{"id":107965,"date":"2026-05-11T08:25:09","date_gmt":"2026-05-11T08:25:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/107965\/"},"modified":"2026-05-11T08:25:09","modified_gmt":"2026-05-11T08:25:09","slug":"syria-is-not-ready-what-returnees-reveal-about-return","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/107965\/","title":{"rendered":"Syria is not ready: what returnees reveal about return"},"content":{"rendered":"

Osman Bahadir Din\u00e7er\u202fand\u202fZeynep Sahin-Menc\u00fctek\u202fargue that Syria is not ready for large-scale refugee return. Drawing on interviews with returnees, they show how economic collapse, weak institutions, and social fragmentation undermine reintegration. Policy debates, they say, must move beyond rhetoric to reflect realities on the ground\u00a0<\/p>\n

At a joint\u202fpress conference<\/a>\u202fin Berlin on 30 March, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated that ‘over the next three years\u00a0\u2013\u00a0this was also Syrian President al-Sharaa\u2019s wish\u00a0\u2013\u00a0around 80% of the Syrians living in Germany should return\u2026.’\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

The German Chancellery swiftly clarified that the ‘80%’ figure came from the Syrians. Yet al-Sharaa\u202frejected<\/a>\u202fthis\u00a0claim, calling it ‘somewhat exaggerated’. Instead, he stressed that\u202freturns would depend on economic reconstruction and improved living conditions.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Despite growing expectations in host countries, and increasing returns from neighbouring countries, we still know little about Syrians’ post-return experiences. This matters for assessing Syria\u2019s material, political and social reconstruction. Many Syrians are\u00a0observing\u00a0returnees’ experiences closely, using their accounts when deciding whether to return, stay, or migrate elsewhere.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Our field-based research<\/a>\u202fwith returnees draws on 210 in-depth interviews. Here, we analyse 80 of those interviews, conducted in March 2026. Three core findings\u00a0emerge.\u00a0<\/p>\n

First, Syria lacks the institutional, economic and infrastructure to absorb large-scale returns. Returnees navigate fragile security, economic hardship and persistent barriers to housing, employment, legal\u00a0assistance\u00a0and services.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Second, returnees perceive the current political order as transitional. They recognise limited openings in participation and representation but no fully functioning system.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

Third,\u00a0unemployment, low wages, rising prices and weak service provision<\/a>\u202fmake return highly precarious, and this\u00a0poses\u00a0the most immediate constraint.\u00a0Economic\u00a0pressures deepen social fragmentation, reinforce divisions\u00a0\u2013\u00a0particularly between stayers and returnees\u00a0\u2013\u00a0and erode social cohesion.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Who returns\u00a0\u2013\u00a0and to what conditions?\u00a0<\/p>\n

Since late 2024, returns to Syria have increased. Around 1.99 million internally displaced persons have returned to their areas of origin. Over 1.14 million have arrived from abroad, meaning that returnees now make\u00a0up roughly\u202f11% of Syria’s population<\/a>.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Cross-border returns come\u00a0largely from\u00a0neighbouring T\u00fcrkiye,\u00a0Lebanon\u00a0and Jordan. Returnees concentrate in urban centres, including\u202fDamascus, Aleppo, Idlib, Homs and rural Damascus<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Returning refugees now make up roughly 11% of the Syrian population<\/p>\n

Our research shows that<\/a>\u202fmultiple factors drive these movements,\u00a0including\u00a0 political\u00a0shifts\u00a0\u2013 most notably the end of Assad-era rule \u2013 as well as family reunification, care responsibilities and a desire to help rebuild local communities. Poor living conditions, legal\u00a0uncertainty\u00a0and limited onward migration options in host countries also push Syrians to return.\u00a0<\/p>\n

But what are these people returning to? Local actors stress that collapsed infrastructure,\u00a0and a\u00a0weak economy limit Syria\u2019s ability to sustain return. As one\u202finterlocutor in Damascus<\/a>\u202fput it: ‘Returnees will drown Syria \u2026 a huge burden for Syria.’\u00a0<\/p>\n

Current levels of return are already straining housing, food\u00a0prices\u00a0and basic services. In Damascus and Aleppo, rising rents and widespread destruction intensify urban overcrowding. Some returnees live in tents next to the ruins of their homes.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Sustainable return requires reconstruction, institutional\u00a0stabilisation\u00a0and economic recovery. This will take considerable time. \u202f\u00a0<\/p>\n

