{"id":151648,"date":"2026-06-08T23:57:22","date_gmt":"2026-06-08T23:57:22","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/151648\/"},"modified":"2026-06-08T23:57:22","modified_gmt":"2026-06-08T23:57:22","slug":"lebanon-between-war-and-statehood-shrinking-the-space-for-hezbollah","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/151648\/","title":{"rendered":"Lebanon between war and statehood: Shrinking the space for Hezbollah"},"content":{"rendered":"

As Iran insists that Lebanon be part of ceasefire negotiations with the United States and Israel, the Israel Defense Forces\u2019 May 31 seizure of Beaufort Castle<\/a> resurrects unsettled memories of the 1982-2000 occupation that fueled Hezbollah\u2019s ascent. As Israel pounds Lebanon, Washington and Tehran wait for the other to blink in negotiations, and Lebanon shatters the taboo against direct talks with Israel, an uncomfortable truth remains: there is no short-term solution to Hezbollah\u2019s arms. American, Israeli, and Lebanese leaders all want Hezbollah defanged. But Israel\u2019s expanding occupation is failing to defeat Hezbollah, which adapts by shifting to asymmetric tactics. Nor are today\u2019s Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) up to the task of disarming Hezbollah. The Lebanese state is far too weak and underdeveloped to replace the jobs, social services, and patronage networks that Hezbollah provides to a once-neglected Shia population. In talks with Washington, Iran is more likely to double down on, rather than negotiate away, its most successful surrogate.<\/p>\n

Neutralizing Hezbollah\u2019s military threat and stranglehold on Lebanon hinges on several difficult factors. First, patience and planning for the longer term. Second, sustained U.S. leadership, focused on capacity-building and monitoring and enforcing what emerges from U.S.-Iran and Israel-Lebanon talks. Third, tangible programs to persuade Lebanon\u2019s Shia that, without Hezbollah\u2019s arms, they will not be left vulnerable to Israel (or a Sunni-dominated Syria) and that a bankrupt and dysfunctional state can evolve to revive the economy and deliver services. If the LAF is to disarm Hezbollah without collapsing along sectarian lines, a credible civilian government presence must accompany it, demonstrating that \u201canti-Hezbollah\u201d does not mean \u201canti-Shia.\u201d Finally, even while maintaining the fiction that the Lebanese and Iranian tracks are separate, Washington must factor Lebanon into its negotiations with Tehran. Iran may use any sanctions relief, Strait of Hormuz \u201ctolls,\u201d or access to frozen funds to give Hezbollah what it lacks: money for relief and reconstruction that could rebuild its tattered political base and undercut government efforts. While Shia fury over Israel\u2019s \u201cscorched earth<\/a>\u201d tactics boils high, growing resentment at Hezbollah for dragging them again into war opens space for the state to step in.<\/p>\n

\u201cPax Syriana\u201d and Hezbollah dominance<\/p>\n

Unique among Lebanon\u2019s militias, Hezbollah was not compelled to disarm under the 1990 Taif agreement that ended the country\u2019s 15-year civil war, an exceptionalism linked to fighting Israel\u2019s occupation. Hezbollah claims, not entirely without merit, that Hezbollah\u2019s \u201cresistance\u201d forced Israel to withdraw its troops in 2000, ending an 18-year occupation. (The Israeli-backed South Lebanon Army defied Taif\u2019s disarmament requirements, dissolving when Israel\u2019s occupation ended.)<\/p>\n

Hezbollah has also positioned itself as a defender and advocate of Lebanon\u2019s Shia community. Sunni and Christian elites historically neglected and politically sidelined the Shia. While foundationally and fundamentally a tool of Iran\u2019s revolutionary ambitions, Hezbollah gave many once-marginalized Lebanese dignity and purpose through social services, employment, and greater political influence. If Hezbollah would evolve into a purely political force\u2014a fantasy, as long as Iran is pulling the strings\u2014it would be Lebanon\u2019s largest, most disciplined movement. That it hasn\u2019t done so speaks volumes about Iran\u2019s intentions. \u00a0<\/p>\n

Despite Hezbollah\u2019s deepening roots and terrorism<\/a>, Washington initially let postwar Lebanon languish under Syrian occupation. In 2004, the United States began supporting Lebanese sovereignty as a means of weakening Syria\u2019s and Iran\u2019s destabilizing influence in the region. After the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri forced Syria to withdraw, Hezbollah emerged even stronger, fighting Israel to a draw in 2006, increasing the size and sophistication of its arsenals aimed at Israel, and using threats and political leverage to hold the government hostage to its preferences.<\/p>\n

U.S. training, equipment, and even salary support<\/a> to the Lebanese Armed Forces has improved its capabilities, resulting in successful campaigns against ISIS. But the LAF\u2019s effectiveness remains constrained by low wages, fears of sectarian splits, and American reluctance\u2014given Israeli objections\u2014to provide the lethal weapons necessary to offset Hezbollah\u2019s military edge. While LAF recruits took second jobs to feed their families, Hezbollah fighters, alongside Iran\u2019s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps forces, became combat-tested in Syria\u2019s civil war.<\/p>\n

