The panel, moderated by Iran International\u2019s Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, brought together Danielle Pletka of the American Enterprise Institute and Jon Alterman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies to discuss what comes after a ceasefire that has not ended the wider confrontation.<\/p>\n
The debate, held on May 14, came a month after the US naval blockade of Iranian ports began on April 13, intensifying pressure on Tehran\u2019s economy and maritime trade. But the blockade has also pushed shipping, insurance risk and control of Hormuz to the center of the conflict.<\/p>\n
A regime under pressure, but not necessarily near collapse<\/p>\n
Alterman said the Islamic Republic has changed since the war began, but \u201cnot in a positive way.\u201d He warned that the war may not have pushed the Islamic Republic toward compromise, but further into the hands of its security establishment.<\/p>\n
With Mojtaba Khamenei less visible and Revolutionary Guard hardliners appearing more influential, he said Tehran\u2019s instinct seems to be to \u201chunker down and wait out\u201d President Donald Trump.<\/p>\n
\u201cIt feels like the default is toward confrontation rather than compromise,\u201d Alterman said.<\/p>\n
For Alterman, that does not necessarily mean the regime is closer to falling. It may instead mean Tehran is more likely to absorb pressure and wait for Trump\u2019s political calendar to become more difficult.<\/p>\n
Pletka also warned against assuming that a weakened regime automatically produces a better outcome. She said Washington often frames Iran\u2019s power struggle as one between hardliners and moderates, but the reality is more complicated.<\/p>\n
\u201cThese are all people who support the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran,\u201d she said. \u201cSome of them want to kill fewer people. Some of them want to kill more people.\u201d<\/p>\n
The danger, she suggested, is that US and Israeli strikes weaken Iran militarily while empowering the most repressive factions at home. Alterman put the question more starkly: does the pressure lead to regime collapse, or \u201cjust lead to more Iranians suffering for a longer period of time\u201d?<\/p>\n
Hormuz changes the balance<\/p>\n
The clearest divide between the two experts came over the Strait of Hormuz.<\/p>\n
Alterman argued that the war has revealed an uncomfortable truth for Washington: even a damaged Iran can still disrupt one of the world\u2019s most important energy chokepoints.<\/p>\n
\u201cEven a weak Iran, a battered Iran, can control the strait,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n
His point was not that Tehran needs to close Hormuz completely. It only needs to create enough fear to alter the behavior of shipping companies, insurers, Persian Gulf states and energy markets. In that sense, the threshold for disruption is lower than many had assumed.<\/p>\n
Pletka sharply disagreed with the idea that Iran truly controls the strait.<\/p>\n
\u201cThe reason the Iranians control the Strait of Hormuz right now is because we\u2019re letting them,\u201d she said. \u201cWe can take control of it. We can do what we want. We can move traffic through.\u201d<\/p>\n
But even in disagreement, both experts treated Hormuz as central to the postwar balance. For Alterman, it gives Iran leverage in negotiations. For Pletka, it exposes a failure of American resolve and clarity.<\/p>\n
She said the issue is no longer only military. It is also about risk, insurance and the willingness of shipowners to send vessels into waters where even a single strike, mine or ambiguous threat can have major consequences.<\/p>\n
The result is a paradox: Iran may be weaker than before the war, but it may have discovered a tool it can use more confidently than before.<\/p>\n
No clear road to victory or a deal<\/p>\n
Both experts were skeptical that the current diplomatic track can quickly produce a comprehensive settlement.<\/p>\n
Alterman said the two sides have persuaded themselves that they are excellent negotiators, which makes compromise harder. The best Washington may get, he argued, is not a grand bargain but a framework for drawn-out talks.<\/p>\n
\u201cThe best-case scenario from a US perspective is locking yourself into negotiations with the Iranians through the end of the Trump administration,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n
Such a process could include talks over the nuclear file, missiles and freedom of navigation, but it would likely remain incremental and fragile, with both sides preserving the option to resume escalation.<\/p>\n
Pletka said Trump appears most focused on removing Iran\u2019s fissile material and its ability to produce more. But she warned that narrowing the issue to the nuclear file would repeat a familiar mistake.<\/p>\n
\u201cEverybody focuses on the nuclear when they need to focus on all of it at once,\u201d she said, pointing to missiles, proxies and Iran\u2019s regional conduct as inseparable parts of the challenge.<\/p>\n
That leaves the conflict suspended between competing assumptions. Trump appears to believe economic pressure will force Iran to blink. Alterman suggested Tehran may believe it can outlast him by enduring pain, repressing dissent and waiting for US domestic politics to intervene.<\/p>\n
For the Iranian people, the risk is that the war ends neither in liberation nor in a durable agreement, but in a murkier outcome: a more militarized regime, a more hesitant Washington, and a long Hormuz standoff that keeps the Islamic Republic weakened, dangerous and still standing.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"The panel, moderated by Iran International\u2019s Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, brought together Danielle Pletka of the American Enterprise Institute and…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":115962,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[28],"tags":[102,34,67,63,60,61,64,58,62,59,65,49,101,66],"class_list":{"0":"post-115961","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-strait-of-hormuz","8":"tag-hormuz","9":"tag-iran","10":"tag-iran-and-china","11":"tag-iran-covid","12":"tag-iran-economy","13":"tag-iran-government","14":"tag-iran-media-iran-and-the-united-states","15":"tag-iran-news","16":"tag-iran-nuclear","17":"tag-iran-politics","18":"tag-iran-us","19":"tag-middle-east","20":"tag-strait-of-hormuz","21":"tag-us-sanctions"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@iran\/116581014335774783","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/115961","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=115961"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/115961\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/115962"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=115961"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=115961"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=115961"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}