![\"Download](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/pdficon_small.png\"\/)
<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0<\/p>\n
If one were to read a typical American narrative on the 2003 Iraq War, it would likely be divided into three phases: the invasion (March\u2013April 2003), the insurgency (May 2003\u20132006), and the surge campaign and withdrawal (2007\u20132011). In the last phase, a combination of factors\u2014the influx of U.S. Army brigades, Sunni fighters forming the Anbar Awakening, and the increasing capabilities of the Iraqi security forces\u2014helped stymie the violence and stabilize the country. According to this telling, Americans departed in December 2011, leaving an independent and self-reliant Iraq. Part of this formulation, however, results from the abundance of print and media that highlight American views and sources. While there has been some recent improvement, less attention has been given to Iraqi stories and memories.1 Reconsidering the Iraq War from the Iraqi perspective reveals how this standard chronology minimizes the conflict\u2019s reality. <\/p>\n
From the Iran-Iraq War through Operation Desert Storm, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), several generations of Iraqis have only known violence and tumult. The 2003 war was particularly devastating as the overthrow of Saddam Hussein\u2019s Ba\u02bfthist regime ruptured Iraqi society. The Ba\u02bfth Party had ruled Iraq since 1968, and the regime had permeated almost every aspect of the country. Sunni insurgents and Shi\u2019a militants rushed to fill this vacuum, eager to impose their own agenda on post-Saddam Iraq. In their competition for power, these groups unleashed waves of violence against civilians, Iraqi government officials, and coalition forces. In February 2006, al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) operatives destroyed the golden dome of the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, just north of Baghdad, one of the most revered sites of Shi\u2019a Islam.2 AQI hoped the provocation would kick-start a full-blown civil war between Iraq\u2019s Sunni and Shi\u2019a populations. The bombing did just that. Thirty thousand Iraqis lost their lives in 2006 alone.3 <\/p>\n
![\"Two](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/Iraq-After-Invasion-img1.jpg\"\/)
<\/p>\n
American narratives point to a major turning point in the war around 2007\u20132008\u2014when violence levels fell precipitously\u2014and suggest the country was on an upward trend, save for some political uncertainty as the new Shi\u2019a-dominated government navigated various growing pains when the Americans withdrew in late 2011.4 And yet, the conclusion of the surge campaign did not bring about immediate and irreversible prosperity in Iraq. Furthermore, the end of American combat operations did not mean the end of the conflict for Iraqis.5 Not long after the U.S. departure, ISIS\u2019s rapid takeover of several cities, including Ramadi, Fallujah, and Mosul, risked upending the government in Baghdad, prompting the Americans and coalition partners to intervene.6 By the end of the 2010s, for old and young Iraqis, the \u201cIraq War\u201d came to describe not only eight years of war but rather almost three decades of conflict, with the Americans playing either a pivotal or peripheral role.7 For Iraqis, the United States was the \u201cinvader, occupier, and state-builder.\u201d8 <\/p>\n
This may be an uncomfortable perspective, and some may take umbrage at these assertions.9 Yet, this article neither seeks to assign blame nor find fault. Instead, it delineates significant changes in Iraqi society and highlights the consequences of war on the Iraqi landscape. Warfare is brutal; it traumatizes soldiers, civilians, and nations. The carnage it leaves behind shapes recovery efforts and influences future military operations; any Iraq War history is incomplete without considering these aftereffects. A renewed focus on the Iraqi position not only challenges conventional narratives about the Iraq War but also permits historians, service members, and veterans to delve deeper into this war\u2019s complicated nature and legacy. <\/p>\n
The Numbers<\/p>\n
Between 2003 and 2011, 4,419 U.S. service members were killed in Iraq, and nearly thirty-two thousand were wounded in action.10 The death toll from the Iraqi side is tricky to discern. Methodological issues, largely stemming from security concerns and difficulties compiling data, obfuscate the actual calculation. Some groups, like the Iraqi Body Count, relied on media reports and thus risk underreporting or duplicating data.11 The Associated Press, which began tracking deaths in 2005, used information from police, hospitals, morgues, and other eyewitness accounts but did not include insurgent deaths in its calculations.12 In general terms, however, tallies from journalists, nongovernmental organizations, and epidemiologists are higher than government estimates.<\/p>\n
Coalition officials often disputed these numbers, contending that any conclusions were flawed and incomplete given the precarious conditions in Iraq. U.S. authorities, for their part, had also long denied tracking casualties.13 However, WikiLeaks\u2019s publication of the \u201cIraqi War Logs\u201d online in October 2010 contradicted these claims, showing that Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I, the coalition headquarters) indeed monitored the death toll. According to these figures, over sixty-six thousand Iraqi civilians and twenty-four thousand insurgents died between January 2004 and December 2009.14 MNF-I data compiled in 2009 showed over fifty-four thousand deaths between 2006 and 2008 alone.15<\/p>\n
Studies from reputable teams of investigators have reached conclusions that differ from MNF-I. Nevertheless, it is still challenging to reach a consensus as these reviews have focused on varying spans of time and thus range widely both in the years included and deductions. A seminal analysis published by a team of researchers from Johns Hopkins University and Baghdad\u2019s Al-Mustansiriya University\u2014often referred to as the Lancet study\u2014concluded over six hundred thousand Iraqis died in the first forty months of the war.16 A British polling firm argued that the total was closer to one million Iraqis by June 2007.17 A World Health Organization-affiliated report published in the New England Journal of Medicine estimated over 150,000 Iraqis died between March 2003 and June 2006.18 Moreover, additional publications have pointed out that countless Iraqis died of issues not directly tied to combat but rather because of wartime conditions\u2014displacement, poor access to potable water and food, limited healthcare, and rising rates of child and infant mortality.19 A 2013 study published in the journal of Public Library Science of Medicine tabulated well over four hundred thousand Iraqi deaths between March 2003 and June 2011, attributing 60 percent of the deaths directly due to violence and the remaining 40 percent to the combat environment.20<\/p>\n
