{"id":258861,"date":"2026-08-21T11:05:10","date_gmt":"2026-08-21T11:05:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/258861\/"},"modified":"2026-08-21T11:05:10","modified_gmt":"2026-08-21T11:05:10","slug":"benjamin-netanyahu-looks-to-russia-playbook-to-handle-turkey-amid-syria-tensions","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/258861\/","title":{"rendered":"Benjamin Netanyahu looks to Russia playbook to handle Turkey amid Syria tensions"},"content":{"rendered":"<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">Israel awoke to a fundamentally changed Middle Eastern reality on September 30, 2015: Russian fighter planes streaked through the skies over Homs, carrying out Moscow\u2019s first combat sorties in the Middle East since the end of the Cold War.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">President Vladimir Putin had arrived to save Russia\u2019s key Middle Eastern ally, Syria\u2019s then-president Bashar al-Assad.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">Nine days earlier, on September 21, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu \u2013 who had good intelligence about Russia\u2019s plans \u2013 flew to Moscow on a lightning visit. He was accompanied not by the press but by then-IDF chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot and then-head of the Military Intelligence Directorate Herzi Halevi \u2013 unusual for a foreign trip.<\/p>\n<p>There, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.jpost.com\/middle-east\/netanyahu-putin-talk-syria-coordination-658241\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">Netanyahu and Putin<\/a> discussed establishing a deconfliction mechanism to prevent Israeli and Russian pilots accidentally confronting each other over Syrian skies. By 2015, Jerusalem had already approved scores of attacks against Hezbollah and Iran\u2019s efforts to build a launchpad against Israel.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">The mechanism worked for nearly a decade, until Assad was overthrown in December 2024 by the forces led by the current president, Ahmed al-Sharaa.<\/p>\n<p><img alt=\"Russia's President Vladimir Putin meets with Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan on October 23, 2024.\" loading=\"lazy\" width=\"632\" height=\"492\" decoding=\"async\" data-nimg=\"1\" style=\"color:transparent\" src=\"https:\/\/images.jpost.com\/image\/upload\/f_auto,fl_lossy\/c_fill,g_faces:center,h_537,w_822\/734715\"\/>Russia&#8217;s President Vladimir Putin meets with Turkey&#8217;s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan on October 23, 2024. (credit: Alexander Zemlianichenko\/Pool\/AFP via Getty Images)How Israel and Russia avoided a Syria confrontation for years<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">It worked largely because Israel and Russia reached an informal understanding: Each had interests in Syria. Israel would not interfere with Russia\u2019s, and Russia would allow Israel to protect its own.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">Those interests were clear. Russia wanted to preserve its regional foothold by keeping Assad in power; Israel wanted to prevent Iran and Hezbollah from entrenching themselves in Syria. Moscow would not interfere with Israel\u2019s actions as long as they did not threaten Assad\u2019s rule, and Israel would not target his regime as long as Jerusalem retained freedom of action against Iran and Hezbollah.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">Put another way, the understanding was: \u201cYou take care of your business, I\u2019ll take care of mine, and we need not clash as long as we remain within our respective spheres.\u201d<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">And it worked. Israel carried out hundreds of attacks in Syria as part of its Campaign Between the Wars without directly confronting or seriously harming Russia\u2019s extensive military presence there.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">Why does this history matter today, in August 2026?<\/p>\n<p>Because on Tuesday, Israel attacked the runway and storage facilities at the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.jpost.com\/middle-east\/article-906085\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">Abu al-Duhur air base<\/a> in the Idlib province, some 60 kilometers from the Turkish border. Israel believed the base was being prepared for Turkish forces, according to foreign media reports, and a military delegation from Turkey had visited the site just hours before the attack.<\/p>\n<p>Why Israel targeted a Syrian air base linked to Turkey<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">Netanyahu discussed the reason for the strike in a clip released on Wednesday. \u201cWe will not tolerate a Turkish military buildup extending southward. We conveyed that in every possible way.\u201d<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">\u201cNow we saw that Turkey intended to establish itself at an air base farther south, close to Aleppo, and we sent a message,\u201d he continued. \u201cHow shall I put that message? \u2018Don\u2019t.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">The prime minister said that although the original message had been received, \u201capparently it wasn\u2019t heard,\u201d so Israel acted to ensure that the Turks \u201cunderstood it better.\u201d<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">\u201cWe will not tolerate a Turkish military buildup extending southward,\u201d he reiterated.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">Considering Turkey\u2019s implacable hostility toward Israel in both words and deeds, Netanyahu\u2019s position is understandable. Turkey hosts Hamas and spearheads diplomatic moves against Israel, while President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has spent years spewing virulently anti-Israel rhetoric.