Shafaq News <\/p>\n
Iraq is entering a period of heightened tension as September 30, 2026
\napproaches, the deadline set by the State Administration Coalition, which
\nbrings together the country’s leading Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish political
\nforces, to bring all weapons under state control.<\/p>\n
The deadline comes amid diverging positions among armed factions, with
\nsome supporting the principle while others rejecting it. Tensions have also
\nintensified following increasingly sharp rhetoric from Kataib Hezbollah in its
\nlatest statement against Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi.<\/p>\n
Two competing positions drive the crisis. Baghdad maintains that control
\nover weapons is a sovereign state responsibility, while several armed factions
\ninsist that any discussion of their weapons must be tied to the withdrawal of
\nUS and Turkish forces, the dissolution of the Peshmerga, and an end to
\n“foreign domination over Iraqi decision-making.”<\/p>\n
Several questions remain unanswered in Iraq: Could the crisis move from
\npolitical tension to armed confrontation? And what impact will external actors,
\nfrom the United States to Iran, have on the dispute?<\/p>\n
Former State of Law Coalition lawmaker Arif al-Hamami calls the
\nsituation critical as regional and international pressure builds, calling for
\nthe weapons issue to be addressed without “imposition or threats.”<\/p>\n
In an interview with Shafaq News, al-Hamami says “everyone supports
\nupholding the law and placing weapons under state control,” but any
\nsolution must weigh the range of security threats facing Iraq, among them the
\nactivities of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups operating from Iraqi territory,
\nthe presence of Turkish forces, and wider regional developments.<\/p>\n
He proposes folding the armed factions<\/a> into the Popular Mobilization Al-Hamami also expresses confidence in the “ability of the leaders Read more: Jurf al-Sakhr and Iraq’s push to disarm factions<\/a><\/p>\n The Religious Establishment’s Position<\/p>\n Debate over a possible role for the religious establishment draws on On April 11, 2024, during a meeting with the UN secretary-general’s On June 26, 2025, his representative in Karbala, Abdul-Mahdi More recently, in May 2026, reports emerged that Patriotic Shiite No such ruling has been issued so far.<\/p>\n Read more: Iraq and the Mecca Defense Pact: Strategic neutrality orgrowing isolation?<\/a><\/p>\n Diverging Positions<\/p>\n The positions of the various parties remain complicated. The government In contrast, Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid The government has also begun taking practical steps, including forming These moves have coincided with serious security incidents, most notably The KRI’s Counter-Terrorism Service said the two explosive-laden drones Read more: Days to disarm Iraq’s factions: deadline or negotiable ceiling?<\/a><\/p>\n Escalation and Factional Demands<\/p>\n The latest escalation also came when Abu Mujahid al-Assaf, a security The group has set three conditions for any talks with the government The conditions sharply widen the gap between the factions and Baghdad Kataib Hezbollah issued the statement days after an unannounced visit to Meanwhile, some political forces have sought to keep the crisis within The Dialogue Track<\/p>\n Nouri al-Maliki, head of the State of Law Coalition, said the committee His position is significant partly because of its timing. During a Hadi al-Ameri, leader of the Badr Organization, called on all sides to A US Perspective <\/p>\n In an interview with Shafaq News, Former US Department of Defense The central question, he argues, is whether the Iraqi state is prepared In Des Roches’ assessment, “Iraq is not a sovereign nation” If armed factions refuse to disarm, Des Roches believes Iraq will either Separating the Two Tracks<\/p>\n
\nForces (PMF), the state-linked security body \u2014a step that would, in practice,
\nformalize much of their existing footprint, since most of the factions already
\nfield brigades within the PMF.<\/p>\n
\nof the Coordination Framework to contain the crisis” and hopes the Shiite
\nreligious establishment in Najaf, Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, will intervene
\n“to end the dispute.”<\/p>\n
\nprevious positions by al-Sistani regarding state control over weapons.<\/p>\n
\nrepresentative in Najaf, al-Sistani stressed the need to prevent foreign
\ninterference, uphold the authority of the law, and place weapons under state
\ncontrol.<\/p>\n
\nal-Karbalaei, renewed the call for the state to hold a monopoly on arms<\/a>,
\nforeign interference to be prevented, and the law to be upheld amid the
\nmilitary escalation between Iran and Israel at the time.<\/p>\n
\nMovement leader Muqtada al-Sadr and Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi had asked
\nal-Sistani to issue a new religious ruling titled “Placing Weapons Under
\nState Control.” According to those reports, the move sought to provide
\nreligious cover for efforts to end the presence of weapons outside official
\ninstitutions.<\/p>\n
\nmaintains that any armed activity outside the state framework after September
\n30 will be dealt with according to the Anti-Terrorism Law, while Iraq’s four
\ntop state authorities remain committed to disarming groups outside the state.<\/p>\n
\nal-Shuhada insist on retaining their military capabilities. Other factions,
\nincluding Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Imam Ali, have taken steps to bring their
\narmed activities under state authority.<\/p>\n
\na committee to address the situation in Jurf al-Sakhr in Babil province. The
\npanel includes representatives from the ministries of Interior, Justice and
\nAgriculture, as well as the PMF.<\/p>\n
\na drone attack on 17 August targeting the private office of Kurdistan Region of
\nIraq (KRI) Prime Minister Masrour Barzani<\/a>, along with the residence of the
\nintelligence chief.<\/p>\n
\nwere launched from Iranian territory, though it offered no supporting evidence.
