{"id":197610,"date":"2026-07-09T05:48:09","date_gmt":"2026-07-09T05:48:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/197610\/"},"modified":"2026-07-09T05:48:09","modified_gmt":"2026-07-09T05:48:09","slug":"us-iran-ceasefire-collapse-all-about-control-of-hormuz","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/197610\/","title":{"rendered":"US-Iran ceasefire collapse all about control of Hormuz"},"content":{"rendered":"

For the second time since the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed,\u00a0Washington<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0Tehran<\/a>\u00a0have slipped back into direct military confrontation. <\/p>\n

The\u00a0United States<\/a>\u00a0struck \u201c80 targets in Iran with precision munitions<\/a>\u201d after Iranian forces fired on several ships transiting the\u00a0Strait of Hormuz<\/a>\u00a0without prior coordination with Tehran. The scale of the American strikes reportedly far exceeded the previous US-Iran exchange, suggesting that Washington sought not merely to retaliate but to reestablish deterrence. <\/p>\n

The US also\u00a0reimposed<\/a>\u00a0sanctions<\/a>\u00a0on Iranian\u00a0oil<\/a>\u00a0sales, reversing one of the central concessions of the MOU. The IRGC, in turn,\u00a0claimed<\/a>\u00a0to have attacked 85\u00a0US military<\/a>\u00a0sites across the region, including the Fifth Fleet headquarters in\u00a0Bahrain<\/a>\u00a0and Ali Al-Salem Air Base in Kuwait, and said eight were destroyed.<\/p>\n

At the heart of the dispute are two competing interpretations of the MOU. Tehran\u2019s reading is that while the Strait of Hormuz is to remain open, all commercial traffic during the 60-day interim period must be coordinated with\u00a0Iran<\/a>\u00a0as the parties negotiate a permanent maritime arrangement. Washington, by contrast, interprets an \u201copen\u201d Strait to mean that vessels may transit either the Iranian or Omani shipping lanes without coordinating with Iran.<\/p>\n

For Tehran, this is not a technical disagreement but a strategic one. Iranian officials fear the US is using the MOU to erode Iran\u2019s control over the Strait by rejecting any requirement for coordination and, in effect, establishing an alternative corridor that could remain open even if war resumes. <\/p>\n

Such an arrangement would deprive Iran of what many of its strategists regard as its single most important source of leverage in a future conflict: the credible ability to disrupt maritime traffic through Hormuz. <\/p>\n

From Tehran\u2019s perspective, commercial shipping can resume without surrendering that leverage\u2014but only if all vessel movements continue to be coordinated with Iran, thereby reinforcing its nominal authority over the waterway.<\/p>\n

Washington counters that the text of the MOU does not explicitly require ships to obtain Iranian authorization before transiting the Strait. Instead, it assigns Iran responsibility for ensuring the safe passage of commercial vessels, a distinction the United States argues falls short of granting Tehran operational control over all maritime traffic. <\/p>\n

Paragraph 5 of the MOU states:<\/p>\n

Upon the signing of this MoU, the Islamic Republic of Iran will make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels, with no charge for 60 days only, from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman, and vice versa. The traffic of commercial vessels will immediately start, and considering the need for removing the technical and military obstacles, and de-mining by the Islamic Republic of Iran, will be instated within 30 days.<\/p>\n

Following the previous round of fighting, the two sides explored a compromise under which commercial vessels would coordinate their transit with both Iran and a designated Gulf Cooperation Council state. <\/p>\n

Under such an arrangement, ships would notify Tehran while also reporting to a GCC maritime authority, balancing Iran\u2019s demand for oversight with Washington\u2019s desire to avoid granting Tehran exclusive control. The talks, however, appear never to have been finalized before they were suspended for the funeral of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.<\/p>\n

During that pause, several commercial vessels \u2014 with their AIS transponders switched off \u2014 attempted to transit the southern shipping corridor without notifying Tehran. Iran viewed these voyages as a direct challenge to its interpretation of the MOU and responded with force.<\/p>\n