Political and methodological issues also raise questions about Iraqi government totals. Baghdad only began providing data publicly a year after the surge campaign concluded. According to this accounting, between 2004 and 2008, there were only eighty-six thousand civilian deaths. These figures were split into two categories: fifty-two thousand \u201cmartyred victims,\u201d by which they meant identified bodies, compared to thirty-four thousand \u201cbodies found,\u201d or unidentified bodies. However, these figures only recorded those killed by \u201cdirect bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, or forced displacement\u201d and set aside any deaths from coalition operations or intramilitia fighting. Finally, the picture is further complicated because different Iraqi agencies\u2014including the Defense, Interior, and Health ministries\u2014released their own datasets.21 Not all government figures are questionable because of political influence or other dubious reasons. Researchers, for example, found death certificates in Erbil, northern Iraq, improperly recorded the cause of death only as a means to settle burial and legal issues for surviving family members quickly.22<\/p>\n
By the summer of 2008, the insurgency, by and large, was over. Yet, it had far-reaching ramifications for the surviving Iraqis. Nearly 2.7 million Iraqis were internally displaced, having fled the violence and still feared returning home.23 Food costs had skyrocketed, and a prolonged drought, which worsened water sanitation and agricultural conditions, further compounded those prices.24 While the World Health Organization reported increasing success in combating diseases like cholera, measles, and malaria, Iraq still urgently required better water treatment, primary care, and outbreak management.25 Despite improvements to Iraq\u2019s electrical grid, delivery to Iraqi houses lagged nationwide.26 Recovery efforts stalled and languished as the price of oil fell in late 2008\/early 2009.27<\/p>\n
While the violence had been curtailed considerably, the recovery process had only just begun. Despite Iraq\u2019s improving gross domestic product, which had endured two decades of war and sanctions, other aspects of Iraq\u2019s economy remained unhealthy. Oil dominated Iraq\u2019s economic planning and output; this resulted, in the words of Eckart Woertz, in \u201cresource capture by elites, neglect of productive sectors of the economy, shortcomings in the educational realm, and other phenomena that have been associated with the \u2018resource curse\u2019 that afflicts economies reliant on the export of raw materials.\u201d28 After the surge, unemployment rates remained exceptionally high, with almost 60 percent of men between the ages of fifteen and twenty-nine without work.29 Although official Iraqi government figures claimed the overall unemployment rate was 15 percent by the time of the U.S. withdrawal in 2011, other estimates suggested the actual rate was likely closer to 30 percent.30 <\/p>\n
The Iraqi Landscape<\/p>\n
The invasion and insurgency had not only transformed the makeup and character of Iraqi cities and society, but the war had also inflicted considerable and irreparable harm on Iraqi history. Some effects were easy to see physically. Barring some exceptions at Ur near Tallil Air Base in southern Iraq and Aqar Quf near Forward Operating Base Warrior near Kirkuk in northern Iraq, coalition forces, insurgents, and raiders had severely damaged archaeological sites.31 Looters had ransacked libraries, museums, archives, and other government institutions, siphoning off valuable Iraqi artifacts and historical pieces.32 <\/p>\n
![\"Large](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/Iraq-After-Invasion-img2.jpg\"\/)
<\/p>\n
Because it was the center of gravity for both insurgents and coalition forces, the war dramatically altered the city of Baghdad. Blast walls, which were made of steel-reinforced concrete, littered the capital. First erected in 2005, U.S. Army units used these structures\u2014called by soldiers T-Walls, or Alaska, Texas, or Jersey barriers depending on the size and slope\u2014to protect the civilian population and coalition forces because they could withstand the blast of improvised explosive devices and other fires. As the insurgency worsened, American and Iraqi units used the concrete walls to control traffic and establish checkpoints alongside them. By 2008, these structures were a ubiquitous sight for anyone driving throughout the capital.33<\/p>\n
It is fair to conclude that the surge campaign, which encompassed increasing the number of U.S. troops on the ground and better cooperation among the U.S. Army, Iraqi security forces, and Iraqi tribal forces, successfully repressed the violence.34 However, this assessment does not capture the entire picture. During the insurgency, Sunni and Shi\u2019a militants carried out waves of killings, assassinations, and forced removals of Baghdadis as part of their respective campaigns to ethnically cleanse and segregate the city.35 By 2007 and 2008, after several years of concerted activity, sectarian killings, and coalition operations, violence in Baghdad waned as groups solidified their gains and established \u201cislands\u201d of sectarian affiliation.36 As the United Nations Assistance Mission-Iraq head, Stefan de Mistura, explained, \u201cWe saw that the city of Baghdad changed its color, there was a cleansing.\u201d37<\/p>\n
This pattern of violence indicates the complicated nature of the insurgency\u2014this was not merely coalition forces pitted against insurgents or what the United States considered to be \u201cformer regime elements\u201d but rather multiple conflicts between varying factions and militias occurring simultaneously.38 It is important to note that sectarian affiliation alone did not drive the fighting between Iraq\u2019s Sunni and Shi\u2019a. Countless individuals joined the insurgency to expel the Americans. AQI and other jihadist groups aimed to thrust the country into a civil war as part of their grand ambitions for postoccupation Iraq.39 For some, political marginalization, ideology, and nationalism proved to be powerful motivators. For others, the violence had become a local issue as individuals sought to protect their neighborhood, tribe, and family in the increasingly lawless and bloody environment.40 Data collected shortly after the American withdrawal further highlights the communal nature of the bloodshed. Whereas the insurgency witnessed several high-profile attacks and high-casualty events due to massive car bombs, suicide bombers, and devastating improvised explosive devices, more Iraqis died of gunshots than they did from bombings or other indirect fire between 2003 and December 2008.41 <\/p>\n
Whatever the deciding factor was for participating in the violence, the result, in the end, was a change in the makeup of Baghdad. Despite their intent to protect Iraqis and Americans, blast walls inadvertently contributed to the \u201cnew ethno-religious boundaries\u201d of Baghdad. In the postsurge environment, neighborhoods such as Ameriya, Dora, Hurriya, and Adhamiya became enclaves surrounded by walls with heavily controlled access. These walls were not always foolproof\u2014various communities still suffered rocket attacks; others inadvertently became safe havens for insurgents. The violence in Adhamiya, a Sunni district on the eastern side of the Tigris River in northern Baghdad, for example, was so destructive that the local cemetery ran out of space to bury the dead. Christians in Dora fled to the Ghadeer area of New Baghdad\/9 Nissan district. The Shi\u2019a presence in Ghazaliya, Khadra, and Ameriya essentially vanished, while other Sunni areas turned into \u201cvirtual ghost towns.\u201d42 Reflecting on the events of 2003\u20132008, a resident from Adhamiya told researchers in 2023 that \u201cthere was chaos \u2026 There was no law, and there was no state.\u201d Another from Kadhimiyya, a Shi\u2019a dominated district on the western side of the Tigris opposite of Adhamiya, said, \u201cIn this period of destruction, everyone had to rely on themselves. This was the worst time by far.\u201d43<\/p>\n
