active air defense<\/a>, and passive protection.\u00a0<\/p>\nTo operate effectively in hunting launchers and executing other missions, the IAF first focused on establishing a secure aerial corridor free of threats and achieving air superiority over Iranian airspace.<\/p>\n
At least in the early stages, Israel\u2019s interest was to concentrate its effort on Iran as much as possible rather than dispersing forces across other theaters. However, the entry of Hezbollah (and possibly the Houthis) creates an opportunity to further degrade Iranian-backed terrorist organizations.<\/p>\n
Five factors will dictate shape the duration of the war:<\/p>\n
The extent of damage to, and erosion of, Iran\u2019s ability to continue launching missiles and UAVs: This is not a war fought along a shared border with ground forces, nor is it an Iran-Iraq-style war that drags on for eight years. It is a war premised on firepower \u2013 missiles, bombs, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). And while Iran\u2019s launch capabilities are likely to be steadily worn down, Israel and the United States are likely to intensify their strikes against Iranian targets.<\/p>\n
The Iranians understand this, which is why they have been launching missiles and drones at other countries in the region. So far, Iran has struck American and domestic targets in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. At this stage, there are no indications that the Gulf states intend to retaliate for Iranian attacks on their territory. Saudi Arabia, however, has said it reserves the right to respond to attacks against it. In addition, Iran\u2019s missile launches have led to renewed coordination between the leaders of Saudi Arabia and the UAE after a long period of estrangement.<\/p>\n
The extent to which Iran and its proxies succeed in disrupting critical shipping routes and driving up energy prices: The naval arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has warned vessels against transiting the Strait of Hormuz. The primary mission of the US Navy will be to keep the straits open.Involvement of Iran\u2019s proxies in the campaign: Hezbollah has already joined the war, initially launching a limited number of missiles and UAVs at Israel and triggering extensive Israeli strikes. This emerging front \u2013 as well as the potential involvement of the Houthis \u2013 broadens the confrontation and could prolong it. Still, it is important to \u201ckeep our eyes on the ball\u201d and preserve the Iranian front as the main theater. International efforts to halt the fighting and return the parties to the negotiating table: China and Russia have strongly condemned the attack on Iran and are calling for an immediate cessation of military operations. Key European states are urging restraint and working to convene the United Nations Security Council, while increasingly criticizing Iranian aggression. It would not be surprising if Turkey, Qatar, or Oman attempt to broker a ceasefire.\u00a0Domestic political pressure in the United States: Trump is torn between allowing the time required for strategic gains to accumulate and his preference for a short campaign, amid political pressure inside the US to bring the war to an end. It is still unclear whether he will opt for a longer campaign aimed at weakening the regime as much as possible, or instead seek to inflict maximum damage on Iran\u2019s nuclear and missile capabilities as a basis for returning to negotiations. His calculus will likely be shaped by internal American pressure stemming from casualties and energy prices, as well as external pressure that may come from Gulf states.Will the Iranian regime fall?\u00a0<\/p>\n
Toppling a regime by airstrikes is extremely difficult, particularly given that the Islamic Republic has demonstrated that it can mobilize significant resources and loyal forces determined to fight with considerable brutality to ensure its survival and maintain its grip on the country.<\/p>\n
Still, a successful campaign that strikes at Iran\u2019s political, religious, and military leadership and strips it of key military capabilities could destabilize the regime to a sufficient degree \u2013 either compelling it to accept a favorable agreement or forcing it to focus on its own survival at the expense of its destabilizing activities in the region.<\/p>\n
An assessment of all factors suggests that the war is unlikely to end overnight and may well continue for quite a few weeks.<\/p>\n
Israelis should take a deep breath and follow Home Front Command instructions. This is a just war, launched in the wake of the massacre of tens of thousands of protesters in Iran \u2013 a massacre met with relative silence in the West \u2013 and against the backdrop of Iran\u2019s refusal to curb its nuclear and missile programs.<\/p>\n
Preventing these threats justifies the costs, with the IDF and the US military working to keep those costs to an absolute minimum.<\/p>\n
The writer is a major-general (res.), a former head of Israeli Military Intelligence and the president and founder of MIND ISRAEL.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"In an unprecedented display of cooperation and coordination \u00a0US and Israel have launched a joint war against Iran.…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":4535,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[33],"tags":[2551,2384,423,3231,37,215,212,92],"class_list":{"0":"post-4534","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-israel","8":"tag-ballistic-missile","9":"tag-defense-tech","10":"tag-idf","11":"tag-iran-and-israel","12":"tag-israel","13":"tag-israel-iran-war","14":"tag-operation-epic-fury","15":"tag-operation-roaring-lion"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@iran\/116175655541621871","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4534","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4534"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4534\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4535"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4534"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4534"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4534"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}