Shafaq News<\/p>\n
Power in
\nnorthern Iraq has never been fully one-sided. For more than two decades, the
\nbalance between Baghdad\u2019s authority and the Kurdistan Region\u2019s autonomy has
\nshifted through wars, negotiations, constitutional disputes, and political
\ncrises. At times, federal institutions have extended deep into Kurdish areas;
\nat others, Erbil has exercised self-rule resembling many functions of a state. The
\nresult is neither a fixed division of power nor a settled constitutional
\narrangement, but a constantly renegotiated relationship.<\/p>\n
Today, the
\nKurdistan Region operates its own parliament, security forces, and executive
\ninstitutions while maintaining direct relations with foreign governments and
\ninternational energy companies. Its leadership negotiates with Baghdad over
\nbudgets, natural resources, and disputed territories, while also navigating the
\ninfluence of neighboring states that shape Iraqi politics.<\/p>\n
These
\ninstitutions were not created through constitutional design alone. Their
\nfoundations rest on decades of armed struggle, internal Kurdish rivalries, and
\nrepeated moments when the Iraqi state fractured or transformed. More than three
\ndecades after self-rule first emerged in northern Iraq, the Kurdistan Region
\nremains one of the Middle East\u2019s most developed examples of autonomous
\ngovernance.<\/p>\n
Boundaries
\nof Identity<\/p>\n
A Estimates Language As former This The United The Kurdistan Kirkuk, During that Read more:Iraq\u2019s population surges past 46M: Burden or opportunity?<\/a><\/p>\n Born from What is now Under the By the This cycle The A major Rather than The violence Rather than Read more: Faili Kurds: Decades of injustice VS. Iraq\u2019s struggle to reconcile with i<\/a>ts past<\/p>\n Rules of That International For the Baghdad and That The KDP and Those The fighting By the early Read more: Into 2026, Baghdad and Erbil face the same disputes\u2014with higher stakes<\/a><\/p>\n Unresolved The US-led Unlike the Oil quickly The 2005 Control over Kirkuk, with By the late The result Over time, As Iraq’s Read more: Kurdistan Region\u2019s political deadlock: Impact and perils<\/a><\/p>\n A Hard Check<\/p>\n By the end Kurdish Baghdad What Inside the The vote In the Read more: Kurdistan\u2019s 10th cabinet: Interlocking alliances and persistent political differences<\/a><\/p>\n Stalled and The most That dispute In 2025, Inside the Beyond Despite Read more: Six months of stalemate: Kurdistan\u2019s government formation crisis deepens<\/a><\/p>\n Read more:\u00a0The Kurdish rebellion dissolves: Turkiye\u2019s century-old equation evolves<\/a><\/p>\n Read more:\u00a0Iran’s Kurds straddle between inclusion and autonomy<\/a><\/p>\n
\nlong-delayed census<\/a> conducted in 2024 and released in 2025 recorded Iraq\u2019s
\npopulation at roughly 46 million, placing the Kurdistan Region at just over 14%
\nof the national total. Rather than settling disputes between Baghdad and Erbil,
\nthe figures became part of them, fueling debates<\/a> over budgets, resources, and
\nfederal entitlements.<\/p>\n
\nplace Iraq\u2019s Kurdish population between 6.5 million and 8.5 million, while the
\nKurdistan Regional Government (KRG) puts the figure at around 6 million. The
\ngap reflects decades of displacement, shifting front lines, migration, and the
\nunresolved status of mixed territories where Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and others
\nhave long lived together.<\/p>\n
\nfurther illustrates the Kurdistan Region\u2019s internal diversity. Kurmanji
\ndominates in Duhok and parts of Erbil, while Sorani shapes political discourse
\nand administration in al-Sulaymaniyah and much of the capital. Both dialects
\nhold official status within the same institutions, each carrying distinct
\ncultural and historical experiences.<\/p>\n
\nIraqi President and late Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal
\nTalabani once observed, \u201cOur strength lies in our unity, not in uniformity.\u201d
\nThe observation remains central to Kurdish political life, where cohesion has
\ndepended less on homogeneity than on managing differences without fracturing
\nthe political space.<\/p>\n
\ndiversity extends beyond language. Most Kurds in Iraq are Muslim, the majority
\nSunni, though Feyli Kurds are largely Shia. Alongside them, Yazidi, Christian,
