Shafaq News<\/p>\n
Syria entered a
\nnew political era following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government in
\n2024; few communities faced a more consequential moment than the country’s
\nKurds. Concentrated largely in the north and northeast, Syrian Kurds spent
\ndecades seeking citizenship, cultural recognition and political representation.
\nThe 2011 civil war transformed them into one of Syria’s most influential
\nmilitary and political actors. Today, Kurdish leaders are working to preserve
\ngains achieved during long-time conflict while defining their place in Syria’s
\nfuture.<\/p>\n
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\nplace Syria’s Kurdish population at between two and three million people before
\nthe civil war, representing roughly 10 to 15% of the country’s population. The
\nlargest Kurdish communities are concentrated in three historically important
\nregions: al-Jazira in the northeast, Kobani<\/a> (also known as Ain al-Arab) along
\nthe Turkish border and Afrin in the northwest. Significant Kurdish populations
\nhave also long lived in Aleppo and Damascus.<\/p>\n
\nKurds of Iraq, who have enjoyed varying degrees of autonomy for decades, Syrian
\nKurds spent much of the modern era on the margins of political life. While
\nKurdish identity remained strong through language, tribal networks and cultural
\ntraditions, successive governments viewed expressions of Kurdish nationalism
\nwith suspicion.<\/p>\n
\npolitics has long been shaped by tribal, ideological and regional divisions.
\nSome movements developed close ties with Iraqi Kurdish parties, particularly
\nthe Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by the Barzani family. Others were
\ninfluenced by the ideas of Abdullah \u00d6calan, founder of the Kurdistan Workers’
\nParty (PKK), whose writings on decentralization and local governance later
\nshaped institutions in northeastern Syria.<\/p>\n
\ninfluences became increasingly important after 2011, when the collapse of state
\nauthority across large parts of Syria created opportunities few Syrian Kurds
\nhad previously imagined. Within a few years, Kurdish-led forces controlled vast
\nterritories, administered millions of residents and became key partners in the
\ninternational campaign against ISIS.<\/p>\n
\nMarginalization<\/p>\n
\nKurdish political experience in Syria was defined by exclusion, cultural
\nrestrictions, and unresolved questions of citizenship.<\/p>\n
\nconsequential episode occurred in 1962, when Damascus conducted a special
\ncensus in al-Hasakah province. Approximately 120,000 Kurds were stripped of
\nSyrian citizenship after being classified as foreigners. Because citizenship status
\nwas inherited, the number of stateless Kurds and their descendants grew
\nsteadily over the following decades, reaching roughly 300,000 by the eve of the
\n2011 uprising.<\/p>\n
\nfaced restrictions on employment, education, property ownership, marriage
\nregistration and freedom of movement. For generations of Kurdish families,
\ncitizenship became one of the defining political issues in their relationship
\nwith the Syrian state.<\/p>\n
\nTejel, author of Syria’s Kurds: “History, Politics and Society,”
\ndescribed statelessness as “one of the most powerful symbols of Kurdish
\nexclusion in Syria.” The issue became a central rallying point for Kurdish
\npolitical movements and remained unresolved for nearly half a century. <\/p>\n
\nonly one aspect of a broader framework that many Kurds viewed as an effort to
\nweaken their identity. Kurdish-language education was largely absent from
\npublic schools, political activism was closely monitored, and Arabization
\npolicies in parts of the northeast deepened tensions between Kurdish
\ncommunities and the state.<\/p>\n
\npressures, Kurdish political movements remained active. Several parties emerged
\nduring the second half of the twentieth century, though many operated under
\nsignificant constraints. Their demands generally focused on cultural rights,
\ncitizenship, and political recognition rather than outright independence.<\/p>\n
\nsignificant pre-war challenge to state authority came in March 2004. What began
\nas clashes during a football match in Qamishli escalated into widespread unrest
\nacross Kurdish areas. Security forces responded forcefully, resulting in,
