{"id":4936,"date":"2026-03-05T13:06:56","date_gmt":"2026-03-05T13:06:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/4936\/"},"modified":"2026-03-05T13:06:56","modified_gmt":"2026-03-05T13:06:56","slug":"on-syria-trump-is-far-from-mission-accomplished","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/4936\/","title":{"rendered":"On Syria, Trump is far from \u2018mission accomplished\u2019"},"content":{"rendered":"

Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa\u2019s White House visit earlier this week was another one of President Donald Trump\u2019s perfectly made-for-television moments. The former al-Qaida fighter entered the White House from a side door\u2014and left with a promise for one more push to lift the layers and layers of U.S. sanctions on Syria. Inside the Oval Office, Trump asked how many wives he had and gave Syria\u2019s interim president his own brand of perfume. Following the visit, an announcement came about Syria entering the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State (ISIS), with unconfirmed reports of plans for a U.S. military presence<\/a> in Damascus.<\/p>\n

Bringing Syria back into the international community after half a century of Assad dictatorship and a devastating civil war is, itself, a worthy goal\u2014and Trump deserves credit for attempting it. Trump\u2019s regional envoy, Tom Barrack, has built close ties with the new government in Damascus and is keen to make a security partner out of former jihadists. Al-Sharaa has shown remarkable pragmatism since his forces toppled Bashar al-Assad and could well emerge as a new American ally.<\/p>\n

But Syria\u2019s monumental internal and external challenges demand a steadier and intensified U.S. engagement than the president\u2019s \u201cvictory-first, details-later\u201d style allows. Trump\u2019s notion of regional peace through large-scale reconstruction projects has, unsurprisingly, a certain appeal to the elites and autocracies of the Middle East\u2014some of whom might step in to help Syria. But rehabilitating a country so politically, economically, and socially fractured cannot be achieved through optics\u2014or construction\u2014alone. While Syria\u2019s economic recovery is vital, genuine stability requires U.S. commitment to governance aid, transitional justice, and institution-building.<\/p>\n

The truth is, Syria\u2019s post-Assad transition remains fragile: governance is weak, institutions are hollow, and millions remain displaced. Relations between Damascus and Syria\u2019s Kurdish and Druze minorities remain undefined, with no legal framework to govern regional autonomy, resource sharing, or representation\u2014leaving key questions of power unsettled. Without serious U.S. and European support for governance, institution-building, and economic reform, Syria risks sliding back into chaos.<\/p>\n

The governance question<\/p>\n

Al-Sharaa has shown pragmatism abroad\u2014balancing ties with the Gulf, the United States, Turkey, and Israel\u2014but he is struggling to build an inclusive political system at home. There has been no framework agreement for political representation or participation, and while it might be too early to expect a new constitution, the issue of minority representation is an urgent one. For a country as diverse as Syria, some form of decentralization<\/a> will be essential to ensure representation for Kurds, Druze, Christians, and Alawites, while maintaining national unity. The procedural and substantive foundations for the future governance structure matter today, in other words.<\/p>\n

Syria\u2019s interim government signed an agreement with the U.S.-backed Syrian Kurds in March to integrate the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the national military, but negotiations have been slow. Beyond how to militarily integrate the 100,000-strong Kurdish-led forces, there are questions of resource-sharing and local governance. Kurds have agreed in principle to join the Syrian army and hand over border crossings and natural resources\u2014but fear losing their sole leverage if there isn\u2019t an agreement on local autonomy. Without an endgame in sight\u2014a new constitution or legal document that codifies regional powers\u2014neither side is likely to compromise.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, Israel supports greater autonomy for the Druze after sectarian clashes in southern Syria over the summer\u2014but the temporary deal with the Druze is not connected to the ongoing negotiations with Kurds. In other words, Damascus is dealing with the Druze issue as part of its security framework with Israel and separate from its dealings with Kurds. These tensions on both fronts underscore the urgent need for a new governance framework that reflects Syria\u2019s complex social and military reality\u2014but the new regime\u2019s capacity for a comprehensive legal reform process is limited.<\/p>\n

Security sector reform should also be a top priority. Militia groups like the SDF must be reintegrated into national security institutions in ways that minimize future fighting and prevent tension with foreign fighters and Salafist groups, which are now embedded into Syria\u2019s defense ministry. Without systemic and wholesale reform, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham-aligned factions\u2014some of which fought alongside al-Sharaa to overthrow Assad\u2014or the Kurdish forces could undermine the transition from within. Integrating these forces into a professional command structure is vital to preventing another collapse of state authority.<\/p>\n