\nand Shabak communities remain woven into the social fabric, particularly in the
\ndisputed areas. Their vulnerability became clear in 2014, when ISIS swept
\nacross northern Iraq, collapsing local security structures and displacing
\nentire communities.<\/p>\n
\nNations Commission of Inquiry on Syria and Iraq later concluded that ISIS\u2019s
\ncampaign against Yezidis in Sinjar \u201cmay amount to genocide,\u201d citing mass
\nkillings, abductions, and systematic sexual slavery. The finding made Sinjar
\none of Iraq\u2019s most sensitive post-ISIS flashpoints, where security, governance,
\nand the return of displaced residents remain unresolved among Baghdad, Erbil,
\nand local actors.<\/p>\n
\nRegion\u2019s three main cities developed distinct roles. Erbil became the
\nadministrative center of the KRG and expanded after 2003 into a hub for
\ndiplomacy, investment, and governance. Al-Sulaymaniyah developed a strong
\ncultural and political identity shaped by a more competitive political
\nenvironment and a diverse media landscape. Duhok, near the Turkish border,
\nevolved into a commercial gateway linking Iraq to regional trade routes.<\/p>\n
\nhowever, best illustrates Iraq\u2019s unresolved territorial disputes. Rich in oil
\nand marked by ethnic diversity, it has remained contested since 2003. Article
\n140 of the Iraqi Constitution outlined a process of normalization, a census,
\nand a referendum to determine its status, but implementation stalled. The
\nbalance shifted in 2017 when Iraqi federal forces retook the city after the
\nKurdish independence referendum, altering territorial realities between Baghdad
\nand Erbil.<\/p>\n
\nperiod, then-Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi framed Baghdad\u2019s position in
\nconstitutional terms. \u201cThe constitution is our reference point for unity and
\nstability,\u201d he remarked, noting that territorial disputes are also disputes
\nover authority, legitimacy, and competing visions of the state.<\/p>\n
\nFriction<\/p>\n
\nthe Kurdistan Region did not emerge through administrative design or a
\nnegotiated federal arrangement. It developed through a long historical process
\nin which Kurdish identity in Iraq was shaped by the collapse of empires, the
\nrise of Arab nationalism, and successive governments in Baghdad that equated
\nunity with centralization. Rather than producing a gradual political project,
\nthese pressures steadily transformed grievance into organized national
\nmobilization.<\/p>\n
\nlate Ottoman Empire and the subsequent British Mandate, Kurdish-inhabited areas
\nin northern Iraq were incorporated into a state that did not reflect Kurdish
\npolitical aspirations. The creation of the modern Iraqi state in 1921 placed
\nthese regions under Baghdad’s authority, establishing a tension that endured
\nfor decades. Kurdish demands for autonomy surfaced repeatedly but became
\nintertwined with broader struggles over state-building and territorial control.<\/p>\n
\nmid-20th century, Kurdish politics had evolved into organized movements. The
\nfounding of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in 1946 under Mullah Mustafa
\nBarzani marked a turning point from fragmented resistance to an organized
\npolitical and military movement. Even then, relations with Baghdad alternated
\nbetween negotiation and conflict, often breaking down when the central
\ngovernment sought to reassert control by force.<\/p>\n
\nbecame a defining feature of modern Iraq. Periods of state weakness enabled
\nKurdish movements to expand, while renewed central authority pushed them back
\ninto rebellion, with Baghdad consistently portraying Kurdish autonomy as a
\nchallenge to Iraq’s territorial integrity rather than a political demand within
\nthe state.<\/p>\n
\nrelationship deteriorated further after the Baath Party consolidated power in
\nthe late 1960s and 1970s. As the Iraqi state became more centralized and
\nmilitarized, Kurdish regions were drawn into prolonged conflict. Efforts to
\nnegotiate autonomy collapsed amid deepening mistrust, giving way to renewed
\nmilitary campaigns against Kurdish strongholds.<\/p>\n
\nturning point came with the 1975 Algiers Agreement between Iraq and Iran, which
\nended Tehran’s support for Kurdish insurgents. The accord triggered the rapid
\ncollapse of the Kurdish uprising, forcing the large-scale withdrawal and