Both sides are clearly testing each other\u2019s red lines. If the dispute were solely about ensuring the safe passage of commercial shipping, vessels could simply transit through the Iranian shipping lane. Tehran has not prevented ships from using the northern corridor. <\/p>\n

Instead, the insistence on using the southern corridor without notifying Iran appears designed to challenge Tehran\u2019s claim that it exercises authority over the Strait \u2014 a claim the US and most Gulf states have long rejected. <\/p>\n

Beyond questions of transit tolls or administrative fees, no country in the region is eager to legitimize Iranian control over one of the world\u2019s most strategically important waterways. The current confrontation is therefore less about navigation than about sovereignty and strategic leverage.<\/p>\n

The compromise discussed before the talks were suspended offers a sensible way out. Requiring vessels to notify both Iran and a designated GCC maritime authority would defer the sovereignty dispute without prejudging its outcome, allowing commercial traffic to continue while negotiations over a permanent arrangement proceed. <\/p>\n

Sacrificing the entire MOU\u2014and the far more consequential regional framework it could ultimately produce\u2014over the question of who nominally manages the Strait for the next few weeks would be a costly and unnecessary mistake.<\/p>\n

The question now is whether the dual-notification arrangement can still be revived after the exchange of fire over the past 12 hours, or whether this latest escalation has closed the diplomatic window altogether. The coming hours are likely to provide the answer.<\/p>\n

One final observation: by responding with both military force and the reimposition of sanctions on Iranian oil exports, Washington appears intent on establishing escalation dominance\u2014not merely deterring further Iranian action but demonstrating its willingness to raise the costs far more sharply than Tehran. <\/p>\n

The contrast with the first post-MOU confrontation in the Strait is striking. This time, the US response has been substantially more severe, suggesting that Washington is seeking to redefine the deterrence equation before negotiations can resume.<\/p>\n

There is, however, a danger in Washington\u2019s decision to rescind the general license permitting the purchase of Iranian oil. The license was intended to serve as one of the MOU\u2019s principal incentives for Tehran to remain committed to the agreement. But an incentive is only as valuable as its credibility.<\/p>\n

Even before this latest escalation, Iran had struggled to attract new buyers. Many governments and companies were reluctant to enter long-term arrangements because they feared negotiations would collapse and the license would expire without renewal. That uncertainty alone diminished the commercial value of the concession.<\/p>\n

From Washington\u2019s perspective, Iran\u2019s alleged violation of the MOU is serious and warrants a response. But if the United States is seen as issuing and withdrawing the license too readily, potential buyers may conclude that access to Iranian oil is too politically volatile to justify the risk. <\/p>\n

That would weaken one of Washington\u2019s most important sources of leverage. The less valuable the license becomes in the marketplace, the less valuable it becomes at the negotiating table\u2014and the less the United States can demand in return for restoring it.<\/p>\n

Trita Parsi is executive vice president of the Quincy Institute and an expert on US-Iranian relations, Iranian foreign politics, and the geopolitics of the Middle East. He is author of \u201cLosing an Enemy \u2013 Obama, Iran and the Triumph of Diplomacy\u201d; \u201cA Single Roll of the Dice \u2013 Obama\u2019s Diplomacy with Iran\u201d; and \u201cTreacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States.\u201d Follow him on X at @tparsi<\/p>\n

This article is republished via Responsible Statecraft through a Creative Commons license. It first appeared on Trita Parsi\u2019s Substack.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"For the second time since the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed,\u00a0Washington\u00a0and\u00a0Tehran\u00a0have slipped back into direct military…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":197611,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","_share_on_mastodon":"0"},"categories":[26],"tags":[46341,8449,17354,58392,196,58516,39,58517,7737,7029,44973],"class_list":["post-197610","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-persian-gulf","tag-block-1","tag-global-shipping","tag-hormuz-blockade","tag-iran-ceasefire-collapse","tag-iran-war","tag-oil-shock-2-0","tag-persian-gulf","tag-responsible-statecraft","tag-sanctions-on-iran","tag-trita-parsi","tag-us-iran-mou"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@iran\/116888450027364802","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/197610","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=197610"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/197610\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/197611"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=197610"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=197610"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=197610"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}