![\"Eurasia](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Eurasia-Maritime-Geopolitcal-Risk-2026_SpecialEurasia-400x267.png\" "\\"Eurasia")
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Executive Summary<\/p>\n
In 2026, the Eurasian maritime environment is experiencing significant instability because of the breakdown of emerging local tensions and disputes and the US-Israel conflict with Iran, affecting the Persian Gulf.<\/p>\n
This report examines how hybrid warfare, rapid technological advancements, and geoeconomic competition intersect in six key maritime zones, offering strategic insights for those involved in sea-based activities.<\/p>\n
While traditional naval strength continues to be vital in statecraft, asymmetric strategies, autonomous technologies, and \u201cnaval guerrilla warfare\u201d have changed the risk profile of Eurasian maritime routes, demanding a move from institutional trust to transactional flexibility.<\/p>\n
Key TakeawaysThe Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz shows how non-state and middle-power actors can use maritime war-risk insurance to disrupt global energy markets, moving from grey-zone harassment to direct state-on-state conflict in the Persian Gulf.The US withdrawal from its global maritime security role, adopting a unilateral \u201cDonroe Doctrine,\u201d has left a security void in Eurasia.Drone swarms, AI maritime denial, and weaponized undersea infrastructure reduce naval deterrence, creating constant hybrid warfare.Eurasia Maritime Geopolitical Risk<\/p>\n
The Eurasian maritime region has shifted from a state of geopolitical disorder to one of overt conflict, driven by the breakdown of international standards and the US \u201cDonroe Doctrine,\u201d (or\u00a0Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine<\/a>) which favoured Western Hemisphere dominance over Eurasian stability.<\/p>\n The escalatingconflict<\/a>between theUnited States, Israel, and Iran, which started on Saturday, 28 February 2026, caused thedeath<\/a>ofSupreme Leader Ali Khameneiand resulted in Tehran\u2019s decision toblockade<\/a>theStrait of Hormuz. Despite Washington\u2019s efforts to ensure regional maritime trade security, the conflict and Iranian strategy within the Persian Gulf significantly disrupted energy and logistics markets and affected theglobal economy<\/a>and financial markets.<\/p>\n Reports can reclassify therisk assessmentfor critical chokepoints from \u201chigh\u201d to \u201cvery high,\u201dwith some categorising it as \u201ccatastrophic.\u201d This is because of the convergence of energy, military, and digital security concerns, which is precipitating a systemic breakdown in conventional maritime insurance markets and the extensive application of force majeure clauses.<\/p>\n The currentenergy crisis<\/a>marks a critical turning point intechnological divergence, with China\u2019s dominance as an \u201celectro-state<\/a>\u201d providing substantial leverage, while Western \u201cpetrostates\u201d confront an energy shortfall.<\/p>\n The utilisation ofBeijing\u2019s advanced \u201celectric stack\u201d capabilities, encompassing autonomous UUVs and drone swarms, by regional players enables them to achieve maritime denial more affordably than conventional naval engagement, rendering the Persian Gulf a high-risk zone for conventional tanker transit.<\/p>\n Within this context,maritime stakeholdersmust manage a condition of persistent exigency, wherein the discernment of nuanced alterations in Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmissions and war risk surcharges serves as the sole defence against irreparable financial detriment amid a disintegrating international framework.<\/p>\n Black Sea<\/p>\n The Black Sea\u2019s role has shifted from a supplementary transit route to a central point of contention within European security, now serving as a theatre for intensehybrid conflict between Russia and NATO-aligned interests.<\/p>\n In the wake of escalating tensions in the Persian Gulf,Russiahas amplified its \u201csecond front\u201d activities by utilising drone strikes and the weaponisation of energy infrastructure. The intention is to weaken European resolve.<\/p>\n In reaction,NATOhas assumed a considerably more risk-embracing stance, which includes the proactive interception of loitering munitions and performing high-intensity drills near disputed maritime zones. The spread ofRussia\u2019s \u201cshadow fleet\u201d(old, uninsured oil tankers that bypass price limits and pose severe environmental dangers) exacerbates this instability. These vessels have become prime targets for Ukrainian naval drones, even within proximity to Turkish-controlled waters, effectively turning commercial logistics into a legitimate theatre of irregular maritime conflict.<\/p>\n Turkey continues to exert its \u201cMavi Vatan\u201d (Blue Homeland<\/a>) doctrine, leveraging the 1936 Montreux Convention as a non-negotiable safeguard to prevent external naval dominance while balancing its NATO obligations with a pragmatic Russian partnership. Despite this, the significant value of theSakarya gas field, holding over 700 billion cubic meters of reserves, has positioned Turkey\u2019s underwater assets as a key focus for hybrid attacks and \u201cinfrastructure lawfare.