{"id":233695,"date":"2026-08-03T09:20:12","date_gmt":"2026-08-03T09:20:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/233695\/"},"modified":"2026-08-03T09:20:12","modified_gmt":"2026-08-03T09:20:12","slug":"why-reopening-the-strait-of-hormuz-will-no-longer-solve-the-global-energy-crisis","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/233695\/","title":{"rendered":"Why reopening the Strait of Hormuz will no longer solve the global energy crisis"},"content":{"rendered":"

The announcement of possible negotiations between the United States and Iran, along with the prospect of reopening the Strait of Hormuz, triggered an immediate reaction in the oil market. On the morning of 3 August, Brent crude fell<\/a> by 6.8% to $83.98 a barrel. Just a few days earlier, on 31 July, it had traded above $90, after gaining 24% over the course of July.<\/p>\n

Such volatility demonstrates that the market is currently responding primarily to political statements and expectations rather than to the actual restoration of energy supplies.<\/p>\n

Even if Washington and Tehran agree to reopen the Strait of Hormuz<\/a>, this will not mean that the global energy crisis is over. During the months of confrontation, the crisis has spread far beyond a single maritime route. It has affected oil production, energy infrastructure, tanker availability, shipping insurance, strategic reserves, refinery operations and another crucial chokepoint \u2014 the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.<\/p>\n

In other words, the Strait of Hormuz may be reopened relatively quickly through a political decision. Restoring the global energy system to its pre-crisis state will be far more difficult.<\/p>\n

Before the conflict, Hormuz was the world’s most important oil artery. In the first half of 2025, approximately 20.9 million barrels of oil and petroleum products passed through the strait every day. This accounted for around 20% of global liquid fuel consumption and roughly one-quarter of all oil transported by sea.<\/p>\n

\"NewsSource: Getty Images<\/p>\n

In addition, around 11.4 billion cubic feet of liquefied natural gas passed through the strait each day, accounting for more than 20% of global LNG trade<\/a>.<\/p>\n

By the first quarter of 2026, oil shipments through Hormuz had already fallen to 14.6 million barrels per day, down from 20.7 million barrels per day in the fourth quarter of 2025. LNG flows also declined over the same period, from 10.1 billion to 7.3 billion cubic feet per day.<\/p>\n

The crisis therefore affects not only the oil market but also gas supplies, electricity generation and industrial production in countries heavily dependent on imported energy.<\/p>\n

Asia is particularly vulnerable. Around 89% of the oil and condensate transported through Hormuz in the first half of 2025 was destined for Asian markets. China<\/a>, India, Japan and South Korea together accounted for 74% of those volumes.<\/p>\n

Even a partial restoration of supplies would therefore not immediately stabilise prices for Asia’s largest economies. They need not only access to oil, but also the restoration of regular delivery schedules, refinery operations and affordable freight rates.<\/p>\n

Against this background, OPEC+ decision<\/a> to increase production quotas by 188,000 barrels per day from September appears more like a political signal than a practical solution.<\/p>\n

The seven countries involved \u2014 Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria and Oman \u2014 are thereby completing the gradual reversal of 1.65 million barrels per day in voluntary production cuts introduced in 2023. Another layer of restrictions, amounting to approximately 2 million barrels per day, is expected to remain formally in place until the end of 2026.<\/p>\n

\"NewsSource: Shutterstock<\/p>\n

However, a higher quota does not automatically translate into additional barrels reaching the global market.<\/p>\n

According to a Reuters survey, the eight OPEC members subject to production quotas pumped 20.276 million barrels per day in June \u2014 6.246 million barrels below their combined target. Russia produced 8.928 million barrels per day, almost 1 million barrels below its quota.<\/p>\n

A significant proportion of the production increases announced by OPEC+ in 2026 therefore existed mainly on paper. Producers were unable to extract or export the authorised volumes because of military, technical and logistical constraints.<\/p>\n

Moreover, the September increase amounts to less than 1% of the pre-crisis oil volumes that passed through Hormuz and less than 0.2% of global oil production. It may influence market sentiment, but it cannot compensate for the loss of millions of barrels from Middle Eastern exporters.<\/p>\n

Official permission for tankers to cross the strait would not be enough to restore supplies.<\/p>\n

Shipowners must be convinced that the route is genuinely safe. Insurance companies must reduce war-risk premiums. Maritime authorities must inspect shipping lanes, ports must restore regular loading schedules, and producers must restart shut-in wells and processing facilities.<\/p>\n

As of 31 July, normal traffic through Hormuz had still not resumed. Only four cargo vessels crossed the strait that day, including two very large crude carriers, each carrying approximately 2 million barrels of oil. The previous day, only three cargo vessels had passed through.<\/p>\n

Some vessels have also switched off their automatic identification systems, making it impossible to determine the true scale of maritime traffic with complete accuracy.<\/p>\n

The transport and insurance crisis will not disappear the moment an agreement is signed.<\/p>\n

In March 2026, the cost of shipping oil on supertankers from the Persian Gulf to Asia reached its highest level since at least November 2005. Vessels already loaded with oil became trapped inside the Gulf, reducing tanker availability and driving up freight rates even on routes from North and South America.<\/p>\n

