{"id":110305,"date":"2026-05-12T14:43:10","date_gmt":"2026-05-12T14:43:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/110305\/"},"modified":"2026-05-12T14:43:10","modified_gmt":"2026-05-12T14:43:10","slug":"the-u-s-naval-blockade-cannot-end-the-strait-of-hormuz-crisis-china-buys-90-of-irans-oil-and-has-not-pulled-back","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/110305\/","title":{"rendered":"The U.S. Naval Blockade Cannot End the Strait of Hormuz Crisis \u2014 China Buys 90% of Iran’s Oil and Has Not Pulled Back"},"content":{"rendered":"

Since the February 28 strikes on Iran, traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has fallen to roughly 5% of pre-war levels. That removes approximately 20 million barrels per day from global markets. The world is burning through strategic reserves. Most analysis in national security channels focuses on pressuring Iran to back down. None focuses on China. China buys roughly 90% of Iran\u2019s crude oil exports. Beijing holds working leverage over the Strait\u2019s reopening. The 2021 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership locked in a 25-year framework between Beijing and Tehran. Iran\u2019s economy runs on Chinese demand. No naval adjustment alters that. The off-ramp exists. China is holding it. Washington is not asking for it.\n<\/p>\n

Iran Just Handed China a Veto Over the Global Economy:
\n\"PACIFIC<\/p>\n

PACIFIC OCEAN (Aug. 11, 2025) \u2013 U.S. Navy Sailors direct an E\/A-18G Growler, assigned to the \u201cVikings\u201d of Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) 129, on the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), Aug. 11, 2025. Theodore Roosevelt, flagship of Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 9, is underway conducting exercises to bolster strike group readiness and capability in the U.S. 3rd Fleet area of operations. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Apprentice Cesar Nungaray)<\/p>\n

The standard read on the Strait of Hormuz crisis puts Tehran at the center and treats Beijing as a spectator. That reading is dead wrong.\n<\/p>\n

Since the February 28 strikes on Iran, traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has fallen to roughly 5% of pre-war levels<\/a>, removing the better part of 20 million barrels a day from global markets. The EIA estimates the resulting global inventory draw at roughly 5 million barrels <\/a>per day. The world is burning through strategic reserves to cover that gap, and the arithmetic of a sustained drawdown ends in one place: a global depression. Most of the analysis circulating through national security channels focuses on how to pressure Iran into backing down. Almost none of it focuses on China, which is where the problem actually has to be solved.\n<\/p>\n

Why China Is Running a Different Clock<\/p>\n

Most coverage of Beijing\u2019s position in this crisis treats China as an energy-dependent bystander, managing its exposure to a disruption it didn\u2019t cause and can\u2019t control. That picture misreads who is benefiting from the current situation and why.<\/p>\n

China has spent five years building reserve capacity<\/a> well beyond what EIA reporting captures. Satellite analysts at Kpler and Vortexa have tracked the tank farm buildout in detail \u2014 the groundwork was laid long before this crisis started.\n<\/p>\n

Beijing also holds supply options unavailable to any American ally in the Pacific: the Power of Siberia pipeline<\/a> from Russia and overland routes through Central Asia that run nowhere near the Strait. Japan, South Korea, and India have none of those alternatives. They are Hormuz-dependent, and they are bleeding.\n<\/p>\n

That bleeding matters beyond the energy numbers. Those three countries are China\u2019s most significant regional competitors and America\u2019s most important treaty partners<\/a> in the Indo-Pacific. Every week the closure holds, they fall further behind China in relative economic terms.<\/p>\n

\"U.S.<\/p>\n

U.S. Air Force Capt. Nick \u201cLaz\u201d Le Tourneau, F-22 Raptor Aerial Demonstration Team commander, performs an aerial maneuver during the Hyundai Air and Sea show at Miami, Florida, May 25, 2025. The F-22 Aerial Demonstration Team highlights cutting-edge airpower, precision, skill, all while reinforcing public confidence in the Air Force\u2019s ability to protect and defend. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Lauren Cobin)<\/p>\n

\"A<\/p>\n

A U.S. Air Force F-15EX Eagle II flies over the Gulf of America, September 16, 2025. The F-15EX, from the 40th Flight Test Squadron at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, is one of the first F-15EXs in the Air Force, and is going through developmental and operational test series at Eglin to confirm its operational capabilities before it is delivered to the combat Air Force. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Blake Wiles)<\/p>\n

Beijing did not engineer this outcome. It is collecting the returns without lifting a finger.\n<\/p>\n

The counterargument is that China absorbs pain here too, and that is true \u2014 energy costs rise in Beijing, along with everywhere else. But the relevant question is not whether China hurts. It is whether China runs out of tolerance before Washington\u2019s allies do. No democratic government facing voter anger over fuel prices holds the same position as one that doesn\u2019t. China runs a longer clock, and the current American strategy does not account for that.\n<\/p>\n

The Off-Ramp Washington Isn\u2019t Holding<\/p>\n

Beijing already showed how it manages Gulf crises. In April 2023, Iranian forces seized the Advantage Sweet<\/a>, a Chinese-owned tanker, in the Gulf of Oman. Days later, IRGC speedboats forced the Panama-flagged Niovi<\/a> into Iranian waters.\n<\/p>\n