Economic and social dynamics\u00a0<\/p>\n

Returnees’\u00a0perceptions\u00a0of the economic situation are overwhelmingly negative, and this is the most immediate constraint shaping post-return life. Many express dissatisfaction (60% dissatisfied; 18.75% very dissatisfied), citing unemployment, low wages, high living\u00a0costs\u00a0and currency depreciation. Only a small number with external income or savings describe their situation as manageable. These conditions shape daily survival and influence whether individuals stay or leave again.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Socially, returnees do not\u00a0identify\u00a0one\u00a0dominant problem but a broader erosion of the social fabric. As one respondent put it: ‘We live side by side, but we don\u2019t know who we are to each other anymore.’ Our interviews highlight broken relationships, weakened family structures and new social divisions. Persistent suspicion across groups\u00a0\u2013\u00a0shaped by past political alignments, displacement histories and ethnic or sectarian differences\u00a0\u2013\u00a0reinforce these divisions. The rift between stayers and returnees has deepened, often marked by resentment,\u00a0exclusion\u00a0and mutual misunderstanding.<\/p>\n

In Syria, the rift between stayers and returnees is marked by resentment,\u00a0exclusion\u00a0and mutual misunderstanding<\/p>\n

Respondents cite poverty,\u00a0unemployment\u00a0and rising inequality as drivers of tension. These weaken family and community structures, and push people toward begging or illicit activities. Many\u202falso point to the erosion of\u202fsocial norms, including mutual support and solidarity.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Perceptions\u00a0about political transition and safety conditions\u00a0<\/p>\n

Returnees\u2019 assessments of the political situation are cautious and ambivalent. In our sample, a majority express some satisfaction with the post-Assad environment:\u00a031.25% are satisfied, 20% very satisfied. However, a large share (41.25%)\u00a0remains\u00a0neutral\u00a0and a small minority expresses dissatisfaction.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Returnees’ main concern is not direct repression or immediate instability but the absence of a fully formed political order. Many describe Syria as being in a ‘transitional period’, and emphasise that ‘there is no real political life yet’. They also point to the lack of a constitution, functioning political parties and institutionalised channels of participation.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Assessments of safety and security are more positive. A majority report satisfaction (51.25% satisfied and 10% very satisfied), while 30%\u00a0remain\u00a0neutral. Many point out that while large-scale violence has receded, insecurity has not disappeared but transformed. Concerns for returnees and stayers include difficulties accessing electricity, water,\u00a0healthcare\u00a0and employment. Landmines, unexploded\u00a0ordnance\u00a0and armed actors\u00a0operating\u00a0outside state control, also pose ongoing threats.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Return without reintegration\u00a0<\/p>\n

While many returnees acknowledge improvements in security and, to a lesser extent, the political environment, they face persistent economic hardship, weak public\u00a0services\u00a0and social fragmentation. They have not experienced return as ‘homecoming’ but as a negotiation with uncertainty. Many express a willingness to stay\u00a0\u2013\u00a0but only if economic opportunities improve, services are restored and security holds.<\/p>\n

Many refugees have not experienced return to Syria as a ‘homecoming’ but as a negotiation with uncertainty<\/p>\n

Our findings support a broader argument: Syria is not only unsafe for return in parts but fundamentally unprepared for return at scale. Increasingly assertive return narratives promoted by European governments and neighbouring countries overlook realities on the ground.\u00a0<\/p>\n

We must place\u00a0returnees\u2019\u00a0lived experiences at the centre of policy debates. Their experiences shape future return intentions and mobility trajectories. Ignoring these experiences risks producing policies that are ineffective and potentially destabilising \u2013 reinforcing cycles of precarious return and renewed migration.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Osman Bahadir Din\u00e7er\u202fand\u202fZeynep Sahin-Menc\u00fctek\u202fargue that Syria is not ready for large-scale refugee return. Drawing on interviews with returnees,…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":107966,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[8031,2735,9249,1120,654,93,17637,2681,1614,37258,2687,95,1176,10738],"class_list":{"0":"post-107965","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-syria","8":"tag-al-sharaa","9":"tag-assad","10":"tag-displacement","11":"tag-friedrich-merz","12":"tag-jordan","13":"tag-lebanon","14":"tag-migrants","15":"tag-migration","16":"tag-refugees","17":"tag-remigration","18":"tag-returnees","19":"tag-syria","20":"tag-turkey","21":"tag-turkiye"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@iran\/116554991060982560","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/107965","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=107965"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/107965\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/107966"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=107965"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=107965"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=107965"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}