Introduction<\/p>\n
Over a year since the fall of the Assad regime, Syria stands at a precarious crossroads between repetition of the past and genuine reform. Inheriting an economy rife with cronyism and corruption, the transitional authorities must reassess how the Syrian economy is shaped. They must consider who gets to participate in the economy, what level of control they can have, and how to achieve accountability for corporate complicity in international atrocity crimes.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Under the Assad regime, Syria\u2019s economy operated using a crony capitalist system under which a\u00a0small class of economic elites<\/a> closely tied to the Assad family held control of the Syrian economy. These economic elites played a significant role<\/a> in supporting and facilitating the Assad regime\u2019s repression<\/a> of the Syrian people for decades, and in the mass atrocities that took place during the 13 years of armed conflict.\u00a0<\/p>\n Today, the transitional authorities have taken an ad hoc approach<\/a> to rebuilding the Syrian economy, making decisions through secretive committees<\/a> without a transparent and accountable legal process in place. This risks replacing one era of cronyism with another while leaving the foundations of systematic corruption and lack of rule of law.\u00a0<\/p>\n Syria\u2019s economic future must be reshaped through tangible accountability, including accountability for corporations and businesspeople in transitional justice processes, and an economic system guided by the rule of law.<\/p>\n Syrian Business and Its Relationship with the Assad Regime\u00a0<\/p>\n The social contract between Syria\u2019s private sector, especially big businesses, and the broader Syrian public has suffered from a history of abuse. Beginning with Hafez al-Assad in the 1970s and continuing under his son Bashar when he took power in 2000, the Assad regime formed an elite class of businesspeople in Syria, awarding business opportunities primarily based on proximity and loyalty<\/a> to the Assad regime. They served as an economic extension<\/a> of the Assad regime, gaining wealth through largely corrupt business practices, such as monopolization and bribery, in exchange for<\/a> loyalty to the government. Businesses outside of the Assads\u2019 close circle that gained too much success<\/a> were either required to pay bribes<\/a> of tens of thousands of dollars a month or were prevented from operating. The most notorious of Syria\u2019s business elites is Rami Makhlouf, Bashar Al-Assad\u2019s cousin, who held control over large swaths of the Syrian economy, at one point controlling 60%<\/a> of the pre-war economy. Makhlouf benefited from exclusive access to government contracts and was allowed to monopolize several sectors of the Syrian economy, most notably the telecommunications sector, while avoiding regulation or paying taxes. When a prominent Syrian parliamentarian conducted an anti-corruption investigation<\/a> into the licensing that led to Makhlouf\u2019s telecommunications monopoly, the parliamentarian was (famously) arrested. Similarly, Mohammad Hamsho<\/a> is reported to have a hand in nearly every economic sector in Syria, in addition to having played several government and parliamentary roles due to his close relationship with Bashar\u2019s brother Maher al-Assad. Makhlouf and Hamsho were designated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury for sanctions in 2008<\/a> and 2011<\/a> respectively, citing their close relationship to the Assad regime, benefit from corruption, and participation in state-sponsored violence. These businesspeople and their relationship with the government were a major factor in the longevity<\/a> of the Assad regime.\u00a0<\/p>\n War Economy: Complicity in International Atrocity Crimes\u00a0<\/p>\n Following the 2011 revolution, these relationships were of the utmost importance, serving to legitimize the regime and finance its ongoing war effort. As a result, not only did economic elites benefit from and uplift a brutal autocratic regime, they also participated directly or were complicit in international atrocity crimes throughout the conflict in Syria.\u00a0<\/p>\n Financing Regime Violence\u00a0<\/p>\n Syrian business elites provided extensive support to the Assad regime\u2019s war effort through both financial and in-kind support to the government. Owners of transportation companies allegedly allowed the regime to use their buses to transport\u00a0troops<\/a>. Others funded pro-regime rallies<\/a> and even provided logistical support for protest suppression<\/a>. Several members of the business elite financed the shabiha<\/a> (a paramilitary group responsible for significant atrocities) and founded pro-regime militias<\/a> to support the Assad regime\u2019s war effort, many of which are likely implicated in war crimes or crimes against humanity. One example is Syrian investor and real estate developer\u00a0Bilal Al-Naal<\/a>, who was close to Fady Saqr, a Commander in the National Defense Forces (NDF), and who is alleged to have provided support to the NDF. The NDF was responsible for the perpetration of the 2013 Tadamon massacre<\/a>, a mass execution of 288 civilians in the Tadamon neighborhood of Damascus. Similarly, brothers Ayman, Ibraham, and Mohammad Jaber, businessmen close to the Assad regime, founded Suqur Al-Sahraa, or the Desert Falcons, a militia that participated in siege warfare in the battle for Aleppo in 2016 and was known for<\/a> \u201clooting and [\u2026]excessively violent behaviour on the battlefield.