{"id":265997,"date":"2026-08-26T19:20:20","date_gmt":"2026-08-26T19:20:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/265997\/"},"modified":"2026-08-26T19:20:20","modified_gmt":"2026-08-26T19:20:20","slug":"syria-is-sidelining-the-fighters-who-beat-isis","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/265997\/","title":{"rendered":"Syria Is Sidelining the Fighters Who Beat ISIS"},"content":{"rendered":"

\t\t\t
\n \"The
\n<\/a><\/p>\n

Israel\u2019s strikes on the Abu al-Duhur base in northwest Syria were, on their face, about Turkey. US Special Envoy to Syria and Iraq Tom Barrack condemned the attack as an unnecessary escalation,\u00a0warning<\/a>\u00a0that an unintended clash between Israel and Turkey could have spiraled into \u201cWorld War III,\u201d and suggested the strikes were meant to stop Turkish forces from expanding a training presence at the base.<\/p>\n

But the episode points to a deeper, unresolved question hanging over Syria\u2019s new army: who, exactly, is being folded into it \u2014 and who is being left out.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Nowhere is that question more fraught than with the Syrian Democratic Forces. Damascus launched a military offensive against the SDF explicitly to force the Kurdish-led group under central government authority \u2014 yet less than half of its fighters have since been integrated into the new national army.<\/p>\n

Since declaring himself Syria\u2019s interim president,\u00a0Ahmad al-Sharaa\u00a0has been trying to build a national army out of factions that spent years fighting each other.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Over the summer, I traveled more than 1,000 kilometers (621 miles) across Syria to see how that process is actually playing out. I spoke with SDF commander-in-chief\u00a0Mazloum Abdi, with Kurdish, Arab, and Syriac Christian units belonging to the SDF\u2019s constituent factions, and with officials in Damascus.<\/p>\n

What I found is a pattern, not an anomaly: some of Syria\u2019s most capable units \u2014 the US-trained Syrian Democratic Forces \u2014 are being sidelined from the new Syrian Army.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Reportedly less than half of the SDF has been integrated so far, even as the government absorbs foreign jihadist fighters. The largest such group, the\u00a0Turkistan Islamic Party<\/a>\u00a0has been folded wholesale into the Syrian Army\u2019s 84th Division, and warlords sanctioned for serious human rights abuses have been promoted into positions of power.<\/p>\n

If al-Sharaa genuinely wants a professional, non-jihadist national army \u2014 and Washington\u2019s trust \u2014 full integration of the SDF, the partner force the US spent a decade training, should be the obvious move. The real question is why that hasn\u2019t happened, and why the United States isn\u2019t pushing harder to make it happen.<\/p>\n

\"AhmedAhmed Al-Sharaa in Damascus. Photo: Rami Alsayed\/NurPhoto via AFP<\/p>\n

The Integration Deal<\/p>\n

In January, al-Sharaa\u2019s forces launched a multi-pronged\u00a0offensive<\/a>\u00a0against the SDF, seizing large swaths of SDF-held territory.\u00a0<\/p>\n

It came on the heels of staggering sectarian violence against the Alawite minority in western Syria and the Druze minority in the south. The US-brokered January 29 Agreement ended the fighting and barred forces belonging to the Syrian Transitional Government (STG) in Damascus from entering Hasakah province, home to a dense mix of ethnic and religious minorities.<\/p>\n

The same agreement stipulated that four SDF brigades would join the new Syrian Army: the Hasakah, Derik, and Qamishli brigades under Division 60, and the Kobani brigade affiliated with Aleppo. Kobani brigade commander\u00a0Mahmoud Berxwedan\u00a0has\u00a0said<\/a>\u00a0only 12,000 of the SDF\u2019s roughly 35,000 fighters have been integrated so far. What happens to the remaining 23,000 is unclear.<\/p>\n

On August 25, SDF Commander Abdi formally announced<\/a> the SDF\u2019s dissolution as an independent force, framing it as the completion of the merger with the Syrian Army. But a name change on paper doesn\u2019t resolve the underlying gap: by the SDF\u2019s own numbers, less than half its fighters had actually been integrated at the time of that announcement, and the treatment of Kurdish, Arab, and women fighters on the ground remains unresolved.<\/p>\n

Afrin and the Limits of \u2018Integration\u2019<\/p>\n

Afrin is the most sensitive test case. The Kurdish-majority region of northern Syria was invaded and occupied by Turkey and Turkish-backed proxy forces in 2018.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Over the past year it\u2019s been held up as a success story: Kurdish families displaced by the invasion have been allowed to return for the first time;\u00a0Ilham Ahmad, co-chair of the Autonomous Administration\u2019s Department of Foreign Relations, was able to visit; and the Turkish military has reportedly begun withdrawing, recently vacating one of its bases in the area.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Taken together, those developments suggested Damascus was finally asserting real control over Afrin.<\/p>\n

