Syrians, and an economic outlet
for northeastern Syria.

Yet no external
partnership has shaped Syrian Kurdish fortunes more than the relationship with
the United States. The alliance took shape during the campaign against ISIS,
enabling the SDF to expand operations, defeat the group, and emerge as one of
the country’s most powerful military actors.

The
partnership, however, has always been accompanied by uncertainty. Kurdish
leaders remain aware that foreign military deployments are rarely permanent,
and that lasting security ultimately depends on a political settlement within
Syria itself.

Fragile New
Dawn

The collapse of
Bashar al-Assad’s government in 2024 opened a new chapter in the history of
Syria’s Kurds. Soon after assuming power, transitional Syrian President Ahmad
al-Sharaa called for all armed formations operating outside state institutions
to be integrated into a unified national army.

Damascus also
sought to restore state authority across territories administered by AANES.

Kurdish leaders
did not reject integration outright but pushed for guarantees on political
representation, local administration, and the future of institutions built
during more than a decade of conflict. A breakthrough appeared to come in March
2025, when al-Sharaa and SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi signed an agreement
establishing a framework for integrating northeastern Syria into the Syrian
state.

The agreement
recognized the Kurdish community as an integral component of Syria and
addressed issues ranging from citizenship rights and border crossings to
airports and energy infrastructure. “Our vision of Syria is a decentralized,
secular and civil country based on democracy that preserves the rights of all
of its components,” Abdi stated during the signing ceremony, describing the
deal as “a real opportunity to build a new Syria.”

Backed by
strong US engagement, the framework was widely viewed as the most significant
understanding reached between Damascus and Kurdish authorities. Yet
implementation soon stalled as disputes emerged over timelines, mechanisms, and
competing interpretations of the text, producing what both sides described as a
“crisis of confidence.”

The tensions
were reflected on the ground. Clashes involving government-backed forces and
the SDF erupted in Aleppo, al-Hasakah, Qamishli, and Kobani. According to local
authorities, at least 24 people were killed and around 129 wounded.
SDF-affiliated media reported dozens of civilian deaths in Sheikh Maqsoud and
Ashrafieh, along with the displacement of more than 165,000 people.

Efforts to revive
the diplomatic route led to a ceasefire agreement on January 20, 2026. Under
the framework, Damascus and the SDF committed to further talks on unresolved
issues, including the future of Kurdish-run civilian and security institutions,
following SDF withdrawals from areas it had previously controlled.

US Special
Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack described the moment as “the greatest opportunity”
for Syria’s Kurds to secure citizenship rights, cultural protections, and
political participation within a unified Syrian state.

Implementation
accelerated in the months that followed. Syrian security forces were deployed
to the centers of al-Hasakah and Qamishli, replacing SDF personnel, while
institutions affiliated with the Autonomous Administration were integrated into
state bodies. The framework retained civilian employees, addressed Kurdish
civil and educational rights, and included provisions facilitating the return
of displaced residents.

Under
al-Sharaa, the Kurdish component has obtained 11 seats in the new Syrian
People’s Assembly (the 2026 transitional parliament), out of a total of 210
seats, representing 4.07% of the legislature, according to electoral data and
official results.

The limited
representation has sparked widespread debate and sharp criticism from Kurdish
political actors, who argue that the figure does not reflect their demographic
weight in Syria.

Of the 11 seats
won by Kurdish representatives, nine were secured through electoral processes
involving local “electoral bodies” in northern and eastern Syria, including
districts in al-Hasakah, Qamishli, and Kobani. The remaining two seats were
part of the 70-member group appointed directly by al-Sharaa. The appointees
include Abdul Hakim Bashar, a leading figure in the Kurdish National Council
(ENKS), and Mustafa Abdi, bringing limited Kurdish representation within the
presidential quota.

Whether the new
process ultimately produces a lasting settlement remains uncertain. What is
already clear, however, is that Syria’s Kurds have moved from the political
margins to the center of negotiations shaping the country’s future.

Written and
edited by Shafaq News Agency staff.