{"id":43148,"date":"2026-03-30T15:32:11","date_gmt":"2026-03-30T15:32:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/43148\/"},"modified":"2026-03-30T15:32:11","modified_gmt":"2026-03-30T15:32:11","slug":"iran-shows-the-emerging-crisis-of-the-us-airborne-battle-management-fleet","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/43148\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran shows the emerging crisis of the US airborne battle management fleet"},"content":{"rendered":"

Whether responding to Russian<\/a> or Iranian<\/a> drone incursions, patrolling the Red Sea<\/a>, or bolstering situational awareness off Venezuelan<\/a> coastlines, airborne battle management (ABM) aircraft like the E-2s<\/a>, E-3s<\/a>, and E-7s<\/a> are in high demand.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Operation Epic Fury<\/a> has further highlighted ABM aircraft\u2019s indispensable role: coordination in a congested and dynamic airspace, and an unmatched ability to identify and orchestrate responses to low-flying drones and cruise missiles. But the operation has also thrown the spotlight on the dilemmas of a limited fleet \u2014 even before an E-3 was reportedly damaged<\/a> by Iranian weapons.<\/p>\n

While drone and cruise missile threats are abundant, the United States lacks enough available and updated ABM aircraft to support its defense priorities. Instead of resourcing solutions to this challenge, the Department of Defense has aggravated the issue by attempting to cancel future ABM systems in favor of unproven or unequal alternatives.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Without a change of approach, the United States risks under-resourcing one of its most important enablers at a time when the effectiveness of air operations is at a strategic premium.<\/p>\n

The ABM capacity gap is most apparent in the Air Force. Driven by chronic readiness\u00a0strains<\/a>\u00a0\u2014 aging airframes, profuse maintenance needs, and limited component replacement options \u2014 USAF now only possesses\u00a0sixteen<\/a>\u00a0E-3 Sentries. As recently as 2024, just over half were\u00a0available<\/a>\u00a0for missions. The United States recently\u00a0deployed six<\/a>\u00a0E-3s to support Operation Epic Fury, a commitment that\u00a0likely leaves\u00a0only two or three remaining Sentries available for other\u00a0existing needs<\/a>, and suggests the USAF ABM fleet has no slack remaining without sacrificing priority missions.<\/p>\n

Prolonged, high-intensity air operations\u2014and the current air campaign does not appear to be closing anytime soon\u2014impose wear and tear on any platform and crew. Airframes approaching fifty years old are no exception. Rather than slowing down as the campaign progresses, it is also\u00a0possible<\/a>\u00a0that E-3s are now assuming an even greater role following the destruction US ground radars\u2014an outcome that would only increase the toll on readiness. If the US air campaign continues unabated for several more weeks, the number of aircraft headed for what one former Air Combat Command head has termed \u201chospice care<\/a>\u201d is likely to increase with no obvious replacement.<\/p>\n

Beyond readiness, the ABM fleet\u2019s problem also lies in fielding enough sensing capability to address one of the Joint Force\u2019s most important threats: low-flying drones and cruise missiles. For this mission, ABM aircraft hold a\u00a0unique<\/a>\u00a0advantage<\/a>: Airborne, top-down sensors can identify and track low-altitude threats much sooner than horizon-constrained surface sensors. However, \u201cclutter<\/a>\u201d around low-flying objects requires distinguishing drones and missiles from background objects such as trucks, or terrain features such as waves. Older radars, like those on E-3s, are less suited to this task.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The Navy fields\u00a0approximately<\/a>\u00a070 E-2D Advanced Hawkeyes whose more\u00a0advanced<\/a>\u00a0radars distinguish threats from clutter and proved their worth in countering Houthi drone attacks in\u00a02024<\/a>. However, the E-2D fleet is primarily tasked with defending the carrier strike group, and is not intended to take on ABM responsibilities for the entire Joint Force.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The department needs additional ABM aircraft to avoid potentially disastrous drone and missile attacks, such as those that have\u00a0struck ground bases<\/a>\u00a0in the Middle East. But the Pentagon\u2019s current solution places too much stock in unequal and unproven alternatives.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Space-based airborne moving target indicator (AMTI) satellites are\u00a0far<\/a>\u00a0from being able to provide both reliable and time-sensitive data to surface forces. Even if the fundamental technological challenges for AMTI are resolved, forward-operating battle mangers will still be\u00a0essential<\/a>\u00a0to cue responses and disseminate new orders, particularly in the event space or other nodes become compromised.<\/p>\n

As I argued in a recent Center for a New American Security\u00a0report<\/a>, ground- and fighter-based battle management alternatives, though capable, also do not substitute for ABM aircrafts\u2019 contributions to the drone and cruise missile threat. While over-the-horizon radars can dramatically increase detection range, their fixed positions make them predictable planning factors and highly\u00a0vulnerable<\/a>\u00a0to attack. Fighter-based sensors and networking suites, while impressive, simply do not achieve the same scale of tracking and control as dedicated ABM aircraft, and are even further outstripped by the combined cognitive capacity of anywhere from four to 20 dedicated ABM operators.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Taken together, the Department has yet to articulate and resource a viable near-term to solution to the expanding ABM gap. The fiscal 2026 defense budget\u2019s \u201cbridge\u201d strategy, which attempted to cancel the E-7 program and instead procure a small number of additional E-2Ds, did not come close to filling the emergent ABM void.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Looking ahead, DoD and Congress must work together to revitalize the ABM fleet, protect and elevate its role in priority theaters, and ensure a resilient and balanced sensing and C2 architecture over the long-term.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The Department of Defense needs to reinterrogate total force requirements for the ABM fleet \u2014 and do so with a sober appreciation of what its alternatives can and cannot do. In the upcoming budget, Congress must authorize and appropriate funds for new ABM aircraft and updated airborne radar systems to replace the ABM fleet\u2019s older and outdated components. Throughout all this, the department needs to ensure the ABM pilot and crew pipeline remains intact, even as older aircraft are retired.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The ABM force structure crisis comes at an acute moment for US air operations. In DoD\u2019s\u00a0priority scenarios<\/a> and beyond, US air operations\u00a0depend<\/a>\u00a0on reliable early warning and responsive air battle management. While complements to ABM abound, there are no replacements.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Today, the procurement gap is even more pronounced in light of force commitments to the Middle East. The United States needs to chart a stronger path forward for the quarterbacks of its air operations, or risk being sacked for a catastrophic loss.<\/p>\n

Philip Sheers is an Associate Fellow with the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). His research covers escalation management and nuclear deterrence, airpower and great power conflict, and defense industrial base (DIB) and defense budget issues.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Whether responding to Russian or Iranian drone incursions, patrolling the Red Sea, or bolstering situational awareness off Venezuelan…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":43149,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[1726,687,18198,17970,18199,34,212,55],"class_list":{"0":"post-43148","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-iran","8":"tag-air-force","9":"tag-drones","10":"tag-e-2-hawkeye","11":"tag-e-3-sentry","12":"tag-e-7","13":"tag-iran","14":"tag-operation-epic-fury","15":"tag-russia"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@iran\/116318853049188691","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/43148","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=43148"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/43148\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/43149"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=43148"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=43148"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=43148"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}