\ndisplacement of fighters and civilians. For Kurdish leaders, it underscored a
\nlesson that would shape future strategy: external alliances could shift
\nabruptly, transforming the internal balance of power.<\/p>\n
\nbringing stability, the agreement ushered in a new phase of repression. Kurdish
\npolitical aspirations endured but were repeatedly forced underground as Baghdad
\nexpanded its coercive power. During the 1980s, particularly throughout the
\nIran-Iraq War, Kurdish areas became one of the principal theaters of Iraq’s
\ninternal conflict.<\/p>\n
\nreached its peak with the Anfal campaign in the late 1980s. Under Saddam
\nHussein, Iraqi forces targeted Kurdish rural communities through mass
\ndisplacement, village destruction, and large-scale killings. Human Rights Watch
\nestimates that between 50,000 and 100,000 Kurds were killed, while around
\n200,000 were displaced across northern Iraq and into neighboring countries. The
\n1988 chemical attack on Halabja became the campaign’s most internationally
\nrecognized symbol, killing thousands in a single assault.<\/p>\n
\nextinguishing Kurdish aspirations, Anfal strengthened them, transforming the
\nKurdish cause into one rooted in collective memory and growing international
\nattention. By the end of the 1980s, Kurdish politics had been reshaped by
\nmilitary defeat and demographic upheaval, setting the stage for autonomy to
\nemerge not through negotiation with Baghdad, but through the weakening of the
\nIraqi state.<\/p>\n
\nCoexistence<\/p>\n
\nopportunity arose after the 1991 Gulf War, when Iraq’s defeat and the ensuing
\nuprisings created a political vacuum across much of the country. In the weeks
\nthat followed, Kurdish fighters and civilians rose against Saddam Hussein’s
\ngovernment. Iraqi forces initially crushed much of the uprising, sending
\nhundreds of thousands of Kurds toward the borders with Turkiye and Iran in one
\nof the region’s largest humanitarian crises.<\/p>\n
\npressure soon prompted the United States and its allies to establish a no-fly
\nzone north of the 36th parallel, effectively preventing Baghdad from
\nreasserting full control over much of northern Iraq.<\/p>\n
\nfirst time in Iraq’s modern history, Kurdish parties found themselves governing
\nterritory beyond Baghdad’s control. Independence was never formally declared,
\nnor was autonomy negotiated with the central government. Instead, self-rule
\nemerged because of war.<\/p>\n
\nthe Kurdish leadership viewed the new reality through very different lenses.
\nSaddam Hussein maintained that Iraq would remain “one Iraq,”
\nrejecting any arrangement that could diminish the authority of the central
\ngovernment. Kurdish leaders, meanwhile, increasingly focused on building
\ninstitutions capable of governing the territory under their control rather than
\nsustaining a purely armed movement.<\/p>\n
\ntransition became visible in 1992, when the Kurdistan Region held its first
\nparliamentary elections. Presenting the vote as a step toward democratic
\nlegitimacy, then-PUK leader Jalal Talabani argued that “Western
\ngovernments will be encouraged and persuaded to deal with the real
\nrepresentatives and listen to the real voice of the Kurdish people.” The
\nelections produced the Kurdistan National Assembly and marked the beginning of
\ninstitutional politics in the Region.<\/p>\n
\nthe PUK quickly emerged as the dominant political forces, but they governed
\nseparate areas and built parallel administrations, security forces, and
\neconomic networks. Even while negotiating with Baghdad, KDP leader Masoud
\nBarzani maintained that Kurdish aspirations centered on meaningful autonomy
\nrather than separation, arguing that Kurdistan would remain “part of
\nIraq” if genuine self-government could be guaranteed.<\/p>\n
\ndifferences eventually spilled into open conflict. By the mid-1990s, rivalry
\nbetween the two parties had developed into a civil war that divided the
\nemerging autonomous Region into competing administrations. Control over border
\ncrossings, customs revenues, government institutions, and political legitimacy
\nbecame as important as military gains on the battlefield.<\/p>\n
\nslowed only after the 1998 Washington Agreement, brokered by the United States.
\nAlthough it did not eliminate political rivalry, it established rules for
\ncoexistence and gradually reduced the conflict between the two parties.