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">In June, Turkish Interior Minister Mustafa Ciftci said that just as Damascus, Aleppo, and Nagorno-Karabakh had been \u201cliberated,\u201d Jerusalem would also be liberated one day. Ciftci added that he had prayed to become Jerusalem\u2019s governor and predicted that lands once ruled by the Ottoman Empire would return to Turkish rule.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">Turkey also recently signed a mutual-defense pact with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan \u2013 two major Sunni powers, one of them nuclear-armed. A country whose leaders speak that way and whose regional ambitions are expanding is not one Israel wants building up militarily anywhere near its borders.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">But there is more to it than that, because the air base attacked on Tuesday is not near Israel\u2019s border. It is, however, reportedly near a route Israeli aircraft could use to fly to Iran. Israel does not want hostile radar and air defense systems compromising its air superiority and freedom of action.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">On Tuesday, the Prime Minister\u2019s Office posted on X\/Twitter that Israel and Syria had agreed to a security status quo that Damascus was on the verge of breaching by permitting Turkish troops to deploy at Abu al-Duhur. Israel warned Syria that such a deployment would pose a threat, the post said, but Syria ignored those warnings.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">Israel, it continued, \u201cwill not tolerate threats to its security and would welcome a return to the status quo.\u201d<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">Syria and Turkey dispute Israel\u2019s account. Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani said there were no plans for a Turkish base or permanent Turkish troop presence at Abu al-Duhur, and that Turkish officers had visited the site only as part of military training and cooperation.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">But the Israeli statement nevertheless revealed that some kind of modus vivendi had been established between Jerusalem and Damascus regarding what would and would not be tolerated. In Israel\u2019s view, moving Turkish troops \u2013 and possibly sophisticated radar and air defense systems \u2013 into the Abu al-Duhur air base violated those understandings.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">The attack, therefore, carried two messages: one to Syria, warning it to respect the previous understandings; and one to Turkey, making clear that Israel has redlines.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">It also triggered a response from US Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack, who is also Washington\u2019s special envoy for Syria and Iraq. Barrack initially called the strike \u201can unnecessary escalation that does not advance regional stability.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The next day, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.jpost.com\/middle-east\/article-905966\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">in an interview<\/a> with The Jerusalem Post, he stressed the need to establish a deconfliction mechanism \u2013 and quickly.\u201cTurkish forces were not aware that the Israeli aircraft were en route to that specific Syrian base, nor of their intended purpose, and therefore could potentially have been inclined to scramble their own jets in the belief that they themselves were under attack,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">Barrack said there was no \u201cinherent obstacle\u201d preventing Syria, Israel, and Turkey from maintaining open lines of communication. \u201cDiplomatic discourse is the best prevention to kinetic interactions,\u201d he said in diplomatese.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">In plain English: Talk to one another through a hotline, not through fighter jets, whereby messages can be misunderstood, leading to potentially tragic consequences.<\/p>\n<p>Can the deconfliction model with Russia work with Turkey?<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">But can the kind of deconfliction mechanism Netanyahu established with Putin be replicated with Erdogan\u2019s Turkey?<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">On paper, the logic holds. Both sides have a compelling interest in avoiding an accidental war. But there are enormous differences between Putin\u2019s Russia in 2015 and Erdogan\u2019s Turkey in 2026.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">Putin did not enter Syria to harm Israel. He came to preserve Russian interests: Saving Assad, maintaining Moscow\u2019s Mediterranean foothold, demonstrating Russia\u2019s global standing, and preventing Islamist forces from taking control of Syria and potentially feeding jihadist threats in Russia\u2019s own North Caucasus region.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">Erdogan\u2019s immediate interest in entrenching Turkey in Syria may likewise not be to attack Israel. He wants to secure Turkey\u2019s southern border, curb Kurdish power, shape the new Syrian state, expand Ankara\u2019s regional influence, and make billions rebuilding the country\u2019s infrastructure.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">But unlike Putin, Erdogan has ideological and historical ambitions that place Turkey on a collision course with Israel.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">When a senior minister speaks of \u201cliberating\u201d Jerusalem and becoming its governor \u2013 after nearly two decades of Erdogan\u2019s poisonous rhetoric against Israel \u2013 the difference between Russia\u2019s attitude toward Israel and Turkey\u2019s becomes clear.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">Putin operated in Syria with the cold calculation of a global strategist. He had no big ideological stake in the Arab-Israeli conflict \u2014 his Russia was not the Soviet Union under Leonid Brezhnev.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">Moscow viewed the Levant as a chessboard on which pieces could be moved to secure Mediterranean ports, preserve an allied regime, and poke a finger in Washington\u2019s eye.