\naccording to Human Rights Watch, at least 30 to 40 deaths, dozens of arrests,
\nand thousands of demonstrations that spread beyond the city.<\/p>\n
\nunrest is widely regarded as the most significant Kurdish protest movement in
\nSyria before the civil war. For many, it demonstrated both the depth of Kurdish
\ngrievances and the limits of reform under the existing system. Researcher
\nHarriet Allsopp has argued that the unrest exposed frustrations that had
\naccumulated over decades and foreshadowed many of the demands that later
\nemerged during the Syrian uprising.<\/p>\n
\nerupted across Syria in 2011, Kurdish communities entered the crisis with a
\ndistinct historical experience. Their concerns overlapped with those of other
\nSyrians seeking political change, while also reflecting long-standing,
\nunresolved grievances that had accumulated over decades.<\/p>\n
\nPower<\/p>\n
\nstate authority across large parts of northern and northeastern Syria created
\nopportunities that previous generations of Syrian Kurds had rarely imagined.<\/p>\n
\ngovernment troops withdrew from many Kurdish-majority towns and cities, including
\nKobani, Amuda, Derik and large parts of al-Hasakah province. The main
\nbeneficiary was the Democratic Union Party (PYD), founded in 2003, which
\nrapidly expanded its influence through local councils, civil institutions, and
\nsecurity structures.<\/p>\n
\nISIS accelerated this transformation. Beginning in 2013, the group seized vast
\nterritory across Syria and Iraq, placing Kurdish-controlled areas on the front
\nlines of one of the region’s most consequential conflicts.<\/p>\n
\nproved more significant than Kobani. In September 2014, ISIS launched a major
\noffensive against the city, and many expected it to fall. Kurdish fighters,
\nbacked by US-led Coalition airstrikes, mounted a determined defense that
\nultimately forced ISIS to retreat.<\/p>\n
\nmilitary importance, Kobani transformed the international profile of Syrian
\nKurdish forces. Images of Kurdish fighters resisting ISIS spread worldwide,
\nturning the city into a symbol of resistance against extremism and elevating
\nKurdish forces into key partners in the campaign against ISIS.<\/p>\n
\nwith Washington expanded, Kurdish-led forces helped establish the Syrian
\nDemocratic Forces (SDF) in October 2015. The Kurdish-majority coalition brought
\ntogether Arab, Syriac-Assyrian and other local forces, enabling operations
\nacross a broader area while reducing perceptions that the fight against ISIS
\nwas exclusively Kurdish.<\/p>\n
\nUS, the SDF spearheaded major offensives against ISIS strongholds, including
\nManbij in 2016 and Raqqa in 2017, the group’s de facto capital in Syria. Former
\nUS Special Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS Brett McGurk described
\nthe SDF as an “indispensable partner” in the campaign, which
\nculminated in March 2019 with the fall of Baghouz, ISIS’s last territorial
\nenclave in Syria. <\/p>\n
\ncame at a high cost. More than 11,000 SDF fighters were killed and
\napproximately 24,000 wounded during the campaign. According to the UN High
\nCommissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), more than 190,000 people were displaced in
\nand around Raqqa between April and July 2017, while large sections of Kobani
\nand other frontline communities were left heavily damaged.<\/p>\n
\nAutonomous Administration<\/p>\n
\nvictories against ISIS transformed the balance of power in northeastern Syria, but
\nthe more enduring development was political. As Kurdish-led forces expanded
\ntheir control, they faced a challenge few Kurdish movements in the Middle East
\nhad previously encountered: governing a territory inhabited by millions of
\npeople from diverse ethnic, religious and tribal backgrounds.<\/p>\n
\nthe gradual emergence of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria
\n(AANES). Known to many supporters as Rojava, it evolved from local councils
\nfocused on public services, aid distribution and security into a broader
\nadministrative framework responsible for education, municipal affairs, economic
\nmanagement, and internal security.<\/p>\n
\nterritorial extent, the Administration governed roughly one-third of Syria, an
\nestimated four to five million residents. The territory also included many of
\nthe country’s most important agricultural regions and oil-producing areas.