Washington largely views its leverage in Syria through its ability to lift or impose sanctions\u2014but not through other levers that could enable governance reform or capacity building. Trump\u2019s instinct to loosen restrictions that block legitimate investment is understandable\u2014yes, Syrians deserve a chance to rebuild their country and leave behind the darkness of the past\u2014but further U.S. assistance should be used strategically as a bargaining chip to promote transparency, reform, and inclusive governance.<\/p>\n

Counterterrorism and deradicalization<\/p>\n

Syria\u2019s governance challenges are directly tied to its security landscape. The United States is eager for Syria to join the global coalition against ISIS and is reportedly planning on having a permanent military presence in Damascus to coordinate Syrian-Israeli relations. But Syria\u2019s security needs go beyond managing relations with Israel. Washington should help the al-Sharaa government develop a deradicalization plan for the thousands of ISIS-linked detainees and families still in prisons and camps\u2014and encourage a humane, transparent policy distinguishing who will be prosecuted, rehabilitated, or reintegrated. Sending everyone home will not address the social and political challenges from radicalism.<\/p>\n

The Israel question<\/p>\n

The Trump administration is reportedly pushing for Syria\u2019s inclusion in the Abraham Accords. Achieving Israeli-Syrian peace would be historic, but it is premature. Israeli forces still occupy parts of southern Syria and regularly target Hezbollah and Iranian-linked assets inside Syria. Israel also views itself as a protector of Syria\u2019s Druze population, intervening militarily as recently as this summer<\/a>. \u00a0While Washington supports Syria\u2019s territorial integrity and unity, it has been unable to deter Israeli military operations. Given the complexity of U.S. relations with Israel on Gaza and Iran, Washington is unlikely to do so in the future. Instead of rushing toward a grand bargain, Washington should encourage smaller, pragmatic steps\u2014such as deconfliction mechanisms, trade links, and border coordination\u2014that could lay the groundwork for eventual peace.<\/p>\n

Reconstruction and the U.S. path forward<\/p>\n

Syria\u2019s humanitarian crisis remains immense. Cities like Aleppo, Homs, and Raqqa are still in ruins, and rural economies have collapsed. Washington must work with the United Nations and aid agencies to ensure that aid and reconstruction reach all communities\u2014Sunni, Kurdish, Alawite, and Christian alike. Yet Trump\u2019s sweeping cuts to foreign assistance have weakened the United States\u2019 ability to influence events on the ground. Without sustained U.S. engagement, the burden will fall to regional powers with narrower interests\u2014whose agendas do not involve accountability, representation, transitional justice, and individual rights and freedoms.<\/p>\n

Inviting al-Sharaa\u2014once labeled a terrorist\u2014to the White House is a bold gamble. But turning this moment into real progress will require more than photo ops. It demands sustained diplomacy, capacity building, sanctions relief, and long-term support for inclusive governance\u2014all the boring work that the U.S. agencies Trump has shut down had excelled in.<\/p>\n

If Trump truly wants to make Syria a \u201csuccess story,\u201d he must move beyond slogans and commit the U.S. government to a transformative agenda inside Syria\u2014with all the less glamorous but critically important work that it entails. Until then, the mission in Syria is far from accomplished.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa\u2019s White House visit earlier this week was another one of President Donald Trump\u2019s perfectly…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":4937,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[1153,1162,3442,3443,1160,177,1150,1151,1152,159,3440,265,1154,1159,3441,95,3444,1155],"class_list":{"0":"post-4936","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-syria","8":"tag-governance","9":"tag-article","10":"tag-center-for-middle-east-policy","11":"tag-center-on-the-united-states-and-europe","12":"tag-commentary","13":"tag-conflict","14":"tag-crisis-conflict-management","15":"tag-defense-security","16":"tag-democracy","17":"tag-foreign-policy","18":"tag-foreign-politics-elections","19":"tag-geopolitics","20":"tag-international-affairs","21":"tag-middle-east-north-africa","22":"tag-order-from-chaos","23":"tag-syria","24":"tag-the-turkey-project","25":"tag-u-s-foreign-policy"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@iran\/116176725386645818","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4936","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4936"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4936\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4937"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4936"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4936"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4936"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}