Shafaq news <\/p>\n
Nearly 20 months after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s
\ngovernment on December 8, 2024, relations between Iraq and Syria are moving
\nfrom a period of anxiety and caution toward a new phase marked by greater
\ncommunication and pragmatism.<\/p>\n
The relationship has never followed the pattern of
\nnormal ties between neighboring states. Throughout its history, Iraq-Syria
\nrelations have been shaped by complex political and security calculations, with
\ntheir trajectory repeatedly changing according to the balance of power and
\ncircumstances in both countries.<\/p>\n
The rise of Ahmad al-Sharaa to the Syrian presidency
\ninitially became one of Baghdad’s main sources of concern. Yet contacts between
\nthe two countries soon began at the intelligence level, taking an increasingly
\ncontainment-oriented approach. Gradually, Iraq’s rhetoric shifted from
\nexpressing multiple security and political concerns toward cautious,
\nincremental engagement.<\/p>\n
The evolution can be seen in the changing language of
\nNouri al-Maliki, head of the State of Law coalition. On February 19, 2025,
\nal-Maliki held al-Sharaa responsible for killings and destruction that had
\naffected Iraqis in previous years. Less than a year later, on February 4, 2026,
\nhe described al-Sharaa as a brother and said he was prepared to establish
\nbilateral relations with Damascus if he won the elections. At the same time, he
\ndirectly accused Bashar al-Assad of having “exported terrorism” to
\nIraq throughout his years in power.<\/p>\n
The shift does not mean that all differences have
\ndisappeared. Rather, it reflects Baghdad’s growing assessment that engagement
\nwith Damascus is becoming necessary to address shared security, political and
\neconomic interests.<\/p>\n
Over the past year and a half, several major issues A Relationship Still Marked by an Imbalance<\/p>\n Despite the expanding contacts, the road between Iraqi officials have made a succession of visits to Syrian official visits to Baghdad, by contrast, have Al-Sharaa<\/a> has not yet visited Baghdad, for reasons Recent developments, however, suggest that this phase Faiq Zidan’s Visit: Important, But not Enough<\/p>\n The visit by Zidan carries particular significance Baghdad-based political analyst Sabah al-Akaili said He pointed to the historical relationship between the ISIS detainees transferred to Iraqi prisons were among Read more:\u00a0From Syrian prisons to Iraqi provinces<\/a><\/p>\n The ISIS file naturally occupies a central position in Al-Akili argued that coordination over trials, Baghdad’s Fears: A Historical Backdrop<\/p>\n Iraq’s concerns have been deeply connected to its For many Iraqi officials, the collapse of al-Assad’s Al-Sharaa’s background added another layer to those Another factor was the presence of Iraqi armed During the initial period, Baghdad therefore adopted a On December 26, 2024, just 18 days after al-Assad’s The visit was more than a brief security contact. It On April 25, 2025, al-Shatri returned to Damascus at The Iraqi tone gradually changed, while Syrian On August 28, 2025, al-Shatri made a third visit to Meanwhile, the issue of ISIS families in al-Hol<\/a> camp During his visit to Baghdad on March 14, 2025, Expanding Contacts: Energy Diplomacy? <\/p>\n The clearest expansion of the relationship came on A week later, Iraq and Syria held their first publicly Energy cooperation had already begun developing on a The discussion subsequently expanded to the The project has acquired additional importance as Al-Akaili described the energy file as activated but Nechirvan Barzani<\/a>‘s Role<\/p>\n
\nhave begun to shape the relationship: security cooperation, the Kurdish issue,
\n judicial<\/a> coordination, and economic ties, particularly oil<\/a> transportation. The
\nlatter has gained additional urgency amid the crisis created by the closure of
\nthe Strait of Hormuz during the ongoing US-Israeli war with Iran, the route for
\nmost of Iraq’s seaborne crude exports.<\/p>\n
\nBaghdad and Damascus is not yet free of obstacles. The imbalance in official
\nvisits remains particularly visible.<\/p>\n
\nDamascus, including National Intelligence Service chief Hamid al-Shatri,
\nForeign Minister Fuad Hussein, Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani
\nand, most recently, Supreme Judicial Council President Faiq Zidan.<\/p>\n
\nremained limited. They have largely consisted of two visits by Foreign Minister
\nAsaad al-Shaibani in 2025: one ahead of the Arab Summit hosted by Baghdad and
\nanother during the summit itself.<\/p>\n
\nthat remain present on both the Iraqi and Syrian sides. One of the most
\nprominent has been the Iraqi political debate over whether to host the Syrian
\npresident.<\/p>\n
\nmay increasingly belong to the past. The succession of high-level visits, most
\nrecently Zidan’s trip to Damascus, points to a relationship moving toward a
\nmore regular institutional framework.<\/p>\n