\nDescribing the agreement, then-US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called
\nit “a new and hopeful chapter,” adding that Washington viewed Kurdish
\nreconciliation as a step that would strengthen stability in northern Iraq and
\nthe broader Iraqi opposition to Saddam Hussein.<\/p>\n
\n2000s, the Kurdistan Region had acquired many of the characteristics of a
\nfunctioning state. It operated its own security forces (Asayish), managed
\nschools and public services, collected revenues, and maintained limited
\neconomic ties through cross-border trade. Legally, it remained part of Iraq. In
\npractice, however, Baghdad exercised little influence over daily life in the
\nRegion after years of sanctions had weakened the central government.<\/p>\n
\non Paper<\/p>\n
\ninvasion in 2003 did more than topple a government. It dismantled the state’s
\ncore structure and left its institutions to be rebuilt from scratch. For Iraq’s
\nKurds, the fall of Saddam Hussein ended decades of coercion, but it also opened
\na period of uncertainty over what autonomy would look like in a country still
\nbeing rebuilt.<\/p>\n
\nrest of the country, the Kurdistan Region did not start from zero. By 2003, it
\nalready had a functioning parliament, security forces, and an administrative
\nsystem that had taken shape during years of de facto autonomy. That head start
\nwould prove decisive as Baghdad’s new political order began to take shape.<\/p>\n
\nbecame one of the defining fault lines. Iraq holds an estimated 145 billion
\nbarrels of proven reserves, while Kirkuk alone contains around 9\u201310 billion
\nbarrels and had once produced roughly 500,000 barrels per day before 2003. The
\nKurdistan Region, for its part, has claimed reserves of more than 45 billion
\nbarrels of oil equivalent, along with 25\u201330 trillion cubic feet of natural gas,
\nfigures that remain disputed by Baghdad.<\/p>\n
\nConstitution gave that reality formal shape. It recognized the Kurdistan Region
\nas a federal entity, with its own parliament and control over internal security
\nthrough the Peshmerga, a force estimated at between 120,000 and 200,000
\nfighters. But recognition on paper did not settle the question of power.
\nInstead, it left it unresolved.<\/p>\n
\nterritory, oil, and revenue remained contested, nowhere more than in Kirkuk.
\nArticle 140 of the Constitution laid out a process to resolve the status of
\ndisputed territories through normalization, a census, and a referendum. It was
\nsupposed to be completed by the end of 2007. It never was.<\/p>\n
\nits oil fields and strategic location, became the clearest expression of the
\ndispute. Control over production and export routes turned hydrocarbons into a
\npolitical dividing line running through the center of Iraq’s federal system.<\/p>\n
\n2000s, that divide had hardened. The Kurdistan Region began signing
\nproduction-sharing contracts with international oil companies, including
\nExxonMobil, Chevron, and TotalEnergies, while Baghdad rejected them as
\nunconstitutional. At the same time, Iraq’s federal oil exports \u2014averaging
\nbetween 2.5 million and 3.5 million barrels per day\u2014 remained under the control
\nof the State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO).<\/p>\n
\nwas two parallel systems operating within one country. Hussain al-Shahristani,
\nIraq’s oil minister at the time, argued that “oil revenues constitute more
\nthan 90% of Iraq’s federal budget, and therefore cannot be fragmented without
\nthreatening state cohesion.” Kurdish leaders viewed the issue differently.
\nMasoud Barzani, then president of the Kurdistan Region, countered that “We
\ncannot exercise real autonomy if it does not control its own economic
\nresources.”<\/p>\n
\nErbil began to function more like a regional capital than an administrative
\ncenter within a federal state. More than 30 foreign diplomatic missions opened
\nrepresentative offices there, and international companies began dealing
\ndirectly with Kurdish authorities. It also maintained close security
\ncoordination with the US, particularly during the fight against ISIS after
\n2014. General Raymond Odierno, who commanded American forces in Iraq, described
\nthe Peshmerga as “the most reliable security partner in Iraq during the
\nearly stabilization phase.”<\/p>\n
\npolitical system stabilized unevenly, relations between Baghdad and Erbil
\nsettled into a familiar pattern: cooperation when necessary, confrontation when
\nit mattered. Jalal Talabani once characterized federalism as “the system
\ndesigned to hold the country in place, and at the same time, the one that kept
\nexposing its fault lines.”<\/p>\n
\nof the war against ISIS, the Kurdistan Region had reached its strongest
\nposition since 2003. The Peshmerga held Kirkuk and other disputed areas,
\nWestern governments relied heavily on Kurdish forces on the ground, and in
\nErbil there was a growing belief that Iraq’s balance of power had shifted in
\nways Baghdad could no longer reverse.<\/p>\n
\nleaders moved to test that assumption in 2017. On Sept. 25, voters across the
\nKurdistan Region took part in an independence referendum. More than 90% backed
\nseparation from Iraq. The leadership framed the vote as a mandate to open
\nnegotiations with Baghdad, not as a unilateral declaration of independence.
