Saudi Arabia\u2019s accession to the Abraham Accords could become one of the most important diplomatic achievements in Israel\u2019s history. Normalization with the largest and most influential kingdom in the Arab world could reshape the Middle East, open new trade routes, strengthen the moderate camp against Iran, and grant Israel unprecedented legitimacy in the region.<\/p>\n
But there is one price Israel must not agree to pay for that achievement.<\/p>\n
Allowing Saudi Arabia to develop an independent uranium enrichment capability should set off alarm bells in Jerusalem.<\/p>\n
According to Reuters, the agreement would not require the kingdom to adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency\u2019s Additional Protocol, which permits more intrusive inspections, including access to undeclared sites.<\/p>\n
This would make it fundamentally different from the agreement signed by the United States and the United Arab Emirates, under which Abu Dhabi renounced uranium enrichment and the reprocessing of nuclear fuel.<\/p>\n
U.S. President Donald Trump and Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia interact during the U.S.-Saudi Investment Forum in Washington, D.C., U.S., November 19, 2025. (credit: EVELYN HOCKSTEIN\/REUTERS)<\/p>\n
There is nothing inherently wrong with Saudi Arabia\u2019s desire to build nuclear reactors for energy production. Many countries operate such reactors, and the kingdom is seeking to diversify its energy sources as part of its Vision 2030<\/a> program.<\/p>\n The problem lies elsewhere. Uranium enrichment is not necessary to operate nuclear power plants. Nuclear fuel can be purchased from other countries, as many nations around the world already do.<\/p>\n The distinction between a civilian nuclear reactor and an independent enrichment capability is critical. The technology used to enrich uranium to low levels for use in reactors can, if a political decision is made and the necessary infrastructure is available, also be used to advance toward the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n The debate, therefore, is not about Saudi Arabia\u2019s right to nuclear energy. It is about why the kingdom needs the most sensitive component of the nuclear fuel cycle.<\/p>\n The concern is not theoretical. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has publicly stated that if Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia will also need to acquire one.<\/p>\n Following the confrontations with Iran and the efforts to prevent Tehran from establishing itself as a nuclear threshold state, it would be difficult to explain why an enrichment capability<\/a> considered dangerous in Iran should suddenly become legitimate when it comes to Saudi Arabia.<\/p>\n Israel cannot base its security policy on the identity of the person currently occupying the palace in Riyadh. Regimes change, leaders are replaced, and alliances shift.<\/p>\n If the US allows one Mideast country to enrich uranium, what\u2019s stopping others from aiming to achieve this as well?<\/p>\n An even greater danger is the potential domino effect. Cairo is already building four nuclear reactors at El Dabaa with a combined capacity of approximately 4,800 megawatts.<\/p>\n Other countries in the region could argue that if Riyadh is permitted to control its own nuclear fuel cycle, there is no reason they should remain dependent on foreign suppliers of enriched uranium.<\/p>\n This is where the real danger of the Saudi precedent lies.<\/p>\n In the Middle East, the balance of power is determined not only by immediate security requirements but also by prestige and regional status. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan\u2019s Turkey has sought for years to establish itself as an independent power, while Egypt regards itself as a leader of the Arab world.<\/p>\n If Saudi Arabia possesses uranium enrichment technology, pressure in Ankara and Cairo to obtain equivalent capabilities could intensify. Other Gulf states may also reassess their positions.<\/p>\n The result could be a race in which no country openly declares that it wants a nuclear bomb, but each seeks to possess the infrastructure that would allow it to move toward one should the need arise.<\/p>\n
If Saudi Arabia receives American approval to enrich uranium, why should Turkey forgo a similar capability? Why should Egypt agree to remain behind?<\/p>\n