\u201d<\/p>\n Pillage\u00a0<\/p>\n In addition to financing the direct perpetration of crimes, economic elites also took advantage of the\u00a0war economy<\/a> to increase profits and develop new business opportunities. Some were awarded government contracts to clear rubble<\/a> following the destruction of entire neighborhoods. Others, such as Samer Foz and Mohammad Hamsho, developed companies that supported the pillage<\/a> of scrap metals and other materials from destroyed homes for resale at a profit. In addition to pillaging the destroyed homes of Syrian civilians (which may constitute a war crime<\/a> under international law), rubble-clearing activities also further entrenched<\/a> the forcible displacement of civilians from their homes.\u00a0<\/p>\n Reconstruction<\/p>\n Similarly, economic elites have built wealth through participation in exploitative real estate projects under the guise of \u201creconstruction.\u201d The Assad regime passed Legislative Decree 66<\/a> in 2012, allegedly to address the informal housing present throughout Damascus. However, the law targeted locations in central Damascus that were hubs for protests early in the revolution and is widely seen as a tactic to demographically engineer central Damascus through the forcible displacement of lower-income, largely anti-Assad populations, and replace them with luxury developments owned by Assad allies. Residents were forced out of their homes and, although they were promised alternative housing or compensation, many never saw that promise fulfilled<\/a>. These \u201creconstruction\u201d projects, such as the so-called Marota City project,were expected to be\u00a0extremely lucrative cash grabs<\/a> for Assad\u2019s economic elites, involving prominent business figures such as Samer Foz<\/a>, Mohammad Hamsho<\/a>, and Mazen Tarazi<\/a> through various investments and development contracts with the Syrian government. Indeed, the United States issued economic sanctions directly targeting these \u201creconstruction\u201d efforts through the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019<\/a> (which was subsequently repealed in December 2025).\u00a0<\/p>\n Fall of an Empire and the Reshaping of the Syrian Economy<\/p>\n As detailed above, economic elites closely tied to the Assad regime were heavily rewarded for their loyalty to the Assad family throughout their time in power, and particularly during the 14 years that the conflict dragged on. However, their individual status in Syria came crumbling down with the collapse of the Assad regime. Following Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham\u2019s (HTS) takeover of Damascus in December 2024, many economic elites fled Syria in different directions,<\/a> with most going to Beirut, Dubai, or Moscow, where they have long had additional homes and business relationships.\u00a0<\/p>\n The Al-Sharaa government inherited a Syria that is facing the repercussions of 54 years of authoritarian rule and economic capture, and nearly 14 years of armed conflict. As such, the transitional government must find a balance between the practical needs of ensuring the Syrian economy can continue functioning and growing on the one hand, and ensuring accountability for and eradicating corruption, illicit business activities, and complicity in war crimes on the other hand. In the early weeks of the transitional government\u2019s rule, interim President Ahmad Al-Sharaa made two economic goals clear: rooting out corruption, and relying on a free-market economy and foreign investment for rebuilding Syria. However, the transitional authority\u2019s approach to rebuilding the Syrian economy thus far has significant red flags. Many in Syria have raised serious concerns<\/a> that economic elites who financed war crimes and profited from Syrians\u2019 suffering, such as Hamsho, are continuing to operate in Syria without adequate accountability. Syrians have also raised concerns<\/a> about reconstruction projects that cut out Syrians and continue to operate using Assad-era reconstruction models.\u00a0<\/p>\n Rooting out Corruption<\/p>\n In the first weeks of the transitional government\u2019s control, reports circulated that the transitional authorities froze the assets and bank accounts of Assad-backed economic elites and developed a secretive committee, led by Al-Sharaa\u2019s brother Maher Al-Sharaa and other HTS loyalists, to review and understand the vast corporate interests<\/a> of Assad-era elites with the intent of \u201croot[ing] out corruption and illegal activity.\u201d However, there has been minimal transparency into the transitional authorities\u2019 approach.\u00a0<\/p>\n For instance, in January 2025, the interim Minister of Economy Basel Abdul Hanan\u00a0noted that<\/a> while the interim government is seeking to return any business profits made through partnerships with the former regime to the public treasury, they do not intend to confiscate the private funds of these businesspeople. Despite this, reports<\/a> circulated that the transitional government met with several businesspeople, including Hamsho and Foz, allegedly extorting them to hand over up to 80% of their assets<\/a> to the state. A settlement with Mohammad Hamsho wasn\u2019t publicly announced until January 2026, when the Syrian National Committee for Combating Illicit Gain announced a financial settlement to recover $800 million of his assets and funds. Syrian legal experts<\/a> have noted that there is no legal authority permitting these settlements to immunize Hamsho from judicial accountability for any financial crimes (let alone any grave violations for which he may be liable). Moreover, the Syrian National Commission for Transitional Justice<\/a> clarified that these settlements \u201cin no way constitute an alternative to judicial accountability.