The second major problem is that Hormuz can no longer be considered separately from the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.<\/p>\n

After traffic through Hormuz declined, Saudi Arabia redirected a significant proportion of its oil exports through the East-West Pipeline to the Red Sea port of Yanbu<\/a>. Since March, the kingdom has exported around 5 million barrels per day from its western coast \u2014 more than double the pre-war level.<\/p>\n

Approximately 80% of those shipments then passed through Bab el-Mandeb on their way to Asian buyers.<\/p>\n

Yet this alternative route has itself come under threat following statements by Yemen’s Houthis about blocking vessels linked to Saudi Arabia. A corridor created to bypass Hormuz has therefore become another military risk zone.<\/p>\n

Shipping data confirm the instability. On 28 July, 28 vessels passed through Bab el-Mandeb, the highest figure in four days but still well below July’s peak of 46 vessels. Only six ships carrying raw materials and energy commodities crossed Hormuz on the same day.<\/p>\n

On 31 July, 29 cargo vessels passed through Bab el-Mandeb, including several oil tankers, but continuing military threats were still influencing the decisions of shipowners.<\/p>\n

\"NewsSource: Middle East Monitor<\/p>\n

Bypassing Bab el-Mandeb results in a dramatic increase in voyage times and shipping costs.<\/p>\n

The usual route from the Saudi port of Yanbu to Taiwan via Bab el-Mandeb takes around 19 days. A voyage via the Suez Canal, the Mediterranean, Gibraltar and around the Cape of Good Hope takes approximately 48 days.<\/p>\n

Fuel costs alone rise from around $1.26 million to $2.87 million per voyage. Transit through the Suez Canal adds another $1 million in fees.<\/p>\n

Moreover, the largest tankers cannot pass through the canal fully loaded. They must partially discharge their cargo into Egypt’s SUMED pipeline and reload it on the Mediterranean coast.<\/p>\n

The SUMED pipeline has a capacity of approximately 2.5 million barrels per day, while Saudi Arabia’s total oil exports amount to around 7 million barrels per day. Alternative infrastructure can therefore soften the impact of the crisis, but it cannot replace the full operation of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb.<\/p>\n

The same limitation applies to overland routes that bypass Hormuz.<\/p>\n

Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline and the United Arab Emirates’ pipeline to the port of Fujairah can together transport around 4.7 million barrels per day. This represents less than one-quarter of the normal oil volumes shipped through Hormuz.<\/p>\n

Even when operating at full capacity, these pipelines cannot eliminate the region’s dependence on secure maritime routes.<\/p>\n

Another major weakness is the state of global oil inventories.<\/p>\n

In early June, the US Energy Information Administration estimated that oil production losses in the Middle East had exceeded 11 million barrels per day and reported that oil stocks in OECD countries had fallen to their lowest level since 2003.<\/p>\n

By the end of July, US commercial crude inventories had declined to their lowest level since 2018. This means the market now has less capacity to absorb another sudden supply disruption.<\/p>\n

Even under a durable ceasefire, normalisation will not occur within days.<\/p>\n

According to an estimate cited in a July Reuters survey, the complete restoration of oil flows following a lasting agreement could take four to six months. US energy authorities also expected most of the lost Middle Eastern production to return only by the beginning of 2027.<\/p>\n

The possible reopening of the Strait of Hormuz would therefore be an essential step towards de-escalation, but it would not mark the end of the energy crisis.<\/p>\n

It would reduce the immediate risk of a physical shortage and could lead to a further decline in oil prices. However, the market would continue to factor in the possibility of renewed attacks, instability around Bab el-Mandeb, high transport costs and the need to rebuild depleted inventories.<\/p>\n

A rapid and complete recovery in supplies could also create a new problem.<\/p>\n

OPEC+ producers may increase output at the same time as Middle Eastern exporters restore shipments and Iran, in the event of sanctions relief, expands its official oil sales. The current shortage could then be replaced by oversupply and a sharp fall in prices.<\/p>\n

For producers, this would become a new source of instability. For OPEC+, it could create pressure to impose fresh production restrictions.<\/p>\n

The global energy market is therefore facing not only a crisis of supply, but also a crisis of unpredictability. Prices move in response to political statements, shipping routes change after every attack, and the gap between official production quotas and the volumes actually available for export is measured in millions of barrels.<\/p>\n

Reopening the Strait of Hormuz may remove the principal symbol of the current crisis. It will not remove its consequences.<\/p>\n

Real stabilisation will require a durable agreement between the United States and Iran, credible guarantees for maritime security, an end to attacks in the Red Sea, the restoration of energy infrastructure, lower insurance premiums and the replenishment of depleted reserves.<\/p>\n

Until those conditions are met, additional OPEC+ production will remain a secondary factor.<\/p>\n

In the modern energy system, producing oil is no longer enough. The central question is whether it can be delivered to consumers safely, on time and at an acceptable cost.<\/p>\n

By Samir Muradov<\/p>\n

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