{"id":33826,"date":"2026-03-24T13:01:09","date_gmt":"2026-03-24T13:01:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/33826\/"},"modified":"2026-03-24T13:01:09","modified_gmt":"2026-03-24T13:01:09","slug":"syria-in-transition-series","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/33826\/","title":{"rendered":"Syria in Transition Series"},"content":{"rendered":"

More than a year and counting after the fall<\/a> of former President Bashar al-Assad, Syria faces a complex set of challenges during its transition to a new future. From comprehensive and sustainable governance reform to meaningfully addressing a long history of systemic mass repression both during the recent civil war and during the Assad regime\u2019s earlier repression, the processes that lie ahead are immense, and the stakes \u2013 both regionally, and for Syrians \u2013 are high. In a new Just Security series curated by myself and Maya Nir (with installments listed below as they are published), a diverse array of experts analyze those dynamics to understand the opportunities and potential pitfalls for Syria in transition, as well as for the region and for the international community.<\/p>\n

Assad\u2019s downfall in December 2024, after decades of brutality and more than 12 years\u00a0 of intensive armed conflict in Syria, came in a shockingly swift and decisive offensive led<\/a> by Hayat Tahrir al Shams (HTS) (formerly Jabhat al Nusra), a Sunni Islamist organization that splintered from al-Qaeda, and that many<\/a> considered a terrorist organization<\/a>. On Jan. 29, 2025, former HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa was appointed<\/a> as transitional president of Syria.<\/p>\n

The civil war itself, which exploded in 2011, was complex, layered, and replete with atrocities. The conflict involved a wide range<\/a> of foreign and domestic actors, including the Assad regime and its Russian and Iranian allies, the U.S.-backed Kurdish and other local opposition forces, Turkish ground troops, ISIS, HTS itself, and at times a U.S.-led coalition of States.<\/p>\n

Mass atrocities<\/a> were, tragically, a hallmark<\/a> of the armed conflict. These included systemic torture<\/a>, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, flagrantly indiscriminate attacks<\/a> on civilians and civilian infrastructure (including schools, hospitals and healthcare workers<\/a>, and journalists<\/a>), the use of chemical weapons<\/a>, and a wide range of other violations. As early as 2016, opposition-held cities like Aleppo had been so severely razed<\/a> by the use of weapons such as barrel bombs that aerial images of the city resembled the cratered surface of the moon.<\/p>\n

Although the December 2024 transition appears to have curbed the most acute of these atrocities, the work is far from done \u2013 and a successful transformation of Syria into a country with democratic, rights-respecting governance is far from certain. Sharaa inherits an extraordinarily complicated situation, with long-standing societal divisions and a host of institutional hurdles. He is also himself a polarizing figure<\/a>, with his own complicated history and alliances<\/a>. Already the fragile peace is showing<\/a> signs<\/a> of strain<\/a> (see also here<\/a>), and regional tensions are testing<\/a> the stability of the new government. This transitional period marks a critical juncture for Syria, with decisions made now poised to have long-term implications for stability and the prevention of a return to conflict.<\/p>\n

Dramatic institutional reforms are critical to address the fault lines that facilitated the long trail of abuses before and during the armed conflict, as is a framework of effective accountability for those responsible. Both international and domestic actors have developed frameworks for a transition, which address these issues to varying degrees. The 2015 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254<\/a> theoretically sets the framework for a Syrian transition to \u201ccredible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance,\u201d calling for a new permanent constitution and free and fair elections pursuant to that constitution. Domestically, Sharaa\u2019s March 2025 Constitutional Decree<\/a> provides a potential foundation for the prosecutions of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide through the domestic Syrian system (although much more remains to be done on that front), but observers have also criticized<\/a> elements of the decree as an attempt to consolidate executive power, among a range of other issues. Two subsequent May 2025 presidential decrees established<\/a> two new institutions focused on transitional justice. Parliamentary elections were held<\/a> in October 2025, with mixed results (particularly as to the inclusion of women and ethnic and religious minorities).<\/p>\n

In this Just Security series, topics range from accountability, reconciliation, and institutional reform, to constitutionalism, the lifting of sanctions and their import for transitional Syria, the ongoing and urgent issues related to camps and prisons for those accused of association with ISIS in northeast Syria, and more. Each of these topics share a central theme: as Syria undergoes this pivotal transition, now is not the time to look away.<\/p>\n

New articles will be added to the series regularly, and can be readily accessed from this page. Please check back for additions throughout the coming months.<\/p>\n

Transitional Justice in Post-Assad Syria: A Transformative Framework for Accountability and Reform by Fadel Abdulghany and Ruti Teitel (March 24, 2026)<\/p>\n

FEATURED IMAGE: People wave Syrian flags as they celebrate a year since the ousting of longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian capital Damascus on December 8, 2025.(Photo by LOUAI BESHARA \/ AFP via Getty Images)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"More than a year and counting after the fall of former President Bashar al-Assad, Syria faces a complex…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":33827,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[1613,6120,95,15323,1177,6101],"class_list":{"0":"post-33826","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-syria","8":"tag-bashar-al-assad","9":"tag-northeast-syria","10":"tag-syria","11":"tag-syria-in-transition","12":"tag-syrian-refugees","13":"tag-transitional-justice"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@iran\/116284285402371842","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/33826","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=33826"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/33826\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/33827"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=33826"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=33826"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=33826"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}