Shafaq News <\/p>\n
The Peshmerga Today, that A Force Rooted The origins of Following the For this That symbolism Read more: Kurdistan\u2019s 10th cabinet: Interlocking alliances and persistent political differences<\/a><\/p>\n How the The backdrop to Initially Political Nevertheless, Their argument Kurdish Statements Nazem Al-Saidi, Al-Saidi He also Kurdistan\u2019s For Kurdish Security expert Speaking to Yawar pointed Consequently, At the She described \u201cConfusing the At the same Read more: Opinion: KDP, PUK, and the fracturing of Kurdish political partnership in Iraq<\/a><\/p>\n Washington\u2019s From In remarks to He recalled the Regarding the \u201cI do not see Similar Caggins, now He argued that Political Lahib Higel, Speaking to
\noccupied a unique place in the Kurdistan Region’s political consciousness long
\nbefore becoming part of Iraq\u2019s federal framework after 2005. For the vast
\nmajority of Kurds, the force represents far more than a military institution.
\nIts name, commonly translated as \u201cthose who face death\u201d, emerged from decades<\/a>
\nof struggle between the Kurdish national movement and central governments in
\nIraq and the wider region.<\/p>\n
\nhistorical legacy stands at the center of a growing political dispute. As Iraq
\nrevisits the issue of restricting weapons to state control, concerns have
\nsurfaced over whether the Peshmerga should also fall within the scope of those
\ndiscussions. The debate has exposed deeper disagreements over federalism,
\nconstitutional authority, and the balance of power between Baghdad and Erbil.<\/p>\n
\nin History<\/p>\n
\nthe modern Peshmerga<\/a> trace back to the early twentieth century, before taking
\nshape as a more organized force through successive Kurdish uprisings and
\npolitical movements that intensified during the 1950s and 1960s.<\/p>\n
\nKurdish uprising of 1991 and the fall of Saddam Hussein\u2019s regime in 2003, the
\nPeshmerga gradually evolved into the Kurdistan Region\u2019s official security
\ninstitution. Their position gained further recognition with the adoption of
\nIraq\u2019s Constitution in 2005, which established a broader framework
\nacknowledging the Region and its governing institutions, including its security
\napparatus.<\/p>\n
\nreason, Kurdish leaders maintain that the Peshmerga cannot be treated as a
\nmilitary force subject to political bargaining. In Kurdish collective memory,
\nthe force embodies experiences ranging from the Anfal<\/a> genocide, chemical<\/a>
\nattacks, displacement, and internal conflicts to the fight against ISIS, when
\nlarge sections of Iraq\u2019s defense lines collapsed while the Kurdistan Region
\nremained largely under the protection of its own forces.<\/p>\n
\nfeatured prominently in recent remarks by the head of the Kurdistan Democratic
\nParty (KDP) leader Masoud Barzani. Widely regarded by many Kurds as a
\ncontinuation of the Peshmerga\u2019s political and military legacy, Barzani
\nportrayed the force\u2019s weapons as more than a conventional arsenal, underscoring
\ntheir role as a symbol of sacrifice, dignity, and historical security
\nguarantees.<\/p>\n
\nPeshmerga Entered the Disarmament Discussion?<\/p>\n
\nthe current controversy lies in renewed efforts to address the issue of weapons
\noutside direct state control. The debate returned to the forefront as the
\nUnited States<\/a> and regional actors intensified pressure on Shiite armed factions
\nallied with Iran.<\/p>\n
\ncentered on the future of groups operating beyond state institutions, the
\ndiscussion gradually expanded in some political circles to encompass the
\nposition of the Peshmerga.<\/p>\n
\nfigures in Iraq have circulated reports of a proposal attributed to Tom
\nBarrack, the US ambassador to Turkiye and presidential envoy for Iraq and
\nSyria, suggesting that all armed formations, including certain Shiite factions
\nand the Peshmerga, should be brought under the umbrella of Iraq\u2019s armed forces
\nand the authority of Baghdad. The proposal, however, has yet to emerge as an
\nofficially declared US position.<\/p>\n
\nthe concept gained traction in domestic political discussions. According to
\nofficial statements and experts interviewed by Shafaq News, some Shiite
\nfactions opposed to disarmament, or reluctant to place their military