The chaos ultimately created opportunities for those looking for power and influence. Insurgent commanders, who may have had a multitude of reasons for fighting, exploited the situation by consolidating gains, territory, and resources for their own profit. Within the enclaves, militants, both Sunni and Shi\u2019a, imposed their rules over the remaining residents; they also outmaneuvered or undercut U.S.-led efforts to establish and stand up new local governing councils.44 In some instances, shops or business owners required the permission of local commanders to operate. Insurgents also commandeered local mosques, appointing preachers and religious leaders of their choosing.45 In the words of one Iraqi journalist, \u201cThese men who had killed, maimed, and destroyed for what they believed in had after years of fighting have become nothing more than criminals.\u201d46 <\/p>\n
More than 270,000 families ultimately fled their homes\u2014including over 90,700 families (estimated to be about 550,000 individuals, based on the average family size of six) from Baghdad\u2014in the wake of the violence.47 But even with security largely reestablished by mid-2008, many could not easily return to their homes and communities. In August, the Iraqi government announced plans to aid the return of those displaced and indicated it would seek to evict illegal squatters and offer financial restitution.48 Still, the families and residents who chose to return faced threats and intimidation. For others, it was impossible because militants and neighbors had vandalized their property beyond repair or simply confiscated them. In some areas, militants supporting Shi\u2019a militant leader Muqtada al-Sadr left ominous taunting graffiti for the returnees, \u201cwe will be right back after a break \u2026 [signed] the Mahdi army.\u201d49 Evidently, many displaced people never came back. According to some estimates, for example, less than 20 percent of Sunni residents returned to their homes in Hurriya.50<\/p>\n
Shi\u2019a Ascendency and Sunni Defeat<\/p>\n
During Saddam\u2019s tenure, Sunni Arabs, who constituted only around 20 percent of Iraq\u2019s overall population, benefited greatly under the Sunni-dominated Ba\u02bfth Party rule. Yet, while the Ba\u02bfthists undoubtedly discriminated against Iraq\u2019s non-Sunni Arab citizens, they did not attempt to segregate Iraq entirely by religious sect or ethnicity. In fact, the regime expended great efforts to create a sense of national identity\u2014an \u201cIraqi\u201d identity\u2014that would supplant any other affiliation.51 As Amatzia Baram, a noted scholar of Iraq, argued, \u201cIraq\u2019s Sunni-Shi\u2019i-Kurdish cleavage was not absolute nor was it always the most important fault line in Iraqi society.\u201d52<\/p>\n
The same could not be said in post-Saddam Iraq. Under the Ba\u02bfth regime, sectarian and ethnic tensions existed but simmered underground. However, they exploded into the open with the invasion and occupation. These fault lines were further crystallized with the formation of the new Iraqi government, which, thanks in part to American fixation on a \u201crepresentative\u201d Iraq, emphasized distributing power based on the country\u2019s religious and ethnic demographics. As a result, the power pendulum swung: Sunnis lost their majority rule, replaced by the Shi\u2019a, who constituted around 60 percent of the population. The Kurds, who live in northern Iraq, also secured several political concessions in the new Iraqi constitution.53 <\/p>\n
![\"U.S.](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/Iraq-After-Invasion-img3.jpg\"\/)
<\/p>\n
Combat operations further cemented this sense of partition. While engaging both Sunni insurgents and Shi\u2019a militias during the surge, coalition forces deemed the former the greatest threat to Iraq\u2019s stability and thus devoted significantly more resources and energy to quell those groups. By 2008, the Iraqi Shi\u2019a emerged as victors in this era. Shi\u2019a militants had secured supremacy in Baghdad. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and his Shi\u2019a political coalition (many of whom had ties to Shi\u2019a militants and Iranian-backed groups) had struggled to govern during the insurgency but now emerged emboldened.54 With the violence tempered, Maliki moved to consolidate his own position and turned his attention to perceived adversaries such as the Kurds and other would-be challengers. Shi\u2019a control over several Iraqi security branches and other government posts also expanded.55 <\/p>\n
Maliki and his associates also seized on prior American-led efforts to root out the Ba\u02bfthists. In the aftermath of the invasion, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) set out to de-Ba\u02bfthify Iraqi society. Issued in May 2003, CPA Orders Number 1 and 2 banned and disbanded the Ba\u02bfth Party and the Iraqi military, respectively. CPA Order Number 5 created the De-Ba\u02bfthification Council (DBC) and charged it with reclaiming Ba\u02bfth property, identifying and classifying Ba\u02bfth members, and eliminating the structure and means of the Ba\u02bfth Party. Nevertheless, as Iraqi leaders and CPA officials worked on creating the new Iraqi constitution, they were mindful of the fact that not every Iraqi was a diehard Ba\u02bfthist. Affiliation or interaction with the party was almost always obligatory for social and economic advancement during Saddam\u2019s rule.56 <\/p>\n
Yet, the DBC surpassed what the CPA had initially anticipated and began what many Iraqis and Americans saw as a purge of Sunnis to solidify Shi\u2019a domination by excluding thousands of Sunnis from the new state.57 While some had connections to the prior regime, the DBC also targeted those who sided with various Sunni political parties and factions. Because of its close ties with the Shi\u2019a government, the DBC also used its prerogative to target perceived wayward trade guilds, unions, and private sector companies. In other words, the DBC attempted to curtail Sunni advancement and thwart would-be challengers under the guise of rooting out Ba\u02bfthism from Iraqi society. While the Americans pressured the DBC (which became the Accountability and Justice Commission in January 2008) to tamp down its activities, the efforts to de-Ba\u02bfthify Iraqi society had already created devastating consequences for Iraq\u2019s future.58 By some estimates, the DBC\/Accountability and Justice Commission removed some fifty thousand to one hundred thousand individuals from government and civil jobs, with education, health, and manufacturing sectors being the hardest hit industries. These dismissals and forced retirements severely limited the Iraqi state\u2019s capacity to provide essential services for its citizens.59 De-Ba\u02bfthification significantly contributed to the Sunnis\u2019 growing sense of alienation and vulnerability. These feelings only intensified, as did the harassment, before they exploded in the open just after the departure of U.S. forces at the end of 2011.<\/p>\n