A transformed landscape after October 7<\/p>\n

The Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, overturned the status quo. The following day\u2014without regard to Lebanon\u2019s government, parliament, or interests\u2014Hezbollah fired guided missiles, rockets, and mortars into Israel. Massive Israeli retaliation followed.<\/p>\n

In the aftermath, the context in which Hezbollah dominated Lebanon was upended. Israel decapitated Hezbollah\u2019s leadership<\/a> and later killed its primary sponsor, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei<\/a>. Its military degraded under Israeli attacks, Hezbollah could not save its other patron, Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad; the Sunni jihadist figures that replaced him in Damascus retain bitter memories of Hezbollah\u2019s role in Syria\u2019s civil war. Although Hezbollah now produces drones locally, replenishing its strategic arsenals absent a Syrian \u201cland bridge\u201d is exceedingly difficult.<\/p>\n

Inside Lebanon, for the first time since 1992, a president and government came to office in 2024 without implicit approval of Hezbollah, Tehran, and Damascus. President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam immediately dropped the tiresome \u201cArmy, People, Resistance\u201d rhetoric that for decades had politically legitimized Hezbollah\u2019s role in national security. Instead, the government outlawed Hezbollah\u2019s arms (so far without enforcement) and wrested control of key institutions, including Beirut\u2019s airport, from Hezbollah\u2019s control. In a series of unprecedented diplomatic steps, Beirut complained to the United Nations<\/a> that Iran violated the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and ordered Iran\u2019s ambassador to leave Lebanon. Aoun accused Hezbollah of \u201ctreason<\/a>\u201d for dragging Lebanon into war on behalf of Iran and criticized Tehran for using Lebanon as a \u201cbargaining chip<\/a>\u201d in talks with Washington. Even while condemning Israeli actions, both Aoun<\/a> and Salam<\/a> have supported the U.S.-brokered, direct Israeli-Lebanese talks, breaking a long-standing taboo. (Having essentially burned their bridges to Hezbollah, Aoun and Salam are forced to depend on Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri as their intermediary with Hezbollah, elevating that wily veteran of Lebanese wars and politics to just where he prefers, in a pivotal position.)<\/p>\n

Significantly, while enraged at Israel, a growing number of Shia also express anger<\/a> that Hezbollah provoked a war resulting in the largest destruction and displacement of Lebanon\u2019s Shia in modern history. Residents of both Tyre and Nabatieh, two major Shia cities in southern Lebanon, publicly called for the end of armed groups and denounced \u201cwars of others<\/a>.\u201d Unlike in 2006<\/a>, with a wasteland of shattered villages in the Shia heartland, Hezbollah will struggle to peddle a credible victory narrative. It is increasingly obvious even to the Shia that Hezbollah\u2019s arms create the very dangers that they are purported to deter.<\/p>\n

Yet Hezbollah\u2019s threats persist. Assassinated Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah\u2019s diminished successor, Naim Qassim, threatened Lebanon\u2019s cabinet<\/a> in May, prompting memories of Hezbollah\u2019s complicity in assassinations<\/a> and its May 2008 takeover of Beirut<\/a>. Emboldened by Iran\u2019s claims of victory in its war with the United States and Israel, Hezbollah triumphantly posts images of drone attacks<\/a> on Israeli soldiers.<\/p>\n

For all the courageous talk and changed context, the Lebanese government and the LAF still lack the will and capacity for direct confrontation with Hezbollah. Forcing them to do so now would break the state and the army. Anger and despair over Israel\u2019s devastation of an expanding swath of Lebanese territory further complicates the task. Even Lebanese who may be relieved that, at last, Lebanon is at the table with Israel\u2014rather than on the menu\u2014must fret that the U.S.-brokered direct negotiations and performative ceasefire announcements<\/a> can appear as a green light for Israel\u2019s ongoing assaults.<\/p>\n

Policy recommendations<\/p>\n

Many people (including this author) have spent decades pushing initiatives intended to weaken Hezbollah. The results were mostly unimpressive. Now, changed conditions present an opportunity to neutralize Hezbollah\u2019s security threat, if one can think longer term and acknowledge that an exclusively military approach will not succeed.<\/p>\n

The key to loosening Hezbollah\u2019s grip is to erode its Shia political base by filling the vacuum left by the state\u2014providing the services a functional government should, which Hezbollah has long supplied. Effective service delivery undermines the narrative that sidelining Hezbollah aims to marginalize the Shia once again. Lebanon\u2019s ability to disarm Hezbollah, without plunging Lebanon back into sectarian chaos, therefore requires steps that both reinforce growing Shia disillusionment with Hezbollah and more generally persuade Lebanese that a state that currently lacks credibility can actually deliver. Multiple lines of work need to be pursued simultaneously.<\/p>\n

