{"id":229242,"date":"2026-07-30T13:14:17","date_gmt":"2026-07-30T13:14:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/229242\/"},"modified":"2026-07-30T13:14:17","modified_gmt":"2026-07-30T13:14:17","slug":"the-israel-lebanon-framework-agreement-return-to-the-land-for-peace-formula","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/229242\/","title":{"rendered":"The Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement: Return to the \u201cLand for Peace\u201d\u2019 Formula"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Trilateral Framework Agreement<\/a> signed by Israel and Lebanon on June 26 established a road map to end the conflict between the two countries. The agreement, which the United States also signed, was predated by other attempts to regulate the long-term relations between Israel and Lebanon, including a 2022 maritime boundary agreement<\/a>, a 1983 peace agreement<\/a> (which never entered into force), and Security Council Resolutions 1701<\/a> (2006), 425<\/a> (1978) and 242<\/a> (1967). The new agreement proclaims the parties\u2019 mutual interest in ending the state of war and establishing peaceful relations between Israel and Lebanon, creating conditions that would allow the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to reassert its exclusive authority over the territory of Lebanon and facilitate Israeli withdrawal from the country. It identifies Hezbollah, the Iran-backed Shiite militia, as the underlying cause of the current conflict. It is against this broad political framework, where both parties have decided to put aside their mutual grievances and work jointly \u2013 with American support \u2013 toward changing conditions on the ground and tackling a common adversary, that the terms of the agreement should be evaluated.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The Main Aspects of the June 26 Agreement<\/p>\n

The Trilateral Framework Agreement is an interim pact between Israel and Lebanon, seen as a first step in a historical process designed to \u201cend conflict between them, ensure the sovereignty and security of both countries, and establish peaceful neighborly relations between the two countries.\u201d In article 12 of the agreement, Israel and Lebanon commit to establish working groups \u201cto draft the full comprehensive peace and security agreement\u201d and to resort to complementary tracks of direct engagement to give effect to the Trilateral Framework Agreement. Both countries commit to proceed to negotiate in good faith until \u201cfull and lasting peace\u201d is achieved. In order to facilitate the negotiations, article 13 provides that the two states will adopt confidence-building measures, including \u201ccessation of all hostile or adverse actions in international political or legal fora.\u201d They also agree to work toward the \u201csearch for and return of remains\u201d (the remains of Ron Arad, an Israeli air force pilot who was captured in Lebanon in 1986, are believed<\/a> to still be in Lebanese territory) and the release of detainees (Israel is reportedly<\/a> detaining several dozen Lebanese citizens). The language of Article 13 has created controversy in some circles, and several NGOs and human rights groups criticized<\/a> this aspect of the agreement for allegedly absolving Israel from incurring international accountability for the many civilian harms it caused during its military operations in Lebanon (the NGOs\u2019 statement also briefly mentions harm inflicted on Israeli citizens in Northern Israel). Indeed, it has already been suggested<\/a> that article 13 may complicate, if not derail, the work of the recently created<\/a> United Nations High Commission for Human Rights Assessment Mission for Lebanon.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

Another key feature of the agreement involves the elaboration of several reciprocal, inter-dependent and verifiable obligations. According to article 2, the verifiable disarmament of non-state armed groups and the dismantlement of associated infrastructure will enable the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to \u201cprogressively redeploy out of Lebanese territory\u201d and allow the LAF to reassert control over the entire territory of Lebanon. Upon the reassumption of LAF control, reconstruction efforts can begin and the civilian population that was evacuated from these areas may safely return (the linkage between civilian return and the milestones identified in the agreement was also criticized in the NGOs\u2019 statement<\/a> because it further prolongs the displacement of Lebanese civilians). The specific details of the process by which measures, security arrangements, and verification will be taken are spelled out in a security annex<\/a>. According to the annex, the LAF will \u201clead the implementation\u201d of the disarmament process. Article 3 of the Trilateral Framework Agreement already provides, however, that the process will begin in two \u201cpilot zones,\u201d and article 4 stipulates that Lebanon will seek international assistance, including by Arab partners, and under the leadership of the United States to verify and support the process.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Unsurprisingly, the pilot withdrawals began with fits and starts. On July 21, the LAF started<\/a> deploying its forces in the \u201cpilot zones\u201d and a few civilian families returned<\/a> to their homes. Yet, on July 26, the LAF put out a statement<\/a> accusing Israel of obstructing its attempts to take control of Southern Lebanon and preventing its soldiers from taking control of villages as agreed. Israel has not yet formally responded to this claim.\u00a0<\/p>\n

