{"id":38966,"date":"2026-03-27T16:18:21","date_gmt":"2026-03-27T16:18:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/38966\/"},"modified":"2026-03-27T16:18:21","modified_gmt":"2026-03-27T16:18:21","slug":"syrian-civil-war-conflict-refugees-destruction","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/38966\/","title":{"rendered":"Syrian Civil War – Conflict, Refugees, Destruction"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Although it is impossible to pinpoint when the uprising turned from a predominately peaceful protest movement into a militarized rebellion, armed clashes became increasingly common, and by September 2011 organized rebel militias were regularly engaging in combat with government troops in cities around Syria. The Free Syrian Army<\/a>, a rebel umbrella group formed by defectors from the Syrian army in July, claimed leadership over the armed opposition fighting in Syria, but its authority was largely unrecognized by the local militias.<\/p>\n

Late 2011 and early 2012 saw a series of ill-fated efforts by international organizations to bring the conflict to an end. In early November 2011 Syrian officials agreed to an Arab League<\/a> initiative calling for the Syrian government to stop violence against protesters, remove tanks and armored vehicles from cities, and release political prisoners. In December 2011 the Syrian government agreed to permit a delegation of monitors from the Arab League to visit Syria to observe the implementation of the plan. The observer mission quickly lost credibility with the opposition as it became clear that not enough monitors and equipment had been sent and that the Syrian government had presented the monitors with orchestrated scenes and restricted their movements. Amid concerns for the monitors\u2019 safety, the Arab League ended the mission in January 28.<\/p>\n

A second agreement, this time brokered by former UN secretary-general Kofi Annan<\/a> and sponsored by the UN and the Arab League, produced a short partial ceasefire in April 2012. But violence soon resumed and reached higher levels than before, and the UN team of monitors, like their Arab League predecessors, had to be withdrawn for security reasons.<\/p>\n

Having had little success in creating peace between the combatants themselves, the UN and the Arab League sought to enlist the international powers in support of a political settlement to the conflict. In June 2012 an international conference organized by the UN produced the Geneva Communiqu\u00e9, which provided a road map for negotiations to establish a transitional governing body for Syria. The United States and Russia were unable to agree on whether Assad would be included in a future Syrian government, though, so this was left unspecified.<\/p>\n

By early 2012 it was becoming clear that the Syrian National Council<\/a> (SNC), an opposition umbrella group formed in Istanbul in August 2011, was too narrow and too weakened by infighting to effectively represent the opposition. Much of the infighting was the result of crosscutting streams of support flowing to different rebel factions as donor countries\u2019 efforts to prioritize their own agendas and maximize their influence over the opposition created conflicts and prevented any single group from developing the stature to lead. After months of contentious diplomacy, in November Syrian opposition leaders announced the formation of a new coalition called the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces<\/a>. Over the next month the coalition received recognition from dozens of countries as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people. The divisions and rivalries that had plagued the Syrian National Council were nevertheless still present in the new organization.<\/p>\n

Arab Spring Events<\/p>\n

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The summer and fall of 2012 saw a string of tactical sucesses for the rebels. Government troops were forced to withdraw from areas in the north and east, allowing the rebels to control significant territory for the first time. In July rebels attacked Aleppo<\/a>, Syria\u2019s largest city, establishing a foothold in the eastern part of the city. By early 2013, though, the military situation appeared to be approaching stalemate. Rebel fighters kept a firm hold on northern areas but were held back by deficiencies in equipment, weaponry, and organization. Meanwhile, government forces, weakened by defections, also seemed incapable of making large gains. Daily fighting continued in contested areas, pushing the civilian death toll higher and higher.<\/p>\n

With no decisive outcome in sight, the international allies of the Syrian government and the rebels stepped up their support, raising the prospect of a regional proxy war. Efforts by Turkey<\/a>, Saudi Arabia<\/a>, and Qatar<\/a> to fund and arm rebels became increasingly public in late 2012 and 2013. The United States, which had been reluctant to send weapons for fear of inadvertently arming radical jihadists<\/a> who would someday turn against the West, eventually started a modest program to train and equip a few vetted rebel groups. The Syrian government continued to receive weapons from Iran<\/a> and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah<\/a>. By late 2012 Hezbollah had also begun sending its own fighters into Syria to battle the rebels.<\/p>\n