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n Conversely, in October 2025<\/a>, reports circulated that in a closed-door meeting with senior security officials, Al-Sharaa warned against \u201cillicit gains\u201d and banned officials from participating in new investments<\/a>, some reporting that he even ordered security officials to give up the keys to their luxury cars (officials have since denied<\/a> that this happened). Around the same time, reports also suggested that Al-Sharaa warned family members to avoid using the family name for economic profits, even shutting down<\/a> his older brother\u2019s business based on reports that he used his connection to the government as a means of building his business. If true, this, at least, would mark a break with the Assad-era approach to corruption by public officials.<\/p>\n Reconstruction Through a Free Market Economy<\/p>\n In addition to seeking wealth through Assad\u2019s economic elites, the transitional authorities are pursuing a free market economic model and relying heavily on foreign direct investment<\/a>. Investment deals have largely been announced with\u00a0little transparency<\/a> into the contents of the deals and the process through which project partners were selected. Moreover, reconstruction projects have followed the Marota City model\u2013 luxury skyscrapers and malls built on the remains of destroyed homes\u2013rather than reconstruction plans that would rebuild the homes of Syrians in need of housing. Indeed, plans for the development of<\/a> Marota City and similar projects, such as Damascus Towers<\/a>, are ongoing, even after the change in leadership. These choices, combined with the Hamsho settlement, seem to indicate that the transitional government is seeking to quickly build financial capital, potentially at the cost of conducting deeper financial reform.<\/p>\n Conclusion\u00a0<\/p>\n Thus far, Syria\u2019s transitional authorities have operated through secretive, ad hoc processes, seemingly prioritizing speed and efficiency over accountable, predictable, and legal processes for addressing Assad-era economic elites. Moreover, although Al-Sharaa has reportedly made some remarks that indicate a potentially stronger anti-corruption position, investment deals have operated with little transparency and largely involved opaque investors from state allies. These dynamics risk maintaining an Assad-era style of economic cronyism.<\/p>\n The legacy of the Assad regime is that of a deeply entrenched economic architecture built on corruption. For over five decades, Syria\u2019s economic elites served as the financial engine funding the Assad regime, maintaining both its control and survival. As Syria rebuilds, the transitional government seems to have prioritized immediate profits over effective reform. Although their stated goals of rebuilding and rooting out corruption are admirable, the methods they have employed risk replicating and entrenching similar dynamics to those that drove Syrians to revolt in 2011. While financial settlements with Assad-era economic elites and the prioritization of foreign investment in luxury developments might offer immediate cash, they create an unpredictable economy, encourage cronyism, and risk excluding the majority of Syrians. Syria\u2019s economy cannot be rebuilt through centralized, private dealings. There must be a fundamental shift that prioritizes transparency, the rule of law, and the needs of the Syrian people recovering from a devastating war.<\/p>\n FEATURED IMAGE: People walk underneath an advertising billboard of Syria’s largest mobile operator Syriatel, owned by businessman Rami Makhlouf, in the Syrian capital Damascus on May 11, 2020. (Photo by STR\/AFP via Getty Images)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Introduction Over a year since the fall of the Assad regime, Syria stands at a precarious crossroads between…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":100610,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[1613,35123,35124,7833,147,509,95,15323,6101],"class_list":{"0":"post-100609","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-syria","8":"tag-bashar-al-assad","9":"tag-corporate-crime","10":"tag-corporate-liability","11":"tag-corruption","12":"tag-economy","13":"tag-sanctions","14":"tag-syria","15":"tag-syria-in-transition","16":"tag-transitional-justice"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@iran\/116527808018307030","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/100609","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=100609"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/100609\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/100610"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=100609"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=100609"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=100609"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}