Shafaq News-
\nBaghdad<\/p>\n
Iraq has a new
\nprime minister and a new government program. For anyone outside the country
\ntrying to understand what Ali Falih Al-Zaidi’s administration has actually
\ncommitted to \u2014and where the obstacles are already visible\u2014 the fourteen-pillar
\ndocument ratified by parliament on May 14 offers a detailed, if carefully
\nworded, set of answers.<\/p>\n
This is what it
\nsays, and what it leaves unresolved.<\/p>\n
The Hardest
\nCommitment: Weapons and the State<\/p>\n
Pillar One
\ncommits the government to consolidating all weapons under exclusive state
\nauthority, meaning no armed group outside the formal military and security
\nstructure should operate independently. In most countries, this would be an
\nunremarkable statement, but in Iraq, it is the central unresolved dilemma of
\nthe post-2003 political order.\u00a0<\/p>\n
The Popular
\nMobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella of predominantly Shiite armed factions
\nthat mobilized against ISIS after 2014, operates under nominal state authority
\nbut maintains independent command structures, funding channels, and regional
\nalignments, most significantly with Iran.<\/p>\n
Read more: Tehran vs. Baghdad: Iraq\u2019s armed factions face a strategic recalculation<\/a><\/p>\n The Al-Zaidi Read more: Why Iraq\u2019s PMF disarmament is a different battle from Lebanon\u2019s Hezbollah<\/a><\/p>\n The deferred By convention Political Read more: Iraq after the regional ceasefire: US bases and unresolved political questions<\/a><\/p>\n Foreign Policy: Al-Zaidi’s What is A September Read more: US-Iraq security agreements keep failing<\/a><\/p>\n Al-Zaidi’s The episode Read more: Israel’s secret base in Iraq: what happened in the western desert and why Baghdad couldn’t respond<\/a><\/p>\n Al-Zaidi’s Read more: Rentier no more? Baghdad\u2019s $17B gamble on the Development Road<\/a><\/p>\n The Economy: Three new Banking reform While Al-Zaidi Beyond Read more: Sovereignty strain: US sanctions trigger Iraq’s liquidity nightmare<\/a><\/p>\n The program also The private Read more: Revitalizing Iraq’s private sector: challenges, initiatives, and economic resilience<\/a><\/p>\n Energy: The Iraq’s The sanctions Iraq now faces Read more: Iraq power 2026: war on Iran collapses the grid’s last defenses ahead of peak summer<\/a><\/p>\n The program The program Read more: Iraq’s gas flaring paradox: a wealth of resources, a nation in need<\/a><\/p>\n The electricity Governance and The governance Read more: Iraq under US financial scrutiny: When corruption meets sovereignty<\/a><\/p>\n The Most notable Regulatory Read more: Silenced voices: The treacherous reality for journalists in Iraq<\/a><\/p>\n The two Read more: Brainpower and bytes: Iraq’s race for AI supremacy<\/a><\/p>\n Human Capital: The education Read more: Iraq’s education crisis: millions of children denied access to education<\/a><\/p>\n Health Read more:\u00a0Iraq\u2019s healthcare system nears collapse: Doctors leave, hospitals overflow<\/a><\/p>\n The social Read more: The rentier trap: Iraq\u2019s existential reform race<\/a><\/p>\n Culture, Youth, A full pillar Read more:\u00a0Iraq: 250K graduates annually amid 20% youth unemployment<\/a><\/p>\n A cultural Read more: Faith and finances: Religious tourism fuels Iraq\u2019s economy<\/a><\/p>\n The youth and Read more: Gold, silver, and growth: Iraq’s sports sweep 2025 podium<\/a><\/p>\n Human Rights, Pillar Twelve The commitments Leadership Read more: From Canvas to Courtroom: Iraq\u2019s dual battle for women\u2019s safety<\/a><\/p>\n The pillar also Whether the Industry: Iraq’s The program The development An export Read more: Can “Made in Iraq” rise again? Challenges and hopes for local manufacturing<\/a><\/p>\n Agriculture, Iraq sits at The program Livestock Read more: Iraq’s agricultural landscape: Overcoming challenges amid water scarcity<\/a><\/p>\n What the Similar However,
\nprogram does not dissolve the PMF. It commits to enhancing their combat
\ncapabilities while formally defining their responsibilities within the military
\nstructure according to law. Whether that legal definition materializes, and
\nwhat it contains, will determine whether this pillar carries any practical
\nweight.<\/p>\n
\ncabinet portfolios tell their own story. Nine ministries remained unfilled
\nafter the May 14 session, including Defense and Interior, the two posts most
\ndirectly responsible for implementing a weapons monopoly. The impasse was
\ndriven partly by the blocking of Nouri Al-Maliki\u2019s State of Law Coalition
\ncandidate Qasim Atta for the Interior Minister post, with lawmakers accusing
\nrival blocs of “injustice, betrayal<\/a>, and treachery.” <\/p>\n
\nin Iraq’s sectarian power-sharing system, the Defense Ministry goes to a Sunni