History and Memory<\/p>\n
The legacy of the 2003 Iraq war is complicated. The invasion removed Saddam Hussein and the Ba\u02bfthists from power, but it also created a vacuum in which the insurgency thrived. The Americans departed when Iraqi governance and stability had remarkably improved but remained fragile still. And yet, the devastation in Iraq cannot be solely pinned on the United States. Militants and insurgents of all walks had their own agendas and agency and inflicted atrocities and horrors on Iraqi civilians. Iraqi politicians and their factions, exploiting American preoccupation on a Ba\u02bfthist-free, democratic Iraq, were eager to rectify historical wrongs (real or perceived) and enshrine their status in this new era at the risk of disaffecting parts of Iraqi society. Without this Iraqi perspective, any picture of the Iraq War is incomplete. A conflation of actors, motivations, and means drove the violence and political tumult. To overlook the carnage and devastation is tantamount to ignoring a vital part of the war\u2019s history. <\/p>\n
![\"U.S.](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/Iraq-After-Invasion-img4.jpg\"\/)
<\/p>\n
The fall of Kabul in 2021 prompted several commentators to invoke Iraq.60 However, just as they were long before the beginning of the \u201cGlobal War on Terrorism,\u201d Iraq and Afghanistan today are not one and the same. Iraq, with all of its faults and weaknesses, such as rampant corruption and militia activity, is a parliamentary republic with three branches of government codified by a federal constitution. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how Iraqi history will look back at the 2003 war and Saddam\u2019s regime. Laws banning membership or support (which is broadly defined) for the Ba\u02bfth Party have stymied academic work on the pre-2003 era, leaving Iraqi researchers and scholars in fear of ostracization, potential loss of employment, and imprisonment.61 <\/p>\n
There are also signs that the successive rounds of violence, combined with the current Iraqi government\u2019s ineptitude and ruthlessness, have contributed to a sort of historical amnesia.62 Longing for stability and peace, many Iraqis look fondly back at the Ba\u02bfthist era. In 2018, one Iraqi general stated that \u201cmany people, when they compare between the situation under Saddam Hussein and now, find maybe their life under Saddam Hussein was better.\u201d63 Given that Iraq still suffers from sewage and electrical problems, Baghdadis interviewed by researchers in 2023 remarked that preinvasion Iraq was the \u201cbest\u201d in terms of reliable public services.64 But beyond this wistfulness, the war has become a clear demarcation line for Iraqis, especially as they consider the present and envision the future. Over one million Iraqis remain internally displaced as of 2024.65 As one Iraqi journalist and filmmaker, whose family fled in 2014 amid ISIS\u2019s conquest, noted, \u201cWe lost our home \u2026 And I keep linking it to the 2003 war. Everything that is happening in our lives\u2014displacement, not having the life we deserve … we are asking to have normal ordinary family lives.\u201d66<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
The opinions and assertions expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of War, or the U.S. government.<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Notes ![\"External](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/AUP-information.png\")
<\/p>\n
Some examples include Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, A Stranger in Your Own City: Travels in the Middle East\u2019s Long War (Knopf, 2023); and Rasha Al Aqeedi, \u201cLiving\u2014and Reliving\u2014the US Invasion of Iraq,\u201d New Lines Magazine, 20 March 2023, https:\/\/newlinesmag.com\/first-person\/living-and-reliving-the-us-invasion-of-iraq\/<\/a>. \u00a0<\/p>\n Kate Tietzen-Wisdom, PhD, is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History in Washington, D.C. She is writing the Army\u2019s official history on the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the withdrawal from Iraq. She has published articles on the Iraqi Ba\u02bfth Party in Diplomatic History and other outlets. She received her PhD from Kansas State University.<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n
\n The mosque complex houses the tombs of the tenth and eleventh imams and sits in the shrine of the twelfth, or hidden, imam.
\n Sam Gollob and Michael E. O\u2019Hanlon, \u201cIraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq\u201d (Brookings Institution, 25 August 2020), 12, https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/08\/FP_20200825_iraq_index.pdf<\/a>.
\n U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (DOD, September 2008), 22, https:\/\/www.health.mil\/Reference-Center\/Reports\/2008\/09\/26\/Measuring-Stability-and-Security-in-Iraq<\/a>. DOD data shows a peak of over 3,500 Iraqi civilian deaths per month near the end of 2006 and then a rapid descent starting in summer 2007 and continuing throughout 2008. By August 2008, these figures had fallen to less than five hundred monthly deaths. Comparing the summers of 2007 and 2008, civilian deaths declined by at least 77 percent. U.S. military personnel and Iraqi security forces deaths, with one stand-alone bump in the summer of 2007, also mirrored this trend.
\n Operation Iraqi Freedom ended 31 August 2010; Operation New Dawn began 1 September 2010 and concluded in December 2011.
\n Mason W. Watson, The Conflict with ISIS: Operation Inherent Resolve, June 2014-January 2020, Publication No. 78-0 (U.S. Army Center of Military History [CMH], 2021).
\n For the First Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm) through 2003, see Sam Helfont, \u201cThe Gulf War\u2019s Afterlife: Dilemmas, Missed Opportunities, and the Post-Cold War Order Undone,\u201d Texas National Security Review 4, no. 2 (Spring 2021): 25\u201347, http:\/\/dx.doi.org\/10.26153\/tsw\/13200<\/a>. Saddam Hussein and several high-ranking Ba\u02bfth believed the United States betrayed Iraq in its war with Iran in the 1980s. For some examples, see Kevin Woods et al., Saddam\u2019s Generals: Perspectives of the Iran-Iraq War (Institute for Defense Analyses, 2011), 107\u20138; and \u201cSaddam Hussein and His Advisers Discussing Reagan\u2019s Speech to the Nation on \u2018Irangate\u2019 (Iran-Contra) Revelations (Part 2),\u201d 15 November 1986, SH-SHTP-A-000-555, Conflict Records Research Center, National Defense University, https:\/\/digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org\/document\/saddam-hussein-and-his-advisers-discussing-reagans-speech-nation-irangate-iran-contra<\/a>. During the rise and expansion of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), several Iraqis (including prominent government officials) and other Arab neighbors believed conspiracy theories about ISIS being an American creation and tool. David D. Kirkpatrick, \u201cSuspicions Run Deep in Iraq that C.I.A. and the Islamic State Are United,\u201d New York Times, 20 September 2014; Suzanne Kianpour, \u201cThe US, IS, and Conspiracy Theory Sweeping Lebanon,\u201d BBC, 12 August 2014, https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/world-middle-east-28745990<\/a>.