In the agreement, Israel and Lebanon set out their intentions vis-\u00e0-vis one another. The government of Lebanon is committed to achieving a monopoly on the use of force in its territory (art. 4) and reaffirms its exclusive sovereign authority over war and peace (art. 6). As part of this stated intention, Lebanon will prevent funding of non-state armed groups, such as Hezbollah, and will take measures to proscribe their operations. Israel declares that it has no territorial ambitions in Lebanon and that its military actions in Lebanese territory are directed only against threats posed to it by non-state actors. The United States, for its part, declares its willingness to support the reconstruction of Lebanon, provide it with humanitarian assistance and with economic recovery programs and investment.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

Article 7 clarifies that the two states retain a right to self-defense under international law, and that this right cannot be invoked by third parties (alluding implicitly both to Hezbollah and Iran), and article 8 identifies the safe return of Lebanese civilians to South Lebanon and the security of Israel\u2019s northern communities as long-term goals.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Finally, the Trilateral Framework Agreement contains an affirmation of the right of both Israel and Lebanon to exist in peace (art. 2), of their intent to achieve \u201clasting peace and security,\u201d and \u201cpeaceful neighborly relations\u201d (preamble), and their appreciation for the role of the United States and the \u201cvision and leadership of President Donald J. Trump\u201d (art. 14).<\/p>\n

Return to \u201cLand for Peace\u201d<\/p>\n

The Trilateral Framework Agreement can be regarded as the continuation of a long-standing legal trajectory governing the Israeli-Arab conflict in the Middle East, which links measures taken by Israel\u2013typically, withdrawals from occupied land\u2013to security guarantees and conclusion of peace agreements. In 1967, the Security Council established through Resolution 242 <\/a>\u00a0a \u201cland for peace\u201d formula:\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

\u2026the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles: (i) \u201cWithdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;<\/p>\n

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;<\/p>\n

On that basis, Israel concluded a peace treaty<\/a> with Egypt in 1979, which involved land withdrawals, the demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula, and the deployment of a multinational force and observers. The 1994 peace treaty<\/a> between Israel and Jordan followed a similar logic\u2013reaffirmation of the international border between Mandatory Palestine and Mandatory Transjordan and the exchange of security guarantees. In 1995, Israel concluded an Interim Agreement<\/a> with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which also reflected\u2013like the 1993 Declaration of Principles<\/a> between the same parties\u2013the logic of land for peace: Withdrawal of Israeli forces from parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and security guarantees, including measures designed to prevent terrorism and violence.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Previous attempts to regulate armed hostilities between Israel and Lebanon from 1978 onwards also tended to conform to the same formula. Security Council Resolution 425<\/a> called on Israel to withdraw from Lebanese territory and established a peacekeeping force\u2013UNIFIL\u2013 to verify the withdrawal and for \u201crestoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.\u201d Whereas Resolution 425 was enacted against the backdrop of Israel\u2019s security concerns stemming from the use of Southern Lebanon by the PLO to attack Israel, Security Council Resolution 1701<\/a> from 2006 was adopted against the background of Hezbollah\u2019s use of Southern Lebanon for comparable military purposes. Resolution 1701 provided a road map for full Israeli withdrawal, redeployment of Lebanese governmental forces and UNIFIL in the South and entrusting it with the task of ensuring the disarmament of armed groups active in the area.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The Trilateral Framework Agreement follows the same logic of withdrawal\/security guarantees of Resolutions 425 and 1701. It differs from them, however, in a number of key aspects. First, it is the product of direct negotiations between Israel and Lebanon and is not a U.N. Security Council resolution. Second, it is more ambitious than the aforementioned resolutions in that it aims to establish peaceful relations between Israel and Lebanon, and not merely security arrangements. In fact, it already includes a mutual recognition of the \u201cright of each state to exist in peace.\u201d It does not designate a role for UNIFIL in the implementation of the agreement (the mandate of UNIFIL is planned<\/a> to expire next year); and it creates \u201cpilot zones,\u201d which the two states will designate for initial LAF deployment with the support of the United States. As indicated above, the parties also agreed to link the safe return of Lebanese civilians to Southern Lebanon to the process of redeployment of the LAF and the gradual withdrawal of the IDF.<\/p>\n