Use of chemical weapons <\/p>\n

There were new calls for international military action in Syria after suspected chemical weapons attacks in the suburbs of Damascus killed hundreds on August 21, 2013. The Syrian opposition accused pro-Assad forces of having carried out the attacks. Syrian officials denied having used chemical weapons and asserted that if such weapons had been used, rebel forces were to blame. While UN weapons inspectors collected evidence at the sites of the alleged chemical attacks, U.S., British, and French leaders denounced the use of chemical weapons and made it known that they were considering retaliatory strikes against the Assad regime. Russia<\/a>, China, and Iran spoke out against military action, and Assad vowed to fight what he described as Western aggression.<\/p>\n

The prospect of international military intervention in Syria began to fade by the end of August, in part because it became evident that majorities in the United States<\/a> and the United Kingdom<\/a> were opposed to military action. A motion in the British Parliament to authorize strikes in Syria failed on August 29, and a similar vote in the U.S. Congress was postponed on September 10. Meanwhile, diplomacy took center stage, resulting in an agreement between Russia, Syria, and the United States on September 14 to place all of Syria\u2019s chemical weapons under international control. The agreement was carried out and all declared chemical weapons were removed from Syria by the agreement\u2019s deadline of June 30, 2014.<\/p>\n

The rise of the Nusrah Front and ISIS <\/p>\n

In 2013 Islamist militants began to take center stage as the non-Islamist factions faltered from exhaustion and infighting. The Nusrah Front (Jabhat al-Nu\u1e63rah), an al-Qaeda<\/a> affiliate operating in Syria, partnered with a variety of other opposition groups and was generally considered to be one of the most-effective fighting forces. Although the coalition was later transformed into Hayat al-Tahrir al-Sham<\/a> (HTS)\u2014the rebel group that led the successful overthrow of Assad in 2024\u2014it was soon overshadowed in 2013 by a group entering the fray from Iraq: in April Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi<\/a>, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq<\/a>, declared that he would combine his forces in Iraq with the Nusrah Front under the name Islamic State in Iraq and Syria<\/a> (ISIS). The Nusrah Front rejected the merger, and the two groups ended up fighting with each other as ISIS began competing for dominance in eastern Syria, beginning with an area in the Euphrates valley centered on the city of Al-Raqqah<\/a> and expanding along the Iraq-Syria border.<\/p>\n

International intervention and the entrance of Russian forces Aleppo, Syria: injured boy<\/a>A child sitting in an ambulance after his home was destroyed by an air strike in Aleppo, Syria, August 2016.(more)<\/p>\n

ISIS\u2019s sudden advances in Iraq, which were accompanied by a steady stream of violent and provocative propaganda, added urgency to the international community\u2019s calls for action. On August 8 the United States launched air strikes in Iraq to prevent ISIS from advancing into the autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq and to shield Christian and Yaz\u012bd\u012b<\/a> communities there. The strikes slowed the group\u2019s advance, but a series of videos showing ISIS fighters beheading Western aid workers and journalists amplified fears that the group posed a global threat. On September 23 the United States and a coalition of Arab states expanded the air campaign to strike ISIS targets in Syria.<\/p>\n

In the summer of 2015, Russia began to take a more-active role in the conflict, deploying troops and military equipment to an air base near Latakia<\/a>. In September Russia launched its first air strikes against targets in Syria. Russian officials originally claimed that the air strikes were targeting ISIS, but it quickly became clear that they were targeting mostly rebels fighting against Assad, with the intention of bolstering their ally.<\/p>\n

After a short ceasefire between Russian and Syrian government forces and Western-backed rebels collapsed in September 2016, Russia and the Syrian government forces turned their focus to the rebel-held eastern part of Aleppo, unleashing a fierce bombing campaign. Russian and Syrian forces made no attempt to avoid causing civilian casualties in their efforts to subdue the rebels; warplanes dropped indiscriminate munitions such as cluster bombs and incendiary bombs and targeted medical facilities, search and rescue teams, and aid workers. Those actions were condemned by human rights groups, but they continued unabated until the rebels in Aleppo collapsed in December. <\/p>\n