\nArabs, Syriac-Assyrians, Armenians, Turkmens, and other communities lived
\nalongside Kurds, making diversity a defining feature of governance.<\/p>\n
\nAdministration’s political philosophy drew heavily on the ideas of Abdullah
\n\u00d6calan, founder of the PKK. His concept of democratic confederalism emphasized
\ndecentralization, local participation, and community-based governance rather than
\na traditional nation-state.<\/p>\n
\nviewed the model as an alternative to the highly centralized structures that
\nhad long dominated Syria. Critics, however, argued that power remained
\nconcentrated within a single political movement. Former Syrian Foreign Minister
\nFaisal Mekdad, for example, dismissed the Kurdish-led project as “a
\nseparatist project that has no future,” questioning whether it truly
\nreflected the region’s political diversity.<\/p>\n
\nAdministration’s most distinctive features has been its emphasis on women’s
\nparticipation. Leadership positions generally operate through a co-chair system
\nin which a man and a woman jointly hold authority, a model replicated across
\ncouncils, political institutions and civil organizations. Among the Administration’s
\nmost prominent female figures was Ilham Ahmed, who emerged as a leading
\ndiplomatic representative and became one of the best-known Kurdish political
\nfigures on the international stage.<\/p>\n
\nassumed prominent military roles through the Women’s<\/a> Protection Units (YPJ),
\nwhich gained international attention during the fight against ISIS and became
\none of the most recognizable symbols of Kurdish resistance.<\/p>\n
\nmeanwhile, became another major area of change. For decades, Kurdish-language
\ninstruction had been largely absent from Syria’s public schools. Under AANES,
\nKurdish-language curricula were introduced in many schools alongside efforts to
\nexpand teaching of Kurdish history, literature, and culture.<\/p>\n
\nsecurity across a vast and conflict-affected territory became another central
\nresponsibility of the Administration. To that end, it established the Asayish,
\nan internal security force responsible for policing, public order, and
\ncounterterrorism operations. Together with the SDF, it became a central pillar
\nof governance.<\/p>\n
\nAdministration also faced persistent political disputes from within the Kurdish
\npolitical arena. Although the PYD emerged as the dominant force, it never
\nenjoyed unanimous support among Syria’s Kurds. The Kurdish National Council
\n(ENKS<\/a>) repeatedly accused it of monopolizing political life and restricting
\nopposition activity.<\/p>\n
\nreflected a broader reality often overlooked by outside observers: Syrian Kurds
\nare not politically unified. Differences over ideology, relations with regional
\npowers and the future of self-government continue to shape politics across
\nnortheastern Syria.<\/p>\n
\nCrossfire<\/p>\n
\nSyria’s Kurds cannot be understood through domestic politics alone. Geography
\nhas placed them within one of the Middle East’s most complex geopolitical
\nenvironments, where decisions made in Damascus, Ankara, Erbil, and Washington
\noften carry as much weight as those made in Qamishli or Raqqa.<\/p>\n
\nemergence of AANES, Syrian Kurds have balanced relationships with regional and
\ninternational actors whose interests frequently overlap, compete or directly
\nconflict. Among these relationships, none has been more important than that
\nwith Damascus.<\/p>\n
\nof conflict, Kurdish authorities and the Syrian state never existed in complete
\nseparation. Government institutions continued operating in parts of Qamishli
\nand Hasakah, while state employees continued receiving salaries from Damascus,
\nmaintaining a limited presence in Rojava.<\/p>\n
\nco-chair Salih Muslim, whose party remains the dominant force within AANES,
\nconsistently maintained that the Kurds were not seeking independence. Instead,
\nthey advocated a decentralized political system that would preserve Syria’s
\nterritorial integrity while granting substantial authority to local
\nadministrations.<\/p>\n
\nmeanwhile, has traditionally taken a different view. Successive governments
\nfavored centralized authority, arguing that military and administrative
\ninstitutions should ultimately operate under state control.<\/p>\n
\nwith Damascus are defined by constitutional and political questions, relations
\nwith Turkiye are shaped primarily by security concerns. Ankara maintains that