\u201d<\/p>\n During the rest of 2026, regional stability will depend on the successful execution of trilateral mine countermeasures and the security of new subsea green energy cables that link the Caucasus with mainland Europe. Within this fragmented structure, the continuous negotiation of autonomous strategic decisions supersedes institutional designs in a \u201ccontested strategic environment\u201d wherenaval deterrence and disinformationhold equivalent importance.<\/p>\n Caspian Sea<\/p>\n By 2026, the Caspian Sea region has experienced a critical geopolitical pivot, characterised by the breakdown of historical Soviet-era reliance, leading to a multipolar contest for transcontinental trade routes.<\/p>\n Azerbaijanhas solidified its role as a logistics hub, utilising its integrated production and transit infrastructure to establish theSouth Caucasus<\/a>as a vital conduit connecting Europe and Central Asia. TheMiddle Corridor(Trans-Caspian International Transport Route), which has attracted significant Western capital seeking redundancy from sanctioned Russian routes, epitomises this shift.<\/p>\n Conversely, this westward reorientation has provoked considerable antagonism from Russia and Iran, entities striving to sustain regional preeminence through a \u201cGas Union\u201d and the instrumentalisation of maintenance schedules for critical infrastructure to obstruct energy transit. Central to this new architecture is the\u201cTrump Route for International Peace and Prosperity\u201d (TRIPP<\/a>), a US-led initiative signed that grants Washington a 74% majority ownership in a tolled transit zone through Armenia, signalling a direct challenge to the Russian-Iranian \u201cSecurity Siloviki\u201d.<\/p>\n Besides geopolitical and economic tensions, a severeenvironmental crisisthat exacerbates maritime risks confronts the Caspian Sea. The sea level is currently declining by approximately 20 centimetres annually, a rate that has accelerated to record minimums in 2026, severely limiting ferry and tanker capacity and requiring constant, costly dredging at key ports like Kuryk and Anzali. Thediminishing water levels pose a significant riskto the cooling infrastructure of essential thermal power facilities, including Iran\u2019s Shahid Salimi plant, increasing the likelihood of widespread regional power outages to 65% annually.<\/p>\n In parallel, AIS tracking data validates anincrease in \u201cDark Fleet\u201dengagements between Turkmen, Russian and Iranian ports, implying that Tehran and Moscow are effectively leveraging covert gas-swap mechanisms to evade the disintegrating international sanctions regime.<\/p>\n Red Sea<\/p>\n By 2026, the Red Sea has become a model of \u201cTransactional Maritime Security,\u201d with the Houthi movement, Ansar Allah, progressing from a localised insurgency to a regional gatekeeper. Despite the fragile ceasefire of late 2025,Iranian allies<\/a>might reactivate theblockadeas part of their broader response to the 2026 conflict with Israel and the United States.<\/p>\n This \u201cconditional truce\u201d framework has collapsed, replaced by a regime of asymmetric maritime denial wheresafety is no longer a legal right under international norms, but a commodity negotiated through semi-state entities.<\/p>\n The economic toll remains devastating. TheSuez Canal\u2019s transitnumbers have remained below their 2025 troughs, incurring losses of over $6 billion for Egypt\u2019s treasury and causing that international shipping companies, including Maersk and the Gemini Cooperation, maintain theCape of Good Hope routeas their default operational path.<\/p>\n Technological proliferation has further eroded the efficacy of traditional naval deterrence. TheHouthisare employinggenerative artificial intelligenceand loitering munitions to enhance their drone swarm strategies, specifically targeting vessels with even slight past connections to Western interests, utilising antiquated public databases. Thisstrategy<\/a>of overwhelming with sheer quantity has compelled naval coalitions, such asOperation Prosperity Guardian, into a financially unviable defensive stance. Naval coalitions allocate substantial financial resources to deploy interceptors that counter economical,AI-supported Water-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIEDs).<\/p>\n This crisis has fostereda strategic alliance between the Gulf and the Horn of Africa. For example, Ethiopia\u2019s economic stability now intrinsically links to Red Sea war-risk premiums. These premiums can rapidly increase following singular kinetic occurrences.<\/p>\n By 2026,the Red Sea will remain one of the most unstable economic hubs globally. This instability highlights how non-state actors in asymmetric warfare can artificially inflate worldwide freight charges. They achieve this by diverging from intrinsic market values through continuous, sophisticated technological interference.<\/p>\n Persian Gulf<\/p>\n The Persian Gulf has effectively transformed into a maritime \u201cKill Zone\u201d following the initiation of Iran\u2019sOperation True Promise 4, signalling a definitive shift from grey-zone harassment to overt state-on-state kinetic warfare.<\/p>\n This shift hasbroadened the regional risk landscapeto encompass a complete asymmetric maritime blockade, wherein the principal hazard has transitioned from unintentional escalation to a calculated strategy of maritime obstruction.Since 2 March 2026<\/a>, commercial tanker traffic transiting the Strait of Hormuz has seen a precipitousdrop exceeding 90%.This development stems from the new Iranian leadership, underMojtaba Khamenei, integrating the closure of the waterway into their strategic framework to mitigate pressure from Western powers and Israel.