{"id":184968,"date":"2026-06-30T19:17:13","date_gmt":"2026-06-30T19:17:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/184968\/"},"modified":"2026-06-30T19:17:13","modified_gmt":"2026-06-30T19:17:13","slug":"iran-nuclear-missile-threats-persist-despite-mou","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/184968\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran nuclear, missile threats persist despite MoU"},"content":{"rendered":"

There have been a variety of evaluations of Iran\u2019s nuclear and ballistic missile threat capabilities following the June 2025 war and the early 2026 war, but where do those threats stand now, two weeks after the US-Iran deal<\/a>?<\/p>\n

Speaking to a variety of top officials with knowledge regarding these issues, The Jerusalem Post\u2019s impressions regarding the threats start with the most significant: the Islamic Republic\u2019s 400-plus kilograms of 60% highly enriched uranium.<\/p>\n

Threat of Iran\u2019s 400 kg. of 60% highly enriched uranium<\/p>\n

The Post learned that these officials believe Iran is taking the position that the status quo will reign regarding its nuclear program. This may mean not constructing more centrifuges or enriching more uranium, but it could also mean not giving up or diluting some or all of its 60% and 20% enriched uranium.<\/p>\n

Sixty percent is the closest level to the 90% weaponized level, and 20% is not that far off from 60%.<\/p>\n

\"AA satellite image shows the Fordow nuclear facility in Iran in this handout image dated June 14, 2025 (credit: MAXAR TECHNOLOGY\/HANDOUT VIA REUTERS)<\/p>\n

Currently, Iran says it will not allow nuclear inspectors to return to nuclear sites that were struck by the US and Israel, which include nearly all of the most crucial sites the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) needs to inspect.<\/p>\n

Certainly, the 60% enriched uranium, which is buried under rubble at the Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow nuclear facilities, requires IAEA<\/a> supervision to make sure it is removed from Iran or diluted.<\/p>\n

US President Donald Trump and IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi have insisted that the nuclear inspectors be given full access to all facilities at any time and anywhere, especially those relating to the 60% enriched uranium.<\/p>\n

Leaks from US officials during the nuclear negotiations with Iran implied that the Islamic Republic has already agreed to allow the uranium to be removed or diluted.<\/p>\n

According to these leaks, the only issue relating to the 60% uranium<\/a> in negotiations is the sequencing of the neutralizing of that uranium threat as it relates to the provision of funds to Iran and the lifting of US nuclear sanctions.<\/p>\n

However, Israeli officials are worried that, whether Iran agreed to that informally or not, since the war ended on April 7 and while the Islamic regime continues to pressure Trump regarding the openness of the Strait of Hormuz are that even his commitment to the 60% enriched uranium issue will eventually falter.<\/p>\n

Further, sources note that American military power in the region has been reduced, with various forces having withdrawn since early April, leaving fewer capabilities on hand to carry out certain operations.<\/p>\n

Even recent attacks by the United States Central Command (CENTCOM<\/a>) on Iranian assets near Hormuz have been viewed by sources as symbolic and lacking any significant punch.<\/p>\n

This comes after Trump has previously backed off several positions toward Iran, including unconditional surrender, regime change, banning ballistic missiles, and ending funding for Iranian regional terror proxies.<\/p>\n

Israeli officials have pointed out that Trump sometimes refers to the 60% uranium as \u201cnuclear dust\u201d and said that the US does not even need to remove or dilute it as long as it stays under the rubble of Iran\u2019s nuclear facilities.<\/p>\n

However, the Post understands that, unlike at some earlier points since June 2025, Iran now has ways to access the enriched uranium to potentially remove it and hide it in other parts of Iran where Israel and the US might not be able to follow how it is used.<\/p>\n

This means that if Trump does not make sure the 60% uranium is removed from Iran or diluted, the Islamic regime could potentially sneak it out and restart a clandestine nuclear weapons program.<\/p>\n

Along the same lines, while earlier public reporting and the Post\u2019s reporting alternately indicated that some Iranian centrifuges survived Israeli attacks or that all were damaged, the Post has now confirmed that Israel believes some did survive.<\/p>\n

The number is unknown, though it is believed to be a fraction of the 20,000 or so that were operational prior to June 2025.<\/p>\n

One of the main reasons that Israel did not renew, and is not renewing, attacks is that it believes that these centrifuges are also being stored under rubble, in environments where they cannot be reinstalled or used.<\/p>\n

In other words, the Islamic regime would need to build new facilities or to adjust existing ones in order to reinstall and reactivate the few remaining centrifuges. Israel may also not know the exact number since they are underground.<\/p>\n

The Post has learned that the future construction of centrifuges was separately hit hard by the June 2025 and early 2026 wars.<\/p>\n

On one hand, Iran\u2019s nuclear program was massively damaged in the two recent wars, and it is currently, at least temporarily, in hibernation.<\/p>\n

On the other hand, until the US at least gains IAEA inspectors\u2019 access to key nuclear sites, there is no way to even begin reducing the severe potential future threat posed by the remaining elements of Iran\u2019s nuclear program.<\/p>\n

What needs to be done to neutralize the uranium if it is diluted?<\/p>\n

According to Institute for Science and International Security President David Albright, in order to neutralize the uranium threat fully, Iran would need to dilute its uranium down to the natural level (0.7%), effectively making it a product with no economic value.<\/p>\n