\ncapabilities entirely under Baghdad\u2019s control, have sought to include the
\nPeshmerga in the same framework.<\/p>\n
\ncenters on a seemingly straightforward question: if all weapons are to be
\nplaced under state authority, why should the Kurdistan Region\u2019s forces be
\nexempt?<\/p>\n
\nofficials, legal specialists, and security experts reject that comparison. They
\nargue that it overlooks the distinction between a regional force whose
\nlegitimacy derives from constitutional provisions within a federal system and
\narmed factions that emerged or expanded under exceptional political and
\nsecurity circumstances after 2003 and during the campaign against ISIS. Many of
\nthose groups, they note, continue to face scrutiny regarding political
\nloyalties, military chains of command, and links to regional conflicts
\nextending beyond Iraq\u2019s official decision-making structures.<\/p>\n
\nissued by some factions have reinforced perceptions that efforts are underway
\nto shift the debate from the dilemma of armed groups to a broader comparison
\ninvolving both the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and the Peshmerga.<\/p>\n
\nhead of the executive council of the US-sanctioned Harakat Al-Nujaba, told
\nShafaq News that the Iraqi \u201cresistance\u201d does not impose red lines regarding
\ndiscussions on surrendering weapons. He nonetheless tied any such process to
\nthe withdrawal of foreign military bases from Iraq, an end to \u201cfinancial and
\neconomic dependency, and distancing the country from political decisions
\ndictated by the US Embassy.\u201d<\/p>\n
\nfurther stated that factions which had relinquished their weapons may have
\nchosen to move from the \u201cresistance project\u201d toward participation in the
\npolitical process, stressing that Harakat Al-Nujaba believes weapons should not
\nbe surrendered \u201cexcept to Imam Mahdi,\u201d* given what he characterized as the
\ndangers and challenges surrounding Iraq. <\/p>\n
\nquestioned why pressure remains concentrated on factional and PMF weapons
\nwhile, in his view, no equivalent attention is directed toward \u201cthe weapons of
\nextremist groups or the Peshmerga forces.\u201d<\/p>\n
\nConstitutional Position<\/p>\n
\nofficials, this is precisely where the Peshmerga became part of a debate not
\ninitiated by Erbil. They interpret references to the force as an attempt either
\nto broaden the discussion or to portray American and governmental pressure as
\nselective. In Erbil\u2019s view, the comparison deliberately conflates two
\nfundamentally different issues in law, politics, and history.<\/p>\n
\nJabar Yawar, a former senior official in the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs and
\na prominent observer of security relations between Baghdad and Erbil, dismissed
\ndiscussions about dissolving or disarming the Peshmerga as lacking any legal or
\npractical basis.<\/p>\n
\nShafaq News, Yawar stated that neither Iraqi nor international officials have
\nissued formal or informal calls for such measures, emphasizing that current
\ndiscussions focus on specific factions, including Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, Kataib
\nHezbollah Iraq, Harakat Al-Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid Al-Shuhada, and Kataib Imam
\nAli\u2014 not the Peshmerga.<\/p>\n
\nto Article 121 of the Iraqi Constitution, which grants regions the right to
\nestablish and organize internal security forces, including police, security
\nservices, and regional guards. On that basis, he argued that the Peshmerga
\nconstitute the Kurdistan Region Guard, operating within a constitutional
\nframework rather than outside state authority.<\/p>\n
\nany attempt to alter the force\u2019s status could not be accomplished through
\npolitical agreements, external pressure, or arrangements between Baghdad and
\narmed factions. Such a move, according to this interpretation, would require a
\ncomplex constitutional and legislative process because the Peshmerga are not
\ngoverned by an ordinary federal law that can be amended in the same manner as
\nlegislation regulating other formations.<\/p>\n
\nlegislative level, Iraqi lawmaker Sarwa Mohammed likewise asserted that any
\neffort to dissolve the Peshmerga would violate the Constitution and contradict
\nthe principles of Iraq\u2019s federal system, which guarantees the Kurdistan Region