\n Roger D. Petersen, Death, Dominance, and State-Building: The U.S. in Iraq and the Future of American Military Intervention (Oxford University Press, 2024), 24. Petersen is referring specifically to the 2003 war.
\n Gregory A. Daddis, \u201cIraq: Twenty Years On, Two Narrative Emerge,\u201d War on the Rocks, 14 April 2023, https:\/\/warontherocks.com\/2023\/04\/iraq-twenty-years-on-two-narratives-emerge\/<\/a>.
\n \u201cU.S. Military Casualties \u2013 Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Casualty, Summary by Casualty (As of 3 January 2025),\u201d Defense Casualty Analysis System, accessed 29 August 2025, https:\/\/dcas.dmdc.osd.mil\/dcas\/app\/conflictCasualties\/oif\/byCategory<\/a>.
\n Anne Siegler et al., \u201cMedia Coverage of Violent Deaths in Iraq: An Opportunistic Capture-Recapture Assessment,\u201d\u00a0Prehospital and Disaster Medicine\u00a023, no. 4 (2008): 369\u201371, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/S1049023X00006026<\/a>.\u00a0
\n Hannah Fischer, Iraq Casualties: U.S. Military Forces and Iraqi Civilians, Police, and Security Forces (Congressional Research Service, 7 October 2010). The Associated Press estimated forty-one thousand Iraqi civilian deaths and eight thousand Iraqi police and security forces deaths between April 2005 and September 2010.
\n Owen Dyer, \u201cUK and US Governments Must Monitor Iraq Casualties,\u201d\u00a0BMJ 330, no. 7491 (2005): 557, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1136\/bmj.330.7491.557<\/a>.
\n Dustin Carpenter et al., \u201cWikiLeaks and Iraq Body Count: The Sum of Parts May Not Add Up to the Whole-A Comparison of Two Tallies of Iraqi Civilian Deaths,\u201d\u00a0Prehospital and Disaster Medicine\u00a028, no. 3 (2013): 223\u201329, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/S1049023X13000113<\/a>.
\n Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), \u201cCivilian Deaths and Casualties as of 17 September 2009,\u201d PowerPoint brief, circa September 2009.
\n Gilbert Burnham et al., \u201cMortality After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: A Cross-Sectional Cluster Sample Survey,\u201d The Lancet 368, no. 9545 (21 October 2006): 1421\u201328, https:\/\/www.thelancet.com\/journals\/lancet\/article\/PIIS0140-6736(06)69491-9\/abstract<\/a>.
\n Medea Benjamin and Nicolas J. S. Davies, \u201cThe Iraq Death Toll 15 Years After the US Invasion,\u201d Common Dreams, 15 March 2018, https:\/\/www.commondreams.org\/views\/2018\/03\/15\/iraq-death-toll-15-years-after-us-invasion<\/a>.
\n Iraq Family Healthy Survey Study Group, \u201cViolence-Related Mortality in Iraq from 2002 to 2006,\u201d New England Journal of Medicine 358, no.5 (31 January 2008): 484\u201392, https:\/\/www.doi.org\/10.1056\/NEJMsa0707782<\/a>.
\n Neta C. Crawford, \u201cBlood and Treasure: United States Budgetary Costs and Human Costs of 20 Years of War in Iraq and Syria, 2003-2003,\u201d Watson Institute at Brown University, 15 March 2023, https:\/\/watson.brown.edu\/costsofwar\/papers\/2023\/IraqSyria20<\/a>; Association for Defending Victims of Terrorism, \u201cPromotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development,\u201d A\/HRC10\/NGO\/71 (United Nations [UN], 2020), 2, https:\/\/digitallibrary.un.org\/record\/3890543?v=pdf<\/a>; World Health Organization (WHO), \u201cIraq: Nutrition Country Profile,\u201d WHO-EM\/NUT\/295\/E (WHO, 2023), https:\/\/iris.who.int\/handle\/10665\/367697<\/a>.
\n Amy Hagopian et al., \u201cMortality in Iraq Associated with the 2003\u20132011 War and Occupation: Findings from a National Cluster Sample Survey by the University Collaborative Iraq Mortality Study,\u201d PLOS Medicine 10, no. 10 (Spring 2013): e1001533, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1371\/journal.pmed.1001533<\/a>.
\n Fischer, Iraq Casualties.
\n Aso Zangana et al., \u201cMortality Trends in Erbil, Iraq, 2007\u20132011,\u201d Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal 25, no. 5 (2019): 315\u201321, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.26719\/emhj.18.042<\/a>.
\n The total number of Iraqi refugees peaked in 2007, reaching around 2.3 million people. Gollob and O\u2019Hanlon, \u201cIraq Index\u201d; Joel Wing, \u201cInternational Organization for Migration Report on Internally Displaced in Tamin, Ninewa, and Salahaddin,\u201d Musings on Iraq, 30 December 2008, http:\/\/musingsoniraq.blogspot.com\/2008\/12\/international-organization-for_30.html<\/a>; Hanna Duggal and AJLabs, \u201c\u2018We Are Still Displaced,\u2019 20 Years After the Iraq War,\u201d Al Jazeera, 5 April 2023, https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/longform\/2023\/4\/5\/iraq-war-20-years-on-visualising-the-impact-of-the-invasion<\/a>. According to the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration, the insurgency displaced 1.6 million Iraqis within the country between 2006 and 2008. International Organization for Migration (IOM), \u201cIOM Migration: Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq\u201d (IOM, August 2010), 1, 17, https:\/\/www.iom.int\/jahia\/webdav\/shared\/shared\/mainsite\/activities\/countries\/docs\/Iraq\/IOM_Iraq_Review_of_Displacement_and_Return_in_Iraq_August_2010.pdf<\/a>.