\nfigure, with competing Sunni alliances \u2014including the Taqaddum party led by
\nformer Parliament Speaker Mohammed Al-Halbousi and the Al-Azm alliance\u2014
\nsubmitting rival candidate lists. <\/p>\n
\nsources told Shafaq News that Washington’s categorical<\/a> rejection of any names
\nperceived as close to armed factions or directly under the Coordination
\nFramework’s influence was the principal obstacle to resolving the sovereign
\nportfolios.<\/p>\n
\nSovereignty Under Pressure<\/p>\n
\nprogram describes an active foreign policy built on balance: keeping Iraq out
\nof regional and international conflict axes while maintaining productive
\nrelationships in every direction. The language is deliberate and familiar from
\nprevious Iraqi governments.<\/p>\n
\nspecific is a commitment to activate the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA)
\nwith the United States in a way that guarantees mutual interests. The SFA,
\nsigned in 2008 alongside a Status of Forces Agreement that set the original
\ntimeline for US troop withdrawal, governs the broader bilateral relationship covering
\ndefense, economic, energy, and cultural cooperation. <\/p>\n
\n2024 security agreement between Baghdad and Washington called for most US-led
\ncoalition forces to relocate from Iraqi bases to the Kurdistan Region by
\nSeptember 2025, with the bulk of remaining troops scheduled to depart by
\nSeptember 2026, leaving the SFA as the framework for whatever security
\nrelationship follows.<\/p>\n
\nendorsement of the SFA is notable precisely because it arrives under pressure.
\nDays before the confidence vote, the Wall Street Journal reported that Israel
\nhad established a secret military base in Iraq’s western desert, southwest of
\nNajaf, to support its aerial campaign against Iran, and those Israeli forces
\nlaunched airstrikes on Iraqi troops who nearly discovered the site in early
\nMarch, killing one Iraqi soldier. Shafaq News sources learned that the United
\nStates blocked an Iraqi investigation into the base. <\/p>\n
\nlanded directly in the new government’s lap: a program committing to the
\nprinciple that Iraq will not be used as a corridor for attacks on other states,
\nadopted days after evidence emerged that its territory had been used for
\nprecisely that, with American awareness.<\/p>\n
\nprogram also prioritizes building relations with Gulf states and advancing the
\nDevelopment Road, a major infrastructure corridor intended to link the Arabian
\nGulf to Turkiye and Europe through Iraqi territory, as well as a commitment to
\nchannel all international engagement through official diplomatic channels.<\/p>\n
\nAmbitious Architecture, Familiar Pressures<\/p>\n
\ninstitutional bodies anchor the economic program. A Supreme Council for
\nFinancial and Monetary Stability would coordinate fiscal and monetary policy. A
\nSupreme Investment Council would rebuild the framework for attracting foreign
\ndirect investment. A Generations Fund would preserve Iraqi citizens’ future
\nshare of oil and natural resource revenues \u2014a sovereign wealth mechanism with
\nstructural parallels to Norway’s Government Pension Fund and several Gulf state
\nmodels.<\/p>\n
\nis a stated priority, with explicit reference to anti-money laundering
\ncompliance and international banking standards. The framing is directly
\nrelevant to Al-Zaidi’s own background: he previously served as chairman of
\nAl-Janoob Islamic Bank, which was sanctioned by the United States in 2024 over alleged
\nmoney laundering on behalf of Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi Shiite armed
\ngroups. <\/p>\n
\nis not himself under sanctions, the institution he once led sat at the center
\nof the exact tension he must now navigate as head of government. An investigation
\nby financial crime assessment firm K2 Integrity found no credible evidence
\nlinking Al-Zaidi to Iran-linked financial activities, with a source noting the
\nrestrictions were imposed for reputational risk rather than proven involvement
\nin money laundering.<\/p>\n
\nAl-Janoob, the broader banking sector has faced sweeping US Treasury measures
\nin recent years, with dozens of Iraqi private banks cut off from
\ndollar-clearing access over compliance failures. The banking reform pillar
\naddresses this directly, though the political will to implement it against the
\ninterests of faction-linked financial networks remains the central question.<\/p>\n
\ncommits to expanding the role of the insurance sector in the national economy,
\na commitment that signals awareness of a market that remains underdeveloped
\nrelative to Iraq’s economic scale. <\/p>\n
\nsector is positioned as the primary driver of growth and employment, with
\nmonopoly prevention and competitive principles written into the framework.