<\/p>\n The Iranian forces employed a strategy of naval interdiction, augmented bysophisticated technological countermeasures. By incorporating widespread GPS jamming and utilising \u201cdark vessels\u201d (unidentified assets that conceal their origin), Tehran has effectively hindered interception operations conducted by US-led naval coalitions.<\/p>\n The consequence is acatastrophic collapse of the insurance market.Global P&I clubs<\/a>have effectively abrogated war-risk coverage for the area, rendering maritime transit prohibitively expensive for commercial operators.Direct military actions against GCC infrastructurealso worsen the situation, and notable incidents occurred in Bahrain and the UAE. The destruction of desalination plants in these areas poses a significant risk to the water supply for over 62 million people.<\/p>\n Indian Ocean<\/p>\n In 2026, the Indian Ocean has become thestrategic pivot of the 21stcentury, acting as the main stage for the \u201cDemocratic Security Diamond\u201d whereIndia, Australia, Japan, and the United Statesare working together to counterbalanceChina\u2019s increasing maritime influence.<\/p>\n Central to this competition isIndia\u2019s decisive move toward strategic autonomy; the 2026 commissioning of theINS Varsha naval base<\/a>provides a hardened, underground facility for nuclear submarines, granting India a credible second-strike capability and a direct counterweight to China\u2019s Longpo base.<\/p>\n China\u2019s response to this regional military buildup involves a twofold increase in its military exercises within the Indian Ocean Region, extending from the Gulf of Oman to the Mozambique Channel, alongside the establishment of trilateral naval drills with Russia and Iran to counter Western-led maritime principles.<\/p>\n TheQuadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)has developed into a functional mini-lateral arrangement; however, it faces challenges such as Washington\u2019s unilateral \u201cAmerica First\u201d policy and New Delhi\u2019s reluctance to commit to an overt anti-China coalition.<\/p>\n Considering this fragmented security architecture, bilateral relations have strengthened, notably betweenIndia and Australia, as they have unified theirmaritime commands<\/a>to confront the escalating threats of cyber warfare and piracy.<\/p>\n With China\u2019s naval expansion, the Indian Ocean is now the key theatre for competition regarding regulatory doctrines and global data transmission, which will shape the future of the Asian era.<\/p>\n Pacific Ocean<\/p>\n The Pacific Ocean remains the pre-eminent theatre ofglobal maritime risk in 2026<\/a>, as China\u2019s assertive posture in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait systematically challenges the remnants of the rules-based regional order.<\/p>\n Chinahas strategically transformed its considerable civilian fishing fleet into an undeclared naval instrument, utilising over 200,000 vessels for staged blockades and ambiguous coercive tactics. The aim is to incapacitate allied maritime forces without triggering a comprehensive war. Reinforcing this strategy are \u201ccognitive warfare\u201d andsignal spoofing techniques, which involve the use of fraudulent AIS data to construct artificial vessel presences in Taiwanese ports, ultimately compromising the island\u2019s maritime domain awareness and its capacity for threat perception.<\/p>\n Taipei regards theSouth China Seaas an indispensable artery, given that any impediment to passaging its 98% imported liquid natural gas (LNG) would be tantamount to an act of \u201cenergy decapitation,\u201d possibly compelling political capitulation to the CCP.<\/p>\n A varied network of mini-lateral security frameworks, such asAUKUS, the Quad, and \u201cthe Squad,\u201dhas been formed to counter this revisionist expansion and ensure a credible \u201cdeterrence by denial\u201d stance. In 2026, a significant achievement occurred withinAUKUS Pillar Iwhen the United Kingdom began rotating nuclear-powered submarines through HMAS Stirling, enhancing Australia\u2019s capacity to host such vessels.<\/p>\n Concurrently,AUKUS Pillar IIhas expedited the deployment of asymmetric assets, such as the \u201cGhost Shark\u201d autonomous undersea vehicles, which serve as an economical countermeasure to China\u2019s naval modernisation efforts.<\/p>\n Even with unilateral \u201cDonroe Doctrine\u201d policy changes originating from Washington,the Indo-Pacific continues to be the primary focus. The struggle for control over undiscovered natural gas deposits and sophisticated tech supply chains will be the critical factor in determining global systemic risk by 2026.