\n UN Environment Programme (UNEP), Support for Environmental Management of the Iraqi Marshlands, 2004-2009 (UNEP, 2009), 72\u201373, https:\/\/www.unep.org\/resources\/report\/support-environmental-management-iraqi-marshlands-2004-2009<\/a>.
\n MNF-I CJ 1\/4\/8 Surgeon, \u201cReliability of Data in Cholera Reports,\u201d information paper (MNF-I, 15 October 2008); WHO, \u201c2009: Stories that Count\u201d (WHO, 2009), 1\u201340, https:\/\/iris.who.int\/handle\/10665\/116609<\/a>.
\n Joel Wing, \u201cBaghdad\u2019s Electrical Plan,\u201d Musings on Iraq, 24 November 2008, https:\/\/musingsoniraq.blogspot.com\/2008\/11\/baghdads-electricity-plan.html<\/a>; UNEP, Support for Environmental Management.
\n \u201cIraqi Government Approves $67 Billion Budget for 2009,\u201d Radio Free Europe\/Radio Liberty, 11 November 2008, https:\/\/www.rferl.org\/a\/Iraqi_Government_Approves_67_Billion_Budget_For_2009\/1347841.html<\/a>; Ahmed Rasheed, \u201cIraq Parliament Likely to Cut Budget Again,\u201d Reuters, 28 February 2009, https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/iraq-budget\/iraq-parliament-likely-to-cut-2009-budget-again-idUKLS29536920090228\/<\/a>.
\n Eckart Woertz, \u201cIraq 20 Years After the U.S. Invasion: Challenges and Continuity,\u201d GIGA Focus Middle East, no. 1 (March 2023): 1\u20139, https:\/\/www.giga-hamburg.de\/en\/publications\/giga-focus\/iraq-20-years-after-the-us-invasion-challenges-and-continuity<\/a>.
\n UN, Iraq and the Region Consolidated Appeal 2009: A Mid-Year Review (UN, 2009), 7\u20138, https:\/\/digitallibrary.un.org\/record\/660402?v=pdf<\/a>.
\n Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Learning from Iraq: A Final Report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR, March 2013), 119, https:\/\/apps.dtic.mil\/sti\/citations\/ADA587236<\/a>; SIGIR, Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress (SIGIR, 30 January 2012), 82, https:\/\/reliefweb.int\/report\/iraq\/sigir-quarterly-report-and-semiannual-report-united-states-congress<\/a>; Bassam Yousif et al., \u201cConflict, Institutions, and the Iraqi Economy, 2003-2018,\u201d ERF Working Paper No. 1387 (Economic Research Forum, April 2020), https:\/\/erf.org.eg\/publications\/conflict-institutions-and-the-iraqi-economy-2003-2018\/<\/a>.
\n John Malcom Russell, Report on Damage to the Site of Babylon, Iraq (Cultural Heritage Center, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, April 2010), https:\/\/eca.state.gov\/files\/bureau\/babylondamagereport.pdf<\/a>; Diane C. Siebrandt, \u201cThe Impact of Coalition Military Operations on Archaeological Sites in Iraq,\u201d chap. 10 in The Legacy of Iraq: From the 2003 War to the Islamic State, ed. Benjamin Isakhan (Edinburgh University Press, 2015).
\n \u201cIraq Museum Looting: 15 Years On,\u201d University of Sydney, 10 April 2018, https:\/\/www.sydney.edu.au\/news-opinion\/news\/2018\/04\/10\/iraq-museum-looting–15-years-on.html<\/a>; Peter Wien, \u201cProblematic Archives: Documentary Knowledge of Modern Iraq Between Ex- and Repatriation,\u201d Middle East Journal 77, no. 3 (Winter 2024): 350\u201371, https:\/\/muse.jhu.edu\/article\/931383<\/a>.
\n Benjamin Neimark et al., \u201cConcrete Impacts: Blast Walls, Wartime Emissions, and the US Occupation of Iraq,\u201d Antipode: A Radical Journal of Geography 56 (2023): 1\u201323, https:\/\/core.ac.uk\/download\/pdf\/595473392.pdf<\/a>; also see Michael Izady, \u201cAtlas of the Islamic World and Vicinity,\u201d Gulf\/2000 Project: 2006-Present, Columbia University, accessed 29 August 2025, https:\/\/gulf2000.columbia.edu\/maps.shtml<\/a>.
\n For debates on this, see Stephen Biddle et al., \u201cTesting the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?,\u201d\u00a0International Security\u00a037, no.1 (Summer 2012): 7\u201340, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1162\/ISEC_a_00087<\/a>.
\n Petersen, Death, Dominance, and State-Building, 89\u2013150; see also Christiana Parreria, \u201cPower Politics: Armed Non-State Actors and the Capture of Public Electricity in Post-Invasion Baghdad,\u201d Journal of Peace Research\u00a058, no. 4 (September 2020): 749\u201362, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1177\/0022343320940768<\/a>; John Agnew et al., \u201cBaghdad Nights: Evaluating the US Military \u2018Surge\u2019 Using Nighttime Light Signatures,\u201d\u00a0Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space\u00a040, no. 10 (October 2008): 2285\u201395, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1068\/a41200<\/a>.
\n Michael M. R. Izady, \u201cUrban Unplanning: How Violence, Walls, and Segregation Destroyed the Urban Fabric of Baghdad,\u201d Journal of Planning History 19, no. 1 (2020): 52\u201368, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1177\/1538513219830106<\/a>.
\n Nir Rosen, Aftermath: Following the Bloodshed of America\u2019s Wars in the Muslim World (Nation Books, 2010), 528.
\n Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B to Multi-National Corps-Iraq Operations Order 05-02, 1 April 2005, U.S. Central Command Iraq Papers (Document 0722), U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center (AHEC), https:\/\/ahec.armywarcollege.edu\/CENTCOM-IRAQ-papers\/0722.%20Annex%20B-Appendix%201-Intelligence%20Estimate.pdf<\/a>; also see U.S. Central Command to U.S. Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum, \u201cTerminology to Describe the Nature of Hostile Force Operations in Iraq,\u201d 25 July 2003, U.S. Central Command Iraq Papers (Document 0383), AHEC, https:\/\/ahec.armywarcollege.edu\/CENTCOM-IRAQ-papers\/0383.%20AbizaidEnemy25July03.pdf<\/a>.