What I witnessed told a different story. My trip was coordinated between the SDF and the Syrian government, and given the uncertain security situation, I traveled with an escort of Kurdish General Security personnel from Hasakah \u2014 former Asayish officers who had since been folded into the Syrian government\u2019s General Security apparatus.\u00a0<\/p>\n

On arrival in Afrin, they were disarmed by local General Security forces, who were almost entirely Arab. These men were, on paper, colleagues: part of the same integrated force. In practice, one group had the authority to strip the other of its weapons, apparently on the basis of ethnicity alone.<\/p>\n

It remains unclear who gave the order. Since Damascus itself had coordinated the visit, it seems unlikely the disarmament decision came from the government.\u00a0<\/p>\n

A more troubling explanation is that it reflects the continued, unofficial authority of former Syrian National Army (SNA) factions \u2014 Turkish-backed militias that were supposedly absorbed into the national army over a year ago, but still appear to answer to their own chain of command rather than to the central government.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Regardless of the source, what I saw firsthand is that Kurdish forces remain vulnerable to arbitrary treatment even after formally joining the same institutions as the men who disarmed them.<\/p>\n

The incident is a reminder that integration can\u2019t be declared complete just because units have been renamed or added to an org chart. Sustained US attention will be needed to ensure a new Afrin brigade is integrated in substance, not just on paper.<\/p>\n

Arguably even more troubling is that two\u00a0constituent SDF factions haven\u2019t been included in the integration agreement at all: women in the YPJ and Arab commanders in the Northern Democratic Brigade. Both are integral to the SDF\u2019s record against the Islamic State, and both have been loyal US partners since 2015.<\/p>\n

\"SyrianSyrian Kurdish YPJ fighters, March 2015. Image: Kurdishstruggle\/flickr CC BY 2.0<\/p>\n

The Next ISIS Threat May Come From Women<\/p>\n

For years, YPJ women were celebrated internationally for their role in the fight against ISIS. They were never only Kurdish: as I documented in my\u00a0book<\/a>\u00a0Statelet of Survivors, Arab, Yezidi, and Syriac Christian women served in the YPJ too, despite its reputation as a Kurdish force.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Since al-Sharaa\u2019s January offensive, some of the Arab women who fought in Raqqa and Manbij have been based in Hasakah following the SDF\u2019s withdrawal from those areas.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The interim government has now told all of them they are not welcome in the new Syrian army. Most of the 89 other members of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS have stayed silent on the issue.\u00a0<\/p>\n

I met YPJ spokeswoman\u00a0Ruksen Mohamed\u00a0and two other YPJ members at a base in Hasakah. On their shelves sat several plaques from US Special Operations Command, including one thanking them \u201cfor your enduring partnership and friendship with Combined Special Operations Joint Task Force \u2013 Levant.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n

These are women who fly drones, fight on the front lines, manage logistics, and gather intelligence in hostile environments. Bringing them into the Ministry of Defense wouldn\u2019t be charity \u2014 it would strengthen the professionalism of the Syrian army.<\/p>\n

Instead, Defense Minister\u00a0Murhaf Abu Qasra\u00a0is refusing to let women join the ministry at all. Asked how he justifies the policy, the YPJ women told me he simply believes it is \u201cagainst Islam.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n

That claim doesn\u2019t survive contact with the region around him: every country bordering Syria \u2014 Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel \u2014 allows women to serve in its defense ministry, as do other Muslim-majority states across the region.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Jordan first allowed women into its armed forces in the 1950s;\u00a0more than 18,000<\/a>\u00a0now serve, including in its medical corps. In 2014, Maj.\u00a0Mariam al-Mansouri\u00a0became<\/a>\u00a0the UAE\u2019s first female fighter pilot, flying F-16 combat missions against ISIS in Syria. In 2020, Lebanon\u2019s\u00a0Zeina Akar\u00a0became the first female defense minister in the Arab world.<\/p>\n

As one YPJ commander put it to me: \u201cthe same patriarchal mentality that existed under the Assad regime continues under al-Sharaa.\u201d The YPJ offered a concession \u2014 remaining based in northeast Syria rather than serving in Damascus \u2014 in case the government wasn\u2019t ready to accept women in the defense ministry itself. That was refused too; they were told their only option was the Ministry of Interior.<\/p>\n

The YPJ has consistently framed its\u00a0demands<\/a>\u00a0around equal rights and equal participation for women in Syrian society, and the Constitutional Declaration \u2014 ambivalent as it is on other fronts \u2014 backs them up.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Article 10 explicitly\u00a0prohibits discrimination<\/a>\u00a0based on race, religion, gender, or affiliation. By that measure, it\u2019s the YPJ whose position aligns with Syria\u2019s own founding document, not the transitional government\u2019s.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Ambassador Barrack\u2019s team should weigh that when deciding whether to back the YPJ\u2019s push for inclusion: this isn\u2019t a special exception, it\u2019s a claim already written into Syria\u2019s constitution.<\/p>\n

