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Malnutrition is set to explode due to a global fertilizer supply squeeze.<\/p>\n
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Warfare in the Persian Gulf is hitting markets well beyond oil and gas. Disruptions near the southern Iranian coastal city of Bandar Abbas and the near-blockade of the Strait of Hormuz \u2014 through which roughly one-third of globally traded fertilizer moves<\/a> \u2014 are forcing buyers to rethink sourcing strategies that had been established for decades. Fertilizer prices track the cost of natural gas, one of their principal production inputs, meaning energy shocks ripple directly into the agricultural markets.<\/p>\n Coupled with past dependence on Russian natural gas for European fertilizer production (Yara International<\/a>, EuroChem<\/a>, and Grupa Azoty<\/a>), the result is a market where oil commands the headlines, but fertilizer supply is quietly becoming more urgent.<\/p>\n Why Fertilizer Flows Are Shifting Faster Than Oil Markets<\/p>\n Oil markets absorb shocks. Fertilizer markets do not.<\/p>\n Unlike crude, which trades on deep, liquid global exchanges, fertilizer moves through tighter, more regionally constrained supply chains. With logistics in the Persian Gulf snarled and endangered due to the conflict, rerouting is not seamless. The Strait of Hormuz<\/a> is a choke point not only for energy, but for the agricultural inputs that underpin global food production.<\/p>\n The distinction matters. Oil disruptions trigger price volatility; fertilizer disruptions threaten planting cycles. For fertilizer-import-dependent economies such as India and Brazil, delays translate directly into higher food production costs and, ultimately, inflation that governments cannot easily absorb.<\/p>\n Global economic choke points at the entrances to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf threaten to upend routine global economic activity.<\/p>\n gettyThe Houthi Threat to the Red Sea Corridor<\/p>\n The Strait of Hormuz is not the only choke point. Fertilizer moving through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Suez Canal<\/a> \u2014 the other main artery for Middle Eastern exports heading toward Asian and European markets \u2014 is now being rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope. This detour adds approximately 6,000 kilometers and up to ten days of transit time, a cost burden that falls hardest on the buyers least able to afford it.<\/p>\n Israel and Jordan occupy a peculiar position in this landscape. Both have some of the world’s richest deposits of potash and phosphate. Israel’s ICL<\/a>, which operates the Dead Sea Works \u2014 the third-largest potassium chloride refinery on the planet \u2014 ships potash, phosphate rock, and specialty fertilizers such as potassium nitrate to markets across Asia and beyond. Jordan’s Arab Potash Company<\/a> mirrors that model from its side of the Dead Sea, making it the Arab world’s sole potash producer. Both ship from Red Sea ports \u2014 Eilat and Aqaba, respectively \u2014 and sail north through Suez or south through Bab el-Mandeb. That geography gives them a structural advantage over Gulf producers, which have been throttled by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. But with Houthi Ansarallah U.S. State Department terrorist-designated forces<\/a> still active along the Yemeni coastline, this corridor is contested and insecure.<\/p>\n How Russian Producers Are Positioned to Benefit<\/p>\n Russia entered this crisis holding the structural cards. It accounts for roughly 20% of global fertilizer exports<\/a>, with producers such as PhosAgro<\/a>, Swiss-registered EuroChem, and Uralkali<\/a> holding dominant positions across key nutrient categories. Industry groups with Kremlin connections are reportedly targeting a 25% share of the global market by 2030<\/a>, with expansion concentrated in non-Western markets. <\/p>\n Russian companies sit at the center of the fertilizer trade. Some of the world\u2019s largest fertilizer producers operate across jurisdictions increasingly divided by incompatible sanctions regimes. European regulators have tightened their scrutiny of Russian-linked inputs. Meanwhile, global demand continues to pull supply toward emerging markets, which are unconstrained by those rules.<\/p>\n The result is a fertilizer market duality. On the one hand, compliance with EU restrictions; on the other, expanding trade relationships in India, Brazil, and across Africa. The challenge is not merely legal \u2014 it is also logistical. Sanctions have forced companies to rebuild their financing, insurance, and shipping arrangements from the ground up. What began as sanction workarounds is hardening into permanent market architecture. <\/p>\n The demand side reinforces that trajectory. BRICS economies already account for approximately half of global fertilizer consumption. This is a built-in customer base that is structurally less sensitive to Western sanctions pressure. In this context, Gulf disruptions do not simply constrain supply. They redirect demand toward Russian producers capable of delivering via alternative corridors such as Baltic rail links, the Black Sea, and the Caspian. The global economic ties come apart. The world is polarizing.<\/p>\n Iran’s small mobile navy of gunboats focusing on asymmetric strikes is perfect for global economic pressure while avoiding confrontations with the conventionally superior American Navy.<\/p>\n NurPhoto via Getty ImagesWhy Fertilizers Create More Durable Leverage Than Oil<\/p>\n Oil is fungible. Fertilizer is strategic.<\/p>\n While energy exports dominate national security briefings, agricultural inputs operate on a different and less forgiving timeline. A missed oil shipment can be replaced from spot markets within days. A missed fertilizer delivery can suppress yields months later, compounding quietly into food shortages and the political instability that follows.<\/p>\n