\n Fawaz A. Gerges, ISIS: A History (Princeton University Press, 2012), 82.
\n Abdul-Ahad, A Stranger in Your Own City, 139; Ranj Alaaldin, \u201cShi\u2019a Ascendancy in Iraq and the Sectarian Polarization of the Middle East,\u201d in Isakhan, The Legacy of Iraq, 183\u201386.
\n Hagopian et al., \u201cMortality in Iraq,\u201d 6.
\n Izady, \u201cUrban Unplanning,\u201d 58\u201360, 62. For more on Adhamiya and Kadhimiyya, see Ula Merie and Sana Murrani, \u201cBaghdad Behind Walls: Mapping Urban Heritage for Spatial Justice,\u201d Middle East Journal 77, no. 3 (Winter 2024): 306\u201328, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3751\/77.34.13<\/a>.
\n Alissa Walter, Contested City: Citizen Advocacy and Survival in Modern Iraq (Stanford University Press, 2025), 218.
\n Walter, Contested City, 187\u2013220.
\n Abdul-Ahad, Stranger in City, 142, 156; Human Terrain Systems\u2014Research Reachback Center, Short-Notice Cultural Report: Christians in Baghdad (Human Terrain Systems\u2014Research Reachback Center, 19 March 2008).
\n Abdul-Ahad, A Stranger in Your Own City, 142\u201344.
\n \u201cIraq Index,\u201d Brookings Institution, 30 November 2011, https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/07\/index20111130.pdf<\/a>; Jamille Bigio and Jen Scott, \u201cInternal Displacement in Iraq: The Process of Working Toward Durable Solutions\u201d (Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, June 2009), https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/articles\/internal-displacement-in-iraq-the-process-of-working-toward-durable-solutions\/<\/a>.
\n U.S. Department of State, \u201cIraq Status Report,\u201d PowerPoint brief, 3 September 2008.
\n Izady, \u201cUrban Unplanning,\u201d 62.
\n Izady, \u201cUrban Unplanning,\u201d 62.
\n Samuel Helfont, Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein, Islam, and the Roots of Insurgencies in Iraq (Oxford University Press, 2018); Dina Rizk Khoury, Iraq in Wartime: Soldiering, Martyrdom, and Remembrance (Cambridge University Press, 2013).
\n Amatzia Baram, Saddam Husayn and Islam, 1968-2003: Ba\u02bfthi Iraq from Secularism to Faith (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 81.
\n Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (Yale University Press, 2007), 164\u201365, 191, 245. The Sunnis also struggled to coalesce politically, unlike the Shi\u2019a. Ronen Zeidel, \u201cBetween Aqalliya and Mukawin: Understanding Sunni Political Attitudes in Post-Saddam Iraq,\u201d chap. 6 in Isakhan, The Legacy of Iraq; Bilal Wahab, \u201cThe Rise and Fall of Kurdish Power in Iraq,\u201d Middle East Research and Information Project, no. 306 (Spring 2023): 1\u201310, https:\/\/merip.org\/2023\/04\/the-rise-and-fall-of-kurdish-power-in-iraq\/<\/a>.
\n For more on Maliki\u2019s Da\u2019wa Party, coalition, and enemies, see Joseph Sassoon, Saddam Hussein\u2019s Ba\u02bfth Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 222\u201323; Joel Rayburn, Iraq After America: Strongmen, Sectarians, Resistance (Hoover Institution Press, 2014), 9\u201336.
\n James L. Jones, \u201cThe National Police,\u201d in The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq (Atlantic Council, 2007), 109\u201315; see also Matthew Nanes, \u201cSectarianism and Conflict in the Iraqi Police,\u201d in\u00a0Policing for Peace: Institutions, Expectations, and Security in Divided Societies (Cambridge University Press, 2021), 42\u201366; Michael J. Totten, In the Wake of the Surge\u00a0(Belmont Estate Books, 2011), 211\u201312, 219, 229\u201330, 234; Abdul-Ahad, Stranger in Your Own City, 165\u201366.
\n Sassoon, Saddam Hussein\u2019s Ba\u02bfth Party, 45\u201347. Even then, the party\u2019s hierarchy had several steps before reaching full membership status. Thousands of Iraqis only ever reached the bottom tiers of mu\u2019ayyid (sympathizer) or nasir (supporter); many only did so as a prerequisite for the occupation or position.
\n There is a certain sense of irony that the DBC exceeded the Coalition Provisional Authority\u2019s (CPA) objectives of the de-Ba\u02bfthification given that the head of the CPA, L. Paul Bremer III, faced accusations and criticisms that his orders to disband the Iraqi military eclipsed the Bush administrations\u2019 intent. President George W. Bush was quoted saying that American policy was to \u201ckeep the [Iraqi] army intact\u201d but that it \u201cdidn\u2019t happen.\u201d Robert Draper, Dead Certain: The Presidency of George W. Bush (Free Press, 2007), 211. Bremer wrote a scathing rebuttal over claims that the CPA Order No. 2 was not only a grave mistake but an ill-advised decision that exacerbated the course of the war, arguing that the CPA policies were crafted by Pentagon leadership, including Under Secretary of Defense Douglas J. Feith, they were \u201cpopular\u201d with Iraqis, and that \u201cIraqi leaders \u2026 broadened the decree\u2019s impact far beyond our original decision.\u201d L. Paul Bremer, \u201cWhat We Got Right in Iraq,\u201d Washington Post, 13 May 2007, https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/archive\/opinions\/2007\/05\/13\/what-we-got-right-in-iraq\/dc5be712-cbee-4579-97a2-810a0e26484d\/<\/a>. Declassified materials, however, suggest the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other Pentagon and U.S. officials advocated for retaining various elements of the Iraqi military and vetting prior Ba\u02bfth and military personnel before removal leading up to the May announcement. See SIGIR, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience (SIGIR, 1 January 2009), 100\u20134, https:\/\/apps.dtic.mil\/sti\/citations\/ADA493696<\/a>; Paul Bremer to Donald Rumsfeld, memorandum, \u201cDissolution of the Ministry of Defense and Related Entities,\u201d 19 May 2003, https:\/\/library.rumsfeld.com\/doclib\/sp\/340\/2003-05-19%20from%20Bremer%20re%20Dissolution%20of%20the%20Ministry%20of%20Defense%20and%20related%20Entities.pdf<\/a>. For his part, Feith would later tell American regulators that while the approval process for CPA Order No. 2 was flawed, the final decision was correct. SIGIR, Hard Lessons, 103.