\nForeign companies operating in Iraq, particularly major oil firms, are promised
\ndedicated security protection. How much of this framework gets built depends substantially
\non global oil prices, which fund roughly 90 percent of the Iraqi state budget,
\na dependency the program acknowledges but cannot resolve.<\/p>\n
\nIranian Gas Problem<\/p>\n
\nelectricity crisis is among the most visible failures of post-2003 governance,
\nand the program addresses it in unusual technical detail. But the structural
\nproblem runs deeper than the reform agenda acknowledges.<\/p>\n
\nwaiver that had exempted Baghdad from penalties for purchasing Iranian energy
\nexpired in March 2025 under the Trump administration, which declined to renew
\nit. At peak supply, Iran was delivering around 30 million cubic meters of gas
\nper day to Iraq, enough to support nearly a third of the country’s power
\ngeneration capacity. Iranian gas flows dropped by roughly 40 percent between
\nApril and August 2025 as sanctions enforcement tightened. <\/p>\n
\npeak summer demand of roughly 40 gigawatts against current production of
\napproximately 29 gigawatts, a shortfall that Iranian imports once helped
\npartially bridge and that domestic alternatives have not yet replaced.<\/p>\n
\ncommits to ending this dependency by accelerating associated gas capture,
\nreducing flaring, and developing domestic gas production on a fixed timeline
\ncoordinated with the oil ministry. Iraq simultaneously flares enough natural
\ngas to power millions of homes while importing gas from Iran to keep power
\nplants running \u2014a paradox that successive governments have promised to resolve,
\nand none has fully delivered. <\/p>\n
\nalso commits to legislating the long-stalled Oil and Gas Law, a draft that has
\nremained deadlocked in parliament since 2007 and whose passage would directly
\naffect revenue-sharing arrangements between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional
\nGovernment (KRG).<\/p>\n
\npillar also calls for private sector participation in distribution, transition
\nto smart grid infrastructure, and a tariff review with explicit protection for
\nlow-income households. <\/p>\n
\nCorruption: The Recurring Commitment<\/p>\n
\npillar commits to institutional reform across all ministries, digital
\ntransformation to reduce bureaucracy, financial investigation mechanisms
\nrunning parallel to legal proceedings, and decentralization of administrative
\nand financial authority to the provinces. A national anti-corruption framework
\nwith clear legal and oversight mechanisms is promised.<\/p>\n
\ncommunications and technology pillar is among the more concrete and ambitious
\nsections of the document. Beyond digital transformation of government services,
\nnational digital identity, and a data governance framework, the program commits
\nto establishing national centers for cybersecurity and artificial intelligence
\nand strengthening their institutional and technical capabilities. A national
\nmobile license project in partnership with the Iraqi private sector is named
\nspecifically, a significant market reform in a sector currently dominated by a
\nsmall number of operators under opaque regulatory arrangements.<\/p>\n
\nfor an international technology audience is the commitment to position Iraq as
\nan international data transit hub and a regional data exchange center. Iraq
\nsits between three continents and borders six countries, a geographic reality
\nthe program proposes to monetize through digital infrastructure investment
\nrather than leaving it underutilized. <\/p>\n
\noversight of social media content to enhance societal stability is also
\ncommitted to, sitting in direct tension with the program’s own guarantee of
\npress freedom and freedom of opinion in the same pillar.<\/p>\n
\npositions occupy the same government document: one promising to regulate online
\ncontent, the other pledging to protect media freedom. How the government
\nresolves that contradiction in practice will be an early indicator of its
\ngovernance character, and one that international press freedom organizations
\nare already positioned to monitor.<\/p>\n
\nEducation, Health, and Social Protection<\/p>\n
\npillar commits to raising standards across public and private schools,
\ncontinuing a school construction program funded through the Iraq-China<\/a>
\nframework agreement, launching a national literacy program, and expanding
\nuniversity specializations in modern fields. Support for study abroad
\nscholarships in priority disciplines and scientific research centers is
\nincluded.<\/p>\n
\ncommitments center on expanding insurance coverage, completing stalled hospital
\nprojects, and modernizing public hospitals, with a specific focus on rare
\nmedical specializations and pharmaceutical research and development.<\/p>\n
\nprotection pillar proposes a gradual shift from welfare dependency to economic
\nempowerment, moving beneficiaries from cash assistance toward small and medium
\nenterprise support, microfinance, and vocational training. <\/p>\n
\nand the National Identity Question<\/p>\n
\nis devoted to culture, tourism, and archaeology, committing to revive Iraq’s
\ncivilizational heritage in domestic and international forums, develop museums,
