Shafaq News<\/p>\n
Iraq is facing its most severe electricity crisis in years
\nas summer approaches, a convergence of war, sanctions, fiscal collapse, and
\ndecades of structural failure that has simultaneously stripped Baghdad of its
\nprimary fuel source, drained the revenues needed to replace it, and left
\ncontingency projects unfinished as temperatures begin to climb toward 50
\ndegrees Celsius.<\/p>\n
The scale of the shortfall is staggering even by Iraq’s What makes the 2026 crisis structurally different from those Read more:\u00a0In darkening Baghdad, oil lamps return as power fears grow<\/a><\/p>\n A Supply Line Built On A Fault Line<\/p>\n For years, Iraq has depended on Iranian natural gas to fuel The arrangement required the United States to issue periodic The Trump administration ended that ambiguity when the US Then, following strikes by the US and Israeli forces on Iran Ahmed Moussa, spokesperson for Iraq’s Ministry of
\nstandards. The country is expected to face peak demand of roughly 40 gigawatts
\nthis summer, compared with current production of approximately 29 gigawatts<\/a>, according
\nto data from the Washington-based Attaqa energy platform. In previous years,
\nthat gap was partly bridged by Iranian gas and electricity imports, but this
\nhas largely collapsed because two decades of deferred investment and governance
\nfailure left Iraq with no buffers when it did.<\/p>\n
\nthat preceded it \u2014in a country that has lived with chronic undersupply for two
\ndecades\u2014 is the simultaneous collapse of the mechanisms Baghdad relied on to
\nmanage it. Iranian gas flows, which underpinned nearly a third of Iraq’s
\nelectricity generation, have been severely disrupted by the war. And the oil
\nrevenues that would ordinarily finance alternative energy arrangements remain
\nunder sustained American pressure: Washington retains significant leverage over
\nIraqi oil revenues, and has repeatedly threatened to restrict access unless
\nBaghdad moves decisively to curtail the Iran-aligned armed factions that are
\ndeeply embedded in Iraqi political life. That leverage has not disappeared with
\nthe war, as Iraq finds itself simultaneously losing its primary fuel source and
\nunable to fully mobilize the fiscal resources needed to replace it.<\/p>\n
\nthe thermal power stations that generate the majority of its electricity. At
\npeak supply, Iran was delivering around 30 million cubic meters of gas per day,
\nenough to support nearly a third of Iraq’s power generation capacity. <\/p>\n
\nsanctions waivers exempting Baghdad from penalties for purchasing Iranian
\nenergy, and Washington used those waivers as leverage, repeatedly urging Iraq
\nto reduce its dependency while renewing the exemptions under political
\npressure.<\/p>\n
\nsanctions waiver expired on March 8, 2025, cutting Iraq off from Iranian
\nelectricity imports and placing its gas purchases under increasing pressure.
\nIranian gas flows dropped by roughly 40 percent between April and August 2025
\nas sanctions enforcement tightened. Baghdad scrambled to negotiate
\nalternatives, a Turkmenistan gas swap, floating LNG terminals in the south,
\naccelerated interconnections with Turkey, Jordan, and the Gulf Cooperation
\nCouncil, but each initiative moved more slowly than the crisis demanded.<\/p>\n
\non February 28, 2026, the crisis entered a new phase. Reported strikes on
\ninfrastructure connected to Iran’s South Pars gas field \u2014the world’s largest\u2014
\ncaused an abrupt halt in gas flows to Iraq, knocking more than 3,000 megawatts
\noff the national grid almost overnight. Partial flows later resumed, but the
\ncurrent supply has since fallen again. <\/p>\n
\nElectricity, told Shafaq News that gas imports now stand at roughly 5 million
\ncubic meters per day, barely one-sixth of the 30 million cubic meters Iraq
\nrequires.<\/p>\n