1. Security and military transition<\/p>\n

Hezbollah\u2019s hardcore, Iran-aligned nucleus will not suddenly change course, and the LAF will eventually need to confront it. It will therefore be essential to continue building up the LAF\u2019s capacity. In parallel, U.S.-brokered Israel-Lebanon talks can build on existing work to develop detailed relief-in-place plans for the LAF to replace Israeli occupying troops. Washington, the United Nations, and others can dust off frequently discussed confidence-building steps; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; security sector reform; and LAF capacity-building plans. U.N. Secretary-General Ant\u00f3nio Guterres has responded to the Security Council\u2019s request for options<\/a> for U.N. monitoring and observations, following the end of the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon\u2019s mandate in December. Options need to be developed for enforcement, which was a notable gap in previous approaches.<\/p>\n

2. Diplomatic efforts and a ceasefire<\/p>\n

Washington should use both the Israel-Lebanon and U.S.-Iran channels to secure a genuine ceasefire. Despite American denials, Tehran has effectively linked Lebanon to any exit strategy from the Iran war. President Donald Trump, for now, is paying attention, which is important since U.S. leadership remains relevant in Israel and Lebanon. Only the Americans, if sufficient U.S. diplomatic machinery remains in working condition, can assemble the funding, coalitions, and understandings needed to permanently transform Israeli-Lebanese dynamics.<\/p>\n

With elections looming and Israelis displaced by Hezbollah\u2019s drones and missiles, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may calculate that escalating the war in Lebanon, supported by 80% of Israeli Jews<\/a>, may distract voters from his failure to achieve his war aims in Iran. Yet Netanyahu is unlikely to risk incurring Trump\u2019s wrath ahead of Israel\u2019s October elections, should Trump demand Israel temper its belligerency in Lebanon<\/a> to help end the Iran war\u2014giving Washington a meaningful source of leverage. While Netanyahu may not be troubled by provoking state collapse in Lebanon\u2014even though the earlier combination of state collapse and occupation led to Hezbollah\u2019s rise\u2014such an outcome would work against the Trump administration\u2019s aim of a more stable Syria.<\/p>\n

U.S. efforts in Syria will also be important for Lebanon. U.S. support for Ahmad al-Sharaa\u2019s interim government can reinforce the emerging mutually constructive Lebanese-Syrian<\/a> relations. It can also reassure Lebanon\u2019s Shia that Sharaa\u2019s Hayat Tahrir al-Sham-dominated government is not a threat to them.<\/p>\n

3. Economic relief and state legitimacy<\/p>\n

After the 2006 war, Hezbollah was perceived as moving faster and more generously than the government in providing compensation and reconstruction assistance. Today\u2019s devastation is far greater, and Hezbollah\u2019s resources are considerably less, giving the state an opportunity to act. To counter Hezbollah, the bankrupt Lebanese government needs resources to be visibly in charge of providing immediate relief to those displaced and lead the eventual reconstruction. Washington, working with the U.N., France, and others, can initiate efforts to both attract financial support and establish supervision mechanisms to prevent the diversion of funds to notoriously corrupt Lebanese institutions, such as the Council for the South. Although the Gulf states will prioritize repairing their own war damages, they can be motivated to prevent either a renewed Iranian hegemony in Lebanon or its replacement by Israel. Donor funds and international financial institution support could help the Lebanese state reassert control and provide services across progressively larger areas of the country.<\/p>\n

4. Constraining Iran<\/p>\n

Throughout this process, Washington must watch Iran closely. Tehran will not trade away Hezbollah at the negotiating table: If Iran gains access to frozen funds or sanctions relief, it may race to transfer resources to Hezbollah to outperform and undermine the government. Iran will remain quite focused on preserving its Lebanese surrogate, and any diplomatic progress must account for this reality.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/p>\n

The aftermath of October 7 and the Iran war have changed Hezbollah\u2019s operating environment considerably. While the window is only as wide as Washington\u2019s attention span, there is an opportunity, after decades of failed efforts, to eliminate the Hezbollah threat against Lebanon and Israel. It requires providing resources and support to help the government put into practice Aoun and Salam\u2019s commitment to a strong state, with a monopoly over arms, that is able to deliver security, services, and economic revival, while posing no threat to its neighbors. Unfortunately, this plan needs more time than Netanyahu is likely to grant it, and more focus than the Trump administration, with its diplomatic and foreign assistance mechanisms dismantled, seems able to maintain.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"As Iran insists that Lebanon be part of ceasefire negotiations with the United States and Israel, the Israel…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":151649,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","_share_on_mastodon":"0"},"categories":[32],"tags":[1153,1158,1162,3442,177,1150,1151,1152,159,3440,265,1154,34,93,1159,2677,1157,1156],"class_list":["post-151648","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-lebanon","tag-governance","tag-and-technology","tag-article","tag-center-for-middle-east-policy","tag-conflict","tag-crisis-conflict-management","tag-defense-security","tag-democracy","tag-foreign-policy","tag-foreign-politics-elections","tag-geopolitics","tag-international-affairs","tag-iran","tag-lebanon","tag-middle-east-north-africa","tag-research","tag-strategy","tag-strobe-talbott-center-for-security"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@iran\/116717200510153915","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/151648","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=151648"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/151648\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/151649"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=151648"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=151648"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=151648"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}