\n The Accountability and Justice Commission eventually permitted some prior Ba\u02bfth members to join the Iraqi security forces and lower levels of government service (except for intelligence and security positions). See Benjamin Isakhan, \u201cThe De-Baathification of Post-2003 Iraq: Purging the Past for Political Power,\u201d chap. 1 in The Legacy of Iraq; Ronen Zeidel \u201cBetween \u2018Aqalliya\u2019 and \u2018Mukawin\u2019: Understanding Sunni Political Attitudes in Post-Saddam Iraq,\u201d chap. 6 in Isakhan, The Legacy of Iraq; James P. Pfiffner, \u201cUS Blunders in Iraq: De-Ba\u02bfthification and Disbanding the Army,\u201d Intelligence and National Security 25, no. 1 (February 2010): 76\u201385.
\n Alissa J. Rubin, \u201cAhmad Chalabi and the Legacy of De-Ba\u02bfthification,\u201d New York Times, 3 November 2015, https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2015\/11\/04\/world\/middleeast\/ahmad-chalabi-and-the-legacy-of-de-baathification-in-iraq.html<\/a>; Miranda Sissons and Abdulrazzaq Al-Saiedi, A Bitter Legacy: Lessons of De-Baathification in Iraq (International Center for Transnational Justice, March 2013), 22\u201323, https:\/\/www.ictj.org\/publication\/bitter-legacy-lessons-de-baathification-iraq<\/a>.
\n Here are just a mere sampling of articles and responses on this issue: Peter Dahl Thruelsen, \u201cMisaligned in Mesopotamia: Conflicting Ambitions in NATO Mission Iraq,\u201d War on the Rocks, 16 September 2021, https:\/\/warontherocks.com\/2021\/09\/misaligned-in-mesopotamia-conflicting-ambitions-in-nato-mission-iraq\/<\/a>; Haroro J. Ingram and Omar Mohammed, \u201cHistory\u2019s Rhymes in the Fall of Kabul and Mosul: Flawed Ideas, Broken Promises, and Poisonous Spin,\u201d International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2 September 2021, https:\/\/icct.nl\/publication\/historys-rhymes-fall-kabul-and-mosul-flawed-ideas-broken-promises-and-poisonous-spin<\/a>; Walden Bello, \u201cSeptember 11 and the Debacle of \u2018Nation Building\u2019 in Iraq and Afghanistan,\u201d Foreign Policy in Focus, 10 September 2021, https:\/\/fpif.org\/september-11-and-the-debacle-of-nation-building-in-iraq-and-afghanistan\/<\/a>; Michael Hirsh, \u201cThe Lessons Not Learned from Iraq: Twenty Years On, the War Still Shapes Policy\u2014Mostly for the Worse,\u201d Foreign Policy, 17 March 2023, https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2023\/03\/17\/iraq-war-anniversary-lessons-bush-biden-afghanistan\/<\/a>.
\n For example, see the Iraqi government\u2019s Banning the Baath Party Act No. 32 of October 2016, https:\/\/www.unodc.org\/uploads\/icsant\/documents\/Legislation\/Iraq\/Iraq\/English\/Law_No._32_of_2016.pdf<\/a>; see also Marsin Alshamary and Shamiran Mako, \u201cHierarchized Knowledge Production and Iraq\u2019s Ba\u2018th Party Archives,\u201d in Ba\u2018thist Iraq Through Archives: Reflections, Explorations, and Opportunities, ed. Samuel Helfont and Lisa Blaydes (Stanford University Press, 2026); Tobey Matthiesen, \u201cBa\u2018thists in the Arab Gulf States and Iraq-Gulf Relations,\u201d in Helfont and Blaydes, Ba\u2018thist Iraq Through Archives.
\n Jarret Bencks, \u201c2019 Protests in Iraq: A Primer,\u201d BrandeisNOW, 11 December 2019, https:\/\/www.brandeis.edu\/now\/2019\/december\/iraq-protests-2019.html<\/a>; \u201cIraq: Four Years After Tishreen Protests, No Justice for State and Militia Violence,\u201d Amnesty International, 27 September 2023, https:\/\/www.amnesty.org\/en\/latest\/news\/2023\/09\/iraq-four-years-after-tishreen-protests-no-justice-for-state-and-militia-violence\/<\/a>. For a recent study on the legacy of the Iran-Iraq War and its impact on memory and Shi\u2019a militias today, see Younes Saramifar, \u201cCollective (Non-)Memory of the Iran-Iraq War and Sectarian Thinking Among Veteran-Turned-Shi\u2019i Militias Fighters,\u201d Middle East Journal 77, no. 3-4 (Winter 2024): 290\u2013305, https:\/\/muse.jhu.edu\/article\/931380<\/a>.
\n Jane Arraf, \u201c15 Years After U.S. Invasion, Some Iraqis are Nostalgic for Saddam Hussein Era,\u201d NPR, 30 April 2018, https:\/\/www.npr.org\/sections\/parallels\/2018\/04\/30\/605240844\/15-years-after-u-s-invasion-some-iraqis-are-nostalgic-for-saddam-hussein-era<\/a>. This has become ingrained in Iraqi education as well. According to Eric Davis, a political scientist at Rutgers University, Iraqi history textbooks do not accurately convey the past, \u201cSo, Saddam is only referred to from time to time, where it\u2019s necessary, as a dictator. It\u2019s almost as if he didn\u2019t exist.\u201d Deborah Amos, \u201cWide Gulf Divides Iraqi Youth from Older Generation,\u201d NPR, 3 January 2011.
\n Walter, Contested City, 220.
\n United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Global Report 2024\u2014Iraq Situation (UNHCR, 2024), 1\u20133; Crawford, \u201cBlood and Treasure,\u201d 18\u201319.
\n Duggal and AJLabs, \u201c\u2018We Are Still Displaced.\u201d<\/p>\n