<\/p>\n Indicators to MonitorThe ongoing US-Israel conflict with Iran, and Tehran\u2019s persistent efforts to blockade the Strait of Hormuz.Security and stability in the Red Sea, as the Houthis can increase their \u201cmaritime guerrilla warfare\u201d against trade vessels and, therefore, increase insurance premiums.The increase in \u201cflag hopping\u201d by sanctioned oil tankers and the rise in ships with deactivated AIS transponders as evidence that maritime governance is weakening and regional supervision is failing.Environmental impact and the sea level in the Caspian Sea whose repercussion might affect maritime trade and operations.China\u2019s military exercises in the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean as a sign to regional and Western allies of Beijing\u2019s willingness to use naval force in the area.The mobilisation of Western capital into TRIPP and TITR projects, weighed against unannounced maintenance outages or physical interference at Novorossiysk.Outlook<\/p>\n Maritime geopolitical risk in Eurasia is expected to remainhighor \u201cunder constant pressure\u201d through the end of 2026.<\/p>\n Looking at the trajectory of 2026, the Eurasian maritime landscape is shifting from a rules-based order toward a\u201ctransactional security\u201dmodel. With the US \u201cDonroe Doctrine\u201d emphasising dominance in the Western Hemisphere,Eurasia can face a security vacuum. A volatile mix of regional middle powers and non-state actors will likely fill this void, employing asymmetric\u201cnaval guerrilla\u201d tactics.<\/p>\n The successful implementation of blockades by Iran and the Houthis implies that the age of assured\u201cfreedom of navigation\u201d has effectively ended. In its place, a new paradigm has emerged wherein maritime passage is now considered a bargained-for commodity rather than an established legal right.<\/p>\n In the future,the growth of AI-powered drone swarms and \u201cdark fleet\u201d operationswill make traditional naval deterrence prohibitively costly, requiring stakeholders to employ digital deception and agile \u201ctransactional flexibility\u201d to manage the emergence of persistent maritime \u201cKill Zones.\u201d<\/p>\n On thegeoeconomic front, a systemic divergence between the struggling Western \u201cpetrostates\u201d and China\u2019s \u201celectro-state\u201d hegemony will define the rest of 2026. Given the disruptions in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, the global economy\u2019s stability depends now on the swift development of alternative routes such asTRIPP and the Middle Corridor. However, the security apparatus of Russia and Iran, who use infrastructure lawfare to impede energy transit, confront these routes with a compounded existential risk. An escalatingenvironmental crisis in the Caspian Seaalso imperils the physical stability of regional ports, further endangering these routes.<\/p>\n The erosion of traditionalinsurance marketsbecause of force majeure provisions will precipitate a significant change, prioritising autonomous supply chain proficiency and adaptability within a fragmenting global structure over established institutional reliance for maritime achievement.<\/p>\n SpecialEurasia Co-Founder & Research Manager.He has vast experience in Intelligence analysis, geopolitics, security, conflict management, and ethnic minorities. He holds a PhD in Islamic history from the University of Rome Tor Vergata, a master\u2019s degree in Peacebuilding Management and International Relations from Pontifical University San Bonaventura, and a master\u2019s degree in History from the University of Rome Tor Vergata. As an Intelligence analyst and political risk advisor, he has organised working visits and official missions in the Middle East, North Africa, Latin America, and the post-Soviet space and has supported the decision-making process of private and public institutions writing reports and risk assessments. Previously, he founded and directed ASRIE Analytica. He has written several academic papers on geopolitics, conflicts, and jihadist propaganda. He is the author of the books\u00a0Geopolitical del Caucaso russo. Gli interessi del Cremlino e degli attori stranieri nelle dinamiche locali nordcaucasiche\u00a0(Sandro Teti Editore 2020) and\u00a0Storia del Caucaso del Nord tra presenza russa, Islam e terrorismo\u00a0(Anteo Edizioni 2022). He was also the co-author of the book\u00a0Conflitto in Ucraina: rischio geopolitico, propaganda jihadista e minaccia per l\u2019Europa\u00a0(Enigma Edizioni). He speaks Italian, English, Russian, Spanish and Arabic.<\/p>\n Read the author’s reports<\/a><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Executive Summary In 2026, the Eurasian maritime environment is experiencing significant instability because of the breakdown of emerging…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":21387,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","_share_on_mastodon":"0"},"categories":[26],"tags":[39],"class_list":["post-21386","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-persian-gulf","tag-persian-gulf"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@iran\/116238012067851624","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/21386","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=21386"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/21386\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/21387"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=21386"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=21386"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=21386"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}![\"Giuliano](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Giuliano-Bifolchi-immagine.jpg\" "\\"Eurasia")
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