{"id":306064,"date":"2026-09-25T06:37:11","date_gmt":"2026-09-25T06:37:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/306064\/"},"modified":"2026-09-25T06:37:11","modified_gmt":"2026-09-25T06:37:11","slug":"the-houthis-irans-bargaining-chip-with-washington","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/306064\/","title":{"rendered":"The Houthis: Iran\u2019s bargaining chip with Washington"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>It is a US foreign policy tactic\u00a0that predates\u00a0Trump,\u00a0in which the US may publicly refuse to legitimise an armed adversary while privately concluding that talking to it is necessary after military pressure fails to resolve the issue. The US talks with the Houthis fit within that tradition. But another aspect of the matter merits further scrutiny. If Ansar Allah (the official name of the Houthi movement) were simply an Iranian proxy operating on instructions from Tehran, why would Washington need to negotiate with it separately?<\/p>\n<p>Iran plainly has enormous influence over the Houthis. Years of Iranian political support, weapons, technology, training and technical assistance helped transform them from a local insurgent movement into a formidable military force and an instrument of influence. At the same time, there have been periods when Houthi choices have not corresponded neatly with Iranian preferences.<\/p>\n<p>That autonomy may actually make the movement more useful to Tehran. Iran does not have to issue every order for Houthi actions to advance Iranian interests. The two sides already converge where it matters most: pressuring Saudi Arabia, challenging US predominance, confronting Israel and demonstrating that maritime security cannot be separated from the region&#8217;s political conflicts.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"Al Majalla\/Reuters\" data-entity-type=\"file\" data-entity-uuid=\"4a664c92-b47f-40e1-870f-caec24b148ee\" src=\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/219568.jpeg\" class=\"align-center\" width=\"1900\" height=\"1199\" loading=\"lazy\"\/><\/p>\n<p>Read more:\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/en.majalla.com\/node\/333085\/politics\/houthis-seek-expansion-after-reaching-bab-al-mandab\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Houthis seek expansion after reaching Bab al-Mandab<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Iranian role<\/p>\n<p>The latest fighting in western Yemen also illustrates why the distinction matters. It is impossible to think that Tehran played no role in encouraging the Houthis to widen the war. Iran had spent months trying to raise the economic costs of the conflict through pressure on Hormuz, and opening a second chokepoint at Bab al-Mandab was an obvious way to multiply that pressure. By July, Reuters was reporting explicitly that Tehran had urged the Houthis to be ready to close the Red Sea oil route if US attacks on Iranian infrastructure continued.<\/p>\n<p>Yet the timing is revealing. The Houthis had fired missiles and drones at Israel in late March, but they did not then open a major Saudi front or turn Bab al-Mandab into an extension of Iran&#8217;s campaign around Hormuz. That came months later, after the Saudi-backed Yemeni government struck Sanaa airport on 13 July to prevent the return of a flight carrying a Houthi delegation from Ali Khamenei&#8217;s funeral in Tehran.<\/p>\n<p>Reuters subsequently reported, citing Iranian and regional sources, that IRGC commanders, military advisers and missile-and drone-related equipment were also on board.\u00a0The Houthis denied that account and said the passengers were civilians. But within days the movement threatened Saudi energy infrastructure and launched a maritime blockade against it.<\/p>\n<p>The airport episode may therefore have been a trigger, a pretext, or both. But that is neither here nor there. What actually matters is that Iranian encouragement and Houthi calculations converged. While Tehran welcomed greater pressure on Saudi Arabia and the global energy system, the Houthis had their own reasons for reopening the confrontation with Riyadh and chose a moment when doing so strengthened their position inside Yemen as well as their regional stature.<\/p>\n<p>Their subsequent advance toward Bab al-Mandab has made Saudi Arabia more vulnerable at the precise moment when Iran is contesting traffic through Hormuz, making both outlets to international trade difficult to access.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Intense debate<\/p>\n<p>While this is an enormous strategic gain for Tehran, it is also fuelling an intense debate\u00a0inside Iran over how best to capitalise on these gains. The sides cannot be neatly divided between peaceniks and warhawks.\u00a0Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Iran&#8217;s parliament speaker,\u00a0and Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of the Supreme National Council, are hardly accommodationists.<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"PAKISTAN PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE \/ AFP\" data-entity-type=\"file\" data-entity-uuid=\"8a9059d7-7cdd-408f-bded-fb766a7f3917\" src=\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/219569.jpeg\" width=\"1900\" height=\"1478\" loading=\"lazy\"\/>Pakistan&#8217;s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif shakes hands with Iran&#8217;s parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf during their meeting prior to the US-Iran peace talks in Islamabad on 11 April, 2026.<\/p>\n<p>Ghalibaf favours keeping negotiation channels open, portraying\u00a0them\u00a0as an instrument of struggle. He also considers the June Islamabad MOU with Washington a product of Iranian resistance rather than US pressure. He frames his position as follows: Iran fights to build leverage and negotiates to convert that leverage into political gains. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi are more diplomatically inclined, so\u00a0it carries more weight\u00a0in Iranian society for Ghalibaf and Rezaei to champion this argument, because they come from the security establishment.<\/p>\n<p>Mohsen Hashemi Rafsanjani, the still prominent son of former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, pointed out that the June Islamabad memorandum of understanding had broad support inside the Supreme National Security Council, including senior military commanders and the heads of Iran&#8217;s principal state institutions.<\/p>\n<p>This camp does not necessarily trust Washington, and it certainly does not envision reconciliation with the United States. Its argument is narrower: military resistance should ultimately produce a political outcome. So the logic follows: if Houthi military success can be converted into political gains for Iran, then why not?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"It is a US foreign policy tactic\u00a0that predates\u00a0Trump,\u00a0in which the US may publicly refuse to legitimise an armed&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":306065,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","_share_on_mastodon":"0"},"categories":[4],"tags":[34,69],"class_list":["post-306064","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-tehran","tag-iran","tag-tehran"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@iran\/117330303784523296","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/306064","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=306064"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/306064\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/306065"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=306064"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=306064"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=306064"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}