While the sequencing, economic incentive mechanisms, and specific steps required by Tehran remain unclear, the deal risks surrendering US leverage without paving the way for a framework to dismantle the regime\u2019s nuclear program, limit its missile capabilities, curb its support for terrorism, or address its repression of the Iranian people.<\/p>\n
The Strait of Hormuz<\/p>\n
Under Article 4, the United States removes the naval blockade within 30 days and withdraws its forces from Iran\u2019s vicinity. In return, the Islamic Republic is merely expected to \u201cmake arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage\u201d of ships per Article 5, something it is already obligated to do under international law.<\/p>\n
It also notes the regime will not charge for passage for 60 days, and mentions how Iran will coordinate with \u201cOman to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait.\u201d<\/p>\n
Discussion surrounding tolling passing vessels, or placing Iran and Oman in charge of maritime traffic through the choke point, only emerged after the conflict and was part of Tehran\u2019s maximalist demands. Simply including these ideas in the MoU lends legitimacy to claims of Iranian authority over the choke point rather than treating the passage as international waters.<\/p>\n
Sanctions relief and enrichment<\/p>\n
The other theme is Washington surrendering its greatest source of leverage, the sanctions architecture created under Trump\u2019s first term and further expanded under Trump\u2019s second, through the maximum pressure campaign.<\/p>\n
Under Article 9, Washington \u201cwill not impose new sanctions on Iran,\u201d while Article 7 discusses terminating \u201call types of sanctions currently facing the Islamic Republic,\u201d including UN Security Council sanctions, IAEA resolutions, and US primary and secondary sanctions.<\/p>\n
![\"US](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/1782469990_745_726905.jpeg\"\/)
US Vice President JD Vance (L) stands next to Pakistan\u2019s Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif prior to the quadrilateral meeting between the United States, Iran, Pakistan, and Qatar at the Burgenstock hotel complex overlooking Lake Lucerne, on June 21. (credit: Fabrice Coffrini\/POOL\/AFP via Getty Images)<\/p>\n
The document does not contain a clear mechanism for the automatic reimposition of sanctions should the agreement collapse due to the regime failing to meet its obligations, a process referred to as \u201csnapback.\u201d<\/p>\n
More importantly, in exchange for sanctions relief, Tehran merely \u201creaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons\u201d and broadly agrees to discuss a mechanism for disposing of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.<\/p>\n
Yet, instead of requiring the regime to dismantle its enrichment capabilities and allow inspections, the draft only expects Tehran to \u201cdiscuss the issue of enrichment,\u201d meaning Iran could once again be allowed to maintain the centrifuges needed to rapidly move toward weapons-grade enrichment if it chooses.<\/p>\n
Financial incentives<\/p>\n
Article 10 states that the \u201cDepartment of Treasury will issue waivers for the export of Iranian crude oil, petroleum products, and derivatives,\u201d while the next section says Iran\u2019s frozen funds, \u201cwhether retained in the original account or transferred, shall be made fully usable for payment.\u201d<\/p>\n
In addition to allowing the regime to sell oil again, the agreement also grants Tehran access to tens of billions of dollars in frozen assets, primarily from oil, gas, and electricity payments blocked in banks in Qatar, Iraq, India, Japan, China, and elsewhere.<\/p>\n
The most staggering financial incentive is found in Article 6, which states that within 60 days, the United States and its regional allies will finalize a mechanism establishing a $300 billion fund<\/a> \u201cfor the reconstruction and economic development of the Islamic Republic of Iran.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n Going beyond granting waivers, it resembles extortion money paid by the Arab states of the Persian Gulf to buy security from the local mafia, in this case, the Islamist regime.<\/p>\n The text also places no restrictions on how the regime may spend the money. There is no requirement that it be directed toward humanitarian goods, despite the regime\u2019s long record of sanctions evasion and money laundering, so extensive that it has shared some of its methods with Russia.<\/p>\n Article 13 further conditions the start of final-status negotiations on the implementation of these measures, meaning Iran would begin receiving economic benefits before resolving the most contentious issues surrounding its nuclear program.<\/p>\n Terror proxies<\/p>\n Article 1 of the MoU says that the US, the Islamic Republic \u201cand their allies in the current war\u201d agree to the \u201ctermination of military operations\u201d in Lebanon and respect its \u201cterritorial integrity.\u201d<\/p>\n This implicitly draws parallels between the alliance between the United States and Israel, two nation-states that are part of the democratic world order, and Tehran\u2019s support for non-state terror networks.<\/p>\n