Beijing said nothing publicly, sent no warships, and kept buying Iranian crude. China protects its Gulf interests through economic relationships rather than naval deployments. That approach has been consistent long enough that it is now simply how Beijing operates.\n<\/p>\n

Those economic relationships are the crux of the current problem. The 2021 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership<\/a> locked in a 25-year framework across energy, infrastructure, and security. China buys roughly 90% of Iran\u2019s crude exports.\n<\/p>\n

Tehran\u2019s ability to withstand international sanctions \u2014 which was supposed to collapse under sustained pressure \u2014 has held because Chinese demand funds the budget that pays the engineers and keeps the production lines running. Iranian officials understand that dependency clearly.<\/p>\n

Beijing does not direct IRGC operations. The relationship does not work that way, and it does not need to work that way to matter. A signal from Beijing \u2014 slower oil purchases, less reliable Security Council cover, a cooling at the senior level \u2014 carries real weight in Tehran without a formal instruction.\n<\/p>\n

\"A<\/p>\n

A U.S. Air Force F-35A Lightning II takes off for a mission during U.S. Air Force Weapons School Integration (WSINT) at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, June 4, 2025. WSINT is a graduate-level training event that combines multi-domain assets in large-force scenarios, enabling U.S. Air Force and joint service members to hone tactical expertise and integrate advanced capabilities in a dynamic threat environment. (U.S. Air Force photo by William R. Lewis)<\/p>\n

Analysts tracking the 2023 period noted that a visible pullback in Chinese engagement with Tehran came before Iranian moves toward de-escalation in the Red Sea theater. The timing strongly suggested Beijing\u2019s preferences were being noticed in Tehran.\n<\/p>\n

Since the U.S. naval blockade of Iranian ports began on April 13 \u2014 creating what analysts have described as a dual blockade of the world\u2019s most critical energy chokepoint \u2014 that signal has not come. Chinese energy access has continued. Iranian crude has continued to reach Chinese ports. The off-ramp exists. China is holding it.\n<\/p>\n

The Bilateral Strategy for a Trilateral Problem<\/p>\n

Washington\u2019s response has been organized around pressure on Iran \u2014 carrier groups<\/a>, Gulf state diplomacy, and administration statements. None of that changes the central fact: Iran\u2019s economy runs on Chinese demand, and no naval adjustment alters that.\n<\/p>\n

None of this guarantees Chinese cooperation. Beijing may ultimately decide that prolonged disruption weakens the American alliance network more than it costs China \u2014 in which case the current arrangement suits Beijing\u2019s interests regardless of what Washington signals. That risk is real. It is also an argument for naming the problem clearly rather than ignoring it.<\/p>\n

Three things would address the actual situation. The first is direct communication to Beijing \u2014 not a threat, but a clear statement of what follows. How China handles its position in this crisis will be priced into every subsequent conversation: Taiwan, chip controls, trade.\n<\/p>\n

Beijing moves when the cost of not moving becomes concrete, and right now that cost is not being named.\n<\/p>\n

Washington also needs to offer China a structured role in post-crisis Hormuz governance. That is not a concession \u2014 Beijing already holds working leverage over the Strait\u2019s reopening, and a formal role acknowledges what is already true.\n<\/p>\n

Beijing cannot simultaneously demand Gulf stability and disclaim responsibility for delivering it. Keeping China out of a formal role while it holds that leverage is a losing position, and right now that is exactly where Washington stands.\n<\/p>\n

A third step would be rebuilding the economic leverage Washington spent years surrendering. A strategy that leaves Beijing holding the financial lifeline to Tehran<\/a> while the U.S. Navy patrols the Gulf is not a sustainable balance of power \u2014 it is a geopolitical dependency trap of America\u2019s own making.\n<\/p>\n

The gap in American influence that this crisis has exposed did not appear overnight. It grew out of years of sanctions policy that pushed Tehran toward Beijing while leaving Washington with fewer economic tools in the Gulf<\/a> than it once had.<\/p>\n

The 2023 tanker seizures showed how this dynamic works on a small scale. What is unfolding now is the same dynamic, but on a scale that threatens the global economy<\/a>.\n<\/p>\n

About the Author: Dr. Andrew Latham<\/p>\n

Andrew Latham<\/a> is a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN. You can follow him on X: @aakatham<\/a>.\u00a0<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Since the February 28 strikes on Iran, traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has fallen to roughly 5%…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":110306,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[28],"tags":[262,648,1170,3108,897,102,34,179,213,101,1527],"class_list":{"0":"post-110305","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-strait-of-hormuz","8":"tag-china","9":"tag-defense","10":"tag-economics","11":"tag-featured","12":"tag-gas","13":"tag-hormuz","14":"tag-iran","15":"tag-military","16":"tag-oil","17":"tag-strait-of-hormuz","18":"tag-u-s-navy"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@iran\/116562139923867482","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/110305","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=110305"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/110305\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/110306"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=110305"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=110305"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=110305"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}