\nthe right to maintain its own security institutions.<\/p>\n
\nthe Peshmerga as a constitutional and professional force responsible for
\nprotecting the Kurdistan Region\u2019s borders, security, and stability, affirming
\nthat it should not be included in debates concerning weapons outside state
\ninstitutions.<\/p>\n
\nPeshmerga with armed factions does not resolve the weapons issue,\u201d Mohammed
\nsaid, \u201cIt opens the door to a constitutional crisis between Baghdad and Erbil.\u201d<\/p>\n
\ntime, she disclosed the existence of an initiative proposed by the State of Law
\nCoalition, led by Nouri al-Maliki, aimed at addressing the status of certain
\narmed factions through integration into Iraq\u2019s official military and security
\ninstitutions. Noting the ongoing discussions between the Iraqi government and
\nseveral factions regarding mechanisms for surrendering weapons or incorporating
\nfighters into formal structures, she stressed concern that armed groups
\noperating outside official institutions do not involve the Peshmerga.<\/p>\n
\nPerspective<\/p>\n
\nWashington, Kurdish affairs and US foreign policy researcher Delovan Barwari
\nsaid the Peshmerga cannot be viewed as a temporary force or an armed group
\nestablished outside the state. Instead, he described it as a recognized
\nregional guard force fulfilling an acknowledged security role.<\/p>\n
\nShafaq News, Barwari characterized proposals advocating the dissolution of the
\nPeshmerga as both unconstitutional and irrational because they conflict with
\nthe constitutional framework through which Iraq recognized the Kurdistan Region
\nand its right to maintain regional security forces within a federal system.<\/p>\n
\nperiod following the fall of Saddam Hussein, when the Kurdistan Region
\npreserved a degree of stability while much of Iraq experienced violence and
\ninstitutional breakdown. Barwari also highlighted the Peshmerga\u2019s role in
\nconfronting extremist organizations ranging from Al-Qaeda to ISIS and
\ncooperating with international coalition partners to safeguard Iraq and the
\nbroader region.<\/p>\n
\nAmerican position, Barwari dismissed the notion that decision-makers in
\nWashington are pursuing a serious effort to dismantle the Peshmerga.<\/p>\n
\ncredible evidence of a US effort in that direction,\u201d he said, describing such proposals
\nas political messaging linked to internal Iraqi dynamics that tend to surface
\nduring periods of tension between Baghdad and Erbil.<\/p>\n
\nassessments have come from American military figures who worked alongside the
\nPeshmerga during the campaign against ISIS. Retired US Army Colonel Myles
\nCaggins, former spokesman for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, went beyond
\nrejecting calls to dissolve the force, portraying it as a valuable security
\npartner whose capabilities should be strengthened rather than reduced.<\/p>\n
\nfounder & CEO of Words Warriors, a consulting and government relations
\nfirm, described the Peshmerga as \u201ca long-standing security force fully
\nauthorized under the Iraqi Constitution.\u201d He emphasized its role in maintaining
\ninternal security in the Kurdistan Region and its record as a dependable US
\npartner during key military campaigns, from the period following Saddam
\nHussein\u2019s fall to the fight against ISIS.<\/p>\n
\nlocally established security forces recognized by the federal system reflect
\nIraq\u2019s geography, history, language, and social realities. Caggins also called
\non the United States and allied countries to deepen cooperation with the
\nPeshmerga and expand support in areas such as technology, training, and
\ncounter-drone capabilities.<\/p>\n
\nBalancing or State Consolidation?<\/p>\n
\nSenior Iraq Analyst at the International Crisis Group, rejected suggestions
\nthat Washington is actively pressing for the dissolution of the Peshmerga or
\nits integration into federal forces. Instead, she viewed the discussion as a
\ndomestic political maneuver linked to Baghdad\u2019s internal balance of power.<\/p>\n
\nShafaq News, Higel observed that the proposal may represent an attempt by
\nfederal authorities to reassure Iran-aligned factions facing pressure over
\ntheir weapons by presenting the issue as one affecting all forces operating
\noutside Baghdad\u2019s direct control.<\/p>\n