By 2016 ISIS, which only a few years earlier had appeared to be nearly unstoppable in northern and eastern Syria, was beginning to collapse under the strain of its simultaneous confrontations with three rival coalitions\u2014Kurdish forces and their American allies, pro-Assad Syrian forces supported by Iran and Russia, and a Turkish-backed coalition of rebel groups. In the north, Kurdish and Turkish-supported forces gradually consolidated their hold on the areas along the Turkish border, depriving ISIS of a strategically important territory. Meanwhile, an escalating U.S.-led air campaign weakened ISIS\u2019s grip on key strongholds. ISIS\u2019s ideological rivals, including the Nusrah Front<\/a> led by Abu Mohammad al-Jolani<\/a> (Golani; byname of Ahmed al-Sharaa), merged into Hayat Tahrir al-Sham<\/a> (HTS) and together fought ISIS in Idlib, capturing territory held by ISIS in the area. In June 2017 the mostly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) launched an assault on Al-Raqqah, ISIS\u2019s de facto capital in Syria, with support from U.S. air power and special forces. In October the SDF announced that Al-Raqqah had been cleared of ISIS forces. In the east, Assad\u2019s forces continued to pressure ISIS, forcing them out of Deir al-Zour in November 2017. Meanwhile, that same month, HTS announced the creation of what it called the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) to govern Idlib; the SSG\u2019s experience governing Idlib helped lay the foundation for HTS-led governance of Syria after the overthrow of Assad in 2024.<\/p>\n

While government forces continued to gain ground, Western governments increasingly intervened in the conflict. After a chemical weapons attack was carried out in Kh\u0101n Shaykh\u016bn in April 2017, the United States barraged Shayrat air base near Homs with 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles. A year later, after the Syrian government used chemical weapons in Douma, U.S., British, and French forces launched more than 100 strikes targeting chemical weapons facilities near Damascus and Homs.<\/p>\n

Israel targeted the Iranian military in Syria in 2018. After Iran shelled the Golan Heights<\/a> in response, Israel launched its heaviest barrage in Syria since the civil war began. Dozens of Iranian military sites were targeted, and Israel claimed to have destroyed nearly all of Iran\u2019s military infrastructure in Syria.<\/p>\n

Assad government restores control over most of Syria <\/p>\n

In June 2018, having solidified their hold on the areas around Damascus and Homs, Syrian government forces began a campaign to recapture rebel-held territories in the southwest province of Daraa, later expanding into Quneitra<\/a> province. As the success of the government operation became clear, a deal was brokered with the help of Russia that allowed rebels safe passage to the rebel-held province of Idlib<\/a> in the north in exchange for their surrender in southwest of the country.<\/p>\n

Idlib was the last remaining region of the country that the rebels held, and the belligerents all began to brace themselves for an imminent clash. Aside from the government\u2019s ability to now focus its military on recapturing just one region, and its history using chemical weapons, Turkey\u2019s military presence in support of the rebels helped guarantee that any government offensive would be met by a tough fight. Both Turkey and the Syrian government began to amass troops along the borders; Turkey reinforced its military within the province, while Syrian and Russian warplanes bombarded border towns.<\/p>\n

Russia and Turkey attempted to de-escalate the situation by agreeing to and implementing a buffer zone between rebel and government forces. The buffer zone required all heavy weaponry and fighters to retreat from an area about 9 to 12 miles (15 to 20 km) wide. It was unclear at the time whether all parties would observe the deal, a top-down agreement. The Syrian government and mainstream rebel groups, such as the Free Syrian Army, quickly embraced the buffer zone agreement. Groups sympathetic to al-Qaeda\u2019s ideology, such as HTS, remained wild cards, though they appeared to signal that they would comply. They quietly pulled heavy weaponry from the buffer zone, though many fighters appeared to remain past the October 15 deadline.<\/p>\n

As part of the agreement, Turkey was responsible for preventing the most radical groups, such as HTS, to prosper in the region. HTS, however, launched an offensive against other rebel groups in January 2019 and soon became the dominant force in Idlib. In April Syrian forces crossed the buffer zone and began an offensive in Idlib with the help of Russian air strikes. They captured territory before a counteroffensive launched in June was able to push the battle back into government-controlled areas.<\/p>\n

In October the conflict expanded eastward. Turkey launched an offensive into Syria\u2019s Kurdish-held northeast region, days after the United States announced that it would not stand in the way. The country aimed to destabilize Kurdish separatists in Syria who were allies of the Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party<\/a> (PKK) in Turkey and to make a safe zone in the region for the repatriation of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Kurdish forces quickly forged a deal with Assad for assistance, allowing government forces to re-enter the region for the first time since 2012.<\/p>\n