But he emphasized to the Post that the level of dilution has not been publicly agreed upon.<\/p>\n

Albright warned that if Iran only dilutes it down to 3.67%, as it did during the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, that it would still leave it about 70% of the way to weapons-grade uranium.<\/p>\n

Further, if it used 1,000 IR-6 centrifuges to return 3.67% enriched uranium to higher levels, this could be accomplished in four to five months, even with the centrifuges not operating optimally.<\/p>\n

Any Iranian uranium left at the 20% level (if Trump only succeeds in enforcing the dilution of the 60% uranium) could be potentially enriched back up to the weaponized level in around a month using 1,000 IR-6 centrifuges.<\/p>\n

How much focus will the US and the IAEA place on the Pickaxe Mountain nuclear facility, and to what extent will they gain access to it?<\/p>\n

Pickaxe Mountain still does not seem to be a major priority for the Israeli military and intelligence.<\/p>\n

Previously, top US and Israeli sources confirmed that although during Operation Midnight Hammer, the US succeeded in destroying the Fordow nuclear facility, which was under a mountain, the Iranians proved that they could dig deeper, to an extent that even the American rock-penetrating bunker busters, which Israel does not possess, would be ineffective.<\/p>\n

The Post first reported in 2021 that Iran was building the Pickaxe Mountain nuclear facility even deeper than previously.<\/p>\n

While the facility is still not considered operational, on June 4 the Post reported it had received confirmation from both top US and Israeli sources about concerns regarding the viability of destroying it from the air.<\/p>\n

Some top US and Israeli officials view Pickaxe Mountain \u2013 along with the 60% uranium covered with rubble under Iran\u2019s nuclear facilities \u2013 as one of the two remaining major nuclear concerns should it become operational and Iran succeed in transferring critical nuclear assets there, potentially creating a \u201czone of immunity.\u201d<\/p>\n

Trump has made it clear publicly that he does not want to send the large US ground forces needed into Iran to destroy Pickaxe Mountain or to seize the uranium.<\/p>\n

After all this and nearly three months since the April 7 ceasefire, there does not seem to be any new information or a strategy about handling the nuclear facility as a threat.<\/p>\n

More than this, given that Israel is now worried whether Trump will succeed in getting Iran to neutralize the 20% and 60% enriched uranium \u2013 the top nuclear threat and priority to be neutralized \u2013 less attention and emphasis are being placed on other issues, such as Pickaxe Mountain.<\/p>\n

That said, Israel is conscious of Iran\u2019s large-scale plans to transfer more of its strategic resources underground to make it more difficult to strike them from the air and is keeping an eye on the issue in a more general way.<\/p>\n

Does Iran have several hundred ballistic missiles or up to 1,000? <\/p>\n

Why is Israel still unsure about the exact number?<\/p>\n

Israel does not fully know the damage to Iran\u2019s ballistic missile program because Iran itself still doesn\u2019t know, the Post has learned.<\/p>\n

Iran is still estimating how much damage it suffered, how much funding it needs to fix the damage, what assets it has lost completely, and what assets it can salvage in some instances.<\/p>\n

Since the ceasefire, Iran has been in minimal survival mode.<\/p>\n

This has involved balancing an assessment of how much of its ballistic missile apparatus might be immediately and continuously usable if fighting reignites against efforts to invest in a longer-term assessment of rebuilding its capabilities, which it might begin once it starts receiving new funds under the memorandum of understanding (MoU).<\/p>\n

The Post understands that reports claiming Iran still has thousands of ballistic missiles are either confusing short-range missiles \u2013 which can reach the UAE but not Israel \u2013 or are misinformed and based on guesses that missile tunnels were caved in and then reopened by Iranian bulldozers.<\/p>\n

Here, reports may be mistakenly assuming that all missiles and launchers inside are fully functional, when sometimes they are not. In other words, simply uncovering a cave-in, does not necessarily mean there is no other damage that could make Iranian missiles unusable in a given location.<\/p>\n

But the largest accomplishment during the 2026 Iran war, as opposed to the war in June 202, was the destruction of around 2,600 ballistic missile-related targets, many of which wiped out the ability to produce new missiles for the next couple of years.<\/p>\n

This accomplishment has been held in place from April 7 so far until now.<\/p>\n

If the MoU funds start flowing to Iran or if Iran starts collecting daily fees for ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz, there is major concern that Tehran could rebuild the missile program within a couple of years.<\/p>\n

If China or another country assists the Islamic Republic in this area with dual-use materials, such as fuel that can be used for ballistic missiles or civilian purposes, the ballistic missile threat could be restored somewhat faster, though still not very rapidly.<\/p>\n

China has repeatedly told the Post that it has never been involved in Iranian weapons issues, but it has not denied dealing in potential dual-use materials, which are not prohibited by the UN.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"There have been a variety of evaluations of Iran\u2019s nuclear and ballistic missile threat capabilities following the June…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":105254,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","_share_on_mastodon":"0"},"categories":[3],"tags":[2551,141,34,62,393,212,5556],"class_list":["post-184968","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-iran","tag-ballistic-missile","tag-centcom","tag-iran","tag-iran-nuclear","tag-islamic-republic","tag-operation-epic-fury","tag-uranium"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@iran\/116840670528197142","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/184968","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=184968"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/184968\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/105254"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=184968"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=184968"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=184968"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}