{"id":246559,"date":"2026-08-12T18:27:25","date_gmt":"2026-08-12T18:27:25","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/246559\/"},"modified":"2026-08-12T18:27:25","modified_gmt":"2026-08-12T18:27:25","slug":"why-the-trump-administration-will-have-to-accept-a-hormuz-toll-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/246559\/","title":{"rendered":"Why the Trump administration will have to accept a Hormuz toll"},"content":{"rendered":"

In the weeks since the US-Iran\u00a0Memorandum of Understanding<\/a>\u00a0collapsed, Washington and Tehran have used the time to strengthen their respective positions in the event negotiations resume.<\/p>\n

For the United States, this has largely taken the form of overt threats by President Donald Trump himself and hints that an even more comprehensive US bombing campaign against Iranian strategic targets is on the table. For\u00a0Iran<\/a>, the strategy is familiar: to ensure maritime traffic through the\u00a0Strait of Hormuz<\/a>\u00a0is kept to an absolute minimum<\/a>.<\/p>\n

US and Iranian officials continue to give conflicting accounts of where negotiations stand. Despite Trump\u2019s repeated declarations that Tehran is begging for a deal, the Iranians stress no talks are occurring with the United States. Still, both sides seem to agree that any pending agreement will center on the Strait of Hormuz, the strategic waterway that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has proved capable of shutting down at will.<\/p>\n

Various\u00a0schemes<\/a>\u00a0have been\u00a0proposed<\/a>\u00a0between Iran and Oman, the two countries on either end of the strait. While a deal is not finalized, Iran will most certainly retain more power over the strait\u2019s traffic than it did before the war began in February.<\/p>\n

The question now is whether tolls or fees will accompany any arrangement worked out between Tehran and Muscat. The\u00a0Trump administration<\/a>\u00a0is dead set against acceding to any fee structure because it would provide the Iranian government with additional revenue and represent visible proof that Trump\u2019s preventive war was a strategic mistake.<\/p>\n

Referring to the Strait of Hormuz, Secretary of State Marco Rubio\u00a0reiterated the U.S. position<\/a>\u00a0in July. \u201cIf we create a precedent in the\u00a0Middle East<\/a>\u00a0where a nation-state can decide that they are going to control an international waterway, charge a toll,\u201d he said, \u201cwe have created a very dangerous precedent which will repeat itself in other parts of the world.\u201d<\/p>\n

Of course, permitting an Iranian toll or fee structure isn\u2019t ideal. Before the war, such a hypothetical would have been difficult to imagine. The strait at that time was free and open, and roughly 120 to 150 ships relied on the route each day to get their products to customers worldwide.<\/p>\n

The United States wants Iran to return to this status quo. Yet Iran has no intention of doing so \u2014 and to expect otherwise is to be completely ignorant of how events have played out since.<\/p>\n

Trump\u2019s war handed Iran the perfect excuse to leverage its geography, and the Iranians didn\u2019t hesitate to do so. Originally, Tehran\u2019s shuttering of the strait aimed to increase the cost on Washington and eventually convince US partners in the region to pressure Trump into ending the war. But, over time, the Strait of Hormuz, in addition to Iran\u2019s more aggressive posture toward its neighbors writ large, has become something far more valuable: a strategic card Iran can play whenever Trump threatens to accelerate military operations.<\/p>\n

Re-opening the strait is now as important to the United States as containing Iran\u2019s nuclear program, if not more so. The question is how to do it.<\/p>\n

Trump originally tried to pursue this objective through military force, hoping US strikes could degrade Iran\u2019s military capacity to such an extent that the IRGC would have to stop shooting at ships. The strategy overestimated the US military\u2019s power to force a change in Tehran\u2019s strategic calculus and underestimated Iran\u2019s ability to manufacture and launch cheap drones and missiles at scale.<\/p>\n

Every US strike merely reaffirmed the Iranian government\u2019s belief that the war was existential for them. Instead of capitulating, Iran fought back, targeting vessels that used the southerly route near Oman\u2019s coast and making it clear that heavier US bombing would compel more Iranian attacks on Gulf energy infrastructure.<\/p>\n

US military attempts to bring the strait back to its pre-February state have failed and will likely continue to fail. If the Trump administration seeks to extricate itself from a war without end, its best option is to accept a toll or fee structure in the regional chokepoint.<\/p>\n

Hawks on Capitol Hill would no doubt scream bloody murder, and some of Trump\u2019s own political allies would have a difficult time explaining how such a scheme could be seen as appealing. But if the choice is between swallowing fees or endless conflict, then the former is the better option.<\/p>\n

The Trump administration may not like paying for the privilege of using the strait, but its decision to go to war in the first place created the situation the United States is now in. Bad policies have unintended consequences.<\/p>\n

Fortunately, fees in the strait would not be the end of the world.<\/p>\n

This wouldn\u2019t be the first time a country located next to a critical trade chokepoint received some form of compensation.\u00a0The most obvious case is the Strait of Malacca<\/a>\u00a0in Southeast Asia, where shipowners contribute to a voluntary fund, administered by Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, for navigational assistance, maritime safety, environmental protection and search and rescue.<\/p>\n

A similar arrangement in the Strait of Hormuz would thus not set a precedent. In fact, shipping companies and the insurance carriers that underwrite them might even view these voluntary payments as in their own interest if they helped prevent even costlier disasters or accidents.<\/p>\n

There\u2019s no use brushing the obvious under the rug: U.S. acceptance of Iranian tolls or fees would be an embarrassing acknowledgment that Iran is now a principal arbiter of the strait. Moreover, depending on how high the fees are \u2014 Tehran\u00a0is reportedly demanding 7%<\/a>\u00a0of the value of a ship\u2019s cargo \u2014 the Iranians would be collecting revenue they wouldn\u2019t have had prior to the war.<\/p>\n

But even this scenario is not as dire as many assume. In practice, Iran\u2019s leverage dissipates with every month that passes by. The Gulf Arab states are not sitting still and watching the new status quo helplessly. Rather, Tehran\u2019s neighbors are increasingly adapting to Iran\u2019s machinations by tapping into pipelines that bypass the strait altogether and\u00a0exploring future projects\u00a0<\/a>that make their energy infrastructure more durable and less vulnerable to a single chokepoint.<\/p>\n

Saudi Arabia<\/a>\u00a0is using its cross-country east-west pipeline to export more crude oil through the Red Sea. While this alternative route remains vulnerable to strikes by the Iran-aligned Houthis and doesn\u2019t fully compensate for the loss of normal traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, it has still allowed the kingdom to avoid shutting down production entirely.<\/p>\n

Ditto the United Arab Emirates, which is sending more crude through its Fujairah export terminal, located outside the strait. Fujairah\u2019s share of UAE exports\u00a0increased to 66%<\/a>\u00a0in July from 51% a month earlier.<\/p>\n

Iran\u2019s actions during the war will only reinforce Persian Gulf oil producers\u2019 desire to diversify their routes, reducing Tehran\u2019s ability to obstruct energy flows in the future.<\/p>\n

Negotiations on reopening the Strait of Hormuz continue. If there comes a point where fees for passage are unavoidable, then US policymakers should keep a cool head. Ceding the point would be the most efficient way for the United States to remove itself from a foolish conflict at minimal cost.<\/p>\n

Daniel R. DePetris is a columnist for the Chicago Tribune, the Washington Examiner and Newsweek. He is also a fellow at Defense Priorities, a think tank in Washington, DC, that\u2019s dedicated to introducing more realism and restraint in US foreign policy.<\/p>\n

This article was originally published by Responsible Statecraft <\/a>and is republished with permission.<\/p>\n

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