\nbecause it expanded bilateral engagement into the judicial sphere.<\/p>\n
\nthe visit was important, but it should be followed by reciprocal visits
\ninvolving security, economic, and political officials. \u201cIraq and Syria need to
\nconsolidate balanced relations at a time when the region is going through a
\ncritical phase.\u201d <\/p>\n
\ntwo countries and their mutual interests as reasons for greater coordination.<\/p>\n
\nthe main issues discussed during the meetings, alongside judicial and legal
\ncooperation, the exchange of expertise, transitional justice, transparency,
\ncombating corruption, and other shared judicial cases.<\/p>\n
\nthe judicial track. Iraq holds around 7,000 members of the organization, with
\nat least 3,000 of them being Syrian nationals. <\/p>\n
\ntransfers, and legal procedures has become both a security and judicial
\nnecessity. The issue also extends to the possibility that individuals wanted by
\nIraqi courts may be present inside Syria.<\/p>\n
\nroughly 600-kilometer border with Syria.<\/p>\n
\ngovernment presented the possibility of a new security vacuum that could be
\nexploited by ISIS cells and other armed groups to carry out attacks in both
\ncountries.<\/p>\n
\nconcerns. His previous association with al-Qaeda in Iraq under the name of Abu
\nMohammad Al-Joulani became a major point of anxiety among Iraqi political and
\nsecurity circles. Baghdad was also concerned about the fate of Syrian prisons
\nand camps holding ISIS members and their families in northeastern Syria.<\/p>\n
\nfactions and their networks inside Syria. The fall of al-Assad raised questions
\nabout what would happen to existing arrangements of influence and regional
\nsupply lines.<\/p>\n
\nhighly cautious position. It did not rush toward full political recognition of
\nthe new reality in Damascus, instead monitoring the behavior of the new Syrian
\nadministration while seeking answers about border<\/a> security, terrorism, and the
\nfuture of detainees.<\/p>\n
\nfall, National Intelligence Service chief Hamid al-Shatri arrived in Damascus
\nat the head of a senior delegation to meet the new Syrian administration. It
\nwas the first major and direct Iraqi contact with the new authorities while
\nformal political relations between Baghdad and Damascus remained largely
\nfrozen.<\/p>\n
\ncarried messages concerning border control, preventing armed groups from
\nentering Iraq, the fate of ISIS members, and the prisons holding them. The
\natmosphere was so tense at the time that al-Sharaa’s reception of al-Shatri
\nsparked widespread debate after the Syrian president was seen carrying his
\npersonal weapon.<\/p>\n
\nthe head of a broader Iraqi government delegation that included officials from
\nthe Border Forces, the Border Crossings Authority and the ministries of oil and
\ntrade. The agenda was no longer limited to security. Both sides discussed
\ncounterterrorism, trade and the possibility of re-exporting Iraqi oil through
\nSyrian ports on the Mediterranean.<\/p>\n
\ncommunication with Baghdad also expanded.<\/p>\n
\nDamascus and met al-Sharaa. Their discussions covered border security,
\ncounterterrorism, and the situation of the Iraqi community in Syria. <\/p>\n
\nmoved toward a solution. Iraq received most of the families transferred from
\nthe camp and continued to place them in social reintegration programs.<\/p>\n
\nal-Shaibani met Iraqi officials and said the new Syrian administration wanted
\nto strengthen relations with Iraq, cooperate to prevent foreign interference,
\nand confront the challenges of reconstruction.<\/p>\n
\nJune 29, 2026, when Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein visited Damascus in his first
\nofficial trip to Syria. He met al-Sharaa at the People’s Palace, with
\ndiscussions focusing on strengthening bilateral relations and coordinating
\npositions on shared challenges.<\/p>\n
\nannounced border meeting between their border forces in the al-Qaim area. The
\nmeeting addressed mechanisms for field coordination, information sharing, and
\ncontrol of the border strip.<\/p>\n
\nparallel track. On March 31, 2026, the first shipments of Iraqi oil were
\ntransported by tanker trucks through the al-Waleed border crossing toward
\nBaniyas. On April 1, the first convoys carrying Iraqi fuel oil crossed through
\nal-Tanf toward Baniyas.<\/p>\n
\nrehabilitation of the historic Kirkuk-Haditha-Baniyas pipeline<\/a>, with US support
\nfor the project and Iraqi-Syrian talks on expanding its capacity.<\/p>\n
\nregional tensions threaten conventional export routes. Diversifying Iraq’s
\naccess to Mediterranean markets could provide Baghdad with an alternative to
\nroutes exposed to disruption around the Gulf.<\/p>\n
\nstill “below the level of ambition.” He argued that continuing
\ninstability around the Strait of Hormuz makes cooperation with Syria on oil
\nexports more urgent, while stressing that such cooperation requires clear
\nagreements between the two countries.<\/p>\n