Although Turkey had largely steered clear of direct confrontation with the Syrian government throughout the conflict, the Syrian government offensive in Idlib, backed by Russian air strikes, sometimes led to Turkish casualties and retaliation. In late February 2020 the conflict escalated briefly after dozens of Turkish soldiers were killed in an air strike and Turkish forces retaliated directly against the Syrian army. The confrontation soon ended, however, after a general ceasefire was negotiated by Turkey and Russia a week later. In 2023, as the war seemed to settle down, the Arab League<\/a> reinstated Syria\u2019s membership in the organization.<\/p>\n

Assad overthrown and the creation of a new government <\/p>\n

A new rebel offensive took place in 2024, however, after international support for government forces was considerably weakened. Assistance from Russia was already mitigated by its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in the Russia-Ukraine War<\/a>. Iran, another important ally for the government, suffered setbacks in 2024 as the Israel-Hamas War<\/a> brought it into conflict with Israel. Israeli strikes resulted in significant blows to Iran\u2019s strategic assets and allies in the region (including, notably, inside Syria). Hezbollah<\/a> in particular\u2014a key component in Assad\u2019s fight against the rebels\u2014was diminished by Israeli bombardment of Lebanon<\/a> lasting from September to November.<\/p>\n

In October Hezbollah pulled its fighters back from Syria as it defended its front lines against a ground invasion, and, by the end of the fighting, more than half a million Syrian refugees in Lebanon had fled back into Syria. When a ceasefire deal was announced between Israel and Hezbollah on November 26, Hezbollah had agreed to considerable concessions and had limited capacity to resume combat outside Lebanon. The next day HTS began advancing in the provinces of Idlib and Aleppo. On November 29 HTS fighters entered Aleppo<\/a>\u2019s city center and forced government forces to withdraw from the city. Russian jets responded the next day with air strikes against HTS, but HTS managed to extend its advance to Hama within a week. Daraa<\/a> and Homs<\/a> were captured on December 7, effectively isolating Damascus and cutting it off from bases and ports that would allow the Syrian army to reinforce and resupply Damascus\u2019s defenses. That same day rebel forces entered Damascus and in the overnight hours took control. Assad was found to have already fled; rebel forces and Assad\u2019s prime minister attempted to arrange a stable transfer of power in order to keep government institutions in tact.<\/p>\n

Leading a revolutionary offensive<\/a>Ahmed al-Sharaa (previously known by the nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jolani) speaking at the landmark Great Mosque of Damascus after ousting Syrian Pres. Bashar al-Assad from power on December 8, 2024.(more)<\/p>\n

On December 10 HTS announced Mohammed al-Bashir, the head of the SSG in Idlib, would take over as interim prime minister until March and that government services would continue as usual. Ahmed al-Sharaa<\/a>, the leader of HTS and the de facto leader of the interim government, was formally proclaimed interim president in January. Sharaa indicated his intention for a careful and inclusive constitutional process that would take place over the span of several years and he called for all armed factions, including HTS, to dissolve in favor of a common government force. But it was unclear to what extent the members of HTS had shed their former affiliation with al-Qaeda\u2019s jihadist<\/a> ideology, especially as the interim government quickly moved to inject certain conservative norms into schools and mosques. In early March\u2014as Bashir and the interim government remained in power with an uncertain timeline for elections or a new constitution\u2014forces loyal to the interim government launched a crackdown against supporters of the Assad regime in predominantly Alawite areas of western Syria. More than 1,000 people, mostly civilians, were killed by government forces in the span of four days.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, the interim government reached an agreement with the SDF to integrate the Kurdish-led militia into the new government in exchange for guarantees that Kurds<\/a> would enjoy full rights as equal citizens in the new Syria. The agreement came days after Abdullah \u00d6calan<\/a>, a jailed Kurdish leader in Turkey, called on his militant organization the Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party<\/a> (PKK) to disarm and disband, prompting the PKK to declare a ceasefire with the Turkish government.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Although it is impossible to pinpoint when the uprising turned from a predominately peaceful protest movement into a…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":38967,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[1162,1199,1198,1197,95,1196],"class_list":{"0":"post-38966","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-syria","8":"tag-article","9":"tag-britannica","10":"tag-encyclopeadia","11":"tag-encyclopedia","12":"tag-syria","13":"tag-syrian-civil-war"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@iran\/116302046988646824","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/38966","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=38966"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/38966\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/38967"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=38966"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=38966"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=38966"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}