\nthe PYD and YPG have close ties to the PKK, an organization designated as a
\nterrorist group by Turkiye, US and the European Union, and therefore represent
\na \u2018\u2019national security threat.\u2019\u2019 This perception has guided Ankara’s policy
\nthroughout the conflict.<\/p>\n
\n2016, Turkiye launched a series of military operations aimed at preventing
\nKurdish-controlled territories from forming a continuous zone along its
\nsouthern border. Operation Euphrates Shield disrupted Kurdish territorial
\ncontinuity west of the Euphrates River. Operation Olive Branch in 2018 resulted
\nin the capture of Afrin, while Operation Peace Spring in 2019 led to further
\nterritorial changes around Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ayn.<\/p>\n
\nPresident Recep Tayyip Erdogan<\/a> described these operations as “necessary
\nborder security measures,” while Syrian Kurds viewed them as efforts to
\nprevent the consolidation of Kurdish self-rule and weaken institutions that
\nemerged during the war.<\/p>\n
\nrelationship between Syrian Kurds and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq has also
\nshaped political dynamics. The strongest ties have historically existed between
\nthe Kurdish National Council (ENKS) and the KDP, one of the dominant political
\nforces in the Region.<\/p>\n
\nMasoud Barzani repeatedly encouraged dialogue among Syrian Kurdish factions,
\nwith Erbil serving as a venue for repeated reconciliation efforts between the
\nPYD and ENKS. That role has continued under current President Nechirvan<\/a>
\nBarzani, who has consistently advocated dialogue and political compromise.<\/p>\n
\nrelationship extends beyond politics. Thousands of Syrian Kurds maintain
\nfamily, educational and commercial ties with the Kurdistan Region, which has
\nserved at various times as a refuge for displaced Syrians, and an economic outlet
\nfor northeastern Syria. <\/p>\n
\npartnership has shaped Syrian Kurdish fortunes more than the relationship with
\nthe United States. The alliance took shape during the campaign against ISIS,
\nenabling the SDF to expand operations, defeat the group, and emerge as one of
\nthe country\u2019s most powerful military actors.<\/p>\n
\npartnership, however, has always been accompanied by uncertainty. Kurdish
\nleaders remain aware that foreign military deployments are rarely permanent,
\nand that lasting security ultimately depends on a political settlement within
\nSyria itself.<\/p>\n
\nDawn<\/p>\n
\nBashar al-Assad’s government in 2024 opened a new chapter in the history of
\nSyria\u2019s Kurds. Soon after assuming power, transitional Syrian President Ahmad
\nal-Sharaa called for all armed formations operating outside state institutions
\nto be integrated into a unified national army. <\/p>\n
\nsought to restore state authority across territories administered by AANES.<\/p>\n
\ndid not reject integration outright but pushed for guarantees on political
\nrepresentation, local administration, and the future of institutions built
\nduring more than a decade of conflict. A breakthrough appeared to come in March
\n2025, when al-Sharaa and SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi signed an agreement<\/a>
\nestablishing a framework for integrating northeastern Syria into the Syrian
\nstate.<\/p>\n
\nrecognized the Kurdish community as an integral component of Syria and
\naddressed issues ranging from citizenship rights and border crossings to
\nairports and energy infrastructure. \u201cOur vision of Syria is a decentralized,
\nsecular and civil country based on democracy that preserves the rights of all
\nof its components,\u201d Abdi stated during the signing ceremony, describing the
\ndeal as \u201ca real opportunity to build a new Syria.\u201d<\/p>\n
\nstrong US engagement, the framework was widely viewed as the most significant
\nunderstanding reached between Damascus and Kurdish authorities. Yet
\nimplementation soon stalled as disputes emerged over timelines, mechanisms, and
\ncompeting interpretations of the text, producing what both sides described as a
\n\u201ccrisis of confidence.\u201d<\/p>\n
\nwere reflected on the ground. Clashes involving government-backed forces and
\nthe SDF erupted in Aleppo, al-Hasakah, Qamishli, and Kobani. According to local
\nauthorities, at least 24 people were killed and around 129 wounded.
\nSDF-affiliated media reported dozens of civilian deaths in Sheikh Maqsoud and
\nAshrafieh, along with the displacement of more than 165,000 people.<\/p>\n