The Trilateral Framework Agreement and General International Law<\/p>\n

The approach taken in the Trilateral Framework Agreement differs significantly from the approach taken by the International Court of Justice in its 2024 advisory opinion on Practices and Policies of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory<\/a>. In that case, the Court opined that Israel must withdraw from the Palestinian territories it occupies \u201cas rapidly as possible,\u201d without linking that withdrawal to any specific security arrangements or the conclusion of a peace agreement. This approach appears to reflect the Court\u2019s strong position on the illegality of Israel\u2019s continued presence and the policies and practices associated with such presence, and its exasperation with Israel\u2019s invocation of security concerns in connection with its settlement policy and its measures of de facto annexation. (We did criticize elsewhere<\/a> the Court\u2019s failure to meaningfully engage with Security Council Resolution 242 and the Oslo Accords as relevant legal frameworks that followed the \u201cland for peace\u201d paradigm).\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

In any event, the case for application of the \u201cland for peace\u201d paradigm in Lebanon is stronger. Unlike with regard to the West Bank, Israel declared it does not have territorial claims to any Lebanese territory, has withdrawn on a number of previous occasions to the international border, and its presence in Lebanon appears to have a clear security rationale. It is difficult for us to accept the critique<\/a> that an agreement freely entered into by the parties and which follows past precedents, including the formula repeatedly endorsed by Security Council resolutions in relation to Israel and Lebanon, violates international law. Rather, it appears that the Trilateral Framework Agreement draws lessons from past failures to stabilize the situation across the Lebanese-Israeli border: It replaces the mechanism of full Israeli withdrawal against inadequate security guarantees in the form of UNIFIL with incremental Israeli withdrawals against gradual assumption of control over evacuated territories by the LAF with the support of the United States. This represents a clear choice by the Lebanese government to transform the security crisis into an opportunity to implement its \u201cmonopoly of arms\u201d agenda, and the Trilateral Framework Agreement lends support to this policy. Arguably, this gradual approach is more likely to result in full Lebanese sovereign control of its territories \u2013 in accordance with basic principles of international law \u2013 than previous attempts that failed due to the power vacuum they left in place. In any event, since Lebanon and Israel may agree, in theory, on the redrawing of the border between them, it is not clear to us why an agreement on gradual withdrawal to the international border constitutes a violation of international law and not a valid agreement under international law.<\/p>\n