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">When Israeli jets entered Syrian airspace, Putin viewed it pragmatically: As long as Russian assets were not hit and Assad was not endangered, Israel\u2019s war against Iranian proxies was none of his business.<\/p>\n<p><img alt=\"Girls play near a sign at Mount Bental, an observation post on the Israeli side of the Golan Heights, overlooking the Syrian side of the Kuneitra crossing\" loading=\"lazy\" width=\"758\" height=\"830\" decoding=\"async\" data-nimg=\"1\" style=\"color:transparent\" src=\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/1787310310_534_ShowImage.ashx.jpeg\"\/>Girls play near a sign at Mount Bental, an observation post on the Israeli side of the Golan Heights, overlooking the Syrian side of the Kuneitra crossing (credit: REUTERS\/BAZ RATNER)Erdogan\u2019s Turkey poses a different challenge than Putin\u2019s Russia<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">Erdogan\u2019s Turkey is different. Ankara views Syria as its immediate backyard, and Erdogan\u2019s worldview is shaped by Muslim Brotherhood sympathies and Neo-Ottoman ambitions inherently hostile to Israel.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">While Putin was content to preserve Russia\u2019s coastal enclave around Tartus and Latakia and keep Assad in power, Erdogan views himself as the principal patron and protector of al-Sharaa\u2019s new Syrian state.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">He has also made no secret of his desire to project Turkish and Sunni power across the region, with the new defense pact with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan the latest expression of Ankara\u2019s growing strategic reach.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">For Erdogan, quietly signing a live-and-let-live airspace agreement with Jerusalem cuts against his ideology and the image he has cultivated as Israel\u2019s strident and uncompromising opponent.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">Yet despite the toxic rhetoric, the danger of an accidental war means that both sides may have little choice but to establish a deconfliction mechanism.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">And this time there is another actor involved that was less central when Israel and Russia made their arrangement work in 2015: Washington.<\/p>\n<p>Washington steps in to prevent an Israel-Turkey Syria escalation<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">Israel and Turkey, a NATO member, are both close US allies, and Washington is already working to prevent a catastrophic miscalculation between two major military powers.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">Israeli and Turkish defense officials began technical talks in Azerbaijan in April 2025 aimed at preventing clashes in Syria. Following the Abu al-Duhur strike, Barrack said the US was working to create a broader mechanism involving Israel, Turkey, and Syria.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">Any arrangement that will emerge will undoubtedly look less like the quiet, permissive green light Israel enjoyed with Russia and more like a tense, highly conditional division of the Syrian arena, brokered and monitored by Washington.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">Israel\u2019s core demand is clear: Turkey may help rebuild Syria, but advanced Turkish radar and air defense systems cannot be allowed to creep southward and threaten the Israel Air Force\u2019s freedom of action or strategic routes toward Iran.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">Turkey and Syria, for their part, will demand that Israel respect Syrian sovereignty, reduce its attacks, and give the new government room to stabilize the country.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">That is a much more difficult bargain than the one Netanyahu struck with Putin.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">In September 2015, Israel demonstrated the diplomatic agility needed to share Syrian skies with Russia. But sharing airspace with a distant global power pursuing cold strategic interests is vastly different from sharing it with a hostile, ideologically driven regional power with far-reaching ambitions.<\/p>\n<p>Left to their own devices, and considering the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.jpost.com\/israel-news\/article-906150\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">bad blood between Ankara and Jerusalem<\/a>, it is doubtful that Israel and Turkey could reproduce the Israeli-Russian model.<\/p>\n<p class=\"article-paragraph-section article-body-paragraph\">But they will not be left to their own devices. Washington has every reason to step in aggressively to ensure that this increasingly tense rivalry does not spiral out of control.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Israel awoke to a fundamentally changed Middle Eastern reality on September 30, 2015: Russian fighter planes streaked through&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":258862,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","_share_on_mastodon":"0"},"categories":[30],"tags":[672,41,989,37,49,3988,55,95,1176,1976],"class_list":["post-258861","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-syria","tag-ahmed-al-sharaa","tag-benjamin-netanyahu","tag-diplomacy","tag-israel","tag-middle-east","tag-recep-tayyip-erdogan","tag-russia","tag-syria","tag-turkey","tag-vladimir-putin"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@iran\/117133176259293765","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/258861","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=258861"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/258861\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/258862"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=258861"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=258861"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=258861"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}