\n“We want to know the will of our people,” Masoud Barzani, head of the
\nKDP, remarked ahead of the vote, adding that “a serious dialogue will soon
\nbegin.”<\/p>\n
\nviewed the move differently from the outset. Then-Prime Minister Haider
\nal-Abadi rejected the referendum as unconstitutional and made it clear that
\n“the unity of Iraq and the Constitution are not subject to discussion or
\ncompromise.” Regional powers quickly aligned with Baghdad. Turkiye and
\nIran opposed the vote, warning it could destabilize borders and encourage
\nseparatist movements across the region.<\/p>\n
\nfollowed shifted rapidly from politics to force. In October of the same year,
\nIraqi federal troops advanced into disputed territories, with Kirkuk at the
\ncenter of the operation. Kurdish forces withdrew from the city within hours,
\nending more than three years of control. The speed of the retreat underscored a
\nhard limit in Kurdish leverage. Gains achieved on the battlefield during the
\nwar against ISIS had not translated into political recognition or
\nconstitutional change. The United States, while praising the role of the
\nPeshmerga, also urged Kurdish leaders to postpone the referendum, warning it
\nwould deepen tensions with Baghdad and complicate the wider campaign against
\nISIS.<\/p>\n
\nKurdistan Region, the consequences were immediate. Baghdad disrupted budget
\ntransfers, trade routes came under pressure, and the loss of disputed
\nterritories \u2014especially Kirkuk\u2014 reduced both revenue and political leverage.
\nThe political unity that had carried the referendum soon began to fray, as
\nlong-standing<\/a> differences between the KDP and the PUK resurfaced.<\/p>\n
\nitself remained politically significant even after its failure. For many Kurds,
\nit marked a rare and overwhelming expression of support for independence. For
\nBaghdad, it reinforced a long-held position that Iraq’s federal system could
\naccommodate Kurdish autonomy but not unilateral moves toward sovereignty.<\/p>\n
\nmonths that followed, Baghdad and Erbil gradually returned to negotiations, but
\nunder altered conditions. The agenda shifted away from independence and toward
\npractical disputes \u2014budgets, oil exports, and the administration of disputed
\nterritories\u2014 within the constraints of Iraq’s federal framework.<\/p>\n
\nStrained<\/p>\n
\npersistent fault line remained the federal budget. Transfers from Baghdad to
\nErbil have been delayed, reduced, or used as leverage in disputes over oil
\nexports and internal revenue collection, turning fiscal policy into a central
\ninstrument of political bargaining.<\/p>\n
\nis inseparable from Iraq’s unresolved energy governance. The Kurdistan Region
\nrelies heavily on oil revenues generated through its own contracts and export
\nchannels, while Baghdad insists on federal control over all national resources.
\nAs a result, Kurdish oil exports through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan<\/a> pipeline to Turkiye
\nremained suspended for more than two years, tightening fiscal pressure on Erbil
\nand deepening disputes over who controls production and revenues. The halt
\nfollowed arbitration rulings and escalating disagreements between Baghdad and
\nErbil over export authority, contracts, and payment mechanisms.<\/p>\n
\nboth sides reached an understanding to resume exports under federal
\nsupervision. The arrangement returned crude sales to SOMO, with revenues tied
\nto budget transfers and salary payments in the Kurdistan Region. The deal
\nrestored limited export flows after a prolonged shutdown but left the core
\nissues \u2014control, contracts, and constitutional authority\u2014 unresolved.<\/p>\n
\nKurdistan Region, domestic politics add another layer of strain. Political
\nrivalry between the two main Kurdish parties \u2014KDP and PUK\u2014 continues to shape
\ngovernance. Following the October 2024 elections, in which the KDP won 39 seats
\nand the PUK secured 23 in the 100-member parliament, efforts to form a
\ngovernment stalled. Lawmakers briefly convened on Dec. 3, 2025, but failed to
\nelect a speaker or move forward with cabinet formation, leaving the legislature
\nat a standstill.<\/p>\n
\ninternal politics, the Kurdistan Region operates within a complex regional
\nenvironment shaped by overlapping external interests. Relations with Turkiye
\nare anchored in economic interdependence and security concerns tied to
\ncross-border militant activity. Relations with Iran are influenced by geography
\nand Tehran’s political influence within Iraq’s broader Shiite political
\nlandscape. Engagement with the United States continues, though primarily
\nthrough advisory and coordination roles rather than long-term security
\nguarantees.<\/p>\n
\nthese pressures, Erbil retains a degree of external agency that is unusual for
\na sub-state entity. It is within this condition of managed ambiguity \u2014where
\nautonomy is preserved but continuously tested\u2014 that the broader trajectory of
\nIraq’s Kurdish experience converges.<\/p>\n