The aforementioned NGOs\u2019 statement<\/a> raises, however, two specific concerns about the Trilateral Framework Agreement, which merit consideration: One, the linkage introduced between transfer of control of areas to the LAF and the safe return of civilians thereto; second, the language on \u201ccessation of all hostile or adverse actions in international political or legal fora.\u201d Regarding the first concern, it appears that the parties to the agreement assumed that, as a practical matter, civilians could only return to areas under the effective control of the LAF, either because in areas controlled by the IDF hostilities continue, or because they would not feel safe to return to areas controlled by a foreign army. While under both international humanitarian law (article 49 <\/a>\u00a0of the Fourth Geneva Convention) and international human rights law (article 12<\/a> of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), civilians have a right to return to places they were deported by an occupying power after the cessation of hostilities (subject to overriding security considerations), it appears as if a gradual\u2013yet not excessively prolonged\u2013program of resettlement might be deemed a reasonable implementation measure, especially when conditions in the South remain volatile and the causes for their displacement are still in place. (Cf. ICRC Customary Rule, Rule 132<\/a>). What\u2019s more, an incremental agreement that seeks to promote peace and security in the area and which affirms the right of civilians to return, could serve the long-term interests of these civilians. Still, if it turns out that civilians are not returned, and that security concerns merely serve as a pretext for the continued presence of Israel in Lebanon, preventing return would be transformed into a new violation of international law.\u00a0<\/p>\n

A more problematic aspect of the agreement is accountability. Indeed, a possible interpretation of the agreement (one no doubt supported by the Israeli government) is that the agreement closes the door on any legal activity in international courts or tribunals regarding past activities of the parties to the conflict. This interpretation, however, is not the only one possible. First, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam claimed<\/a> that the duty to refrain from invoking the jurisdiction of international courts was undertaken only with respect to the time of negotiations. Second, such an undertaking cannot bar Lebanon from demanding reparations from Israel for harm to its citizens (which is likely to issue parallel reparation claims for harms caused to Israeli citizens); nor can it bar individuals and third states from taking measures to enforce the rights of individuals in foreign or international courts. We note, in this regard, that renunciation of international claims is not exceptional in international agreements having a transitional justice dimension (see e.g., the Chagos agreement<\/a>, art. 11), and that states are not legally required to accept the jurisdiction of international courts\u2013including the International Criminal Court (which Lebanon has not joined to date)\u2013or even exercise diplomatic protection<\/a> over their nationals.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/p>\n

As we have discussed previously<\/a>, for almost three years, since October 7, 2023 (the date of Hamas\u2019 attack on Israel), a multi-front war has been raging in the Middle East. The main question facing the parties to the Lebanon conflict, and, in fact, the entire international community, is how to end this prolonged and devastating multi-front conflict. The Trilateral Framework Agreement between Israel, Lebanon, and the United States represents a major step in the direction of restoring international peace and security on the Israel-Lebanese front. Although the prospects of full implementation of the Agreement are unclear, it still appears to offer the best chance in a long time for a successful cessation of hostilities between Israel and Lebanon.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

The long-term interest of the international community, and especially of civilians in Lebanon and Israel, is to lend support for the agreement and promote its implementation. Without it, civilians on both sides of the border will pay the highest price.<\/p>\n

FEATURED IMAGE: US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C, back) looks on as (L\/R, front row) Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter, State Department Chief of Staff Daniel Holler, and Lebanese Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh sign a framework agreement at the US Department of State in Washington, DC, on June 26, 2026. Lebanon, Israel and the United States on Friday signed a trilateral framework agreement aimed at paving the way for a peace deal between the two long-time Middle East adversaries. (Photo by SAUL LOEB \/ AFP via Getty Images)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"The Trilateral Framework Agreement signed by Israel and Lebanon on June 26 established a road map to end…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":229243,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","_share_on_mastodon":"0"},"categories":[32],"tags":[10346,3065,989,100,34,37,5072,93,14882,65101,3955,6806,6905],"class_list":["post-229242","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-lebanon","tag-armed-conflicts","tag-ceasefire","tag-diplomacy","tag-hezbollah","tag-iran","tag-israel","tag-israel-defense-forces-idf","tag-lebanon","tag-territorial-integrity","tag-un-security-council-unsc","tag-united-states-us","tag-united-nations-un","tag-west-bank"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@iran\/117009112285694441","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/229242","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=229242"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/229242\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/229243"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=229242"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=229242"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=229242"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}