\nincluding virtual ones, recover looted artifacts, and build cultural tourism
\ninto a source of budget revenue.<\/p>\n
\nsecurity project is named explicitly, framing culture as a defense of national
\nidentity. In a country where sectarian and ethnic divisions remain politically
\noperative, and where the government’s own coalition reflects those divisions,
\nthe framing carries weight beyond its surface meaning.<\/p>\n
\nsports pillar calls for institutional empowerment of young Iraqis in
\ndecision-making, digital platforms for youth engagement, and funding models
\nallowing sports clubs to sustain themselves from their own revenues rather than
\nstate dependency.<\/p>\n
\nWomen, and Civil Society<\/p>\n
\naddresses human rights, women, and children, and for international observers,
\nit is among the more closely watched sections of any Iraqi government program.<\/p>\n
\ninclude combating all forms of violence and discrimination against women and
\nchildren through legislation against domestic violence, accountability in cases
\nof abuse, and embedding a human rights culture across state institutions. <\/p>\n
\ntraining programs for women in government and political work are specifically
\nnamed, alongside a commitment to treat women as active and fundamental partners
\nin development and decision-making.<\/p>\n
\ncommits to strengthening the role of local and international civil society
\norganizations in human rights protection, and to establishing an independent
\nbody for civil society affairs with a long-term plan to support, empower, and
\nevaluate their social role.<\/p>\n
\ninstitutional calculus to implement them follows is a separate issue. Iraq
\nranked 132nd out of 146 countries in the World Economic Forum’s 2024 Global
\nGender Gap Index, and civil society organizations have operated under
\nincreasing legal and political pressure in recent years.<\/p>\n
\nRestoring a Neglected Sector<\/p>\n
\nindustrial sector, once a meaningful contributor to the national economy, has
\ncontracted sharply over decades of conflict, sanctions, and oil dependency.
\nPillar Five commits to reversing that trajectory through legislative and
\nregulatory reform, with the stated goal of increasing the industry’s share of
\ngross domestic product and reducing reliance on oil revenues.<\/p>\n
\nidentifies strategic industries \u2014food processing, pharmaceuticals, and
\nconstruction materials\u2014 as priority sectors, and commits to reactivating
\nstalled state-owned factories through partnerships with strategic investors
\nfrom inside and outside Iraq. Export-oriented industries and those with high
\nlocal employment intensity receive preferential treatment under the framework,
\nalongside environmentally-friendly projects.<\/p>\n
\nof industrial cities is named as a structural goal, alongside streamlining the
\nadministrative procedures and licensing processes that have long deterred
\nprivate industrial investment. <\/p>\n
\nsupport fund and a policy of protecting domestic products against dumping are
\nalso committed to, measures that signal an intent to use trade policy actively
\nrather than leaving local manufacturers exposed to cheaper imports. How much of
\nthis translates into functioning industrial policy depends heavily on the
\ninvestment climate reforms promised in the economic pillar and on the security
\nguarantees the government can credibly offer to private and foreign investors.<\/p>\n
\nWater, and Food Security<\/p>\n
\nthe downstream end of the Tigris and Euphrates river system, with Turkiye and
\nIran controlling significant upstream flow through dam construction and
\ndiversion projects that have reduced Iraqi river levels dramatically over the
\npast two decades. Against that backdrop, Pillar Six commits to restoring
\nagricultural production as a vital economic sector, adopting modern irrigation
\ntechniques, and pursuing food security as an explicit policy goal.<\/p>\n
\ncommits to leveraging Iraq’s political and economic relationships with upstream
\ncountries to secure maximum water benefit, directing those relationships
\nspecifically toward agricultural development. <\/p>\n
\nproduction, reduction of food imports, local and foreign agricultural
\ninvestment, and water conservation across all sectors are also addressed. The
\nUN has identified Iraq as one of the five countries most vulnerable to climate
\nchange and water scarcity, an urgency the document itself does not fully
\nconvey.<\/p>\n
\nProgram Does Not Resolve<\/p>\n
\ncommitments appeared in the programs of both of Al-Zaidi’s immediate
\npredecessors, Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani and Mustafa Al-Kadhimi. According to a
\nShafaq News analysis comparing the programs of Al-Zaidi and his two immediate
\npredecessors, the vast majority of core commitments appeared verbatim in one or
\nboth previous programs without having been resolved. The program does not name
\nspecific cases, frozen assets, or institutional targets, standard for a program
\ndocument, but limiting for any observer trying to identify measurable
\ncommitments.<\/p>\n
\nAl-Zaidi’s ministerial program is more technically specific than many of its
\npredecessors in several areas, particularly banking reform, energy, and digital
\ngovernance. <\/p>\n