In 2025, the PKK decided to end its armed struggle and dissolve its organizational structure. Ocalan\u2019s call thus moved beyond a personal statement and became an organizational decision.<\/p>\n
Different views may exist within the organization, but unless there is an alternative congress decision, parallel leadership, or an open split, there is insufficient evidence to support a \u201ctwo-faction\u201d narrative.<\/p>\n
Kurdish PKK workers marching 370 (credit: Azad Lashkari \/Reuters)<\/p>\n
The transformation is rooted less in ideology than in changing power dynamics. Turkey\u2019s military technology, intelligence capabilities, and international position have changed significantly. For the PKK, achieving political results through armed struggle has become increasingly difficult.<\/p>\n
The process Ankara calls \u201cTerror-Free Turkey\u201d is also connected to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan<\/a>\u2019s domestic political calculations.\u00a0<\/p>\n Kurdish voters have significant weight in Turkey\u2019s political balance. For this reason, the process being conducted through Ocalan can be interpreted not only as an attempt to end the armed conflict, but also as an effort to reshape the Kurdish political field.<\/p>\n However, Kurdish society is not controlled by a single political actor.<\/p>\n This point is particularly important when assessing Ocalan\u2019s statements about Israel. Ocalan has been in Turkish custody for decades, and his political space for communication is not independent of the conditions determined by Ankara. His recent anti-Israel statements therefore should not automatically be regarded as a reflection of the general views of Kurdish society.<\/p>\n Moreover, the fact that some of Ocalan\u2019s statements overlap with the Erdogan government\u2019s increasingly harsh rhetoric toward Israel does not mean that the Kurdish people\u2019s historical approach toward Israel or the Jewish people has fundamentally changed.<\/p>\n Kurdish attitudes toward Israel and Jews have a much more complex historical background than today\u2019s political rhetoric suggests. Many Kurds, because of their own experiences of statelessness, insecurity, and the struggle for collective rights, have viewed the historical experiences of Jews and Israel with sympathy.<\/p>\n For this reason, interpreting the statements of one political actor as the position of an entire people is misleading.<\/p>\n The real source of Kurdish disappointment today is not Israel, but the failure of international expectations surrounding Rojava.<\/p>\n During the war against ISIS, Kurdish-led forces in northeastern Syria became one of the United States\u2019 most important local partners. As a result, many Kurds believed that this partnership would eventually translate into lasting political and security guarantees after the war.<\/p>\n Expectations toward Israel also emerged largely from this context. Because of Israel\u2019s influence in Washington and its strategic position in the region, many Kurds believed that Israel could help secure Rojava\u2019s political and security future.<\/p>\n But these expectations did not materialize.<\/p>\n The United States\u2019 prioritization of its strategic relationship with Turkey, Rojava\u2019s failure to receive the expected international guarantees, and the severe political and military pressure faced by Kurdish forces in Syria have shaken many Kurds\u2019 expectations regarding international alliances.<\/p>\n Therefore, it is incomplete to view the PKK\u2019s new direction merely as an ideological shift. It is also a reassessment of international expectations that failed to materialize.<\/p>\n The PKK\u2019s anti-Israel and pro-Palestinian rhetoric is not new either. From its foundation, the organization was influenced by the leftist, revolutionary, and anti-imperialist political culture of the Middle East, in which the Palestinian cause occupied an important place. The participation of PKK cadres in training in Palestinian camps and in struggles against Israel in the past is part of this historical relationship.<\/p>\n Presenting today\u2019s rhetoric as an entirely new development therefore ignores this historical continuity.<\/p>\n Heading toward a new era<\/p>\n