Iraq has been trying its best to stay out of the Iran war, even if in vain. Just a few months ago, Iraq seemed more stable, more secure and more self-reliant than it had been in years. But now the country is in danger of being dragged back to the dark days of instability.<\/p>\n
When the \u2018Twelve-Day War\u2019 between Israel and Iran broke out in June 2025, Iraq was barely affected. Two years earlier, Baghdad had even mediated tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani\u2019s government also managed to keep Iranian and American interests in balance inside Iraq, with some degree of success. Polls showed rising satisfaction with the government and its \u2018Iraq First\u2019 agenda. The November 2025 election<\/a> saw a relatively high turnout of 56 per cent. Even long-running disputes between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) over oil revenues and direct contracts with foreign firms had been settled at least for the time being. Meanwhile, the Iraqi government pushed ahead with ambitious infrastructure projects, prompting The Economist to label Baghdad as \u2018The world\u2019s surprise boomtown<\/a>\u2019.<\/p>\n More than two decades after the US-led invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003 and nearly a decade after ISIS was defeated following its 2014 onslaught, Iraq finally seemed to be on a path toward a brighter future.<\/p>\n But the war between the United States, Israel and Iran has now revealed Iraq\u2019s deep internal tensions. Many of the structural problems that have long fuelled conflict under the country\u2019s profoundly ethno-sectarian system remain, despite its recent period of stability. The very same tensions already hampered the formation of a new government after last year\u2019s elections.<\/p>\n Powerless<\/p>\n The official line from Iraq\u2019s leadership is that the country won\u2019t be drawn into the war, and any violations of Iraqi sovereignty and attacks launched from Iraqi territory against its neighbours are not acceptable. The rhetoric is remarkably consistent from across the political spectrum \u2013 from the Shiite caretaker prime minister and the Sunni speaker of parliament to the Kurdish president, the KRG and the Supreme Judicial Council. All of them have condemned the American and Israeli strikes, mourned the death of Iran\u2019s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and congratulated the appointment of his successor. Yet calls for military action are notably silent. There have even been calls for restraint and diplomacy from the highly influential Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani<\/a>, Iraq\u2019s highest Shiite authority and a moderate, nationally oriented counterweight to Iran\u2019s revolutionary leadership. For all this carefully calibrated rhetoric, the Iraqi government is practically powerless to stop the violence unfolding within its borders. There are three developments that clearly illustrate this:<\/p>\n Firstly, Iran-aligned militias operating under the banner of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq<\/a> (IRI) have joined the conflict on Tehran\u2019s side. They have been using drones and rockets to hit US and international military and civilian sites, such as bases, airports, embassies and hotels, as well as oil and port infrastructure. It is not always clear whether Iran or Iraqi militias are behind them. In response, the United States and\/or Israel are striking IRI fighters and logistics hubs, deliberately targeting their operational leadership.<\/p>\n PMF leaders have expanded deep into the economy (including sensitive sectors like telecommunications) and wield significant political influence, controlling ministries and roughly a third of parliament through allied parties and loyalists.<\/p>\n Some of these militias are part of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), an umbrella organisation that, on paper, answers to the Iraqi prime minister and receives state funding. In reality, though, its factions largely operate autonomously from Iraq\u2019s official security forces, increasingly clashing with them. Some militia groups have even threatened violence against the Prime Minister personally if he takes any action against them.<\/p>\n At the same time, the PMF itself is divided. Despite their fierce anti-American and anti-Israeli rhetoric, key factions are holding back militarily. They face the struggle<\/a> of keeping up their image as a force of \u2018resistance\u2019 and their ties with Iran, without jeopardising the political institutional foothold they\u2019ve secured inside Iraq. PMF leaders have expanded deep into the economy (including sensitive sectors like telecommunications<\/a>) and wield significant political influence, controlling ministries and roughly a third of parliament through allied parties and loyalists. But as US strikes increasingly hit PMF hubs and leadership figures, the pressure is mounting on all factions to take a more active role.<\/p>\n With more than 90 per cent of Iraq\u2019s export revenues coming from oil, a financial and budgetary crisis is now on the horizon.<\/p>\n Secondly, Iraq\u2019s Kurdistan region is increasingly becoming a battleground for proxy conflict. Iraqi militias and\/or Iran are targeting Western military and civilian assets there, as well as oil infrastructure and Iranian-Kurdish opposition groups \u2013 sometimes hitting Kurdish Iraqi facilities as well. Reports in early March suggested the US and Israel were equipping these opposition groups in Iraq for a possible ground offensive and that they had even already crossed the border. The Kurdish government in Erbil firmly denied this. Still, Baghdad remains wary that US pressure could ultimately push Erbil into backing these efforts. Meanwhile, KRG President Masoud Barzani has urged the central government to curb militia attacks<\/a>, even threatening to deploy Kurdish Peshmerga forces.<\/p>\n