\nIran rejected the accusation: Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi called the attack
\n“reckless” and warned Kurdish authorities against “false-flag
\nploys” designed to sow discord between the two neighbors, affirming that
\nTehran’s ties with the Kurdistan Region remain friendly. No Iraqi armed faction
\nclaimed responsibility.<\/p>\n
\nofficial with Kataib Hezbollah<\/a>, warned that “patience is running out”
\nover the government’s “provocative and irresponsible actions,”
\nthreatening a response based on the principle of “an eye for an eye, and
\nthe aggressor is the wrongdoer.”<\/p>\n
\nover the weapons issue: the complete withdrawal of US forces and guarantees
\nthat they will not return; an end to what it describes as American domination
\nof Iraq’s political and economic decisions; and the withdrawal of Turkish
\nforces from northern Iraq and dissolution of the Peshmerga.<\/p>\n
\nand could complicate efforts to reach a negotiated settlement.<\/p>\n
\nBaghdad by Esmail Qaani, commander of Iran’s Quds Force, on August 10. Iraqi
\nsources told Shafaq News that the visit addressed the weapons issue and that
\nQaani urged the factions not to surrender their weapons for now, while avoiding
\nconfrontation with the government and seeking a political settlement.<\/p>\n
\nthe political sphere to prevent it from developing into an armed confrontation.
\nSigns of such a possibility emerged following the arrest of a PMF officer, who
\nwas subsequently handed back to the PMF following rapid political intervention.<\/p>\n
\nformed by the Coordination Framework to address the issue of state control over
\nweapons would begin its work soon in coordination with the government to
\nestablish appropriate mechanisms for implementation.<\/p>\n
\nmeeting with US Charg\u00e9 d’Affaires in Baghdad Joshua Harris, al-Maliki stressed
\nthat the issue should be addressed through “dialogue and
\nunderstanding,” while emphasizing that the state and its constitutional
\ninstitutions must remain the ultimate authority over security and military
\naffairs.<\/p>\n
\nexercise restraint and avoid inflammatory statements. He expressed confidence
\nin the “good intentions” of the prime minister and faction leaders
\nwhile warning against steps that could give external actors grounds to
\ninterfere in Iraqi decision-making.<\/p>\n
\nofficial David Des Roches views the establishment of a deadline as “a
\npositive step,” but warns that resistance from factions \u201ctaking orders
\nfrom Iran\u201d rather than Iraq could prove “potentially lethal.” <\/p>\n
\nto confront “the Iranian agents in its midst,” or whether it will
\naccept a compromise that amounts to “a new validation of an unacceptable
\nstatus quo.” <\/p>\n
\nand does not appear ready to confront the internal forces he believes are
\nnecessary to establish full sovereignty. He argues that maintaining “a
\nthinly-veiled Iranian presence” may be politically acceptable, but would
\nnot be sufficient to lift restrictions on bank transfers and other mechanisms
\nIran uses to evade international and US restrictions, particularly as “the
\nIranian economy continues to crater.” <\/p>\n
\n“continue to be a partially sovereign nation” or face “a period
\nof civil war against Iranian proxies,” adding that “there really is
\nno other way.” He also expects the KRI to “continue to have its own
\ndynamic, separate from the rest of Iraq.” <\/p>\n