Barring women from an entire ministry sets a troubling precedent for a government claiming to build an inclusive Syria, and the stakes go beyond precedent.\u00a0<\/p>\n

More than\u00a015,000 people<\/a>, most of them women and children, escaped ISIS detention facilities during al-Sharaa\u2019s offensive against the SDF. A\u00a0UN report<\/a>\u00a0published earlier this month found ISIS in Syria is now prioritizing the recruitment of \u201cwomen facilitators.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n

The YPJ is an asset al-Sharaa cannot afford to sideline. If Damascus won\u2019t recognize that, American officials should treat their inclusion as a condition of continued support.<\/p>\n

\u2018Arabs in the SDF Are the Biggest Losers of the Integration Deal\u2019<\/p>\n

Given that the interim government insists on calling its forces the Syrian Arab Army, one might expect Arab commanders to have an easy path into its ranks.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The experience of\u00a0Abu Omar al-Idliby\u00a0suggests otherwise. He commands the Northern Democratic Brigade, is an Arab from Idlib, and has been part of the SDF since its founding in 2015. I\u2019d interviewed him several times before for my book, and met him again on this trip.<\/p>\n

\u201cArabs in the SDF are the biggest losers,\u201d he told me. Despite his years of service, he and his unit haven\u2019t been included in the integration agreement.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Much has been written about the Arab factions that defected from the SDF during the January offensive; almost nothing has been written about the Arab units, like his, that stayed loyal. Al-Idliby believes HTS regards him as a traitor for choosing the SDF over them.<\/p>\n

Several sources told me General Mazloum has been given to understand that he should no longer speak on behalf of all of northeast Syria \u2014 or even the SDF he\u2019s commanded for a decade \u2014 but only on behalf of Kurds.\u00a0<\/p>\n

That may be an attempt to diminish the influence of a popular general. It also leaves SDF-aligned Arabs like al-Idliby stranded: still loyal to a force whose commander is no longer permitted to speak for them, and still unwelcome in the Syrian Arab Army that seems intent on punishing him for choosing the Kurdish-led SDF.<\/p>\n

\"SDFMembers of the Syrian Democratic Forces. Photo: Mohamad Daboul\/AFP<\/p>\n

The Cost of Getting This Wrong<\/p>\n

This marginalization is happening even as the Pentagon continues funding the SDF and other vetted forces. Recent security incidents \u2014 including bombings near the Damascus hotel where French President\u00a0Emmanuel Macron\u00a0was staying \u2014 are a reminder of how badly the SDF\u2019s counterterrorism expertise is still needed.\u00a0<\/p>\n

After a decade of training and millions of dollars invested, the United States has a direct strategic interest in seeing SDF units integrated in a way that is dignified and meaningful, not token.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Cutting them out weakens the new army, entrenches the very divisions al-Sharaa says he wants to overcome, and squanders an investment that could otherwise help stabilize Syria at a critical moment.<\/p>\n

Successful integration would strengthen Syria\u2019s army. Mishandled, it risks restarting the conflict. Kurdish security officers disarmed by their Arab counterparts in Afrin despite being formally part of the same force; decorated SDF women barred from a ministry that calls their exclusion religious doctrine; an Arab commander punished for choosing to fight in the Kurdish-led SDF instead of HTS \u2014 these aren\u2019t isolated grievances.\u00a0<\/p>\n

They\u2019re the same failure recurring: a government that promises integration while building an army that still divides Syrians by gender, ethnicity, and old loyalties.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Washington spent a decade building the SDF into Syria\u2019s most capable counterterrorism force. As al-Idliby put it, the men who stayed loyal are now the ones paying for it.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The United States should not stand by while that investment is dismantled \u2014 before the cracks in this process become the fault lines of the next war.<\/p>\n

\"Headshot<\/p>\n

Amy Austin Holmes\u00a0is the author of three books, including most recently\u00a0Statelet of Survivors: The Making of a Semi-Autonomous Region in Northeast Syria<\/a>\u00a0published by Oxford University Press.<\/p>\n

Dr Holmes teaches at Texas A&M University\u2019s Bush School of Government and Public Service in DC, and is a Research Professor of International Affairs at George Washington University.<\/p>\n

She previously served at the State Department through a Council on Foreign Relations fellowship.<\/p>\n

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.<\/p>\n

The Defense Post aims to publish a wide range of high-quality opinion and analysis from a diverse array of people \u2013 do you want to send us yours?\u00a0Click here<\/a>\u00a0to submit an op-ed.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Israel\u2019s strikes on the Abu al-Duhur base in northwest Syria were, on their face, about Turkey.…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":265998,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","_share_on_mastodon":"0"},"categories":[30],"tags":[1828,2667,95,51,20143],"class_list":["post-265997","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-syria","tag-ahmad-al-sharaa","tag-sdf","tag-syria","tag-united-states","tag-ypj"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@iran\/117163434552629205","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/265997","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=265997"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/265997\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/265998"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=265997"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=265997"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=265997"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}